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THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY: BRITAIN AND EUROPEAN
MONETARY UNION ABSTRACT
Raymond Keitch. PhD International Relations, London School of Economics
The thesis examines the interrelationship between conceptions of British sovereignty 
and European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The central argument 
advanced is that the multiple discourses of sovereignty generated in the political 
debate have been a key influence in understanding British government policy on 
EMU. Before 1997 both Conservative government policy and Labour opposition 
policy on EMU was marked by an overall “wait and see” approach and a referendum 
commitment. After 1997 there was a divergence between the “Yes subject to 
economic tests” policy of the Labour government and the “No for two Parliaments” 
policy of the Conservative opposition. The multiple discourses of sovereignty focused 
on the locus of sovereignty (executive, parliamentary or popular) and the divisibility 
of sovereignty (pooling, differentiated or absolutist). These discourses taken together 
influenced policy in a number of identifiable ways.
Initial chapters outline the epistemological approach of discourse analysis, the 
interpretation of sovereignty as a social construct and the serious challenges of EMU 
to British conceptions of sovereignty. The relationships between the discourses of 
sovereignty and government policy on EMU are examined in the political debate from 
the Maastricht ratification process in 1992/3 to the aftermath of the European election 
of 1999. Five arguments are advanced. Firstly, the discourses of sovereignty 
reinforced the cautious “wait and see” policy. Secondly, sovereignty was a key 
component of Conservative divisions, which influenced Conservative government 
policy (1992-1997). Thirdly, Conservative divisions, arguments on popular 
sovereignty, and reaction by the Labour opposition fostered the referendum 
commitment by both major parties. Fourthly, the referendum commitment itself 
strongly influenced Labour government policy (1997-2001). Finally, the alternative 
discourses of pooling and absolutist sovereignty between the two major parties 
prefigured the 1997 policy divergence. Other factors influencing government policy 
on EMU are considered. The conclusion stresses the key influence of the multiple 
discourses of sovereignty.
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INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Primary Thesis
This thesis examines the interrelationship between European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and conceptions of British sovereignty.1 The focus is on the British 
political debate during the period between the formalisation of EMU in the 1991 
Maastricht Treaty of European Union and the aftermath of the British European election 
in 1999. EMU has raised a series of issues related to British sovereignty which have led 
to heated political debate. These issues include monetary sovereignty over interest and 
exchange rates, fiscal sovereignty over taxation and public expenditure, institutional 
sovereignty in terms of the new European Central Bank (ECB) and ultimately Britain's 
status as an independent nation-state. The sovereignty debate itself influenced 
government policy on EMU.
The central thesis advanced is that the multiple discourses of sovereignty engendered by 
the political debate were a key influence on British government policy on EMU. Many 
conceptions of sovereignty were utilised during the debate. On the dimension of the 
divisibility of sovereignty the discourses ranged from an absolutist discourse of 
sovereignty surrendered to the idea of sovereignty being functionally differentiated 
(between say monetary and defence issues) through to the idea of pooling or sharing 
sovereignty. On the other dimension of the locus of sovereignty, the discourse ranged 
from executive sovereignty through Parliamentary sovereignty to the wider idea of 
popular sovereignty. Far from weakening the impact of sovereignty, the multiple 
discourses have strengthened its impact like the many strands that constitute a rope.
1 An initial note on terminology. EMU is used throughout this book for Economic and Monetary Union and is used synonymously for 
the more popular term "single currency" unless indicated otherwise. EU is used for European Union and is used except where 
historical or other circumstances require an alternative term. Britain is used throughout the thesis as a synonym for die United 
Kingdom.
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British government policy on EMU displayed a number of characteristics. The strand of 
continuity throughout is the general caution displayed by both the Conservative 
government under John Major (1991-1997) and the Labour government (1997-2001) 
under Tony Blair. This caution was marked from the beginning by the British "opt-out" 
in the Maastricht Treaty, the general espousal of a "wait and see" approach and the 
decision not to join the first wave of EMU members in 1999. Another strand of similarity 
between the policies of the two main parties was the 1996 decision to grant a popular 
referendum on the specific issue of ultimate British membership of EMU. Underneath 
this apparently similar policy surface were marked differences in the detailed policies of 
the two main parties. The Conservative government stuck, with increasing difficulty, to 
the "wait and see" policy until their defeat in the 1997 General Election. The Labour 
opposition supported EMU membership in principle but stressed economic obstacles to 
British membership. After the 1997 General Election a clearer policy divergence emerged 
between the two main parties. The Labour government explicitly rejected a constitutional 
barrier to EMU (whilst rejecting early membership) and the Conservative opposition 
rejected EMU membership for two Parliaments.
How did the multiple discourses of sovereignty relate to British government policy on 
EMU? The relationship is both a complex and a dynamic one. Five particular arguments 
are made in this thesis. Firstly, the general policy characteristic of caution reflected a 
failure by both the Conservative and Labour governments to openly address the issues of 
sovereignty raised by EMU. Secondly, the divergent discourses of sovereignty used by 
the two main parties were ultimately reflected in different policies on EMU. The Labour 
discourse of pooling sovereignty made it easier to support EMU membership in principle. 
The Conservative attachment to an absolutist conception of sovereignty created larger 
barriers to EMU membership. The third argument made stresses the importance of 
sovereignty in deepening the divisions over EMU within the Conservative party,
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especially during the Maastricht Treaty ratification process in Parliament. The agenda on 
EMU was set by an absolutist conception of sovereignty vigorously espoused by the 
Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative party. This created deep divisions in the party and a 
gradual drift in government policy in a Eurosceptic direction. Closely related is the fourth 
argument that the increasing influence of the Conservative Eurosceptic wing led the 
Conservative government to propose a referendum in 1996, shortly followed by the 
Labour opposition. However, there was also a wider feeling that EMU was such a key 
issue that a referendum was a necessary expression of popular sovereignty. Both 
approaches reflected the influence of the sovereignty discourses. The final argument 
made is that, whatever the motivation for the referendum commitment, the consistent 
opinion poll evidence against EMU acted as a continuing constraint on moves in favour 
of EMU membership by the Labour government. In these ways the “politics of 
sovereignty”, expressed through the multiple discourses of sovereignty, actively 
influenced government EMU policy. Other approaches, including geography, history, 
business interests and economics will be examined but it will be argued that the influence 
of the multiple discourses of sovereignty was essential for an understanding of British 
government policy on EMU.
Contribution Made
The primary contribution of this thesis is an interpretive understanding of British 
government policy on EMU in terms of multiple discourses of sovereignty. The focus is 
inevitably on the British domestic debate, which remains the primary location of debates 
on European issues. European issues are channelled through the prism of domestic 
politics so that, to use Simon Bulmer's phrase, British politics matter.2 However, the 
external dimension of European developments is equally significant. EMU itself 
represented a qualitative increase in the level of integration and, crucially, was a binary 
decision for EU member states in that you either joined or you did not. In sum, EMU and 
British sovereignty were key concepts on the border of the internal and the external, of
2 S. Bulmer, "Britain and European Integration: O f Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation and Semi-Detachment" in S. George (Ed.), Britain 
and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), p.2.
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the domestic and the foreign, which could potentially generate friction. The other 
subsidiary contributions made are a theoretical refinement in terms of sovereignty and an 
empirical contribution in terms of the linking of the discourses of sovereignty and British 
government policy on EMU. The theoretical refinement develops the constructivist 
approach to sovereignty by emphasising the strength rather than weakness of multiple 
conceptions of sovereignty. The empirical contribution stresses the explicit analysis of 
the relationships between sovereignty discourses and EMU policy including original 
research material (for example, the business cases discussed in Chapter 7). Whilst the 
emphasis is on the influence of the politics of sovereignty on government policy on EMU 
the key alternative arguments are also addressed. These include the impact of electoral 
considerations, economic factors and business interests. A specific chapter (Chapter 7) is 
devoted to the influence of business interests whilst wider electoral and economic 
considerations are considered throughout the other empirical chapters (Chapters 4-6).
These contributions are located in three areas of academic literature from which key 
strands are extracted and refined. These areas are sovereignty, the political economy of 
EMU and the relationship between Britain and Europe. The academic literature on 
sovereignty is extremely varied. Whilst an "essentially contested concept", the key 
elements of the locus of ultimate political authority within a territorial political entity are 
common to most interpretations. Four groupings of literature on sovereignty will be 
identified. Firstly, literature which focuses on the legal aspects of sovereignty, 
particularly on international law. Secondly, a body of literature, arguably the most 
common, focuses on the political nature of sovereignty, including the extent to which 
sovereignty has been eroded by developments such as globalisation and interdependence. 
The third grouping looks at the universal normative significance of sovereignty as a 
universal principle for political arrangements, albeit favouring a territorial, local solution 
as seen in the debates on intervention and human rights. The fourth grouping stresses the 
constructivist nature of sovereignty, which is not a tangible object but a social construct 
in a specific temporal and spatial context. This thesis follows the constructivist
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conception and locates sovereignty in the context of the EU, Britain's relationship with 
EMU and the challenge of EMU.
The academic literature on EMU has tended to focus on the economic aspects of EMU 
including such issues as optimal currency areas and central banking arrangements. There 
is also a considerable literature on the history of EMU from a political economy 
perspective. Another grouping focuses on the political negotiation process in the EU. A 
further grouping examines Britain's role in the EMU negotiations. The discussion in 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the literature that addresses EMU issues with a particular 
impact on sovereignty. The key points extracted are the political dynamics behind EMU, 
the historical significance of EMU to the European integration process and the binary 
nature of EMU which, given its wide initial membership (11 out of 15 member states), 
meant that it was difficult for Britain to stand aside.
The third body of literature focuses on Britain's relationship with Europe in the post-war 
period. The key theme here is Britain's semi-detachment from the European integration 
process. This can be seen historically in Britain's late entry into the European Community 
in 1972. Even after joining Britain was portrayed as an "awkward partner" due to 
domestic political constraints such as a sceptical population, real economic problems in 
adjusting to membership, continued Atlanticism and an awkward negotiating style. The 
key point extracted is the range of domestic explanations advanced for Britain's "semi­
detachment", which must be considered against the influence of the sovereignty 
discourses.
Having located the EMU/sovereignty debate in three groups of academic literature how is
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the British debate extended? The epistemological approach adopted in this thesis is that 
of a discourse analysis of statements linking EMU and sovereignty. The core chapters 
analyse the correlation between statements linking EMU and sovereignty and the 
development of government policy on EMU. This is surveyed for the period from the 
conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 until the aftermath of the European election 
in 1999. The aim is to specify the relationships between the range of discourses 
articulated on EMU and sovereignty and government policy as outlined earlier in this 
introduction. The arguments around sovereignty represented a multiplicity of arguments 
which extended the debate from EMU ‘per se’ to the very nature of Britain’s relationship 
with the EU. Policy was marked by a cautious pragmatism by both Conservative and 
Labour governments and eventually a referendum commitment by both main parties. The 
focus is on the debate in the political arena but a chapter is devoted to considering the 
debate in the business arena.
Structure of Thesis
The structure of the thesis deals with the academic literature followed by detailed 
analysis of the debate in the political and business arenas. Chapter 1 focuses on the 
epistemological approach used throughout this thesis. The underlying interpretive 
approach is aimed at "understanding" rather than "explanation". The use of language will 
be briefly considered and stress laid on the articulation of specific discourses in the light 
of the wider debate. A key point, discussed in the context of the structure/agency debate, 
is the importance of competing discourses as opposed to the focus on a hegemonic 
discourse which has dominated the literature. It is argued that competing discourses, far 
from weakening the impact of discourse analysis, can gain strength through their 
multiplicity. The focus will then turn to the relationship between discourse and policy. It 
will be argued that these are analytically distinct, especially when the discourses are 
focused on the EMU/sovereignty intersection and policy on government policy on EMU. 
The need to develop explicit arguments between the discourses and the policy will be 
discussed along with criticisms of the discourse approach.
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Chapter 2 addresses the theoretical discussion on sovereignty. Four perspectives in the 
literature will be stressed. These are the legal perspective, the political perspective, the 
normative perspective and the constructivist perspective. The constructivist perspective 
will be explicitly chosen for this thesis. Whilst key elements of sovereignty including 
final authority and territory are utilised it is argued that these elements need to be seen in 
a specific time and place. Sovereignty is treated as a social construct which is developed 
by key actors within a temporal and spatial context. The context in this thesis is the 
debate on sovereignty in Britain in the light of EMU. The idea of sovereignty must also 
be seen against a competing idea or organisation. The discussion of sovereignty is briefly 
considered in the light of competing perspectives on the nature of the EU. The focus is 
then narrowed further to a discussion of sovereignty and the EU in relation to Britain.
Chapter 3 addresses the challenges to sovereignty presented by EMU. EMU is considered 
historically in relation to previous specific monetary unions and wider international 
monetary arrangements such as the Gold Standard system. The issues raised by EMU will 
be considered in four main areas. Firstly, in the monetary area the powers of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) under the Maastricht Treaty will be discussed. Secondly, 
the impact of EMU on EU fiscal arrangements will be surveyed including the issue of 
potential tax harmonisation. Thirdly, the institutional political accountability of the ECB 
will be discussed. Finally, the thorny question of the implications of EMU for wider 
European political union will be addressed. The last section of this chapter deals with 
Britain's unhappy relationship with European monetary politics including the Maastricht 
negotiations on EMU. The basic argument made in this chapter is that EMU is a 
historically unique process which, at the very least, raises a series of "sovereignty 
questions" across the monetary, fiscal, institutional and political areas. Whilst the most 
direct challenges are in the monetary and institutional (in the form of the ECB) arenas 
EMU also raises the issue of future fiscal and political arrangements within the EU.
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The next three chapters examine the interrelationship between the discourses of 
sovereignty raised by EMU and government policy on EMU. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
prolonged debates on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Parliament during which 
the government followed a strict "wait and see" policy based on the "opt-out" obtained in 
the Maastricht Treaty. The debate featured an organised rebellion by a small but 
disciplined faction in the Conservative party, supported by Labour rebels, against 
ratification. This debate generated a range of conceptions of sovereignty thereby setting 
the agenda for the political debate on EMU. Emphasis is placed on the depth of divisions 
within the Conservative party which crystallised around a sovereignty/interdependence 
axis. Whilst the rebels were a small faction they received sympathy from wider sections 
of the party, other backbenchers and Cabinet ministers. Although ratification eventually 
proceeded the divisions engendered by the sovereignty debate were to influence 
government EMU policy until 1997.
Chapter 5 analyses the extension of the debate from the parliamentary sphere to the wider 
public sphere. This was prompted by the decision in 1996 by both main parties to commit 
to a referendum on any potential future entry into EMU. The reasons for the referendum 
decision by both major parties are examined. For the Conservative government the 
development of the referendum idea over a number of years is stressed in terms of the 
ongoing desire for party unity prior to the 1997 general election. This was exacerbated by 
the fear of a pre-emptive move by the Labour party and the launch of the Referendum 
party. The development of a similar "wait and see" EMU policy within the Labour party 
is examined together with their own 1996 referendum commitment. This is interpreted as 
a reaction to the Conservative move amidst the overwhelming desire for election victory. 
There was also a wider feeling that a referendum was inevitable on such a significant 
issue as EMU membership. By the 1997 election the discourses on sovereignty of the two
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parties were different whilst the policies were essentially similar. An analysis of the 1997 
election campaign shows the centrality of the EMU issue in the public sphere, 
particularly in highlighting continued Conservative divisions.
Chapter 6 examines the period after the 1997 general election focusing on the policy of 
the new Labour government. The central argument made is that the policy divergence 
between the two main parties was now aligned with their divergent discourses on 
sovereignty. Labour accepted EMU in principle, rejected a constitutional bar on 
membership but set a series of economic conditions which must be met prior to entry at 
an uncertain future date. In contrast the Conservative opposition under William Hague 
ruled out EMU membership for two Parliaments. The debates over tax harmonisation, the 
Euro-X grouping and the actual launch of EMU are discussed. A crucial factor inhibiting 
a more pro-EMU policy by the Labour government was the ongoing referendum 
commitment which, given consistent EMU-scepticism in opinion polls, served to 
constrain policy. This constraint illustrates the linked nature of policy commitments. 
Labour’s 1996 referendum commitment, originally made in opposition as an electoral 
response to the Conservative government (itself a product of internal party divisions), 
continued to shape their policy in government.
Chapter 7 focuses on the business debate over EMU, examining the extent to which it has 
provided an alternative dimension to the political debate around sovereignty. The 
business debate is traced through the arguments made by leading peak business 
organisations. The debate has tended to focus on economic factors with an underlying 
sub-theme as to the overall nature of the EU. Two business cases are outlined to analyse 
the preparations made for EMU entry. The debate is seen to have largely followed the 
political debate and became increasingly polarised around pro- and anti-EMU positions. 
The key demand of business though is for certainty of policy in order to allow
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appropriate business planning. Given this demand and divisions within business it is 
argued that the business debate has tended to be a subsidiary factor in overall government 
EMU policy.
The conclusion seeks to draw together the main threads of the arguments made in a wider 
framework. The central thesis that the multiple discourses of sovereignty are crucial to an 
understanding of British government's EMU policy is stressed by highlighting the five 
key arguments made. The generally cautious policy of both Conservative and Labour 
governments is seen as an understandable reaction to the challenge of EMU. Divisions 
engendered by the sovereignty debate, especially within the Conservative party, are 
highlighted. These divisions are seen as critical in the change of policy manifested by the 
referendum commitment of both main parties. Following the Labour election victory in 
1997 the environment allowed the policy divergence between the two main parties to be 
aligned with differing sovereignty discourses. The final argument advanced is that the 
public scepticism toward EMU which, given force by the referendum commitments, 
continued to constrain government policy. In these ways the idea of sovereignty was a 
key influence on government policy on EMU.
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CHAPTER 1: EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to outline the epistemological framework used throughout 
this thesis. The approach taken is that of understanding government policy on EMU in 
the light of the meanings given to sovereignty in the British debate. Ideas, like 
sovereignty, define the universe of possibilities for action and provide a normative set of 
beliefs.1 However, their precise meaning needs to be expressed through discourse and 
discourse analysis is the specific epistemological tool used throughout this thesis. An 
initial discussion will briefly highlight the distinction made between "explanation" and 
"understanding". This will be followed by more detailed discussion of the 
epistemological approach adopted in four main areas. Firstly, the changing nature of the 
relationship between language and meaning will be briefly examined. Secondly, the use 
of discourse analysis in the context of other concepts including power, interests, beliefs 
and values will be discussed in the work of discourse theorists including the idea of 
competing discourses. Thirdly, discourse will be discussed in relation to the concept of 
policy. Finally, the specific application of discourse analysis to the EMU/sovereignty 
debate will be outlined. The value added by a discourse approach specifically for the 
concept of sovereignty will be enunciated in the light of perceived criticisms of the 
approach.
Explaining and Understanding
The distinction between approaches of explanation and understanding has been outlined 
by Hollis and Smith. Explanation is linked to a call for the application of scientific 
method in constructing knowledge. The tasks of a scientific theory are to abstract, 
generalise and to connect. Abstraction involves the grouping of similar objects or events. 
Generalisation involves identifying common characteristics amongst the objects or events
1 J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (Eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993), p.8.
2 M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990).
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abstracted. Connection aims to link the characteristics identified in a necessary and 
constant manner leading to potential cause and effect statements which can be tested by 
experience.3 Clearly these general principles of a scientific approach cover a wide range 
of scientific approaches. The Logical Positivist school argues that the methods of the 
natural sciences can be related to the social world through the testing of hypotheses by 
experience and observation.4 Thomas Kuhn, studying the abrupt conceptual revolutions 
in science which tended to recur at frequent intervals, argued that scientific thinking takes 
place within a dominant paradigm. A paradigm is a set of broad, fundamental 
assumptions and a set of institutional practices within which scientific thinking takes 
place. These paradigms are subject to change when the fundamental assumptions are 
undermined by radical new research illustrated by the change from Newtonian ideas of 
the operation of forces to Einsteinian ideas of relativity.5 Even given the variety of 
scientific approaches the common theme is that scientific methods are applicable, albeit 
in a modified form, to social sciences. Within International Relations this approach is 
most explicitly followed by the school of Neo-Realism.6
An alternative epistemological approach, which is termed "understanding" by Hollis and 
Smith, argues that social sciences are fundamentally distinct from the natural sciences 
and must be studied using alternative approaches. They identify four differences between 
the social sciences and the natural sciences. The first of these is the meanings human 
beings find in experience, the meaning of which can be given symbolic expression such 
as a flag at half-mast. The second is the use of language. Thirdly, actions and the context 
of actions can influence meaning such as the presumption that a deployment of missiles 
signals a hostile move toward armed conflict. Finally, ideological views and
3 Ibid., p.63.
4 Ibid.. p.52.
5 Ibid., p.59.
6 See K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. (Addison-Weseley Press, Reading, Massachusetts, 1979).
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7preconceptions can influence the views of decision makers.
The differences outlined above have led to a variety of approaches seeking to study social 
action which can be loosely grouped under the umbrella of "understanding". A range of 
responses can be grouped under the term, hermeneutics, or the interpretative tradition in 
social thought. Weber argued that ideas of rationality, in which a rational actor would 
seek to maximise utility based on perfect information, fully ordered preferences and 
accurate information processing, could be used as a key concept in understanding social 
action. He also distinguished between purely calculating instrumental rationality and
Q
value rationality which takes account of individual values. A hermeneutical approach is 
arguably taken within International Relations by the "English School" of Realism seeking 
to understand how people order their experience in order to interpret the world. An 
alternative approach, argued by Peter Winch, is that reality itself is constructed, based on 
the different rules developed by different cultures.9 Yet another approach is the 
deconstructionist approach of post-structuralism which seeks to peel away like an onion 
the layers of constructed meanings. All of these approaches under the umbrella of 
"understanding" reject the association of the natural sciences with the social sciences.
The discourse analysis approach adopted in this study clearly falls within the ambit of 
"understanding" as developed by Hollis and Smith. Henrik Larsen has sought to develop 
the concept of "explication" as an intermediate idea between explanation and 
understanding. However, his definition of the term as being between explanation and 
understanding is rather vague. In practice he uses the term almost synonymously with 
explanation in seeking to explain British policy towards the European Union as a product
7 Ibid.. pp:69-71.
8 Ibid.. pp:75-77.
9 P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science. (Routledge Publishing, London, 1958), p. 15.
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of conceptions of "Europe" developed in political discourse.10 In this study the explicit 
approach taken is that of understanding. The idea of sovereignty is clearly a social 
concept which does not easily fit into models of scientific explanation. The central 
argument outlined in Chapter 2 is that sovereignty is a social construct contingently 
developed in the particular time and space of a given community. Discourse analysis is 
used to examine the range of meanings given to sovereignty in a particular context, 
namely that of potential British membership of EMU.
Language and Meaning
Before discussing discourse analysis the function of language needs to be briefly 
discussed. In nineteenth century philosophy the function of language was primarily 
representative with language and thought regarded as separate activities. Language was 
an activity with words and thought was an activity with ideas. Whilst words depended on 
ideas, ideas were deemed to be independent of words. Ideas were treated as standing for 
objects, properties and relations in the external world as perceived by the senses. 
Language was only significant as a means of communication between human beings. 
Language was capable of being misused by use of incorrect words or grammar, especially 
in translation between two different languages. By implying that language had no direct 
corresponding link with reality but only an arbitrary, ever changing one the overall 
significance of language was downplayed.11
The representative view of language was challenged from two different disciplines, the 
linguist Ferdinand Saussure and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. They attacked 
nomenclaturism, which seeks to link words with objects (given the idea that certain 
words "stand for" certain objects, either naturally or in men's ideas about pre-existing
10 H. Larsen, Foreign Policy as Discourse Analysis: France. Britain and Europe. (Routledge Publishing, London, 1997), p.32.
11 R. Harris, Language. Saussure and Wittgenstein. (Routledge Publishing, London, 1988), pp:2-6.
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things). Saussure defined language as a "a system of signs held together by chains of 
syntagmatic or associative relations".12 Syntagmatic relations are spatial links such as in 
"my house", whilst associative relations highlight similarity such as "house" and 
"dwelling". This system of signs is self-contained within the limits of the individual 
language. Wittgenstein developed a similar theme of language as a network of self- 
contained signs. However, he used the analogy of games, especially chess, to support his 
argument. Language, he argued, is a game which requires an overall set of rules in order 
to function. The rules of the game are self-contained in that there is no need to go outside 
of the game to understand its operation. Under the games analogy language and thought 
are inseparable. Saussure used the metaphor of an air ripple on water to illustrate the 
interdependent relationship between language and thought. The ripple is caused by both 
the pressure of air and the countervailing pressure of water but only the water is visible. 
Likewise thought and language are interdependent even though only language is 
"visible”.13
Michel Foucault analysed language through an archaeological approach. By archaeology 
he means;
"...systems that establish statements as events (with their own conditions and domain of 
appearance) and as things (with their own possibility and field of use)."14
Using archaeology Foucault charted epistemic breaks in the philosophy of language. 
During the Renaissance period language was regarded as part of the natural order of 
things and was studied for its intrinsic properties (for example, letters, grammar, words, 
syntax) rather than its meaningfulness. With the Classical age there was an epistemic 
shift to the idea of language as representing meaning. It had become a separate
12 Ibid.. d.23.
13 Ibid.. p 30.
14 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. (Pantheon Publishing, New York, 1972), p.128.
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ontological system divorced from overall reality and only served to represent this reality. 
With modernity language lost its purely representative character and was reinterpreted as 
a complexly dispersed historical phenomena.15
Rush Rhees has developed a revised relationship between language and meaning building 
on Wittgenstein's ideas. Rhees stressed the role of dynamic conversation. Conversations 
are inherently open-ended unlike the self-contained nature of the rules of a game. 
Conversation also connects with things outside the dialogue. The focus on conversation, 
which must be about something, serves to distinguish the use of language in conversation 
to other uses (such as ordering a cup of coffee). For Rhees the two key elements of 
conversation are that it is connected with things outside itself and, secondly, that persons 
involved in the conversation must have something in common. He criticised philosophers 
who tend to study language apart from an understanding of the lives people lead.16 In 
sum, the key point made for discourse analysis is the interdependence between language 
and meaning with language having a constructive as well as a representative function.
Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis has been given a variety of meanings by a number of writers. Cook 
defines discourse as "stretches of language perceived to be meaningful, unified and 
purposive".17 Crystal refers to discourse as "a continuous stretch of language larger than a 
sentence, often constituting a coherent unit, such as a sermon, argument, joke or
1 finarrative". The common constituent here is the coherent use of language. Whilst 
language, in either written or spoken form, provides the primary condition for discourse a
15 G. Gutting (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), pp:16-17.
16 R. Rhees, Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), pp:5-17.
17 G. Cook, Discourse. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989), p. 156.
18 D. Crystal, Introducing Linguistics. (Penguin Publishing, London, 1992), p.25.
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distinction is often made between text and discourse. Text is usually confined to any 
written record of a communicative event. Discourse is seen to refer to the interpretation 
of the communicative event in context and focuses on the identification and interpretation 
of regularities and patterns in language in relation to the meanings expressed.19 Van Dijk, 
defining discourse as “talk and text in context”, traces the spread of discourse analysis 
across disciplines. He notes ironically that;
"In fact, in this long list of the various discourse disciplines only political science seems 
to be systematically absent. And yet, it needs little argument that text and talk are central 
and constitutive parts of the political process."20
In this thesis discourse is used as a specific term, following Laclau and Mouffe, as a set
of articulations bound by specific rules. An articulation is defined as "any practice
1establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified". The rules 
that bind together these articulations include those that define the kind of articulations 
that can legitimately be made and the sort of relations that can be proposed. Particularly 
significant for the discourses outlined in this thesis is the need for elected governments to 
justify their actions or policies. In our specific case the question of sovereignty in respect 
of potential British membership of EMU raises articulations that must either deny or 
accept necessary impacts on British sovereignty. In sum, the discourses on sovereignty 
are sets of articulations set within the ground rules of the British polity, especially the 
need for the legitimate rationalisations of all aspects of government policy. The term 
"debate" is used throughout as the wider notion of public discussions in general22
19 Ibid.
20 T. Van Dijk, Discourse as Structure and Process. (SAGE Publications, London, 1997), p.27.
21 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. (Verso Publishing, London, 1985), p.105.
22 T. Diez, "Discursive Nodal Points and the Analysis of European Integration Policy", 3rd Pan-European Conference, Vienna, 
September 1998, p. 14.
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The political context of discourse is developed further by Foucault who distinguishes 
between discourses that constitute scientific knowledge in a particular period and any 
other discourse. Foucault's conception of discourse links closely with his interpretation of 
power. For Foucault power is not contained by a particular agent but is "everywhere" in a 
complex network of dynamic social relations between dominant and subordinate agents 
(often relying on the subordinate agent wilfully acceding to the wishes of the dominant 
agent).23 Power and knowledge are inextricably linked in a dynamic relationship with 
power privileging certain constructions of knowledge in a particular epistemic period. 
During these periods certain discourses acquire hegemonic positions as constitutive 
knowledge. However, given the dynamic nature of the power/knowledge relationship a 
space is left open for alternative discourses which may in time lead to an epistemic 
shift.24 Nevertheless, the overall impression is one of a discursive hegemony.
Laclau and Mouffe, in a critique of socialist strategy, formulate a dynamic version of 
discourse. Discursive structures constitute and organise all social relations 25 However, 
although all-embracing, Laclau and Mouffe argue that there can be no absolute fixity in 
discourse. Nevertheless, moments of partial fixity, or nodal points, can be analytically 
articulated. The central argument advanced by Laclau and Mouffe is the social 
articulation of hegemony, which is a political relationship unifying a number of 
hegemonic discursive nodal points but without a single, defined centre. Indeed 
hegemonic relations open the field for antagonistic discourses which may challenge the 
current hegemonic discourse. However, the overall relationship appears to be an unequal, 
dual relationship between "hegemony" and "antagonism";
23 J. Rouse, "Power/Knowledge" in G. Gutting (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1994), p. 107.
24 Ibid., p. 112.
25 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. (Verso Publishing, London, 1985), p.96.
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"But it is equally wrong to propose as an alternative ... pluralism ... as this would blind 
the analysis to the presence of nodal points and to partial concentrations of power."26
The key point is the overall focus on hegemony as opposed to the concept of "competing 
discourses" developed below.
Even though both Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe leave space for alternative discourses 
the overall impression of hegemony remains. The structuralism of Saussure and the 
hegemonic approaches of Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe together imply a degree of 
inflexibility in the use of language. Other linguistic studies have challenged this argument 
suggesting that language needs to be more closely linked to social structures and local 
cultures. These factors highlight the complexity and the nuance of meaning between such
77words as "sullen", "morose", "moody", ill-tempered". Whorf, in a study of American 
Indian languages, stresses the link between different linguistic forms and the cognitive 
interpretation of daily events. Lakoff, in a study of Aboriginal languages, argues that 
cultural factors influence grammatical categories. The heterogeneity of language can also 
be extended within a particular language through the use of metaphor. Metaphor allows a 
wide variety of statements to be made including the changing nature of language use 
(such as the attribution of human characteristics to computers in the phrase "the
7ftMillennium virus"). Language also varies with social settings. For example, in Sauris, a 
multilingual community in the Italian Alps, German is used in the home, Romansch in
7 0public places and Italian in formal situations. In sum, language as a medium of social 
interaction is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon.
26 Ibid.. p.142.
27 D. Lee, Competing Discourses: Perspective and Ideology in Language. (Longman Group UK Limited, Harlow, 1992), p.26.
28 Ibid.. p.89.
29 J. Aitchison, Linguistics. (3rd Ed., Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1987), p.l 17.
30 Ibid.. p.49.
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Given the heterogeneity of language David Lee argues that instead of hegemonic 
discourses an alternative position of competing discourses should be used to reflect the 
complexity of social interactions. This should not be restricted to the use of binary 
discourses which necessarily oppose each other but should allow a range of discourses to 
be identified.31 Lee argues that traditional linguistics saw language largely as a 
homogenous structure divorced from the wider social context. He argues that, instead of 
seeing language as a mirror of autonomous social structures, it should be regarded as the 
primary medium through which social processes operate. Social and institutional 
diversity is established and perpetuated through diversity in linguistic usage leading to 
competing, rather than hegemonic, discourses.32
Discourse, Structure and Agency
The role of discourse analysis also needs to be considered against the question of 
structure and agency. Applied to International Relations Hollis and Smith refer to the 
"structure" as the international system and the "agents" as the individual nation-states.33 
They argue that these levels exist on one dimension and the "explanation/understanding" 
dualism on the other dimension, creating an overall epistemological matrix. The main 
problem with this dual matrix is the lack of a sense of dynamism. Anthony Giddens has 
sought to transcend this dualism with his theory of structuration. Three main elements are 
analytically distinguished; the communication process, moral relations and the operation 
of rules.34 These reproduce structures which are "systems of generative rules and 
resources" which exist "out of time and space". However, structures only exist as the
31 D. Lee, op.cit. p. 183.
32 Ibid.. pjc.
33 M. Hollis and S. Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990), p.9. They 
also add bureaucracies and individuals.
34 A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method. (2nd. Ed., Polity Press, Cambridge, 1993), p.134.
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"reproduced conduct of situated actors with definite intentions and interests".35 In sum, 
Giddens sees structure and agency as mutually constituted phenomena which, like a coin, 
have two visible sides but are in effect mutually interdependent.
Giddens' structuration theory has been criticised from a number of perspectives. Firstly, it 
has been argued that, given that structures are reproduced by agents’ actions, Giddens 
eventually comes down on the side of agency.36 Secondly, Giddens' failure to analytically 
separate structure and agency implies that they are unable to act in ways that are 
independent of each other. Finally, his definition of structure is seen as unduly limiting.
Placing discourse analysis in the overall structure/agency problematique is a complex 
question. Agents are responsible for producing the contemporary discourses in contingent 
time and space. However, it is difficult to understand individual events or actions in terms 
of discourse analysis. Stuart McAnnulla provides an interesting framework for 
integrating discourse analysis within the structure/agency debate. He argues that 
discourse plays an intermediate but independent role between structure and agency. 
McAnnulla makes an initial assumption that discourse takes place within a material, 
objective structure. However, this structure must be interpreted and constructed by 
individual actors in terms of discourse which, in a dynamic process of social interaction, 
can itself change the discursive formation and influence structure in an ongoing, 
morphogenetic cycle.38
35 Ibid.
36 S. McAnnulla, "Structure, Agency and Discourse as Analytical Concepts", PSA Conference, Keele, 1998, p.642.
37 C. Hay, "Structure and Agency" in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (Eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science. (Macmillan Publishing, 
London, 1995).
38 S. McAnnulla. op.cit. p.651.
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McAnnulla's framework provides a useful guide to considering issues such as the 
question of the relationship between discourse and agency driven factors such as beliefs, 
values, interests, ideology and culture. Beliefs and values usually focus on individual 
decision makers. In terms of social cognition two broad approaches can be outlined. The 
first is the "mentalist" approach focused on the psychological mechanisms that allow 
isolated individual subjects to perceive themselves and other people in particular ways in 
particular circumstances. The second is the “social basis” approach focused on the social 
nature of perceivers and the social construction of knowledge.
The different approaches to social cognition have differing implications for discourse 
analysis. For the "mentalist” approach discourse is sense making mediated by mental 
processes. Discourse is, therefore, a useful guide to the processes of sense making, 
namely information selection, handling and judgement and the resultant decision making 
process. Given that mental activity is deemed to be separate from and ontologically prior 
to discourse the role of discourse analysis is to highlight these mental processes.40
The "social basis" of cognition has three broad streams; shared culture or ideology, 
shared group interests and interpersonal exchange leading to a joint construction of social 
reality. Discourse is accorded an ontologically greater priority under this approach. Billig, 
in a study of discourse and ideology, stresses the dynamics of discourse in influencing 
thought. He argues that human thinking is not just an information processing mechanism
39 S. Condor and C. Antaki, "Social Cognition and Discourse" in T. Van Dijk, Discourse as Structure and Process. (SAGE 
Publications, London, 1997), p.320.
40 Ibid.. pJ22.
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but must be seen in the dynamics of discussion and argument.41 Shared group interests 
focuses on the role of discourse in favouring one group over another.42 Finally, the social 
interaction strand focuses on the social construction of reality. The very analytical 
distinction between cognition and discourse is undermined by this strand. Discourse is 
here accorded priority as the public face of language and the main device by which social 
reality is constructed.43
The relationship between discourse and other key concepts such as beliefs, values, 
ideology, interests and culture is a highly complex one but three comments can be made. 
Firstly, discourse can be seen as analytically distinct, albeit interrelated with, these other 
key concepts. In my opinion, Laclau and Mouffe's use of discourse is too wide in 
incorporating these other concepts into its overall ambit. McAnnulla, whilst criticising 
Laclau and Mouffe, also conflates discourse with the ideational in his analytical 
framework.44 However, his interweaving of discourse between structure and agency is an 
approach that is adopted here. The second comment is to support the concept of 
articulation as formulated by Laclau and Mouffe. All of the other concepts need to be 
articulated through language whatever their own intrinsic significance. Finally, this 
articulation is inherently a dynamic one as the arguments shape each other in an ongoing 
process. I would argue that the idea of competing discourses, as espoused by Lee, is a 
more fruitful conception than that of hegemonic and antagonistic discourses postulated 
by Laclau and Mouffe.
Discourse and Policy
Policy is a key concept which dominates our understanding of the governing
41 M. Billig, Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology. (SAGE Publishing, London, 1991), p.17.
42 S. Condor and C. Antaki, "Social Cognition and Discourse" in T. Van Dijk, op.cit.. p.333.
43 Ibid., p J35.
44 S. McAnnulla, oo.cit. p.651.
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arrangements of society. In this thesis policy is understood as “the structuring of 
collective action by the mobilisation of a model of government as authorised decision 
making1'.45 Four points need to be made in clarification of this definition. Firstly, policy 
must be seen as both a process and an end product. Secondly, policy is concerned with 
creating coherence in the face of ambiguity. Thirdly, policy is inherently problematic and 
graduated rather than definite and absolute. Finally, the key point in the argument made 
here is that policy needs to be authorised by government. Whilst many actors may be 
involved in the formulation of a particular policy only elected government can provide 
the necessary legitimacy. Given the focus on sovereignty in this thesis policy is deemed 
here to be government policy both in the sense of representing official government action 
and in terms of legitimation of that action 46
Like other epistemological questions the relationship between discourse and policy is a 
complex one. The initial question relates to whether the two concepts can be clearly 
segregated. Larsen argues that the two concepts can be clearly delineated and indeed 
makes this the basis of his main thesis that different conceptions of "Europe" in Britain 
and France explain the different policies adopted.47 Other writers using discourse analysis 
are more guarded. Thomas Diez, in a discussion of discursive nodal points constructing 
"Europe", takes a more reserved view. He argues that there is no knowledge outside 
language and this assumption clearly makes the distinction between discourse and policy 
problematic 48 However, he goes on to argue that within discourse a distinction can be 
made between policynarratives and metanarratives. Policynarratives refer to the 
discourses that lie in a nodal point. Metanarratives refers to discourses which constitute 
the policynarratives. A good example in this case would be the concept of the "state" as a
45 H.K.Colebatch, Policy. (Open University Press, Buckingham, 1998), p.l 11.
44 Ibid.. p .l 13.
47 H. Larsen, op.cit. (Routledge Publishing, London, 1997), p.32.
48 T. Diez, "Discursive Nodal Points and the Analysis of European Integration Policy", 3rd Pan-European Conference, Vienna, 
September 1998, p. 11.
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metanarrative and "Europe" as the policynarrative.49 In this thesis discourse and policy 
are seen as distinct concepts. Waever argues that discourse is able to account for an 
overall policy but not for a single policy act. It does this by providing a rationalised 
legitimation of various policy positions. Once these legitimations have been advanced it 
is difficult to adapt quickly to new positions.50
Even given the assumption that discourse can be ontologically separated from policy the 
relationship between the two concepts is a dynamic one. Colebatch, in an analysis of the 
concept of policy, distinguishes between sacred and profane accounts of policy. Sacred 
accounts focus on the normative framework of policy and talk of the rational pursuit of 
legitimate objectives. Profane accounts focus instead on the empirical framework of 
policy such as the contest between bureaucratic agencies.51 The focus in this thesis is 
exclusively on the "sacred" account. However, this "account" is a dynamic process and 
the use of language becomes part of this process. The very use of the phrase "the 
government objective is" provides a policy with a degree of importance it would not 
acquire without such a statement. Rational legitimations of policy only serve to add to the 
complexity of the process. Whilst policy may indeed change these changes need to be 
explained in terms of previous discourse within a democratic polity. In the 
EMU/sovereignty debate the commitment to a popular referendum was extremely 
difficult to reverse once made. In sum, language is itself part of the action.
49 Ibid.. d.14.
50 O. Waever, Explaining Europe bv Decoding Discourses. 1998, (Mimeo.).
51H. Colebatch, op.cit„ p.99.
52 Ibid.. p. 64. See also F. Fischer and J. Forester, The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. (Duke University Press, 
Durham NC, 1993).
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The Utility of Discourse
Discourse analysis has been criticised both from a general perspective and for specific 
methodological problems. The key general criticism is that discourse serves to reify the 
language above other factors. For example Bryan Palmer, from a historical materialist 
perspective, argues that discourse analysts;
"...offer their own program: simplistic denial of the base/superstructure distinction; 
unproblematic reification of language as non-referential and autonomous; refusal of any 
center that might, in however nuanced a manner, draw lines of separation between
53substance and form. This program has a smooth tongue, too smooth."
Clearly, like any other epistemological approach, there can be a tendency to ignore other 
factors. In particular the autonomy of discourse can be taken too far. The role of 
individual actors remains highly significant and can indeed be bome out by discourse 
analysis. I would agree with McAnnulla that "actors and agents exist as more than mere 
'nodal points' of decentred discourses".54 My main criticism of prevailing discourse 
approaches is their focus on hegemonic or dominant discourses linking discourse analysis 
with a structural conception of power. However, if discourse is located within a wider 
social context and allows the idea of competing discourses, it can fulfil several useful 
functions as discussed below.
Specific criticisms of discourse analysis include the difficulty of segregating one 
discourse from another, a tendency to focus on the national rather than international arena 
and a tendency to reproduce existing structures. The segregation of discourses is clearly a 
subjective decision which needs to be made by each individual researcher. For example,
53 B. Palmer, Descent into Discourse. (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990), pp217-8.
54 S. McAnnulla, op.cit. p.647.
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Diez and Larsen, in similar analyses of British discourses on Europe, find different 
patterns of segregation. Whilst Larsen advances a basically binary discourse Diez 
espouses a wider range of positions.55 Waever argues that a "tree structure" can be made 
of individual discourses. This would consist of main trunk discursive concepts such as 
"state" or "nation", which tend to remain fairly consistent over time, and other discourses 
or "branches" which are more likely to change.56 Whilst this is a neat distinction, 
especially in the way it allows scope for change, it does not alter the fact that segregation 
of discourses is an inherently subjective process. However, this can be said of all 
qualitative epistemologies in the social sciences. Discourse analysis has tended to focus 
on the national rather than the international arena. However, this generally reflects the 
fact that most political debate, even within the EU, continues to take place in the national 
arena. As for discourses reproducing existing structures this will largely depend on 
individual situations but should not necessarily be a criticism of discourse analysis.
Notwithstanding the wider criticisms of discourse analysis what specific functions can it 
fulfil, especially in the political sphere? Chilton and Schaeffner argue that discourse can 
fulfil four strategic functions. The first is the traditional concern with coercion in the 
form of edicts, commands and propaganda. The second is the converse discourses of 
resistance and opposition. Thirdly, discourse analysis can serve the function of 
dissimulation which refers to the control over sources of information. Finally, discourse 
analysis can serve to underpin legitimacy of a particular idea or policy. Equally 
significant in this respect are moves to delegitimise alternative arguments.57 It is the 
fourth function of legitimation that is the focus of this thesis.
55 T. Diez, op.cit.. pp:20-21.
56 O. Waever, Discourse Analysis as Foreign Policy Theory: The Case of Germany and Europe, (mimeo.), p.6.
57 P. Chilton and C. Schaeffner, "Discourse and Politics" in T. Van Dijk (Ed.), Discourse as Social Interaction. (SAGE Publications 
Limited, London, 1997), pp212-3.
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The key epistemological argument made is that discourse analysis is a particularly 
appropriate tool in relation to the concept of sovereignty. A fuller theoretical discussion 
of sovereignty is outlined in Chapter 2 but it is argued that sovereignty as a concept can 
only be fully explored by discourse analysis in a specific time and place. The legitimacy 
function outlined above is a key aspect of sovereignty which focuses on the locus of 
political authority. This locus can not be studied in a positivist manner like the existence 
of a chair or table because sovereignty is inherently intangible. Academically arguments 
can be constructed as to the boundaries of sovereignty in a particular situation such as 
EMU membership. However, discourse analysis takes this a step further by analysing the 
use of the concept by key actors in specific arenas and contexts. This strategic function of 
legitimation acts in a variety of ways. Actors can set the agenda, select particular topics 
for conversation, position themselves and other actors in specific relationships, make 
particular constructions of knowledge, appeal to wider ideological frameworks and 
present other concepts or actors in a negative light.58
Politics of Sovereignty: Application of Discourse Analysis
The central thesis argues that the discourses of sovereignty in the political debate were a 
key influence on government policy on EMU. Discourse analysis is empirically examined 
around the five key relationships made. Chapter 4 analyses the divisions within the 
Conservative party along a sovereignty/interdependence axis in the context of the 
Maastricht ratification debates in Parliament. Chapter 5 focuses on the decision of both 
major parties to opt for a referendum on EMU in 1996. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
continuing constraint that the referendum decision placed on Labour government policy 
after 1997. In addition, the divergence between the discourses on sovereignty and 
government policy on EMU is followed through the policy turns in 1997. Throughout 
Chapters 4-6 the overall caution of government policy is outlined.
58 Ibid.. p.213.
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The relationship between discourse and policy requires intermediation by key agents. As 
Risse-Kappen argues “ideas do not just float freely” but need to be acted on by agents.59 
Ideas not only need to be constructed and legitimated through discourse but must acquire 
influential, if not necessarily hegemonic, positions. Goldstein and Keohane argue that 
ideas can be related to policy in three main ways. These are ideas as road maps for 
individual decision makers, as strategic focal points for groups or as embedded in 
institutions.60 In the EMU/sovereignty debate the key agents were individuals and 
political parties. Sovereignty operated at an individual level but, more significantly, as a 
group norm in the British polity. Crucially arguments on sovereignty supported the 
“status quo” and would require a major change should government policy move towards 
accession to EMU.
Discourse and government policy throughout this study refer to different objects. The 
primary object of the discourse analysis is focused on the concept of "sovereignty". The 
primary object of the government policy is that of "potential British membership of 
EMU". The connection between the discourse analysis and the government policy is 
empirically examined in three specific debates. These debates are chosen, not to produce 
a chronological narrative of the debate on British membership of EMU, but to focus on 
selected debates where the intertwining threads of the discourse analysis (with the object 
of "sovereignty") and government policy (with the object of "potential British 
membership of EMU") can be studied. By examining the relationship in a specific time 
and place an understanding of the complex interrelationship can be obtained. The aim is 
to identify relationships between the discourses of sovereignty and government policy on 
EMU including intermediation by key agents.
59 T. Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structure and the End of the Cold War”, 
International Organisation. Vol. 48, Spring 1994, pp: 185-214. See also A. Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies”, 
International Organisation. Vol. 50, Winter 1996.
60 J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (Eds.), op. c it. pp:12-13.
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The historical start date taken is the completion of the Maastricht Treaty, which set the 
basic ground rules for EMU largely without any particular British influence (see Chapter 
3). The end date chosen is the aftermath of the 1999 European election following the 
launch of EMU. These points provide an appropriate time horizon across two different 
governments and across a range of historical cases. The completion of the Maastricht 
treaty allows the debate to be placed in the context of treaty based provisions rather than 
unconfirmed proposals. Three debates are specifically chosen to evaluate the discourses 
of sovereignty in different situations (rather than presenting a chronological history). The 
first debate (Chapter 4) deals with the discourses of sovereignty developed in the 
parliamentary context of the ratification of the Maastricht treaty in Parliament. The 
second debate (Chapter 5) covers the decision by the main political parties to promise a 
referendum as a necessary condition prior to British entry into EMU and the 1997 general 
election campaign, placing the discourses in a context of popular debate. Finally, the third 
debate (Chapter 6) follows the new Labour government’s policy from the October 1997 
statement to the aftermath of the 1999 European election. The key contextual factors 
were the volatility of the financial markets, the growing realisation and confirmation that 
EMU was to become a certainty and a thriving business debate. In each of these cases the 
relationship between the discourses of sovereignty and government policy will be 
examined.
Chapter 7 focuses on the business debate on EMU. The importance of the business debate 
necessitated a separate chapter given the nature of the EMU issue, its importance to 
business interests and the need to consider a major counter argument to the politics of 
sovereignty in stressing the influence of business on government policy on EMU. The 
overall argument of Chapter 7 made is that business itself was divided on EMU, desired 
certainty of government policy over direction, and ultimately accepted the subordination 
of business interests to the political debate on sovereignty. Whilst business attitudes were 
basically driven by economic calculations these positions did not have a direct impact on
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the dominant political discourse because business ultimately accepted the subordination 
of business interests to the wider debate on sovereignty. The other key alternative 
interpretations for government EMU policy, especially electoral considerations and 
economic factors, are considered throughout empirical chapters 4-6.
The primary underlying motivation behind the research strategy was that discourse 
analysis was an appropriate epistemological tool for a political idea such as sovereignty. 
Three specific reasons account for the particular sources used. Firstly, their contribution 
to the discourses on sovereignty. Secondly, the overall impact of these sources on 
government policy on EMU. Thirdly, the specific relevance of individual sources to the 
five main relationships outlined. A wide range of sources was used throughout the 
empirical chapters. These included autobiographies, biographies, Hansard, a review of 
press articles, Select Committee reports, government documents, election manifestoes, 
opinion poll surveys, interviews with selected persons, academic texts and other 
secondary literature.
The sources utilised vary by chapter. In Chapter 4 the primary source utilised is Hansard 
with the emphasis being placed on conceptions of sovereignty raised by MPs in the 
parliamentary debate. In addition, a review is made of key Eurosceptic publications 
during the debate. These were chosen on the basis of their contribution to the debate on 
sovereignty rather than other issues (such as the parliamentary tactics used). In Chapter 5 
the sources utilised include autobiographies, biographies, manifestoes, selected 
interviews and a review of press articles. This reflected the movement in the debate from 
the parliamentary sphere to the wider public sphere given the referendum decision and 
the 1997 general election. In Chapter 6 the sources utilised include biographies, 
manifestoes, selected interviews and a review of press articles. In addition, opinion poll 
survey data is utilised given the continued influence of EMU-sceptic public opinion on
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Labour government policy after 1997. In the business debate in Chapter 7 extensive use 
was made of Select Committee evidence supported by a review of press articles and 
business documents. In addition, extensive interviews were held on two specific business 
cases to illustrate the emphasis on uncertainty in the business debate.
Given the emphasis on the discourses of sovereignty and government policy on EMU the 
sources utilised were inevitably selective. For example, the following groupings are only 
briefly mentioned. The Liberal Democrats and other political parties are not specifically 
addressed given their limited influence on government policy. Particular mention is 
made, however, of the conception of popular sovereignty utilised by the Liberal 
Democrats. In addition, the Referendum Party is briefly discussed during the 1997 
election. The role of trade unions is only briefly discussed given their focus on the 
economics of EMU, internal divisions and declining political influence. Other special 
interest groups, such as the farmers union, are excluded for similar reasons. Limited 
mention is made of bureaucratic bodies given the emphasis on sovereignty, which as a 
concept based on political authority must be articulated in the political debate. The 
emphasis made throughout is not to deny the significance and perspective of the groups 
identified but is made to emphasise the importance of sovereignty within the debate and 
its role on government policy. The influence of the media is not directly addressed given 
the extensive nature of the subject. However, extensive use is made throughout of press 
articles and opinion surveys reflecting the overall importance of the media.
Selective interviews were made with relevant politicians to supplement the wider range 
of textual evidence. These were chosen in three specific areas. Firstly, to examine the 
particular reasons behind the Conservative decision to accede to a referendum in 1996. 
Secondly, to gauge qualitatively the depth of internal divisions within both main political 
parties. Finally, to examine the development of EMU specific pressure groups. Given the 
continued presence after 1997 of a Labour government most interviews were carried out
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with persons unconnected with the government given the practical difficulties in 
interviewing government spokespersons. Extensive interviews were also carried out with 
over forty persons in the two business cases to highlight the degree of uncertainty and 
lack of preparation within British business. The list of politicians interviewed is included 
in the reference section. The interviews were carried out on the basis of personal 
confidentiality and are generally attributed as “Author’s interview” at relevant points in 
the text.
Conclusions
Discourse analysis is used as the main tool throughout this thesis in the specific sense of a 
set of articulations bound by specific rules. Discourse must be set in a social context. In 
the wider discourse studies of Foucault and Laclau and Mouffe an overall conception of 
hegemony emerges. An alternative approach, adopted in this thesis, is to stress the 
flexibility of language in a social context and to allow the possibility of competing 
discourses. Discourse is treated as an intermediate layer between structure and agency, 
which is analytically distinct from policy. The approach taken is to identity the detailed 
relationships between the discourses of sovereignty and government policy on EMU 
mediated by the agency of key individuals and political parties.
The primary argument for utilising discourse analysis as an epistemological technique is 
its relevance to the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is not a concept that can be 
researched scientifically, examined through bureaucratic politics or through rational 
approaches to policy formation. As a concept focused on the locus of authority its 
elucidation requires a detailed analysis of the discourses which constitute its meaning. 
This meaning is developed within a specific spatial and temporal context, namely Britain 
in the 1990s. Prior to this detailed analysis the discussion turns to the academic analysis 
of sovereignty in the context of Britain and the EU.
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CHAPTER 2: SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF BRITAIN AND THE EU
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to review selected academic literature on sovereignty in the 
context of Britain and the European Union (EU). This chapter deals with six main 
aspects. Firstly, there is a preliminary discussion of the conceptual bases of sovereignty 
in relation to other concepts including the state, power and authority. Secondly, four 
interrelated perspectives on sovereignty are identified; as a legal principle, as a political 
authority claim, as a normative organising principle and as a social construct. Thirdly, 
setting sovereignty in the context of the debate over the nature of the EU, its continued 
relevance will be examined from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Fourthly, the 
specific EU concepts of subsidiarity and the democratic deficit will be briefly discussed 
in relation to sovereignty. Fifhly, the issues of sovereignty involved in Britain’s overall 
relationship with the EU will be considered. Finally, the chapter will set out the central 
thesis for the detailed discussion of the sovereignty issues raised by EMU in later 
chapters.
The central argument of this chapter is that the approach taken throughout this thesis is to 
focus on sovereignty as a social construct. Key elements and debates arise from the legal, 
political and normative perspectives of sovereignty, which offer important insights into 
the essentially contested nature of sovereignty. However, the emphasis in this thesis is 
that, whilst containing ongoing features, the absolute principle of sovereignty is 
continually interpreted in changing time and space by key actors. Whilst complex 
academic meanings can be given to the concept of sovereignty, greater significance is 
given throughout to the use of the concept by key actors for their own objectives. The 
context of this thesis is the issue of EMU in Britain during the 1990s. It is important to 
see sovereignty in relation to alternative organising principles, one of which is the 
challenge to the sovereignty of individual member states presented by the EU. The
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contention maintained throughout is that sovereignty remains a central feature but needs 
to be continually reinterpreted in changing circumstances.
Sovereignty: Conceptual Bases
Like many problematic concepts sovereignty can be given a variety of meanings. The 
classical definition of sovereignty as presented by Hinsley is;
"...the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political 
community...and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere."1
This definition highlights the dual nature of sovereignty. One aspect is the "internal" 
dimension of one final and absolute authority within the political community, usually the 
government of a state. The other aspect is the external independence of the state 
recognised universally by other sovereign states. The "external" element of sovereignty is 
epitomised in the legal principle of sovereign equality, the corollary of which is non­
intervention.2 Though analytically distinct I would agree with Malcolm that these two 
aspects are inextricably linked and, hence, the importance of the word "and" in Kinsley's 
definition.3 It is difficult to envisage a situation where a state has internal sovereignty 
without external sovereignty or vice-versa. The nearest possible situation is the position 
whereby a state may not have full external sovereignty but has almost complete internal 
sovereignty as was, arguably, the situation of the British Dominions in the 1930s. 
However, this does not amount to sovereignty in the sense of "final" and "absolute".4 The 
idea of "constitutional independence" also reconciles the two aspects, as argued by
1 F.H.Hinsley, Sovereignty. (2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986), p.26.
2 C. Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), 
p xi.
3 N. Malcolm, "Sense on Sovereignty" in M. Holmes (Ed.), The Eurosceptical Reader. (Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p.351.
4
Daniel Philpott also refers to the situation where an internal civil war is not matched by any external intervention but as he 
comments "when sovereignty is realised both aspects are present". D. Philpott, "Westphalia, Authority and International Society", 
Political Studies. Vol.47.No.3. Special Issue 1999, pp:566-589.
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James;
"A sovereign state may have all sorts of links with other such states and with 
international bodies, but the one sort of link which, by definition, it cannot have is a 
constitutional one."5
The concept of sovereignty is inextricably linked with the development of the state. A 
law convention outlined the criteria of statehood as a permanent population, a defined 
territory, government and a capacity to enter relations with other states.6 Hinsley argues 
that the development of the state was a fundamental change in the pattern of authority 
within society when contrasted with tribal societies dependent on kinship ties. A state is a 
precondition but not a sufficient condition for the development of the concept of 
sovereignty. The further requirement is the gradual convergence of the state with the 
needs of the community (albeit as distinct components). Thus, the concept of sovereignty 
developed some time after the development of the state and, in certain societies such as 
Africa, does not have very deep roots.7
The link between sovereignty and the "state" has been challenged by Weber and 
Biersteker. Defining the state as "a geographically contained structure whose agents 
claim ultimate political authority within their domain" they seek to make a clear 
distinction from sovereignty. This, they argue, allows certain anomalies such as Taiwan 
(non-sovereign territorial state) and Palestine (sovereign, non-territorial state) to be
s A. James, Sovereien Statehood: The Basis of International Society. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1986), p.24.
6 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), quoted from N. Malcolm, op.cit.. p.349.
7 F.H.Hinsley, op. cit.. p.21.
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theoretically identified.8 Clearly state and sovereignty are analytically distinct concepts 
with a state reflecting a political entity and sovereignty an authority claim. However, they 
are, in my opinion, inextricably linked in the discourse and authority claims by non-state 
actors do not usually amount to sovereignty claims. Indeed the title of the Weber and 
Biersteker work, "State Sovereignty as a Social Construct", ironically highlights the link.
The second key relationship is with the concepts of power and authority. A distinction 
needs to be made between power and authority. Power is usually defined either as 
structural, in that an agent is powerful if he influences the actions of others or relational, 
in that one actor alters the behaviour of another in a particular context.9 Authority implies 
that power is exercised in accordance with a moral or judicial basis. Malcolm paints the 
picture of a heavy man raiding a house; in one case he is a police officer with a search 
warrant for drugs and in the other he is a dangerous criminal. In both cases the power 
situation is similar but only in one case is there a case of authority.10 Sovereignty needs 
to be clearly linked with authority as a claim by a political community to rightful 
independence.
The distinction between power and authority is made by a variety of writers. Some 
writers have gone further to distinguish sovereignty from autonomy. Kassim and Menon 
argue that autonomy, which they define as the ability of the state to transform its policy 
preferences into authoritative actions in the light of internal and external constraints, is a 
more flexible and subtle instrument.11 William Wallace makes a similar distinction;
8 C. Weber and T. Biersteker, State Sovereignty As a Social Construct (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), p. 2.
9 S. Strange, States and Markets. (2nd. Ed., Pinter Publishers, London, 1994), p.24.
10 N. Malcolm, op.cit.. p.347.
11 H. Kassim and A. Menon (Eds.), The European Union and National Industrial Policy. (Routledge Publishing, London, 1996), p.2.
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"Autonomy is a relative, not an absolute concept: to be assessed in comparative terms 
with reference to external constraints and domestic vulnerabilities to outside 
developments. Sovereignty is formal, legal; autonomy informal, shaped by economic,
17social and security factors."
This distinction may be useful for empirical studies such as that carried out by Kassim 
and Menon but it is not universally accepted.13 Autonomy seems too limited a term given 
the important authority foundation of sovereignty, which can be considered across a 
number of issue areas. The persistence of the term "sovereignty" is illustrated by 
Wallace's use of the term later in the same article in which the distinction is made;
"I want to suggest, however, that these {defence and public order} were the areas in 
which sovereignty - this is the most appropriate term for areas so fundamental for any 
concept of the state - was undermined."14
The main problem with the distinction is that it reduces sovereignty to a legal concept. 
The position taken in this thesis is that sovereignty, whilst located in terms of authority, 
also needs a degree of efficacy in terms of power or capability so that it is not reduced to 
a legal shell. States have never had untrammelled power to achieve all of their desired 
actions and whilst they may be increasingly constrained this does not imply complete 
dependence. The importance of having some capability basis to sovereignty is vividly 
illustrated in the case of the Eastern European states which emerged from communism 
after 1989. They had been subject to the doctrine of "limited sovereignty" imposed by the 
Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. As Vaclav Havel commented;
12 W. Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe" in P. Gowan and P. Anderson (Eds.), The Question of 
Europe. (Verso Publishing, London, 1997), p.23.
13 H. Kassim and A. Menon, op.cit.. p.4.
14 W. Wallace in P. Gowan and P. Anderson, op. cit.. p.40. My italics in brackets.
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"Independence is not just a state of being. It is a task. And fresh independence, such as 
ours, is a particularly complex task. We must fill it with substance and meaning, give it a 
specific form."15
Another useful distinction in this area is made by Jackson, who distinguishes between 
states with positive sovereignty and "quasi-states" where sovereignty is more juridical 
than empirical.16 The idea of available options, albeit in a constraining environment, 
allows the core of sovereignty to reside with authority but to be accompanied with a 
degree of effective capability.
Sovereignty: Key Perspectives
Although sovereignty can be given a working definition it can be considered from four 
perspectives each of which emphasises different elements. The four perspectives 
identified here are legal, political efficacy, normative principle and social construct. 
Clearly these perspectives overlap but each highlights particular elements of sovereignty. 
The first of these is the legal perspective which argues that sovereignty is primarily a 
legal principle. Alan James argues that;
"Sovereignty,...is a matter of law and not of stature. It neatly expresses a legal and not a
17physical reality."
For James sovereignty is the principle of "constitutional independence" with the key 
question being whether states qualify for sovereign status. Three key features are 
characteristic of this perspective of sovereignty. Firstly, sovereignty is inherently a legal
15 V. Havel, Summer Meditations: On Politics. Morality and Civility in Times o f Transition. (Alfred A. Knopf Publishing, New York, 
1992), p.82.
16 R. Jackson. Quasi-States: Sovereignty. International Relations and the Third World. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1990), p.l.
17 A. James, op.cit.. p.40.
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phenomenon. This is not necessarily just in terms of international law but also in terms of 
a state possessing a set of constitutional legal arrangements. The second feature is 
absolutism. For James a state is either totally sovereign or not sovereign, regardless of its 
power. The final feature is that sovereignty is unitary, namely that the internal and 
external functions flow from the same source.18
The legal perspective highlights the dichotomy between law and capability. However, to 
reduce sovereignty to a legal principle is to ignore the political context in three key 
respects. Firstly, a state becomes sovereign primarily through a recognition process by 
other already sovereign states. Whilst there are guidelines for this process it is inevitably 
highly subjective and political. The recognition of Croatia was a good example of the 
political nature of this process.19 Secondly, the importance of the political practice of key 
states and the desire for sovereignty of other states is underplayed. The political practice 
includes the highly significant question of whether states have effective sovereignty over 
all functional issues.20 Finally, there is a considerable amount of political debate on the 
concept amongst different actors outside the narrow legal arena.
The political efficacy perspective emphasises the political reality of sovereignty as an 
effective authority claim. This perspective can have both an external and internal focus. 
The external focus has a legal dimension in that sovereignty is treated as a bundle of legal 
rights which accrue to a sovereign state. These rights may be separated and passed to
18 A. James, "Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary Internationa] Society", Political Studies. Vol.47, No.3, Special Issue 1999, 
pp:462-464.
19 See P. Taylor, "The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty”, Political Studies. 
Vol.47, No.3, Special Issue 1999, p.558.
20 D. Philpott, op.cit. p.571.
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other bodies but they remain legal rights.21 The political dimension of the external focus 
stresses the degree to which a state is able to exercise its political freedom. Both of these 
dimensions are relative in that there is no absolute immutability but a range of 
constraints. Even the legal dimension is relative in that a state is subject to the direct 
requirements of international law 22 The external focus allows consideration of the extent 
to which sovereignty has been eroded by external developments. These include a variety 
of transnational forces including environmental factors, the increasing importance of 
international organisations, the impact of nuclear weapons and, most significantly, the 
increasing web of economic interdependence. It also allows the consideration of 
sovereignty within various issue areas. This has led to a number of distinctions being 
made, especially in relation to non-state organisations. These include the idea of sharing 
or pooling sovereignty in an intergovernmental organisation, the delegation of 
sovereignty to an international organisation with the retaining of reserve capabilities or 
the irrevocable transfer of sovereignty. Each of these more nuanced distinctions can be 
applied to relevant issue areas such as industrial, monetary or security policy.24
The internal focus emphasises internal sovereignty arrangements within a state. As noted 
earlier by Hinsley the development of the state was only one pre-condition in the 
historical development of sovereignty. The other crucial factor was a degree of alignment 
between the state and the community. The internal focus raises the issue of who is the 
final and absolute authority within the state and allows consideration of such matters as 
the relative roles of the executive, parliamentary and legislative bodies within a state. It 
also gives scope for the idea of popular democratic sovereignty which is largely ignored
21 See F. Kratochwil, "Sovereignty as Dominium: Is there a right o f Humanitarian intervention" in G. Lyons and J. Mastanduno,
(Eds.), Bevond Westphalia?. (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995), pp:21-42.
22 A. James, op.cit.. p.457.
23 See R. Vemon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. (Basic Books, New York, 1967); J. Camilleri and 
J. Falk, The End o f Sovereignty: The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World. (Elgar Publishing, Aldershot, 1992).
24 P. Taylor, The European Union in the 1990s. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp:180-l.
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by the legal and external political perspectives. An interesting approach here is
Hedetoft's perception of sovereignty as a "cultural self-image" where a political
2 6community defines itself by comparison with other political communities.
A third perspective focuses on sovereignty as a normative principle. R.B.J. Walker argues 
that sovereignty is a central political principle of the modem era. He rejects the argument
27that sovereignty is "the preserve of legal experts and constitutional experts". Instead 
sovereignty;
"... offers both a spatial and a temporal resolution to questions about what political 
community can be, given the priority of citizenship and particularity over all universalist
7Rclaims to a common human identity."
Hence the principle of sovereignty creates constitutively an "inside" and an "outside" 
highlighting the dichotomy drawn between ethics and international relations. For Walker 
sovereignty is a normative principle which stresses that the "good life", whilst guided by 
universal principles, can only occur within particular political communities. Sovereignty 
may be codified as a legal principle but this is based on a deeper political and normative 
foundation. This perspective of sovereignty allows consideration of the increasingly 
significant debate about the role of universal human rights and active military 
intervention vis-a-vis the traditional idea of non-interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state.29
25 R. Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics”, Political Studies. Vol.47, No.3, Special Issue 1999, p.444.
26 U. Hedetoft, “Sovereignty: Political Concept or Cultural Self-Image?'1 in S. Zetterholm (Ed.), National Culture and European 
Integration. (Berg Publishing, Oxford, 1996), pp:13-48.
27 ILB.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992), p.62.
28 Ibid.
29 See G. Lyons and J. Mastanduno, Bevond Westphalia?. (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1995) and P. Taylor, "The 
United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty”. Political Studies. Vol.47, No.3, Special Issue 
1999, pp:538-565.
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The fourth perspective stresses the idea of sovereignty as a social construct which must 
be placed in time and space. This perspective builds on the elements identified in the 
three previous perspectives but focuses on their interpretation in a dynamic maimer by 
key actors. The tradition within the Realist paradigm of International Relations has been 
to treat sovereignty as a timeless principle of international relations. Waltz, for example, 
defines sovereignty as "a state deciding for itself how it will cope with internal and 
external problems".30 Thus, all of the key components (population; territory; recognition 
and authority) are combined into a key actor, the sovereign state. Weber and Biersteker 
argue, in contrast, that sovereignty and its key components are a social construct 
developed by a range of actors but crucially contingent on time and space. These actors 
build on the elements of sovereignty discussed but to give the concept a wider range of 
meanings.
The social construct perspective is often underplayed by academic writers because of the 
lack of conceptual precision. Lynch, referring to the British debate on the EU, comments 
that "making sense of sovereignty in popular political discourse is more problematic 
given its frequent misuse".31 In a similar vein Falk has argued that sovereignty is in such 
deep trouble as a concept that its use should be left to politicians but discarded in serious
39academic analysis. The central argument made here is that the interpretation of the 
concept by key actors with the ability to determine both debate and policy is of crucial 
significance, arguably even greater than the detailed refinements made by academic
30 K. Waltz, Theory o f International Relations. (Addison Weseley Publishing, Reading, Mass.,1979), p.96.
31 P. Lynch, "Sovereignty and the European Union: Eroded, Enhanced, Fragmented" in J. Hoffman and L. Brace (Eds.), Reclaiming 
Sovereignty. (Pinter Publishing, London, 1997), p.57.
32 R. Falk, "Sovereignty" in R. Krieger (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1989), pp:851-853.
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writers. Hence sovereignty is seen as contingent on space and time. Sovereignty is often 
regarded as a spatial concept.33 Walker argues that the territorial boundaries of sovereign 
states are not fixed and that the key components of sovereignty are continually redefined 
creating an "inside" and an "outside".34 Temporally, sovereignty has evolved in a 
historically contingent manner. Bartelson, in his study of the genealogy of sovereignty, 
identifies three historic phases (Renaissance, Classicism and Modernity) to the concept. 
In this thesis the position is taken that, whilst sovereignty can be given a broad meaning, 
its precise interpretation is contingent on time and place.
Viewing sovereignty as a contingent political idea rather than a timeless principle allows 
the specific consideration of alternative authority claims. These include heteronomy, 
(neo-) colonialism, informal hierarchy and alternative international organisations. 
Heteronomy is the classical alternative to Westphalian state sovereignty involving 
overlapping authority claims of political princes and the universal church. Neo­
colonialism undermines effective sovereignty by denying wealth to “de jure” independent 
states.36 Informal hierarchy is illustrated in the experience of the East European states 
prior to the collapse of communism in 1989. Finally, international organisations, such as 
the EU, provide potential alternatives to sovereignty.37
33 C. Weber and T. Biersteker, op.cit.. p.3.
34 R.B J . Walker, op.cit.. p.l 64.
35 J. Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), p.3.
36 N. Inaytullah, "Beyond the sovereignty dilemma: quasi-states as a social construct" in C. Weber and T. Biersteker (Eds.), op.cit. 
p.77.
37 U. Hedetoft, "The state of sovereignty in Europe" in S. Zetterhobn (Ed.), National Cultures and European Integration. (Berg 
Publishing, Oxford), p. 121.
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In summary, sovereignty is interpreted as an authority claim by a state which is externally 
recognised by other states supported by a degree of effective capability. However, its 
precise meaning is socially constructed by key actors through discourses at a particular 
point in time and space and in relevant issue areas. Finally, sovereignty needs to be 
considered against alternative organising principles in a changing global situation. One 
such area is the challenges raised by the EU.
The European Union and Sovereignty
The gradual, albeit volatile, development of EU integration has prompted a wide debate 
as to its implications for state sovereignty. A working definition of integration from 
Galtung is;
"The process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is 
completed, the actors are said to be integrated."
The aim here is to analyse the implications for sovereignty as portrayed by six 
perspectives of the EU providing a range of positions along the integration/sovereignty 
nexus. These are the European rescue of the nation-state, the EU as a unique (’sui 
generis1) organisation, the EU as a consociation, the EU as a multi-level governance 
network, the EU as a putative federation and the EU as a post-sovereign state.
One interpretation of the EU’s development is that, far from leading to an erosion of 
sovereignty through integration, it has actually acted to rescue the nation-state in a 
modified form. Alan Milward argues that the EU needs to be seen in the historical 
context of the inter-war period when the Great Depression destroyed the frail political 
elites in many nation-states leading ultimately to the disaster of the Second World War.39
38 J. Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Integration", Journal o f Peace Research. Vol 5, No. 4,1968.
39 A  Milward and V. Sorensen "The Frontier of National Sovereignty" in A. Milward, F. Lynch, R. Ranieri, F. Romero and V.
49
States reasserted their presence as the fundamental political unit of organisation in the 
post-war period by placing a bundle of industrial and agricultural policies into an 
international framework where they could be more efficiently achieved. The policies 
chosen were primarily selected for sectoral reasons but also the general feeling that 
intergovernmental bargains struck in an integrationist rather than an interdependence 
framework were likely to be more durable in the longer term. This was supported by 
exclusive EU policy management underpinned by a permanent legal framework.40 Within 
the integrationist framework though national policy considerations continued to 
dominate, accounting for the episodic rather than gradual process of European 
integration.
Milward challenges the view that the integrationist trend in the 1980s, culminating in the 
Maastricht Treaty, arose primarily from an alliance of a determined Commission 
President, Jacques Delors, and transnational business interests seeking a liberalised 
market. Instead Milward argues that the "burst" represented a consensus of national 
policy objectives, particularly in the monetary field. The key element was the bargain 
between France and a unified Germany with France embedding Germany within an EU 
framework and Germany gaining an independent foreign policy. In addition, France 
sought to limit the overwhelming influence of the Bundesbank in monetary affairs. The 
negative reaction to the Maastricht Treaty in several member states highlighted the 
fragility of the intergovernmental bargain struck at Maastricht41
Clearly within the framework expounded by Milward sovereignty remains an important
Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty. (Routledge Publishing, London, 1993), p.5.
40 Ibid.. p. 19.
41 Ibid.. p.31.
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factor within the EU. An important conceptual foundation is the sense of the nation-state 
as a purposive actor rather than as a constellation of diverse interests. In certain limited 
sectors sovereignty is transferred to an integrationist framework within the EU. However, 
this framework is itself heavily influenced by the governments of the member states 
through the Council of Ministers and the European Council. The intergovernmental 
nature of the second and third pillars of the Maastricht Treaty highlighted the limits of 
sovereignty transfers in the areas of foreign policy and home affairs. In conclusion, 
Milward argues that;
"The frontier of national sovereignty, which is approached within varying distances by 
national policy choices, remains with little alteration where it was fixed in 1952 and 
1957."42
The fact that national political parties continue to espouse national policy solutions to 
their electorates, downplaying the EU angle, highlights for Milward the continued pre­
eminence of the nation-state.
Another key perspective on the EU is that it reflects a unique historical position. In this 
perspective the EU cannot be explained by a particular social scientific theory and 
represents a 'sui generis' or unique situation. A good example of this approach is Keith 
Middlemas' voluminous study of the informal politics in "Orchestrating Europe".43 
Middlemas uses the word "orchestrate" in his title to convey the two meanings of the 
formal arrangement of instruments in an orchestra and the informal sequencing to ensure 
that the orchestra plays in tune. He stresses the failure of any particular generic 
framework;
42 Ibid.
43 K. Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe: The Informal Politics o f European Union 1973-1995. (Fontana Press, London, 1995).
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"For all the efforts of federalists, functionalists, neofunctionalists and interdependence 
theorists to assign primacy to a single process, no single theory commands general 
assent.. .That the EC is distinct and probably unique is rarely in dispute"44
Below the "stable crust" of the acquis communitaire is a "vast molten magma of 
diversity".45
Within the diverse EU Middlemas1 main project is to highlight the importance of informal 
political networks. Within Middlemas’ informal EU what are the implications for a 
concept such as sovereignty which requires a clear locus of authority? In the early period 
(1945-1958) Middlemas stresses the federalist elite behind early integration moves 
transferring particular sovereign powers into supranational authorities. With the 
Maastricht Treaty the EU had become an entity in its own right, attracting the ongoing 
interest of non-governmental players 46 However, there are limits to the overall transfers 
of sovereignty, two of which are highlighted by Middlemas. The first is the perceived 
lack of a European political community.47 Secondly, whilst EMU itself represented a 
major cession of sovereignty to the EU level, other functional areas, such as defence and 
welfare, remained with the member states.48
Whilst most perspectives on EU integration and sovereignty portray an inherently 
conflictual relationship Paul Taylor argues that there is a symbiotic relationship between
44 Ibid.. dp:.669-670.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.. p.612.
47 Ibid.. p. 696.
48 Ibid., p.555.
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them. Both the state and the EU have acquired a degree of legitimacy and autonomy and 
developments in one have led to countervailing developments in the other. Each has 
become essential to the survival of the other. In addition to a symbiotic relationship 
between the state and European levels, of equal significance is the perceived 
consociational relationship between the states.49
The consociational model comprises four main elements. Firstly, there are a number of 
distinct, inwardly focused groupings. Secondly, there is a cartel of elites which dominate, 
on a continuous basis, the policy processes within the groups. Thirdly, there is generally 
consensus within the elites. Finally, there is a broad principle of proportionality in the 
representation of the various segments of the population within the elites. The central 
outcome of the consociational model is a continual approach based on the search for the 
lowest common denominator, a tendency to eschew conflict whenever possible and a 
potential for elites within the groups to become detached from their publics.50
Applying the consociational model to the EU Taylor argues that it explains several 
unique features of the EU. These include the growing rift between elites and their publics, 
the use of this rift by the elites in the intergovernmental bargaining process, the support 
for European integration by nationalist groups and the consensual nature of the decision 
making process within the European Union. Within the decision making system there is a 
wide range of disagreements between the elites but the overwhelming need for consensus 
leads to a system of "confined dissent".51
49 P. Taylor, The European Union in the 1990s. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p.79.
50 Ibid.. p.81.
51 Ibid., p.88.
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What are the implications for sovereignty of the consociational approach to the EU? 
Taylor argues that sovereignty was not necessarily diminished by integration, especially 
after 1974. Indeed for the smaller states the EU served as a mechanism for strengthening 
their sense of statehood within a context of common values. Given that the conditions of 
sovereignty are continually changing in the modem world, moves toward integration do 
not necessarily threaten sovereignty. States have retained a large number of reserve 
powers or are sharing them in central mechanisms. Integrative moves in the future could 
undermine sovereignty but if the principles of subsidiarity and balanced competencies 
(by which national authorities retain competencies in areas adjacent to those of the 
Communities) continue to be followed such erosion was unlikely to occur. In sum;
"...to say that sovereignty was shared or pooled was quite different from saying it had 
been lost or transferred."52
Another approach with complex implications for sovereignty is that of multi-level 
governance. This involves a system of continuous negotiations among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers; supranational, national, regional and local.53 
Three main elements are encompassed in the multi-level governance approach. Firstly, 
the stress on the decision making competencies of non-governmental actors, especially 
supranational bodies like the Commission, the European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice. These bodies, once created, do not remain under close state control and 
it is difficult to reverse competencies that have been granted. The second element is that 
states are subject to both domestic political interests and transnational interests (such as 
the European Round Table of Industrialists). The final element recognises that, although
52 Ibid.. p. 181.
53 G. Marks, "Structural Policy and Multi-level Governance in the EC" in A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (Eds.). The State o f the 
European Community. Volume 2: The Maastricht Debates and Bevond. (Longman Publishing, Harlow, 1993).
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the Council of Ministers may be the most significant decision making body, it cannot 
control all situations. From a sovereignty angle Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 
provides some limitation and the consensus culture of the Council acts against the 
maximal use of national vetoes. Hence, collective decision making and other levels of 
governance can significantly impact sovereignty.54
The relevance of sovereignty in a multi-level governance environment has been 
considered more directly by William Wallace. He argues that there was a "European 
rescue of the nation-state" until the 1960s but that wider processes of informal integration 
have had a major impact culminating in the Maastricht Treaty;
"The Maastricht Treaty ... touches on almost all the core functions of the nation-state; 
control of the national territory and borders, police, citizenship and immigration, 
currency, taxation, financial transfers, management of the economy, promotion of 
industry, representation and accountability, foreign policy and defence."55
The most noticeable changes have been the agreed futility of national industrial strategies 
(illustrated by the failure of the French ’dash to growth' in the early 1980s) and the crisis 
of the European welfare state in an era of constrained resources and ageing populations. 
These developments are underpinned in an EU legal order which takes precedence over 
national legislation.
Although Wallace points to trends that have diminished national sovereignty he notes that
54 S. George, Politics and Policy in the European Unioa (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p.53.
55 W. Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe" in P. Gowan and P. Anderson (Eds.), The Question of 
Europe. (Verso Publishing, London, 1997), p.35.
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parallel changes in respect of identity have not occurred to the same extent. Multi-level 
governance should imply multiple identities with a distribution of legitimacy to the 
various levels. An example would be a Bavarian who is Bavarian in some circumstances, 
a German in others and a European in yet others. Wallace argues that there is no clear 
pattern of multiple loyalties leading to a central contradiction between the forces of 
production and services operating across wider spaces and communities increasingly 
splintering into divided ethnic and social groupings. In 1993 Wallace did not see this 
contradiction being addressed;
"The European nation-state is in retreat. It might again be rescued through striking a 
further bargain between sovereignty and integration ... to a more explicitly confederal 
regional framework. But that would require a redefinition of the European nation-state ... 
of which in 1993 there was little sign."56
Writing later in 1999 this "central paradox" remains prevalent;
"Much of the substance of European state sovereignty has now fallen away; the symbols, 
the sense of national solidarity, the focus for political representation and accountability, 
nevertheless remain."57
The perspective of the EU as a putative federation emphasises a constitutional 
arrangement between the political communities (states) establishing the separation of 
powers between the political communities and federal institutions. Four principles 
underlie the proposed constitutional arrangement. Firstly, the principle of subsidiarity 
prescribes that each state should remain autonomous, except in matters that concern other 
states or the union as a whole. Secondly, states should act in accordance with a common
i6Ibid.. p.46.
57 W. Wallace, "The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox", Political Studies. VoL47, No.3, Special Issue 1999, pp:503-521.
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legislative or judicial framework. The third principle is that the union is empowered to 
act on behalf of all by the vote of a majority. Finally, the union recognises and guarantees
•  •  • SRinalienable and universal rights to its citizens including direct political representation.
Given the federal framework outlined what are the implications for sovereignty in this 
arrangement? At one level federalism seeks to transfer sovereignty from the individual 
states to the federal level. However, from another perspective, federalism ideally seeks to 
replace the political principle of sovereignty itself. David Coombes argues that 
federalism;
"...actually implies a rejection of such sovereignty as a unique principle of political rule."
There is also an explicit rejection of the link between political rule and exclusive national 
identity. The ideal situation would be the development of a pan-European identity in 
addition to national identities. Coombes attacks two "modernist" assumptions. Firstly, the 
principle of unlimited and indivisible political authority within centralised states. 
Secondly, the principle that a human community can only enjoy the benefits of political 
rule on the basis of an exclusive principle of common national identity.
David Mackay argues that the Maastricht Treaty gave the EU the basis of a federal state. 
The rhetoric of the treaty was essentially federalist (especially when referring to citizens) 
and EMU represented a fundamental shift in economic policy to the supranational level.59 
Three conditions underlined the essentially federalist nature of Maastricht. These were 
the assumption of exclusive powers, the acceptance of two levels of citizenship and a
s* D. Coombes, "Problems of Governance in the Union" in A. Duff, J. Pinder and R. Pryce (Eds.), Maastricht and Beyond. (Routledge 
Publishing, London, 1994), pp:161-171.
59 D. Mackay, Rush to Union: Understanding the European Federal Bargain. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), p.18.
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supranational institutional framework. Mackay also argues that the principle of 
subsidiarity formalised for the first time the separation of powers between the state and 
European levels. However, the overall putative federal position arose from a rationalistic 
bargaining process rather than an ideological foundation.60
Coombes also argues that the EU has developed some elements of a federative structure. 
The EU has its own financial resources, a directly elected Parliament and a European 
Court of Justice, which has established the precedence of EU law over national law. 
However, Coombes admits that the federal vocation is far from complete and argues that 
Maastricht was a "major reverse".61 Maastricht effectively rejected a constitutional 
settlement, confirmed the intergovernmental nature of key policy areas such as security 
and home affairs and made the EU a system founded on state sovereignty.62
The legal arrangements of the EU presents arguably the most significant challenge to 
sovereignty. Neil MacCormick has argued that the EU is going "beyond the sovereign 
state" to become a "post-sovereign" entity given the supremacy of EU law over national 
law. The European Court of Justice is a supranational institution in ruling on the 
validity of national legislation in certain areas.64 For MacCormick there is not so much a 
sharing of sovereignty but a mutual acknowledgement of co-ordinated jurisdiction
60 Ibid.. p.27.
61D. Coombes, op.cit. p. 162.
62 Ibid.. p.163.
63 N. MacCormick, "Liberalism, Nationalism and the Post-Sovereign State", Political Studies. Vol. 44, Special Issue 1996, pp:561-
567.
64 Ibid.. p.555.
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between the EU and the member states over a wide range of policy areas.65 In the Van 
Gend en Loos case EU law was seen as imposing direct rights and obligations on EU 
citizens as well as member state governments.66
The perspective of the EU being a "post-sovereign” state can be criticised from three 
main perspectives. Firstly, as Bull argues, whilst the member states retain the right to
fnsecede from the EU, sovereignty remains with the member states. Whilst it may be 
increasingly difficult for practical reasons for member states to secede, it remains a viable 
and not just a legal reserve power. The second argument is that, even if the EU emerges 
as an effective sovereign state, international society is unchanged as several sovereign 
states are just replaced by one larger sovereign state.69 Whilst acknowledging this 
argument the very replacement of 15 or more significant sovereign states in Europe 
would be a major development, especially for the individual states. The third, and most 
significant, argument is that for the majority of academic opinion the EU does not yet 
resemble a state. Wallace argues that it is not just an international organisation but 
certainly not a federation.70 For Sorensen it has an intermediate status which he terms the 
"post-modem state".71
65 Ibid.
66 J. Weiler, "European Neo-Constitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order", Political Studies. 
Vol.44, Special Issue, 1996, pp:520-521.
67 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1977), p.265.
68 Whilst not a sovereign entity Greenland has seceded from the EU. See W. Wallace, op.cit. p.505.
69 R. Jackson, "Sovereignty in World Politics", Political Studies. Vol.47, No. 3, Special Issue 1999, p.453.
70 W. Wallace, op.cit.. p.518.
71 G. Sorensen, "Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution", Political Studies. Vol.47, No.3, Special Issue 
1999, pp:590-604.
59
In summarising the implications for sovereignty from the perspectives discussed three 
main arguments are made. Firstly, by placing sovereignty in the context of an alternative 
organising principle, the EU, the frontiers of sovereignty are clearly changing. Even for 
Milward’s “rescue of the nation-state”, an intergovernmental bargain moved the 
traditional frontier of sovereignty. Secondly, whilst the EU has problematised certain 
aspects of the sovereignty of the member states, it has not yet superseded their 
sovereignty for most of the perspectives discussed (except in the narrower, legal sense of 
the EU as a “post-sovereign” entity). Thirdly, the contested nature of the sovereignty 
frontier has created intense academic and political discourse within the member states. 
Before turning to Britain the two particular EU concepts of subsidiarity and “democratic 
deficit” will be briefly discussed in relation to sovereignty.
Subsidiarity and the “Democratic Deficit”
Subsidiarity and the “democratic deficit” are two particular EU concepts that deserve 
further attention in relation to sovereignty. Although used indirectly in earlier EU 
documentation, subsidiarity was explicitly defined in Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty 
as follows;
“In the areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take 
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community."72
In addition, the preamble to the Treaty stated;
"The objectives of the Union shall be achieved ... respecting the principle of
72 Article 3b, The Maastricht Treaty on European Union 07/02/92, From M. Holland, European Integration: From Community to 
Union. (Pinter Publishing, London, 1994), p.210.
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subsidiarity."73
The subsidiarity principle has provoked a wide degree of discussion but the key point in 
relation to sovereignty is that whereas sovereignty focuses on authority, subsidiarity 
focuses on the radically different aim of efficiency.
What are the implications of subsidiarity for sovereignty? Mackay argues that 
subsidiarity formalises the EU into "a species of a federal state".74 This is achieved by 
formalising the separation of powers between the member states and the European level. 
Taylor argues conversely that the principle of subsidiarity has served to reinforce state 
sovereignty within the EU. Referring to a Commission Report on subsidiarity Taylor 
argues that the question of the exclusive jurisdiction given to the Community cannot be 
decided by the principle of subsidiarity itself but only by the Treaty. Given this 
presumption the Report stated that the powers conferred on the Community could not be 
assumed with member state powers being the rule and the Community’s the exception. 
Taylor interprets this as an assertion of state sovereignty;
"It recognised that the powers of the states were superior, that they were the conferring 
agency, and that they could de-confer: in other words it asserted the continuing 
sovereignty of the states."75
Even if subsidiarity does serve to reinforce state sovereignty, it is carried out in a very 
indirect manner. Indeed some writers have argued that subsidiarity undermines the 
powers of the member states in favour of regions through an interpretation of Article A of 
the Maastricht Treaty which states that "decisions are taken as closely as possible to the
73 Article B, The Maastricht Treaty on European Union 07/02/92, From M. Holland, op.cit. p.208.
74 D. Mackay, op.cit. p20.
75 P. Taylor, op.cit.. p.66.
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citizen".76 Given the widespread discussion on subsidiarity the key argument made here 
is the distinction between the authority basis to sovereignty and the efficiency basis to 
subsidiarity.
Before discussing the particular EU concept of "democratic deficit" a few initial 
comments need to be made on the general relationship between sovereignty and 
democracy. The notion of sovereignty as developed historically initially had no 
democratic roots. As developed by Bodin (1529-96) and Hobbes (1588-1679) 
sovereignty within the state was a claim that authority was vested in a single source. In 
this historical context sovereignty symbolised monarchical absolutism as opposed to
7 7alternative claims of Christian universalism or local privileges. In parallel, legal 
theorists, including Austin, refined the concept of legal sovereignty as the command of a 
sovereign who was habitually obeyed by society without owing obedience to any other 
authority.78
Sovereignty, originally linked to the sovereign, quickly became associated with 
democratic ideas. Locke (1632-1704) argued that sovereignty rests with the "people" 
rather than the sovereign. Hence the "people" could decide the form of institutions 
through which sovereignty could be rightfully exercised. The concept of popular 
sovereignty was further developed by Rousseau (1712-78) setting the claims of the 
people against the claims of the state. The development of nationalism in the 19th century 
led to claims that the people formed a nation and popular sovereignty represented the
76 Article A, The Maastricht Treaty on European Union 07/02/92. See K. Bradley and A. Sutton, "European Union and the Rule of 
Law", in A. Duff, J. Pinder, R. Pryce (Eds.), op.cit.. p.234.
77 M. Newman, Democracy. Sovereignty and the European Union. (Hirst Publishing, London, 1996), p.5.
78 Ibid.. p.6.
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national will.79 Although the three concepts are analytically distinct and need to be 
considered in specific historic and spatial contexts the conflation of sovereignty with 
democracy and nationhood within a defined territory presented a strong metaphor to 
underpin sovereignty claims.
Moving the emphasis to democracy, sovereignty provides an important analytical 
assumption for models of democracy. David Held argues that the majority of democracy 
models assume a symmetrical relationship between political decision-makers and citizen-
on
voters allowing the citizen-voters to hold their decision-makers to account. Other 
implicit assumptions have been that the political community is clearly defined and 
practically effective. The world outside the nation-state is deemed irrelevant for 
democracy.81 Held argues that these assumptions need to be re-evaluated in a period of 
globalisation. "Disjunctures" which have undermined the implicit link between 
sovereignty and democracy include the internationalisation of the world economy 
(especially financial transactions), the growth of international organisations and regimes, 
international law, the globalisation of culture and environmental issues. These 
"disjunctures" create a need for a "cosmopolitan democracy" with international and 
regional structures at least supplementing traditional state structures.82
One central criticism of the EU has been the perceived "democratic deficit". The term 
"democratic deficit" can be defined as an implied gap between democratic practice in
79 Ibid.. p.7.
80 D. Held, Models of Democracy. (2nd Ed., Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, 1996), p.335.
81 Ibid., p.336.
82 Ibid.. pp337-60.
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theory and in reality within the EU.83 This gap has two main dimensions. The first is the 
representative nature of the EU institutions. The European Parliament is directly elected, 
the Council is indirectly representative being composed of elected representatives of 
national governments and the Commission is arguably the least representative institution. 
Legally the norm of popular sovereignty was explicitly addressed in the Brunner 
judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court (on the constitutionality of the 
Maastricht Treaty) providing limitations on the ways in which European integration can 
restrict this norm.84 The second dimension, more significant for sovereignty, is the 
relationship between the European level and respective national levels. State sovereignty 
stresses the continued efficacy of the defined political community of the member state 
through which democracy is practiced as opposed to the EU level. The continued 
retention of sovereignty by the member states limits the relevance of the EU “democratic 
deficit”.85 However, any acquisition of greater competencies by the EU could 
conceivably increase the significance of the “democratic deficit” in the wider political 
debate on national sovereignty.
In conclusion, the relationship between democracy and sovereignty is a complex one. 
From a sovereignty perspective, democracy provides an important underpinning to the 
political authority claim captured in the concept of popular sovereignty. From a 
democracy perspective, sovereignty has often provided the implicit assumption of the 
spatial link between citizens and their elected representatives. Within the EU the 
development of a strong EU polity has problematised the emphasis of sovereignty on the 
state as the ultimate authoritative political community. Both democracy and sovereignty, 
though analytically distinct, are open to multiple interpretations. Newman in his book
83 J. Lodge (Ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future. (Pinter Publishers, London, 1993), p.22.
84 www.jura.uni-sb.de/Entscheidungen/abstracts/euro.html
85 M. Newman, op.cit. p.23. See also M. Holland, European Integration: From Community to Union. (Pinter Publishers, London, 
1994), p.151.
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"Democracy, Sovereignty and the European Union" argues, having used the term in the 
title and spent a chapter elucidating the concept, that the lack of conceptual clarity 
undermines the term sovereignty.86 He then argues that democracy is a more appropriate 
term However, democracy too is an essentially contested concept with many conceptions 
of democracy being formulated.87 The key point here for the later British debate is the 
underpinning of sovereignty by democracy within the state.
Britain and Europe: A Troubled Relationship?
Turning to the question of the relationship between Britain and Europe the sovereignty 
issue has been central to a wide range of academic literature. This will be reviewed here 
by focusing on four main aspects. Firstly, what is the essential nature of Britain's 
relationship with Europe, especially since 1945? Secondly, what structural explanations 
of geography, history and institutions have informed this relationship? Thirdly, what 
other agency-level factors such as political party politics and individuals help to explain 
this relationship? Finally, what role has been attributed to sovereignty, especially 
parliamentary sovereignty?
There can be little doubt that Britain's relationship with Europe, until 1972 at least, was 
largely one of detachment. Even since joining in 1972 Britain has often been seen as 
pursuing narrow self-interest rather than being fully committed to the European ideal, 
leading Stephen George to argue that Britain has acquired a reputation as an "awkward 
partner".88 Whilst "awkward" may not be the right term to use given its somewhat
86 Ibid.
87 See D. Held, op.cit.
88 S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p.l. For criticism 
of this approach see J. Buller, "Britain as an Awkward Partner". Politics. Vol. 15,No. 1, 1995, pp33-42; S. George, "AReplyto 
Buller", Politics. Vol. 15, No. 1, pp:43-47
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negative connotation other terms are "reluctant" European or “semi-detachment”. David 
Allen argues that, whilst governmental institutions in Britain have adapted to the EU, the 
wider political system has not contributing to "semi-detachment".90 Before 1972 Britain 
had remained detached from European developments, but even after this date Britain has 
clearly not been at the "heart" of Europe.91
Britain’s semi-detached relationship with the EU is aptly illustrated in the area of 
monetary politics prior to EMU.92 Britain participated very briefly in the first European 
monetary system, the "snake". She joined in May 1972 as a clear gesture of solidarity but 
left after speculative flows as early as June 1972.93 This brief engagement with European 
monetary systems was a notable precursor to later developments. Three main 
explanations have been advanced for the early exit of sterling. Firstly, in 1972 sterling 
was still widely held as a reserve currency by many states. In addition, Britain's overseas 
dominions held "sterling balances" as a result of war lending. These large sterling 
reserves made it difficult for governments to steadily devalue a clearly overvalued 
sterling without precipitating a wider devaluation. Secondly, Prime Minister Heath and 
his Chancellor Barber did not want economic policy to be focused on exchange rate 
factors given their desire to pursue an expansionary domestic policy. This was epitomised 
in the brief "Barber boom" prior to the first oil-price shock and the resultant recession. 
Finally, there was a sense that sterling was overvalued and that free floating of sterling
89 See J.W. Young, Britain and European Unitv 1945-1992. (Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1993); D. Watts. Reluctant Europeans. 
(PAV1C Publications, Sheffield, 1994); S. George (Ed.), Britain and the European Community: The Politics o f Semi-Detachment. 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).
90 D. Allen, "Britain and Western Europe" in M. Smith, S. Smith and B. White (Eds.). British Foreign Policy. (Unwin Hyman,
London, 1988), pp:168-192. Term also used by former Labour Chancellor Roy Jenkins, Federal Trust Conference. Britain and Europe: 
The Forthcoming British Presidency of the EU. 4/12/1997.
91 J. Major, Speech to die Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 11/3/1991.
92 For detailed histories see K. Dyson, The Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. (Longman Group 
Limited, Harlow, 1994); P. Stephens. Politics and the Pound: The Tories, the Economy and Europe. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 
1996).
93 K. Dyson, op.cit. p.85.
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was the correct course given the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. This was 
seemingly confirmed by a fall in the value of the pound of over 20% against most 
European currencies during 1973.94
The launch of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 was the next significant 
episode in terms of Britain's relationship with European monetary issues. The Labour 
government under Callaghan with Healey as Chancellor was instinctively less pro- 
European but rejected membership of EMS for similar reasons to Barber. Sterling 
balances were less of a factor because these had been sharply reduced during Callaghan's 
term The 1976 sterling crisis and recourse to financial aid from the IMF limited 
enthusiasm for pegged rate schemes vulnerable to speculative attacks. The main factor 
was again the desire to pursue domestic economic policies in favour of maintaining 
employment levels. Euroscepticism on the Labour backbenches for a minority 
government was also a restraining factor.95 The then Conservative opposition, even under 
Mrs. Thatcher's leadership, was much more favourable toward the EMS.
The final element of Britain's historical relationship with European monetary politics was 
a brief but disastrous membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from 
October 1990 to September 1992. Having stood aside from the ERM (the centrepiece of 
EMS) at the beginning, its seeming success in curbing inflation and providing stability, 
led to a widespread domestic consensus by 1990 to join the ERM. The British 
government eventually joined the ERM at the overvalued rate of 2.95 Deutschemarks to 
one pound presenting a target for speculators. After a series of speculative attacks sterling 
withdrew from the ERM on Black Wednesday1, 16 September 1992. The ERM crisis was
94 P. Stephens, op.cit.. p.3.
95 Ibid.. p.6.
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international with many other currencies being devalued (Italy also left the ERM) and the 
ERM was effectively sidelined with the decision to move to +/- 15% bands in August 
1993. The reasons were varied including a tight monetary policy by the Bundesbank 
(following the fiscal pressures of German unification), economic recession (which 
lowered political tolerance for “sound money” policies) and institutional weaknesses in 
the ERM (which led to a lack of co-ordinated central bank action during the crises).96
Three factors associated with the ERM crisis are key in relation to Britain. Firstly, and 
most significantly, the speed of Britain's withdrawal led to a serious embarrassment for 
the British Conservative government from which it arguably never recovered. Interest 
rates were raised 5% in one day before falling by the same amount when Britain 
suspended ERM membership and £4 billion of reserves were spent in an unsuccessful 
attempt to remain in the ERM.97 Secondly, the tight monetary approach of the
QO
Bundesbank during the crisis further undermined British-German relations. Thirdly, the 
domestic political fallout from the ERM crisis led to a higher degree of sensitivity in 
British government dealings with European monetary politics.
In her detailed analysis of the British government's relationship with the ERM Helen 
Thompson stresses short-term political considerations. These included the desire to utilise 
exchange rate policy to avoid recession, the need for some influence over the Maastricht 
Treaty negotiations and the fact that Mrs. Thatcher, having already lost Chancellor 
Lawson and Foreign Secretary Howe, was forced, reluctantly and eventually, to support
96 B. Eichengreen and J. Frieden, The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification. (Westview Press, Oxford, 1994), p.4.
97 P. Stephens, op.cit.. p.257.
98 K. Dyson, op.cit. p.161.
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Chancellor Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd." In the haste to decide whether to enter 
the ERM the actual entry rate was not considered in much detail leading to the 
inappropriate rate of £1 to 2.95 Deutschemarks being used.100 There was also a lack of 
consensus between the government, which saw the move as a medium-term stabilisation 
policy, and the Bank of England, which saw the move as a necessary deflationary move 
to combat the aftermath of the "Lawson boom".101 Having entered at too high a rate 
Major saw the need to defend the parity rate as much in terms of maintaining credibility
1 O')for his "heart of Europe" strategy as maintaining British pride in avoiding devaluation. 
This made the later forced departure all the more damaging, underlined Britain's unhappy 
experience with European monetary politics and illustrated once again her semi­
detachment.
Structural Explanations of Semi-Detachment
Five structural explanations of Britain's "semi-detached" status include geographical, 
historical, economic, popular opinion and institutional explanations. The geographical 
explanation focuses on Britain's status as an offshore island which gives her a peripheral 
status in Europe.103 Britain's policies have not traditionally been focused entirely on 
Europe but have had global reach. In the immediate post-war period Churchill concisely 
captured British foreign policy as resting at the intersection of three circles between the 
USA, Europe and the Commonwealth. Clearly the Commonwealth has been of declining 
importance in the post-war period but the Atlanticist dimension, centred on the "special 
relationship" with the USA, continues to be a salient factor. This was functionally the
99 H. Thompson, The British Conservative Government and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 1979-1994. (Pinter Publishing, 
London, 1996), p.176.
100 Ibid.. p. 173.
101 H. Thompson, “The UK and the Exchange Rate Mechanism 1978-1990” in B. Brivati & H. Jones (Eds.), From Reconstruction to 
Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945. (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1992), p.237.
102 H. Thompson, The British Conservative Government and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 1979-1994. (Pinter Publishing, 
London, 1996), p.194.
103 See G. Radice, Offshore: Britain and the European Idea. (LB. Tauris, London, 1990) and M. Chisholm, Britain on the Edge. 
(Routledge Publishing, London, 1994).
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case most noticeably in foreign and defence policy but also in the realm of ideas where 
"Anglo-Saxon" liberalism was contrasted with the European social model. However, 
there were also the symbols of great power status such as nuclear weapons and a 
permanent seat in the Security Council. It was only after the Suez and the realisation of 
the economic potential of the EC that Britain moved towards membership.
Another structural explanation emphasises the different historical background in Britain 
vis-a-vis continental Europe.104 The central theme of this approach is to stress the 
different war experiences in Britain as opposed to the rest of continental Europe. One of 
the key motivations behind the formation of the EC after 1945 was the desire to avoid 
further war in Europe. For Britain the war experiences had been different, especially in 
the Second World War where she had defiantly ’stood alone' in 1940.105 Historically the 
strategy of Britain in Europe had been to ensure a balance of power on the continent by 
acting as a "balancer" in the overall power equation but without getting fully involved in 
continental European affairs. Other historical factors were the relative unity of the British 
state (following the union with Scotland in 1707), the relative absence of revolutionary 
activity, the progressive development of democracy, the relative absence of ethnic 
tensions (excluding Northern Ireland) and the idea of a common identity amongst the 
British people (whether English, Scottish or Welsh). These were settled nations, which 
consistently felt their prime identity to be national rather than European in contrast with 
other continental states. These factors all served to reinforce the British sense of semi­
detachment.
104 See N. Parker, "The Lion and die Sheepdog: The Ex-Imperial State in the European States System", 13th Lothian Conference, 
London, November 1997.
105 S. Bulmer, "Britain and European Integration: O f Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation and Semi-Detachment" in S. George (Ed.), Britain 
and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992), p.9.
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Structural economic factors may have played a role in Britain's semi-detachment. Initially 
a high proportion of Britain's trade remained with states outside the EC, especially the 
Commonwealth. However, the trade pattern changed dramatically with the percentage of 
trade with EU members rising from 22% in 1958 to over 49% in 1988.106 The declining 
trade with other states was a key factor behind British attempts to join the EC in the 
1960s. However, in spite of increasing trade interdependence (especially with the launch 
of the Single Market) four structural economic differences have been significant. Firstly, 
the Common Agricultural Policy has clearly not favoured Britain. Secondly, Britain's net 
contribution to the EU budget has led to the specific British budget rebate which 
continues to cause tensions. The third factor is the limited progress towards a single 
market in financial services, a key and growing part of the British economy. Finally, 
Britain's individualist liberal capitalism contrasts with Rhineland capitalism with its 
greater social dimension.107
Public opinion in respect of the EU has been a factor in British semi-detachment. Neill 
Nugent, in a comprehensive analysis of British public opinion, concludes that overall
10 R  ,there is a sense of moderate Euroscepticism but also a high degree of indifference. The 
malleability of public opinion is stressed by Lord, in his study of the 1970-1974 period, 
given that initial hostility toward the EC was transformed by a positive campaign by 
Edward Heath.109 Later a similar transformation occurred before the 1975 referendum 
which confirmed British membership. It seems clear that opinion on Europe to date has 
not generally influenced the result of recent general elections or European policy in
106 Ibid.. p.19.
107 Ibid.. p p :1 8-21.
,os N. Nugent, "Public Opinion" in S. George (Ed.), Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1992).
109 C. Lord, British Entry to the European Community under the Heath Government of 1970-1974. (Dartmouth Publishing, London, 
1993), p.118.
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general.110 Public opinion has only had one specific "outlet" to date, namely the 1975 
referendum. However, as will be argued in Chapter 5, this situation has changed 
significantly under EMU.
A variety of institutional factors have been put forward to account for British semi­
detachment. Wilks has argued that Britain's centralised state institutions run counter to 
the more decentralised institutions in the rest of Europe. This trend has been accelerated 
by the centralisation of power under Mrs. Thatcher against a corresponding 
decentralisation of power even in France.111 Buller rightly criticises this view, in my 
opinion, by stressing the small state ethos of Thatcherism and the idea that the centralised 
state apparatus is a cohesive force.112 Another institutional factor lies in the bargaining 
style of the British bureaucracy. The "game" in Bmssels depended on long negotiations, 
flexibility and consensus, which contrasted with the relatively inflexible approach of 
British negotiators.113 The political system in Britain characterised by adversarial politics, 
a first-past-the-post election system and reversible policy positions are all distinct from 
most EU states, undermining the consensual and continuous nature of EU decision 
making.114 In Britain's primarily two party system the opposition is deemed to oppose 
government policy making continuity difficult.115 A final political-cultural explanation 
for semi-detachment lies in British pragmatism which eschews rhetorical goals, focuses 
on issues 'per se' rather than linked agendas and seeks legalistic implementation.116
110 N. Nugent, op.cit.. p.197.
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The two main criticisms of the range of structural explanations put forward for British 
"semi-detachment" is that they overemphasise continuity and understate external 
developments. Continuity is the main theme of most of the literature on Britain and 
Europe leading to linked policy prescriptions such as Young's ironic play on the 
Eurosceptic idea of a "blessed plot" to undermine Britain or Denman's Europhile stress 
on past "missed chances" for Britain.117 Simon Bulmer loosely terms the set of 
explanations put forward as "new institutionalist" focusing on a broad political 
framework within which specific state institutions operate. The emphasis is on domestic 
politics because, for Bulmer, "British politics matter" in mediating the European 
experience.118 Buller feels that this approach ignores the ideational and the role of 
agency.119
Agency Explanations of Semi-Detachment
Agency centred explanations for semi-detachment focus on political party dynamics, 
pressure groups and leading individuals. These explanations do give a degree of 
dynamism to Britain's relationship with the EU as opposed to the continuity inherent in 
structural explanations. The overall structure of the political system has already been 
mentioned as a factor in terms of not favouring consensual politics. The adversarial party 
system is claimed by Ashford to be an important factor in that any moves on European 
policy by one party create an incentive for the other party to take an alternative 
position.120 This may have been the case for the increasingly pro-EU policy of the Labour
117 H. Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998); R. Denman, 
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party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. George and Rosamond argue that a reaction to 
Thatcherism was an important factor in the Labour policy turn changing the perception of
191the EU as a "capitalist club" to one of a progressive organisation.
Of equal significance to political party differences were differences within the two main 
parties forcing the leaderships to adopt compromise positions. The Labour Party in the 
1970s and the Conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s were deeply split over the EU. 
Anthony Forster, in his study of the Maastricht negotiations, stresses the dynamics of 
internal Conservative differences which continually forced party leaders to modify their 
situation.122 Helen Wallace, using the examples of the Maastricht treaty, the "mad cow" 
disease debate and the Ioannina affair (over revised QMV arrangements following the 
admission of Finland, Austria and Sweden), emphasises the importance of 'nested games' 
within the Conservative party. The Major government sought to buy off Eurosceptic 
opposition but these concessions only served to strengthen the opposition.123
The role of leading individuals has often been underplayed by explanatory accounts of 
Britain's semi-detachment. Hugo Young, in his epic study of Britain and Europe, focuses 
on the role of key individuals in the post-war period. These include Prime Ministers such 
as Winston Churchill ("Rule Brittania"), Margaret Thatcher ("Deutschland Uber Alles") 
and Edward Heath ("The Triumph of the Will"). However, he also includes other 
influential persons who have left their mark such as Roy Jenkins and Bill Cash.124 By
121 S. George and B. Rosamond T he  European Community" in M J.Smith and J. Spear (Eds.), The Changing Labour Party. 
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emphasising the role of individuals some of the changing dynamics of Britain's 
relationship with Europe are highlighted, a good example being Edward Heath's 
determined pro-European attitude.
Pressure groups can also help to explain Britain's semi-detachment. Trade unions have 
traditionally been reluctant Europeans. However, in the 1980s, with the growing
• • 125 ■, iiEuropean social dimension, the unions took a more pro-European position. The 
business community has adapted to the EU, though in a selective manner. Enthusiasm for 
the Single Market has been matched by opposition to the Social Chapter. Business has 
tended to divide between those, such as the Confederation of British Industry, who stress 
the EU as the key market and those, such as the Institute of Directors, who see the EU 
primarily as a regulatory organisation.
Sovereignty: Parliamentary or Other?
What relationship does sovereignty play in relation to the myriad of structural and agency 
explanations outlined? Most of the focus on sovereignty has concentrated on Britain's 
particular conception of parliamentary sovereignty. Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain 
refers to the supremacy of Parliament as the legislative body that has no superior body
177able to override legislative decisions made for the territory over which it is sovereign. 
Parliament has been the institutional embodiment of the evolutionary development of the 
British state. This contrasts with more revolutionary developments in many continental 
European states.128 Since the Glorious Revolution of 1689 the central position of 
Parliament has been asserted within the British state in relation to the monarchy and the
125 S. Tindale, "Labour Learns to Love the Market", Political Quarterly. Vol. 63, No. 3, 1992.
126 J. Greenwood and L. Stancich, "British Business: Managing Complexity" in D. Baker and D. Seawright (Eds.), Britain For and 
Against Europe. (Clarendon Publishing, Oxford, 1998), pp: 148-164.
127 C. Pilkington, Britain in the European Union Today. (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995), pp:96-97.
128 D. Judge, The Parliamentary State. (SAGE Publications, London, 1993), p. 194.
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judiciary so that parliamentary sovereignty has become the defining principle of the 
British state.129
The classical constitutional statement on parliamentary sovereignty was made by A.V. 
Dicey in 1885 in the "Introduction to the Law of the Constitution" which outlined three 
constitutional principles. Firstly, Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever. Secondly, no person or body is recognised by law as having the right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. Finally, no Parliament has the ability to 
bind its successors.130 Parliament in this context refers to the House of Commons with the 
House of Lords which, together with the monarchy, are referred to by Kingdom as "the 
living dead of the constitution".131 The absence of a written constitution has limited the 
relative constitutional role of the judiciary in that, for example, there is no British 
equivalent to the German constitutional court. The British parliamentary sovereignty 
tradition with its centralising principle within a unitary state can be contrasted with 
federal constitutions where sovereign powers are divided between different institutions.
The development of the EU has posed a series of challenges to Diceyan parliamentary 
sovereignty. The accession of Britain into the EC under the Heath government in 1972 
was marked by a Parliamentary debate in which the European Communities Act was 
passed by a majority of 112 with the assistance of 69 pro-EC Labour rebels led by Roy 
Jenkins. Section 2 (1) gave effect to all provisions of EC law, including retrospective 
application, which have direct effect within member states. Section 3 requires all UK
129 Ibid.
130 A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of die Constitution. (10th Ed., Macmillan Publishing, London, 1885).
131 J. Kingdom, Government and Politics in Britain. (Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991), p.253.
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courts to take judicial notice of European Court of Justice decisions (again
retrospectively). This has, since 1972, been judicially interpreted by the UK courts to
1ensure that European law overrides UK law in any conflict. In the Parliamentary 
debate on the Act these sections were interpreted by opponents as clearly overriding 
parliamentary sovereignty. Enoch Powell argued that the 1972 Act;
"...destroyed the parliamentary sovereignty of the United Kingdom by vesting the 
overriding power of legislation...in an external body."
This conclusion has been supported by a number of constitutional lawyers.134 However, 
from a political perspective two main arguments were advanced in defence of the 
continuing relevance of parliamentary sovereignty. Firstly, ultimate authority would still 
reside with the British Parliament in that it could in future repeal the European 
Communities Act (thereby meeting the Diceyan principles of Parliament having the right 
to unmake any law whatsoever and being unable to bind any successors). The second 
argument was that sovereignty was being pooled with other member states. The Council 
of Ministers would include a British representative who ultimately had the right of veto 
under the 1966 Luxembourg compromise agreement (which allowed any member state to
t i e
veto a proposed decision against its national interest).
As the EC developed the most obvious challenge has been the status of EC legislation, 
which as a corpus of law overrides national law. British courts have increasingly 
recognised this to be the case both in terms of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice and the treaties. Lord Denning in 1983 commented that EC law was "like an
132 D. Judge, op.cit. p.l 82.
133 In Ibid.. p. 183.
134 See C. Turpin, British Government and the Constitution. (Wiedenfield Nicholson, London, 1985).
135 D. Judge, op.cit. p. 183.
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incoming tide, it flows into the estuaries and up the rivers".136 Another feature which has 
challenged parliamentary sovereignty is the increased use of QMV in the Council of 
Ministers, especially since the development of Single Market. A third challenge is the
• 1 7 7perceived reduction in significance of the Luxembourg compromise. Teasdale has 
argued that the Compromise "no longer has any significant bearing on the way the 
Community functions".138 A more general challenge has been the gradual increase in the 
powers of other EU institutions including the European Parliament and the European 
Court of Justice. Finally, the role of parliament in the legislative process of the EU is
1 70marginal even in terms of scrutiny. All of these challenges are contested by academic 
writers but the key point here is the clash between EU developments and parliamentary 
sovereignty.
Parliamentary sovereignty incorporates a range of historical factors. William Wallace 
focuses on the "historical myth" of parliamentary sovereignty, which developed 
historically in the struggle between King and Parliament. He links this "eighteenth 
century Whig doctrine" to the British sense of national identity which evolved in contrast 
to the European continent. Key features included opposition to Catholicism and to 
autocratic monarchy, pragmatic democracy, a weak state and commitment to economic 
liberalism. These links served to merge the conception of internal and external 
sovereignty and form a strong set of core values against alternative continental values. 
For Wallace parliamentary sovereignty may amount to a "historical myth" but "historical 
myths shape practical policy".140
136 P. Riddell, Parliament Under Pressure. (Victor Gollancz Publishing, London, 1998), p.41.
137 N. Nugent, "Sovereignty and Britain's membership of the European Union", Public Policy and Administration. Vol. 11, No. 2, 
Summer 1996.
138 A. Teasdale, "The Luxembourg Compromise" in M. Westlake, The Council o f the European Union. (Catermill Publishing, London, 
1996), p. 104.
139 P. Norton, Does Parliament Matter?. (Harvester Wheatsheaf Publishing, Hemel Hempstead, 1993), p.127.
140 W. Wallace, "What price independence? Sovereignty and Interdependence in British Politics", International Affairs. Vol. 67, No. 3, 
1986, pp:651-680.
78
The influence of parliamentary sovereignty has been very influential not just in political 
circles but also in academia. For Forster the first key historical background factor 
mentioned is "a constitutional doctrine which merges political and legal sovereignty".141 
Bulmer recognises the "myth of parliamentary sovereignty" as an historical explanation 
for the consistency of British desire for intergovernmental co-operation.142 Pilkington 
stresses that parliamentary sovereignty gives the British debate an additional dimension 
compared with other EU member states.143 Riddell criticises the historical myth of the 
Diceyan model arguing that Dicey himself was not consistent with his own doctrine in 
calling for a referendum and popular resistance over Ulster Unionism. However, he 
admits that Diceyan orthodoxy "still mesmerizes an influential group of politicians and 
political commentators in Britain".144
For some writers parliamentary sovereignty has largely been a cover for executive 
sovereignty, namely the authority of government decision makers to take decisions on 
British laws and policies free from external restraint.145 Bulmer argues that parliamentary 
sovereignty is often a "fig leaf' for "central government's wish to maintain control over 
national attitudes and policy on the EC".146 The seemingly uniform edifice of British 
parliamentary sovereignty nevertheless hides a range of contradictions. In Diceys
141 A. Forster, op.cit. p.21.
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formulation power flows from the people to Parliament to the executive in a 
unidirectional manner with Parliament exercising collective control over the executive. 
However, in essence legislative supremacy rests with the executive operating through 
Parliament This position could not just be attained through the practice of political party 
oligarchies but also had to be legitimised through the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Above all, parliamentary sovereignty endorses the doctrine of "auto- 
limitation" of the executive (in that it recognises certain limits to its actions itself) as 
opposed to written constitutional limitations. Within these "auto-limits" parliamentary 
sovereignty provides a high degree of legitimated independence for the executive in 
policy formulation and implementation.147 David Judge concludes that;
"Far from being immutable, therefore, parliamentary sovereignty is...a marvellously 
flexible thing when it is viewed politically rather than legalistically."148
The other dimension of sovereignty in respect of the EU is the wider idea of popular 
sovereignty which stresses that ultimate authority must reside with the citizens of the 
state.149 This notion of sovereignty linked closely with other ideas such as democracy and 
national identity. The increased debate around the use of referendums has also been a 
notable development as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. On national identity the 
concept of nation lay at the heart of Enoch Powell's conception of sovereignty and 
opposition to the EC.150 Mrs. Thatcher developed this linkage in her later years, most 
notably during her Bruges speech in 1988, where her vision was one of;
"My first guideline is...willing and active co-operation between independent sovereign
147 D. Judge, op.cit. p. 184.
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states is the best way to build a successful European Community. To try to suppress 
nationhood and concentrate power at the centre...would be highly damaging. It would be 
folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality."151
These linkages to national identity and democracy have reinforced the importance of the 
sovereignty dimension in the debates over Britain and the EU.
Whilst analytically distinct the three meanings of sovereignty used in the context of 
Britain's relationship with the EU have an essential unity. From a democratic standpoint 
the people elect both Parliament and the executive. This is conflated with the concepts of 
nation and state in that persons elected to Parliament and the executive are the 
representatives of the nation and of the citizens of the state. There is an internal unity in 
this construction whereby the real difference lies with the external institutions of the EU. 
The developments in the EU mentioned earlier are seen to affect all three dimensions of 
sovereignty at the same time. The "other" is the European Union which is territorially and 
functionally differentiated from the internal of the nation, state citizens, elected 
Parliament and an elected executive. The "fault-line" of sovereignty separates Britain 
from the EU. Each of the three dimensions presents an absolutist or maximalist 
conception of sovereignty and acquires greater strength when the three dimensions are 
conflated.
Central Thesis: The Politics of Sovereignty and EMU
Analysing sovereignty in relation to Britain and the EU highlights the constructivist 
interpretation of sovereignty as a social construct in time and place. The central thesis 
advanced is that sovereignty, in respect of EMU, was constructed in the British political 
debate in the 1990s in such a manner that it became a key influence on government
151 M. Thatcher, Britain and Europe: The Bruges Speech. (Conservative Political Centre, London, 1988).
81
policy on EMU. Many discourses of sovereignty were developed in the debate on EMU 
but the three conceptions of absolutist sovereignty, the pooling of sovereignty and 
popular sovereignty were the most influential. These key discourses influenced 
government policy in five explicit ways. Firstly, the focus on sovereignty reinforced 
government caution. Secondly, Conservative divisions crystallised around a 
sovereignty/interdependence axis. Thirdly, Conservative divisions fostered the 
referendum commitment of both main parties. Fourthly, the referendum commitment, 
once given, continued to constrain the Labour government after 1997. Finally, in the 
longer term, the alternative discourses of pooling and absolutist sovereignty used 
respectively by the Labour and Conservative parties prefigured the 1997 policy 
divergence. The politics of sovereignty operated in a dynamic and cumulative manner. 
For example, Conservative divisions developed during the Maastricht ratification debate 
engendered the 1996 referendum decision by both main parties; a decision which 
continued to constrain the Labour government after 1997.
In developing the thesis the first stage is to consider the academic discussion of the 
impact of EMU on British sovereignty. Chapter 3 outlines this discussion focusing on 
four aspects of sovereignty. These are monetary sovereignty, institutional sovereignty (in 
the form of the European Central Bank), fiscal sovereignty and ultimate political 
sovereignty. In this way the academic debate was able to divide sovereignty into relevant 
issue areas. The general conclusion advanced is the greater impact on monetary and 
institutional sovereignty rather than wider questions of fiscal and political sovereignty.
The second stage in developing the thesis is to consider the discourses of sovereignty 
developed in the political debate as advanced by key political actors with the ability to 
influence government policy. The political debate developed a multitude of conceptions 
of sovereignty but tended to coalesce around three main conceptions. Firstly, an
82
absolutist conception of sovereignty used by Conservative Eurosceptics. Secondly, a 
pooling conception of sovereignty was explicitly used by the Labour government. As the 
debate developed the idea of increasing sovereignty within the EU in terms of power and 
influence also became a key pro-EMU argument of the Labour government. Thirdly, an 
overall conception of popular sovereignty resonated throughout the debate. As the 
political debate developed the question of EMU became a litmus test of Britain’s overall 
political relationship with the EU. Unlike the academic debate the political debate 
focused on overall conceptions of sovereignty rather than dividing sovereignty by 
specific issue.
The third, and most significant, development of the thesis is to explicitly examine in 
detail the five key relationships between the discourses of sovereignty and government 
policy on EMU. The empirical sections of the thesis directly address in detail the five key 
relationships and the reasons for gradual government policy change on EMU. Chapter 4 
focuses on the Conservative divisions over EMU which developed during the Maastricht 
ratification debate. These deep divisions developed along a sovereignty/interdependence 
dimension with Eurosceptics arguing a consistent absolutist conception of sovereignty, 
which would be undermined by EMU. Chapter 5 focuses on the referendum decision by 
both major parties. The primary factor was internal Conservative divisions supported by a 
reactive Labour opposition and the wider feeling that EMU was such a critical issue that 
it should be subject to the popular sovereignty of the British people. Chapter 6 focuses on 
two further relationships. The alignment of the pooling and absolutist discourses of 
sovereignty with differing EMU policies of the two major parties after 1997 is discussed. 
In addition the continuing constraint of the referendum given public scepticism on EMU 
stopped the Labour government from developing a more active pro-EMU policy. The 
continuous caution of government policy is reflected throughout the empirical sections.
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The five relationships made must be seen as mutually reinforcing. Two particular points 
are stressed. Firstly, the importance of the referendum decision highlighted the 
interrelationship and dynamism of the debate. The decision, a contrast to British political 
tradition, reflected the deep Conservative divisions. However, the referendum 
commitment placed the EMU decision into the widest possible public debate leaving the 
ultimate decision to the British people. Ironically the key ongoing influence of the 
referendum decision, engendered primarily by Conservative divisions, was to act as a 
constraint on the Labour government after 1997 moving in a pro-EMU direction. 
Secondly, the politics of sovereignty stressed the dynamic interplay between the two 
major political parties in that they were forced to respond to the alternative sovereignty 
arguments and policy changes of each other.
Whilst the five key relationships provide the specific empirical links between the 
sovereignty discourses and government policy on EMU how did the sovereignty 
discourses more generally place clear constraints on government policy on EMU? Four 
constraints can be identified. Firstly, focusing the debate around sovereignty reinforced 
the ‘status quo’ position of Britain staying outside EMU and government caution. A 
significant degree of risk was placed on actively supporting British accession to EMU. 
Secondly, sovereignty was seen as a clear value within the British polity. Government 
policy was forced to debate EMU membership in terms of British sovereignty. Whilst 
individual politicians denied the relevance of sovereignty no government spokesperson 
would do so. Thirdly, sovereignty created a major practical barrier to EMU membership 
in terms of the need to win a popular referendum given popular scepticism toward EMU. 
The referendum was engendered by Conservative divisions over sovereignty and the 
wider feeling that EMU was such an important issue that it must be resolved by the 
sovereign British people. Finally, whilst multiple discourses of sovereignty were 
developed, the three key conceptions were an absolutist conception, a pooling conception 
and a popular conception. Sovereignty in the political debate was not divided by issue, 
such as monetary or fiscal sovereignty, but, in the form of EMU, came to represent the
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highly sensitive litmus test of the wider political relationship between Britain and the EU. 
In these ways the politics of sovereignty, both in the wider ways outlined above and the 
five explicit empirical relationships, became a key influence on government policy on 
EMU. In sum, the politics of sovereignty were a key influence rather than an “ex post 
facto” rationalisation of government policy.
The main alternative interpretations need to be considered in relation to the politics of 
sovereignty. On EMU three main alternative interpretations were relevant and build on 
the alternatives addressed earlier in understanding Britain’s overall relationship with the 
EU. Firstly, parties need to get re-elected and adjust their policies to maximise this 
possibility. Secondly, economic interest is seen as the dominant factor for voters, interest 
groups and political parties in deciding policies toward EMU. Thirdly, business pressure 
for a pro-EMU position is a key influence on government policy.
The politics of sovereignty thesis could be refuted if the evidence supported the 
dominance of either of these alternative interpretations. For example, did electoral 
considerations before the 1997 and 2001 general elections play a key role? On economic 
interest to what extent did this influence the Labour government after 1997? Similarly to 
what extent was cohesive business pressure a key influence on Labour government policy 
after 1997? Each of these alternative interpretations will be considered throughout the 
thesis in relation to the politics of sovereignty. The electoral necessity thesis will be 
considered throughout the empirical chapters, especially Chapter 5. The economic 
interest thesis is also considered throughout the empirical chapters but the focus is placed 
on Labour government policy in Chapter 6. A specific chapter (Chapter 7) is devoted to 
the business influence given the nature of the EMU issue, its inherent importance to 
business interests and the methods by which these interests were translated into influence 
on government policy. The overall argument made is that the politics of sovereignty was
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the dominant interpretation. The electoral constraints were limited by the referendum 
decision which deferred EMU to a specific popular vote at an uncertain future date. The 
economic arguments for EMU were not conclusive and crucially had not been articulated 
clearly by the Labour government. The business community was itself divided, focused 
on certainty of policy rather than direction and ultimately accepted the subordination of 
business interest to the debate around sovereignty.
Conclusions
The aims of this chapter, as set out in its introduction, were to examine the concept of 
sovereignty in the context of Britain and the EU and to set the context for Chapter 3 on 
the specific questions raised in terms of sovereignty by EMU. The key arguments made 
primarily relate to the conception of sovereignty. Five broad conclusions are advanced. 
Firstly, the key basis of sovereignty is represented by an authority claim on behalf of a 
political community (a state). Secondly, this claim can be assessed in relevant issue areas. 
Thirdly, sovereignty is a social construct which needs to be continually reinterpreted in 
the context of different temporal and spatial situations. Fourthly, the EU itself has 
represented a series of challenges to the concept of sovereignty but has not, to date, from 
a range of perspectives, undermined sovereignty. Finally, the series of challenges to 
sovereignty raised by the EU have been particularly sharp for Britain for a wide range of 
specific reasons, the importance of which can be illustrated by developing the distinction 
between sovereignty and autonomy made earlier in this chapter.
In the Britain/EU context a crucial distinction can be made between sovereignty and 
autonomy. Sovereignty is seen throughout this thesis as either formal, concerning legal 
rights, or as effective, in concerning the practical capability to exercise those legal rights. 
In contrast autonomy refers to the results achieved by their exercise in as far as they can 
be exercised. The importance of this distinction in the Britain/EU context is that debate in 
Britain has focused on the formal and visible transfer of powers to the EU. This contrasts
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with the position in France where the EU is perceived as increasing autonomy over 
German monetary policy or the forces of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. The British focus on 
sovereignty highlights the dichotomy between the absolutism of popular, parliamentary 
and executive sovereignty and EU developments. This clash has been rationalised in a 
series of ways from pooling sovereignty, dividing sovereignty by issue, the keeping of 
sovereignty as a reserve power whilst delegating powers, the symbolic myth of 
sovereignty to the irrelevance of sovereignty in an interdependent, globalised world. 
These conceptions of sovereignty will be discussed in more detail in later chapters but the 
key point here is that in Britain’s relationship with the EU sovereignty is not just a dry, 
legal concept but an essentially contested and emotive word.
What role can a discourse analysis of the idea of sovereignty play in this debate? Firstly, 
on the surface sovereignty seems to emphasise continuity. In particular I would argue that 
too much emphasis has been placed on parliamentary sovereignty, which has tended to 
solidify the view of sovereignty as a key element of continuity. However, using a 
discourse analysis approach the multiple conceptions of sovereignty developed by 
different actors at different times allow an element of dynamism to enter the analysis. It 
allows space for the agency forces of individuals and political parties with their differing 
views of sovereignty to play a significant role. As argued previously the discourse of the 
idea of sovereignty can be located in a dynamic manner between structure and agency. 
Secondly, the emphasis is undoubtedly at the domestic level. Sovereignty itself stresses 
the domestic and the discourse on sovereignty and Europe remains primarily located at 
the individual state level. Hence, British politics certainly do matter in the sovereignty 
debate. While predominantly domestic though the challenges to sovereignty are external 
and dynamic. Before examining the British debate on EMU the discussion turns to the 
substantial challenges to sovereignty posed by EMU.
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CHAPTER 3 SOVEREIGNTY: THE CHALLENGES OF EMU
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider the challenges to sovereignty raised by EMU. To 
what extent do monetary unions affect national sovereignty? A proposed fourfold 
analytical framework of "sovereignty questions" will be used throughout this and 
subsequent chapters. This framework is developed in the light of the conclusion of 
Chapter 2 as to the authority basis of sovereignty which can be considered in relevant 
issue areas. The first question is that of monetary sovereignty, namely the actions of the 
state in terms of monetary policy. The second question focuses on institutional 
sovereignty, which arises in terms of any particular institutional arrangements arising 
from monetary union. Thirdly, fiscal sovereignty, namely the actions of the state in terms 
of taxation, borrowing and public expenditure, needs to be considered. Finally, the 
question of political sovereignty arises in terms of the need for some form of political 
union to match monetary union. This framework will be applied in this chapter to historic 
monetary unions and to EMU.
Six main areas will be discussed in this chapter. Firstly, after some brief initial comments 
on the functions of money, EMU will be set in the context of previous monetary unions 
including the Gold Standard and particular monetary unions. It will be argued that none 
of these unions had a significant lasting impact on sovereignty. Secondly, the EMU 
negotiation process will be briefly considered focusing on Britain’s limited role. The 
discussion then turns to an analysis of each of the four “sovereignty questions” raised by 
EMU. Within each sovereignty question three aspects need to be considered. Firstly, 
what meanings can be given to each of the "sovereignty questions" in EMU. Secondly, 
what are the appropriate provisions within the Maastricht treaty (or where relevant the 
1996 Dublin Stability and Growth Pact as confirmed by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty). 
Thirdly, what other key considerations need to be taken into account. The basic argument
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advanced is that EMU presented considerable challenges to sovereignty, especially in the 
monetary and institutional questions. The challenges to fiscal and political sovereignty 
were more problematic but certainly placed the relevant issues at the centre of European 
debates. The binary nature of EMU, namely that a state had to either join EMU or remain 
outside, added to these challenges. These challenges set the context in which the heat of 
the British domestic debate can be considered. In reviewing selected EMU literature the 
focus throughout is on the visible transfers of formal powers rather than the wider 
political and economic issues raised by EMU.
Money and Monetary Unions: Challenges to Sovereignty
Money is generally regarded as fulfilling three main functions in an economic system. 
These are acting as a medium for exchange, a unit of account and a store of value.1 Hence 
it acts as an intermediate agent for economic transactions as opposed to direct barter. 
However, money has often taken a wide variety of forms over the generations ranging 
from the earliest coins in ancient Greece in the seventh century before Christ to the use of 
commodities.2 The relationship between money and political authority was initially a 
complex one. Gilpin refers to the premodem period as the "era of specie money" in that 
precious metals or specie money (principally gold and silver) served as the basis for the 
international monetary system. Political princes, often seeking to finance military 
activities, sought to enforce payment of debts, gain control over the issue of currency and 
even debase particular currencies. However, money ultimately relied on the social 
convention that it was acceptable to both parties in a transaction rather than deriving from 
political authority.4 The value of international money was in the main dependent upon its 
supply and was generally outside the control of individual political authorities.
1 J. Grahl, After Maastricht (Lawrence and Wishart Limited, London, 1997), p .l. Also, D. Currie, The Pros and Cons o f EMU 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1997), p.5.
2 A. Walter, World Power and World Money. (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1993), p.28.
3 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations. (Princeton University Press, Chichester, 1987), p.l 19.
4 Ibid.. p.29.
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The growth of the state had a significant effect on the development of money and finance. 
States needed money to finance the use of resources, especially mercenaries, and to 
consolidate their power in an era constantly characterised by wars. A close relationship 
was built between political elites and private financiers who swapped the high risks 
inherent in sovereign lending for political influence. In addition states sought to extend 
their bases of ongoing taxation. Above all there was a financial revolution with 
governments beginning to issue paper money, modem banking and the proliferation of 
public and private credit instruments.
In Britain the formation of the Bank of England in 1694 was based on an agreement 
between the post-Glorious Revolution government and a group of London and foreign 
financiers. This effectively allowed the government to rationalise its outstanding debts in 
return for giving the Bank of England preference, and eventually a monopoly, of its 
business. Britain was, therefore, able to finance subsequent wars and consolidate its 
development as the major political and financial power. The Bank of England was 
gradually transformed from a standard private bank to a central bank. In 1844 the 
Banking Act formalised the "public" role of the Bank by dividing the Issuing department 
from the Banking department. In the private sphere the expansion of credit enhanced the 
Bank's role at the pinnacle of the hierarchy of banks. In spite of several financial crises, 
by 1866 the Bank's task had effectively become that of managing the financial system 
through acting as the lender of last resort, maintaining the discount rate and reserves and 
issuing currency.5 A similar process can be identified in other unitary states though often 
in a more uneven manner (as the later examples of the USA and Germany will illustrate).
5 Ibid-, pp34-36.
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The relationship between central state governments and the central banks is a close one. 
State legislation has underpinned the universal acceptability of money within the borders 
of the state as legal tender reinforced by the state's position as a monopoly supplier of 
money. Hence the general position in a world of sovereign states has been for each state 
to have its own national currency (often a very potent symbol of national sovereignty). 
The state itself gains financially in the form of seigniorage whereby through issuing 
money it can purchase additional goods and services at little incremental cost to itself. 
Monetary policy can be defined as the ability of governments (albeit transmitted through 
central banks) to influence monetary conditions in their national economies. Three main 
instruments can be defined. Firstly, the use of interest rates to influence borrowing and 
lending. Secondly, policy aimed at influencing the exchange rate of the national currency 
in relation to foreign currencies. Finally, the use of other monetary instruments including 
the issue of currency, the issue of government securities ("open market operations"), the 
holding of reserves and the regulation of the financial system. Monetary policy needs to 
be distinguished from fiscal policy, the latter being the direct financial activities of the 
government in terms of revenue raising by taxation or borrowing and public expenditure.6
Monetary unions can be defined in a variety of ways in terms of economic theory and, 
hence, the meanings utilised here are developed in the context of EMU. The Wemer 
Report of 1970, the first detailed blueprint for EMU, defined monetary union as a regime 
that satisfies three main conditions; fully convertible currencies, complete freedom of 
capital movements and irrevocably fixed exchange rates. Following the shelving of the 
Wemer report in the 1970s, the Delors Report of 1989 (the precursor to the Maastricht 
Treaty) added two further conditions. These were the full liberalisation of financial 
services and a single monetary policy. This last element is the central element of which a 
single European currency is an outward manifestation.7 The "economic" element of EMU
6 D. Currie, The Pros and Cons of EMU. (Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1997), pp:4-7.
7 T. Paddoa-Schioppa, The Road to Monetary Union in Europe. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 138.
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comprised three main elements; the single market, regional and structural policies and 
fiscal and budgetary macro-economic policies.8 Mica Panic makes a useful distinction 
between a complete monetary union and a quasi monetary union. A complete monetary 
union involves the creation of a single currency and monetary policy (as in EMU) whilst 
a quasi monetary union involves the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates (as in the Gold 
Standard system).9 The main difference between the two types is the far higher exit costs 
of a complete monetary union.
International Monetary Union: The Gold Standard (1867-1914)
The Gold Standard is often portrayed as an international quasi monetary union which
underpinned a golden era of world economic prosperity whilst limiting monetary
sovereignty.10 The classical liberal interpretation of the operation of the Gold Standard
system owed much to the price-specie flow theory developed by David Hume. This
theory postulated a model of automatic equilibrium based on rational economic forces
and gold supplies.11 Central banks supplemented this process by buying and selling a
given weight of gold at a fixed price to their national currency by law, using their
reserves to control the level of gold reserves and using interest rates to control private
levels of gold reserves. In addition, there were no capital controls over the import and
export of gold. These cumulative processes led to a series of credit systems based on gold
and linked by fixed exchange rates. The benign economic environment was underpinned
by the political and financial hegemony of Britain, which enforced the "rules of the
game" (via interest rate changes by the Bank of England). Generally these rules were
accepted by other parties as the external "discipline" for stable economic growth whilst
1 ^
limiting their independent monetary policies.
8 Ibid.. d.139.
9 M. Panic, European Monetary Union: Lessons from the Classical Gold Standard, (Macmillan Press, London, 1992), p2.
10 Ibid.. p.12
11 R. Gilpin, on.cit.. p .121.
12 Ibid.. p.124.
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The automaticity of the Gold Standard in classical accounts has been increasingly 
questioned by later writers. For a start many of the leading states were only late or 
intermittent members of the Gold Standard. The United States did not join until 1879, 
Austria-Hungary until 1892 and Russia until 1897.13 In addition, the Gold Standard 
tended to be a "club" of leading powers in an imperial age rather than a global system.14 
Even the two main states that were ongoing members, France and Germany, did not 
necessarily follow the line of the Bank of England in interest rate movements wishing to 
maintain a degree of monetary sovereignty.15 Panic argues that there was little 
automaticity in the Gold Standard. The UK and Germany ran persistent trade surpluses 
whilst the USA and Italy ran persistent trade deficits, contradicting the equilibrium 
process.16 He also argues that there was an historic absence of an essential conflict of 
interest between the monetary conditions of the Gold Standard and the domestic 
economic needs of the major participants. This was due to record levels of overseas 
investment (especially by Britain and Germany), widespread labour migration and 
differentiated trade policies in accordance with the level of industrialisation (Russia and 
Japan widely used protective policies whilst Britain endorsed free trade).17 In sum there 
was a coincidence of monetary and other economic policies as opposed to an erosion of 
monetary sovereignty.
From a political perspective the stability of the Gold Standard was seemingly based on
13 For the US see J.K. Galbraith, Monev: Whence It Came. Where It Went (2nd Ed., Penguin Books, London, 1995), p. 99. For the 
others see J. Foreman-Peck "The Gold Standard as a European Monetary Lesson" in J. Driffill and M. Beber (Eds.), A Currency for 
Europe. (Lothian Foundation Press, London, 1991), p.9.
14 J. Grahl, op.cit.. p.38.
15 A. Giovannini, The Debate on Monev in Europe. (MIT Press, London, 1995), pp:17-22.
16 M. Panic, op.cit.. p.62.
17 Ibid.. p.82.
93
British hegemony. Robert Gilpin is one of the writers who has argued this "hegemonic 
stability" thesis. Sterling was the key currency in international transactions and interest 
rate changes by the Bank of England helped to control the flows of gold reserves. The 
ideology of laissez-faire combined with British economic interests dictated an emphasis 
on monetary stability. Gilpin argues that the international monetary system;
"...was organized and managed by Great Britain; and the City of London, through its 
hegemonic position in the world commodity, money, and capital markets, enforced the 
"rules of the system" upon the world's economies."18
Hence the effective monetary sovereignty of other states was eroded by largely beneficial 
British hegemony. The "hegemonic stability" thesis has been challenged by a number of 
writers. Andrew Walter argues that British power was itself limited in this period.19 The 
Bank of England did not automatically adjust every twist of monetary policy to reflect 
gold flows. In addition, other centres such as Paris and Berlin played a key supporting 
role in the international monetary system. Most significantly, according to Walter, the 
Bank of England did not fulfil the function of "lender of last resort" and had limited 
contacts with other European central banks.20 The Gold Standard was, in sum;
"...the product of similar domestic monetary institutions and a commitment to the general 
observance of an external monetary restraint, rather than...'policy cooperation'."21
Walter's conclusions are largely supported by Latham who argues that, whilst Britain had 
economic dominance in the late nineteenth century, there was a lack of purposive actions 
by the British state.22
18 R. Gilpin, op.cit.. p. 124.
19 A. Walter, op.cit.. p.91.
20 Ibid.. p.107.
21 Ibid.
22 R. Latham, "Nineteenth Century Lessons", Review o f International Studies. Vol. 23, No.4, October 1997, p.429.
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Given the limited overall impact on monetary sovereignty what impact did the Gold 
Standard have on the other "sovereignty questions"? On political sovereignty there was 
clearly no impact. This also applied to fiscal sovereignty with the nineteenth century 
being a period of government nonintervention.23 Even in the area of institutional 
sovereignty there were no lasting arrangements or formal treaty commitments. The 
independence of the Bank of England has already been noted and apart from a few 
isolated cases of central bank co-operation there was little active management. Indeed 
Panic argues that the very lack of an institutional framework was a foundation for the 
success of the Gold Standard;
"The decision to take the steps which, in effect amounted to joining an international 
monetary union was made easier by the absence of formal treaties which required the 
countries to harmonise' their economic policies, or to adopt the standard by a certain 
date."24
In sum, whilst the Gold Standard amounted to a quasi monetary union and served to 
underpin a period of relative economic prosperity, Panic concludes that;
"The question of the locus of sovereignty never arose under the classical gold standard, 
probably the most demanding monetary union attempted so far."25
Particular Monetary Unions
There have been a variety of particular monetary unions since the 19th century, both 
between existing sovereign states and in newly emerging federal states. In analysing
23 R. Gilpin, op.cit.. p. 126.
24 M. Panic, op.cit.. p.202.
25 M. Panic, "Monetary Sovereignty under Different Systems" in C. Taylor (Ed.), European Monetary Union: The Kinesdown 
Enquiry. (Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p.202.
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these unions the "sovereignty questions" need to be borne in mind, especially that of the 
relationship between political union and monetary union. Probably the most extensive 
and interesting example of a monetary union was the Latin Monetary Union (LMU). This 
union lasted from 1865 to 1878 and was centred on France. France sought to create a 
European monetary zone partly in competition to the Gold Standard led by Britain. The 
origins can be traced to a bilateral monetary union between France and Belgium 
following Belgium's independence from Netherlands in 1830. Switzerland gave official 
status to French coins in 1848, partly to escape the chaos of cantonal currencies. Italy did 
likewise in 1861 and in 1865 a treaty was signed between the four states based on a 
bimetallic standard (gold and silver), which mutually recognised the use of each of the 
participatory currencies in each state at par value. Greece and Bulgaria joined the LMU 
in 1871.26 The LMU effectively lasted until 1878 when the members joined the more 
successful Gold Standard and coinage exchange of silver ended in 1885 (though officially 
the LMU lasted until 1927). There was no single monetary policy or central institution to 
enforce the agreed inter-govemmental rules relating to the issue of currency and the 
system, primarily based on French hegemony, was undermined by the defeat of France in 
the 1870 war with Prussia 27
An interesting development associated with the LMU was the attempt by France to 
extend the system to a world monetary union, which led to the convening of an 
international conference on this issue in Paris in 1867. This proposal was sharply opposed 
by the British delegation in an ironic precursor to the EMU debate today. Mr. Wilson, the 
British delegate, told the conference;
"So long as public opinion has not decided in favour of a change in the present system, 
which offers no serious inconvenience...and until it shall be incontestably demonstrated
26 C. Johnson, In With the Euro. Out With the Pound. (Penguin Publishing, London, 1996), p.29.
27 J. Driffill and M. Beber (Eds.), op.cit.. p. 8.
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that a new system offers advantages sufficiently commanding to justify the abandonment 
of that which is approved by experience and rooted in the habits of the people, the 
English government could not believe it to be its duty to take the initiative in assimilating 
its coinage with those of the countries of the continent."28
The Conference sparked a debate in Britain with Bagehot arguing in the Economist for 
Britain to join a world currency;
"If we do nothing, what then? Why, we shall...be left out in the cold...If things remain as 
now, [Germany] is sure to choose the French currency...Before long, all Europe, save 
England, will have one money, and England be left standing with another money."
Although the Conference reaffirmed the Gold Standard rather than a world currency the 
debate was an interesting historic precursor for the 1990s EMU debate.
The Scandinavian Monetary Union was formed between Sweden and Denmark in 1872 
and was joined by Norway in 1875. It lasted until the outbreak of the First World War in 
1914 (though Sweden officially withdrew in 1905) when differing national priorities 
forced a division. Three features of this union are notable. Firstly, it was one of the 
longest monetary unions between independent states, lasting over 40 years. Secondly, a 
common minted coin, the Scandinavian crown, was minted and circulated freely in the 
three states replacing gold (which was made illegal). In addition, there was a wide degree 
of co-operation between the three central banks. Thirdly, the union did not have a clear 
hegemon but reflected a degree of political solidarity between the Scandinavian states. 
However, there was no clear institutional framework and the union ultimately depended 
on political will.30
28 Quoted in C. Johnson, op.cit.. p.31.
29 Ibid.
30 K. Dyson, The Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. (Longman Publishing, London, 1994),
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The cases of the US, Italy, Switzerland and Germany present differing perspectives on 
the relationship between political union and monetary union. Monetary union in the US 
took until the First World War, over a century after political union, an astonishing fact 
given the later pre-eminence of the dollar. In 1792 following the Philadelphia Congress 
the US federal government gained the right to tax and mint currency but early federal 
banks did not override individual state practices. Even after the Civil War in the 1860s 
monetary decentralisation continued with over 5,600 banks issuing notes in 1905 until 
recurring financial crises eventually led to the creation of a system of Federal Reserve 
Banks in 1913.31 Temperley argues that the US never resolved the political "sovereignty 
question" until the end of the Civil War.32 Galbraith stresses US specific factors such as 
the general feeling against taxation and centralisation.33 In Italy the move to a monetary 
union paralleled to a degree the process in the USA. After political union in 1860 a 
decree of 1862 established the lira as legal tender. However, government policy tended to 
favour one particular bank (the BNR) without actually creating a centralised system until 
1893.34 The Italian case partly reflected the relative lack of a cohesive political centre in 
the Italian polity. A similar process was reflected in Switzerland, which remained a 
highly decentralised confederation after the union of 1848. After a brief period in the 
LMU a common currency was adopted in 1870 as a counter to the waning of French 
influence.35 In all these cases political union preceded monetary union.
p.28.
31 Ibid.. p.31.
32 H. Temperley, "The US in the 1790s and the European Union in die 1990s", Lothian Foundation Conference, 11/12/1997.
33 J.K. Galbraith, op.cit. p.86.
34 V. Sannucci, "The Establishment of a Central Bank: Italy in the Nineteenth Century" in J. Driffill and M. Beber (Eds.), op.cit. p.45.
35 D. Currie, op.cit. p. 15.
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The pattern in Germany was somewhat different. Establishment of the mark as the single 
currency in Germany was a clear act of political will. The initial impetus came with the 
Prussian-led customs union ("Zollverein") of 1834 which fixed exchange rates between 
the various currencies and called for standardised coinage. However, competition 
between the northern currency standard ("the thaler") and the southern standard ("the 
guilden") continued. Following the political unification of Germany in 1871 rapid moves 
were made to complete monetary union by 1875 with the passing of the Banks Act
36creating the centralised Reichsbank and limiting the freedom of states to issue coinage. 
The key feature of the German case is the way that centralised political union accelerated 
monetary union. However, although political union was preceded by customs union it is 
significant that complete monetary union was only successful after complete political 
union.
20th century monetary unions have tended to date to be on a smaller scale than the 19th 
century unions. Relevant examples include Britain/Ireland, Belgium/Luxembourg, the 
German Union in 1990, the Central African Union, the Eastern Caribbean Union, the 
Southern African Union and the East African Union. The monetary union between 
Britain and Ireland actually goes back to 1826 but was maintained by the Irish Free State 
following independence in 1922 until 1979 when Ireland joined the European Monetary 
System. Ireland maintained its monetary link with Britain in 1922, in spite of nationalist 
pressures, largely because of the overwhelming dependence of a relatively poor state on a 
wealthier economy.37 This link was maintained until 1979 in spite of many important 
events including the withdrawal of sterling from the Gold Standard in 1931, the Second 
World War and continued sterling devaluations in the post-war period. The breaking of 
the link in 1979 was partly due to long-term factors such as diminishing trade dependence 
on Britain and the desire to avoid the importation of inflation from the weakening British
36 K. Dyson, op.cit. p.30.
37 J. Bradley and K. Whelan, "Irish Experience of Monetary Linkages with the United Kingdom and Developments since joining the 
EMS" in R. Barrell (Ed.), Economic Convereence and Monetary Union in Europe. (SAGE Publications Ltd., London, 1992), p.123.
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economy. However, arguably the main factor was the viable policy alternative of the 
European Monetary System (EMS), linking the Irish pound to a hard currency area 
centred around the deutschemark. Given the UK's decision not to join the EMS Ireland 
broke its link with sterling. The Britain/Ireland monetary union was noticeable for the 
voluntarist actions of the smaller party, the absence of a collective decision-making
-JO
process and also the absence of a link between political union and monetary union. The 
Belgium/Luxembourg monetary union shows some parallels to the Britain/Ireland union. 
It was formed in 1923 when Luxembourg, following severance of its traditional ties with 
Germany, elected to link itself to Belgium.39 In effect Luxembourg was an appendage of 
the Belgian monetary system.40
The German monetary union in 1990 followed the political unification between the West 
German Federal Republic and the East German Democratic Republic after the end of the 
Cold War. In technical terms the speed of the monetary union was extremely swift with 
one West German mark being exchanged at par for each East German mark. This speed 
reflected the dominant political will of the German government which overcame the 
resistance of the powerful and independent Bundesbank. Other factors included an 
underlying political consensus, economic inequality between the two partners and 
massive financial transfers from west to east41 Economically the rapid monetary union 
and par exchange rate (not allowing any period of convergence) has been heavily 
criticised by some economists.42 Indeed the circumstances were radically different from 
those of EMU with the underlying political unity being the most salient feature.
38 Ibid.. p.128.
39 C. Johnson, op.cit. p.30.
40 Ibid.
41W. Friedman, "German Monetary Union and Some Lessons for Europe" in R. Barrell (Ed.), op.cit.. p. 150.
42 For example, Charles Goodhart, Lothian Conference on the European Central Bank, November 1997.
100
Outside of Europe a variety of other monetary unions have taken place with various 
degrees of success. These either represent clear cases of hegemony or involve micro­
states where the loss of monetary sovereignty was relatively small compared with the 
economic costs. The Central African Franc Zone (under the overall management of the 
Bank of France) and the Southern African monetary union (led by South Africa) are clear 
cases of hegemony.43 The Eastern Caribbean monetary union, established by 10 members 
in 1950, is an example of monetary union between micro-states using the East Caribbean 
dollar. The union has survived in spite of the withdrawal of some key participants 
including Barbados, Trinidad and Guyana.44 Other monetary unions, such as the East 
African monetary union in the 1960s, have quickly collapsed illustrating the high degree 
of cohesion required for a successful monetary union 45
It is difficult to draw "lessons" from the diverse range of particular monetary unions each 
of which represents a distinct historical situation. In a similar historical review, albeit 
with a more limited number of cases, Cohen and Currie draw a range of conclusions. 
Cohen stresses the importance of a hegemon (or very strong affinities) in the 
sustainability of a monetary union as opposed to economic or organisational factors.46 I 
would broadly agree with Cohen's conclusion, especially in the cases of the smaller 
monetary unions where a very small state has tended to attach itself to the orbit of a 
larger state. However, I would argue that if there are sufficient mutual economic gains 
this could override political differences as Cohen obliquely admits;
43 B. Cohen, "Beyond EMU: The Problem of Sustainability" in B. Eichengreen and D. Frieden. The Political Economy of Monetary 
Unification. (Westview Press, Oxford, 1994)* pp:160-161; J. Stuart, The Economics o f a Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa. 
(Economics Research Unit, University of Natal, 1992)
44 T. Farrell and D. Worrell, Caribbean Monetary Integration. (Caribbean Information Systems and Services, Port of Spain, Trinidad, 
1994), p.95.
45 B. Cohen, op.cit. p.155.
46 Ibid.. p. 162.
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"Sovereign governments require incentives to stick to bargains that turn out to be
.-47inconvenient.
The failure of the Scandinavian Monetary Union and the limited success of the Eastern 
Caribbean Union highlight the large degree of mutual solidarity required. Currie argues 
that monetary unions not followed by political integration tended to be temporary, 
monetary union can precede political union (though the degree of political union may be 
quite limited) and the road to monetary union was not necessarily smooth.48 I would 
broadly agree with the first and third arguments. However, I would argue that there have 
been no cases to date where monetary union has preceded political union. As discussed 
the two cases quoted by Currie, Italy and Switzerland, actually show the reverse situation 
even if political union was relatively weak when monetary union commenced.
Three further conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the ideological laissez-faire environment 
of the 19th century was a factor in the time lag of many monetary unions during this 
period. There was no clear agreement as to the division between the functions of central 
banks and commercial banks in a period of the noninterventionist state. Secondly, in 
many of the continuing cases of monetary unions there are usually some symbolic 
vestiges of monetary sovereignty (such as separate bank notes) and continued fiscal 
sovereignty. Thirdly, whilst monetary unions have generally followed on from political 
unions there is little evidence of a reverse process. Indeed the surviving monetary unions 
of the 20th century are either clear cases of hegemony or of micro-states. Overall one is 
struck by the continuing "one state, one money" position. EMU, in seeking to place 
economic and monetary union before political union and in its breadth of membership, 
was arguably unique historically.
47 Ibid.
48 D. Currie, op.cit. p. 16.
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Britain and the Historical Development of EMU
The development of EMU had a long gestation period. The initial establishment of the 
European Economic Community was not accompanied by moves toward monetary 
integration. Article 107 of the Rome Treaty referred to the need for EC members to treat 
their exchange rates as a matter of common concern.49 The relatively stable monetary 
framework of the Bretton Woods system, policy differences between France and 
Germany and the need to develop other key policies, such as customs union, limited 
monetary initiatives.50 After cracks developed in the Bretton Woods system the Wemer 
Committee was established to examine the options on EMU and subsequently called for a 
wide ranging EMU, including a centralised monetary policy, strong fiscal centralisation 
and reinforced regional and structural funds.51 The plan was adopted by the Council in 
February 1971 but never came to fruition given the recession of the 1970s.
Practical moves in European monetary co-operation did follow the Wemer Plan and also 
built on earlier co-operation of the European Payments Union in the 1950s. After the 
failure of the first scheme (the "snake"), the European Monetary System (EMS) was 
launched in 1979 following an initiative by President Giscard D’Estaing and Chancellor 
Schmidt, aiming to create a "zone of monetary stability in Europe". The centrepiece of 
this system was the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) where national currencies traded 
within agreed margins. After initial difficulties the EMS was increasingly being seen as a 
"glide path" to EMU. This aim was shattered during the speculative crises of 1992/3 
when the exchange rate bands were widened from +/- 2.25% to +/- 15% in August 1993
e*y
and sterling and lira were forced to withdraw from the system. Initially it was felt that
49 C. Taylor, EMU 2000? Prospects for European Monetary Union. (Pinter Publishing, London, 1995), p.12.
50 K. Dyson, The Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. (Longman Group Limited, Harlow, 1994).
51 The Wemer Report in A. Steinherr, 30 Years o f European Monetary Integration: From the Wemer Plan to EMU. (Longman 
Publishing, Harlow, 1994), pp:10-28.
52 C. Taylor, op.cit. pp:13-18.
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the EMU process was irreparably damaged.53 However, it was argued that there were 
inevitable technical weaknesses in a pegged-rate scheme such as the ERM, which set 
targets for financial speculation in a world of potentially massive and fast moving capital 
flows.54 More significant though was the depth of political will shown by key actors in 
the EU political process to stay the course with EMU.55 EMU, as defined at Maastricht, 
represented a situation where internal exchange rates between members were ultimately 
irrelevant whereas under the EMS exchange rates were the key factor. Arguably EMU 
required at least a pooling of monetary sovereignty whereas the EMS required monetary 
co-operation.56
Britain’s troubled relationship with earlier European monetary politics was outlined in 
Chapter 2 and continuous British resistance marked the negotiations that transformed the 
EMS into EMU. Given the development of the EMS, together with attention to other 
issues such as British budgetary contributions and the move toward a Single Market, 
EMU was a lower priority. However, the preamble to the Single European Act (1986), 
which focused on the completion of the Single Market, mentioned the eventual aim of 
EMU. At the Hannover Summit of June 1988 Mrs. Thatcher took a resolutely hostile 
stance on EMU. Outnumbered eleven to one, she reluctantly agreed to the establishment 
of the Delors Committee to examine the steps toward an improved EMS or EMU.57 At 
the Madrid Summit of June 1989, which discussed the Delors Report, the government 
took a more conciliatory line (largely due to Mrs. Thatcher being "boxed in" by her two 
senior ministers, Chancellor Lawson and Foreign Secretary Howe).58 There was an
53 D. Cobham, European Monetary Upheavals. (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994). See also J. Major, "Raise your Eyes, 
there is a Land beyond", The Economist 25/9/1993, p.24.
54 D. Currie, op.cit. p.25. This was a widespread view after the ERM crisis. See C. Taylor, ojnnt., p. 76.
55 K. Dyson, op.cit. p.357.
56 D. Currie, op.cit. p.26.
57 S. George, An Awkward Parther: Britain in the European Community. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p.192.
58 K. Dvson. op.cit. p.135.
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agreement to accept the staged approach to EMU recommended by the Delors Report 
(though without a definite commitment), agreement to begin Stage 1 of co-ordinating 
economic and monetary policies and, most significantly, a commitment to an 
Intergovernmental conference (IGC) to incorporate EMU in the treaty process.59
The first significant break with the policy of resistance toward EMU was the "competing 
currency" plan of November 1989 shortly following the resignation of Nigel Lawson as 
Chancellor over ERM policy and his replacement by John Major. This plan sought to 
challenge the Delors Report vision of a staged approach to EMU with an evolutionary 
plan based on competing currencies. Inspired intellectually by Hayek, the plan foresaw an 
eventual potential monetary union based on the strongest currency as determined by 
market forces. The plan was designed in particular to appeal to the Bundesbank, which 
was a hesitant partner on EMU, seeking, at the very least, to ensure a "strong" EMU. 
However, the plan was rejected by the Bundesbank, which was too committed to the 
Delors process and saw the British scheme as potentially chaotic, undermining co­
ordinated monetary policies.60 In effect, however, the plan was largely seen as a 
diversionary tactic, which had little impact on a deeply embedded EMU process.61
In June 1990 Britain launched a revamped proposal termed the "hard ecu" proposal. 
Major as Chancellor sought tactically to engage in the EMU process as opposed to Mrs. 
Thatcher’s principled opposition and this plan was, therefore, a compromise position. The 
plan was more practical than the "competing currency" proposal having City backing and 
some institutional framework. The "hard ecu" would be issued by a central institution, the
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.. p.137.
61 Mrs. Thatcher in her memoirs confirms the tactical nature o f the plan. M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years. (Harper Collins 
Publishing, London, 1993), p.716.
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European Monetary Fund, and would be traded as a full currency. Thus, the ecu was 
turned from a weighted average basket currency, dependent on the averaging of other 
European currencies, to a free standing currency. It would then compete with national 
currencies and might, subject to market forces, eventually evolve into the key or even 
single currency. The plan was welcomed more widely than the "competing currency" 
proposal, especially in intellectual circles and also by the Spanish government. However, 
the Bundesbank feared the launch of a new currency could lead to an increase in the 
overall money supply and, hence, inflation. In his autobiography Major claims that the 
“hard ecu” plan was “facing up to the reality of EMU”, an aim in which he was
ft)undermined by Mrs. Thatcher. On the Continent the plan was perceived as a 
diversionary tactic from the Delors EMU process and was quickly sidelined due to lack 
of support.63
The failure of both the "competing currency” and "hard ecu" plans prefigured the 
eventual "opt-out" solution to Britain's policy on EMU. In March 1991 the German 
government clearly rejected the "hard ecu" plan leaving the central problem of keeping 
Britain on board, whilst recognising the need for its government to avoid a commitment 
to EMU. Major had originally suggested to Mrs. Thatcher the idea of an "opt-out" clause 
in May 1990 foreseeing the wider commitment to EMU.64 Ironically Delors, a fervent 
proponent of EMU, revitalised the idea of a specific "opt-out" for Britain (and 
subsequently Denmark), whilst enabling the other member states to proceed with EMU. 
The "opt-out" protocol was accepted by Britain although she sought a general provision 
rather than a particular protocol for Britain. This aim was abortive and the acceptance of 
the "opt-out" further diminished any vestigial British influence on the process allowing 
the French government to attain a definite timetable for the implementation of EMU. The
62 J. Major, John Major: The Autobiography. (HarpeiCollins Publishers, London, 1999), p. 151.
63 K. Dyson, op.cit. p. 142.
64 P. Stephens, op.cit.. p. 162.
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compromise was enough for Britain to accede to the Maastricht Treaty whilst deferring 
any future commitment to EMU.
A brief synopsis of the negotiating process highlights the peripheral role of Britain in the 
EMU process. What then were the main structural factors driving the process? In his 
detailed study of the political bargaining process on EMU, Kenneth Dyson highlights a 
particular historical convergence of four main factors. Firstly, there was a political 
bargain between France and Germany (France being specifically interested in EMU 
whilst Germany traded EMU co-operation for wider European integration), which 
provided the "close inner channel of co-operation within the policy process".65 Secondly, 
there was a politically insulated process which maximised technocratic input, especially 
central bankers and the European Commission.66 Thirdly, economic growth provided an 
optimistic environment, reinforced by the Single Market process, and a degree of 
economic convergence. Finally, there was a broad ideological consensus on sound money 
policy ideas anchored by "Modell Deutschland" and the need for exchange rate 
stability.67 However, there was a "hollow core" at the centre of this process as no single 
political actor, not even the Bundesbank, dominated the process. Similar conclusions are 
advanced by Eichengreen and Frieden in their study of the political economy of EMU. 
They identify three main dynamics which taken together help to explain the EMU 
process. These were intergovernmental bargaining, linkage politics between functional 
issues and domestic policy spillover. For Moravscik, EMU arose from a rational 
calculation of national interest by key member states.69
65 K. Dyson, op.cit. p.334.
66 At the Lothian Conference, A Central Bank for Europe?. 19/11/1997. It was instructive to note the overall EMU optimism of the 
bankers vis-a-vis the pessimism of the academic economists.
67 Ibid. Also K. McNamara. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1998).
68 B. Eichengreen and J. Frieden, op.cit.. pp:9-l 5.
69 A. Moravscik, The Choice for Europe. (UCL Press, London, 1998).
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In their voluminous study of the Maastricht negotiations Kenneth Dyson and Kevin 
Featherstone argue that a range of economic, political and diplomatic factors lay behind 
EMU. Economic factors included a set of shared ‘sound money’ economic policy beliefs, 
macroeconomic expansion in the late 1980s and economic spillover from other European 
programmes, especially the Single Market. Political factors included the ‘core executive’ 
character of the EMU negotiations, which effectively sidelined sectoral interests (save 
those of the central bankers), and the detailed institutional structuring of the negotiations 
favouring finance ministries and central bankers. Wider diplomatic factors included the 
shock of German unification and the political leadership of Mitterand and Kohl. EMU 
though “represented the triumph of an ideal of technical elitism over the idea of political 
democracy” and was, therefore, built on “fragile” foundations.70
What role did Britain play in this wider process? Dyson argues that British influence had 
waned dramatically after the 1949 launch of the European Payments Union;
"The launch of the EMS showed just how far that power had waned in relation to the 
Franco-German axis. With the relaunch of EMU after the mid-1980s British bargaining 
power was even less apparent."71
This power was weakened by structural factors but also by non-participation in the ERM 
until October 1990. In contrast the British government had a high degree of influence in 
the Single Market process which fitted with the neo-liberal ideology of the Thatcher 
government. In the Eichengreen and Frieden study there is minimal discussion of 
Britain’s role. There are a few instances where British influence may have played a role.
70 K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union. (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999).
71K. Dyson, op.cit. p. 172.
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Dyson, for example, points to the role of British negotiator, Nigel Wicks, in setting the 
“tough but flexible” criteria on fiscal deficits.72
In their study of the British position in the EMU negotiations Dyson and Featherstone 
argue that Britain diverged from the rest of her EC partners, reacting to rather than 
leading events. With greater flexibility Britain might have been able to materially affect 
the outcome of the EMU process, possibly leading to a more gradual, evolutionary 
process. In particular, the “hard ecu” proposal could have won support if it had been 
launched at an earlier stage. Generally though British policy failed to influence the 
debate, being hemmed in by internal Conservative party politics, a failure to acknowledge
• 7*2 a •the goal of a single currency and inhibited by a narrow policy setting. In sum, Britain 
was undeniably on the periphery in the EMU process. The discussion now turns to the 
specific challenges to sovereignty raised by EMU.
Monetary Sovereignty
Monetary sovereignty, or authority over monetary policy, has traditionally been exercised 
by national central banks within an overall governing framework. Before discussing the 
specific monetary arrangements under EMU a brief overview will be made of the 
classical functions of central banks. These are to serve as the banker to both the 
government and the wider commercial banking system.74 The relationship with 
commercial banks can be seen as a mutually beneficial one. Commercial banks leave 
non-interest bearing deposits with the central bank in return for the security offered by 
their high credit ratings. The goal of monetary policy is usually to control the domestic
72 Ibid.. p. 155.
73 K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, op.cit.. pp:641-643.
74 T. Congdon, "Could Monetary Union Work without Political Union" in C. Taylor (Ed.), European Monetary Union: The 
Kinesdown Enquiry. (Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p. 213.1 have assumed here that central banks play a key monopoly role in a 
national financial system. For an alternative view see P. Salin, Currency Competition and Monetary Union. (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague, 1995).
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price level, though sometimes other economic goals are taken into account such as 
promoting employment and economic growth. The monetary targets used include 
quantitative measures of money in circulation and sometimes exchange rate targets. Most 
money is issued by private commercial banks under the constraint of convertibility into 
central bank money (often referred to as "high-powered" money) allowing central banks 
to influence the overall money supply.75 Four specific policy instruments can be 
identified. Firstly, discount policy sets the terms by which the central bank lends directly 
to the commercial banking system. Secondly, open market operations focus on central 
bank borrowings. Thirdly, central banks use reserves for exchange market interventions. 
Finally, some central banks have cash reserve requirements for commercial banks. In 
addition to these direct monetary instruments central banks usually act as the "lender of
• Hf klast resort" and sometimes provide prudential supervision of the financial system.
The Maastricht Treaty sets out the main details of EMU. Article 3a refers to;
"...the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates leading to the introduction of a single 
currency...and the definition and conduct of a single monetary policy and exchange rate 
policy the primary objective of both of which shall be to maintain price stability and, 
without prejudice to this objective, to support the general economic policies in the 
Community."77
Hence the singularity of EMU and the "primary" objective of price stability are made 
explicit in the treaty. The "general economic policies" include balanced economic 
development, environmental protection, economic convergence, employment, social
75 J. Grahl, After Maastricht: A Guide to European Monetary Union. (Lawrence and Wishart Limited, London, 1997), p. 15.
16 S. Eijffinger, "Convergence o f Monetary Policies in Europe-Concepts, Targets and Instruments" in K. Gretschmann (Ed.), 
Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy Makers. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993), pp:170- 
189.
77 Treaty o f European Union. Article G, Article 3a^.
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protection, raising the standard and quality of life and economic and social cohesion. The 
other central feature is the establishment of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) composed of the existing national central banks and the new European Central 
Bank (ECB). Article 105 reaffirms the objective of price stability and sets out the basic 
tasks of the ESCB as the defining and implementing of the monetary policy, conducting 
foreign exchange operations, holding and managing official foreign reserves and
7 8  • •promoting smooth operation of payment systems. The ECB has the exclusive right to
70  •authorise the issue of bank notes in the Community. However, certain tasks are reserved 
for the Council or national authorities including exchange rate policy to non-Community 
states and the prudential supervision of the financial system (though with the support of 
the ESCB).
The organisational structure of the ESCB stresses the importance of the ECB. The 
shareholders of the ECB are the national central banks in proportion to population and 
gross national product. The management consists of a Governing Council and an 
Executive Board. The Governing Council consists of the governors of national central 
banks and the Executive Board members. The six members of the Executive Board, 
including the President and Vice-President, are appointed by "common accord" by the 
Heads of Government. Decisions in both bodies are made by simple majority voting.80 In 
effect strategic decisions are made by the Governing Council and operating decisions by 
the Executive Council.
The other clear principle enshrined in the treaty is the independence of the ECB. Article 
107 states that;
78 Treaty of European Union. Article G, Article 105,2.
79 Treaty of European Union. Article G, Article 105a,l.
80 P. Kenen, Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), pp:31-34.
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"When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon 
them...neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision 
making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies,
Q 1
from any government of a Member State or from any other body."
This independence is supported by a number of practical measures. The members of the 
ECB executive board are appointed for non-renewable terms of eight years. They can 
only be removed by death or compulsory retirement by the European Court of Justice for 
extreme personal misdemeanour or incapacity. They are employed full-time and can have 
no other occupation. Although the President of the Council of Finance Ministers 
(ECOFIN) and a member of the Commission are entitled to attend the meetings of the 
Governing Council and submit motions, they are not entitled to vote.82
Six areas of the Maastricht treaty arrangements merit further attention. These are 
interpretations of the independence of the ESCB, the role of the national central banks in 
the ESCB, the subjectivity of the monetary instruments available to the ESCB, the role of 
the ECB in external exchange rate policy, hanking relations with member governments 
and supervision of the wider banking system The structure of the ECB is widely 
regarded as being based on the Bundesbank model given its successful record on 
managing inflation over many years. John Grahl argues that;
"German central bankers seem to have subscribed to the scholastic doctrine that, in order 
to secure the immortality of the soul, it is necessary to resurrect the body - certainly the 
ECB could hardly be closer than it is to a physical replication of the Bundesbank."
S1 Treaty of European Union. Article G, Article 107.
821. Harden, "The Role of European and National Central Banks" in K. Gretschmann (Ed.), op.cit. pp: 153-4. Also, C. Taylor, op.cit.. 
p.114.
83 J. Grahl, op.cit.. p. 154.
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The Bundesbank supported the structure of the ECB.84 For Grahl the ESCB also reflects 
the overall neo-liberal ideology of sound money;
"Rarely, in fact, can the abstract proposition of a school of economic thought have 
received such complete and rapid embodiment in actual institutions as is the case for the
Of
notion of central bank independence in the Maastricht Treaty."
The Maastricht Treaty largely endorsed the recommendations of the Delors Committee, 
which was composed of central bankers. Arguably the ECB is the most independent 
central bank in the world. This independence was designed to give the ECB credibility in 
the pursuit of price stability given that, unlike the Bundesbank, it has no track record and 
must rely on stated pre-existing commitment. In addition, in another contrast to the 
Bundesbank, the ECB does not have, currently at least, a high degree of public support
Of
and, therefore, relies on its formal powers.
What role do national central banks play in the ESCB? Under the treaty the national 
central banks are clearly subsidiary to the ECB. In addition, the national central banks 
must themselves be independent of political authorities with similar practical 
considerations to those of the ECB.87 However, although they may be legally 
independent, the individual Governors of the various national central banks clearly bring 
a national perspective with them into the decision making process of the ECB. Hence 
there is a similar degree of representation of regional interests in the ECB as exists in the
84 See H. Tietmeyer, Europe on the Road to Monetary Integration. Speech at the German/Finnish Chamber of Commerce, Helsinki, 
23/5/1995.
85 J. Grahl, op.cit. p. 132.
86 C. Johnson, In With the Euro. Out With the Pound. (Penguin Books, London, 1996), p.l 16.
871. Harden, "The Role of European and National Central Banks" in K. Gretschmann (Ed.), op.cit. pp:l 54-155.
113
structures of the Bundesbank.88 In addition a large element of task delegation of 
administrative functions is decentralised to the national level. Overall though, the 
national central banks play a subordinate role.
The Maastricht Treaty leaves a wide scope for the ESCB in terms of the monetary 
instruments to be used in pursuit of its objective of price stability thereby further 
enhancing its independence. A Protocol to the Statute of the ESCB prescribes a variety of 
classical central bank monetary instruments. However, the primary debate was over the 
use of minimum reserve requirements (traditionally favoured by the Bundesbank) or 
inflation targets as in Britain. The ECB initially decided to utilise both instruments of 
monetary policy. The main point here, though, is the overall autonomy of the ECB in the 
use of monetary instruments.89
The ESCB also acts as the banker to the national governments. Article 21.2 of the 
Protocol on the ESCB states that;
"The ECB and the national central banks may act as fiscal agents for the governments."90
This usually involves the issue of government securities to the open market. Tim 
Congdon argues that EMU muddles responsibility for inflation as the combination of 
different political authorities tends to make the identification of responsibility for lax 
financial policy difficult to apportion. Hence, he argues, that the ECB may need to 
control the amount and maturity of government debt profile in order to attain its primary
88 Ibid.. p. 157.
89 R. Pitchford and A. Cox (Eds.), EMU Explained. (Kogan Page Limited, London, 1997), pp:222-223.
90 Quoted from T. Congdon, "Could Monetary Union Work without Political Union" in C. Taylor (Ed.), European Monetary Union:
The Kinpsdown Enquiry. (Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p.215.
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objective of price stability. This would be a clear alteration in the relationship between 
governments and national central banks.91 One specific change in the relationship is that 
overdrafts and credit facilities are prohibited. This would, for example, prohibit the "ways 
and means" facility which the British government has traditionally held with the Bank of 
England if Britain accedes to Stage 3 of EMU.92 Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty 
prohibits any "bail out" for national governments with financial problems (this will be 
discussed further under fiscal policy).93 In sum, EMU clearly alters the balance in the 
traditional relationship between national governments and national central banks.
The exchange rate provisions in Maastricht were a compromise between national 
governments in contrast to the relative clarity of most of the monetary provisions. The 
ECB has operational responsibility for exchange rate policy with non-EMU states. 
However, ECOFIN may formulate general orientations on exchange rate policies (using 
QMV) and conclude international agreements (by unanimity), which must then be 
implemented by the ECB (providing it does not conflict with the primary objective of 
price stability).94 This is a clear compromise and gives ECOFIN a reserve power. 
However, in practice the powers of ECOFIN are likely to be minimal. The need for wide 
support in the unanimity and QMV requirements in ECOFIN will probably reduce the 
efficacy of ECOFIN’s role.95
In the area of prudential supervision of the banking system the key role remains with 
national central banks reflecting widespread national differences. National central banks
91 Ibid.. p.217.
92 Ibid. d.215.
93 Treaty o f  European Union. Article 104(b).
94 Treaty o f European Union. Article 109.
951. Harden, op.cit. p. 158. Also, J. Grahl op.cit.. p. 131.
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are given the power to act as a "lender of last resort" to assist financial institutions with 
liquidity problems (provided that there is no government interference). However, the 
ECB has some indirect powers. Firstly, national central banks must act in accordance 
with the primary objective of price stability. Secondly, the ECB can ultimately deprive a 
national central bank of its national prudential supervision role. Thirdly, there is 
provision for ECOFIN to grant specific tasks to the ECB.96 In a sense, as argued by 
Grahl, the relatively prescribed role for the ECB in this area reflects the focus on price
• Q7stability and, hence, does not necessarily reduce its overall influence. Congdon argues 
that the limited role for the ECB as a "lender of last resort" effectively prohibits any 
hypothetical financial rescue of a struggling British financial institution by the ECB.98 In 
sum though the detailed provisions of the Maastricht Treaty give the ECB a high degree 
of monetary authority, focused particularly on the primary objective of price stability.
The wide range of monetary powers given constitutionally to the ECB would 'prima facie' 
seem to undermine national monetary sovereignty. Certainly control over interest rates 
and exchange reserves is effectively transferred to the ECB and exchange rates within the 
EMU area are now irrelevant. This appears to be the conclusion of many writers. Even 
unequivocal supporters of EMU, who may wish to deny that sovereignty is undermined, 
concede this point though it is often referred to as the "pooling" of sovereignty. 
Christopher Johnson argues that;
"The single currency means pooling sovereignty for monetary policy through the 
European System of Central Banks."99
961. Harden, op.cit. p.161.
97 J. Grahl, op.cit.. p. 150.
98 T. Congdon, "Could Monetary Union Work without Political Union" in C. Taylor (Ed.), op.cit. p. 222.
99 C. Johnson, op.cit. p. 196.
116
Christopher Taylor, a sceptical supporter of EMU, comments that;
"As compared with the status quo there would be...a significant loss of monetary-policy 
sovereignty from joining EMU."100
Charles Goodhart, a leading academic on banking affairs, is equally direct;
"Would joining EMU mean passing monetary sovereignty to the ECB? Yes, joining 
EMU would mean passing the autonomy to control monetary policy over to the ECB."101
In sum, under the ECB there would no longer be an operationally independent role for 
British monetary policy.
Two main critiques are made against the general argument stressing the loss of monetary 
sovereignty. The theoretical argument is that Britain will retain the reserve power to 
withdraw from EMU at any time and reestablish monetary sovereignty with an 
independent currency and central bank. Panic argues that an important distinction needs 
to be made between losing control over monetary policy and retaining the sovereign 
power to revoke these obligations if they are not in the national interest. He argues that 
this distinction is not just a clever legal nuance but has a degree of operational efficacy. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and the 
establishment of separate national currencies serves to underline this point.102 The 
perceived potential inequalities and required disciplines of EMU may provide the 
conditions for future withdrawals.
100 C. Taylor, op.cit.. p. 139.
101C. Goodhart "Would it Matter if  the Chancellor of the Exchequer No Longer Controlled Monetary Policy?" in C. Taylor (Ed.), 
op.cit.. p.198.
102 M. Panic, "Monetary Sovereignty under Different Systems" in C. Taylor (Ed.), op.cit. p.205.
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The other more widespread argument on monetary sovereignty is that the globalisation of 
financial flows, in terms of both volumes and speed, has served to undermine the 
effectiveness of national monetary policy anyway, irrespective of the development of 
EMU. In the British case the withdrawal from the ERM is often seen as the prime 
example of the power of financial market forces over a national monetary policy. The 
debacle of Britain spending around £30 billion of its exchange reserves and raising 
interest rates by 5% before being forced to leave the ERM on "Black Wednesday" was a 
clear symbol of the power of financial markets. Norman Lamont, the Chancellor during 
the ERM crisis, conceded later the increased powers of the financial markets;
"The events of the last few years have clearly shown how much freedom we have lost to 
manage our own affairs."103
Ironically, though, Lamont fears the loss of powers to the EU more than the financial 
markets. Malcolm Crawford argues that the ERM debacle undermines the need for 
monetary independence;
"Such errors surely undermine the case for monetary independence, especially if the 
policy is operated by ministers."104
The power of the financial markets is often taken as a "given" by a variety of writers. 
David Currie argues that the last ten years have seen a remarkable transformation of 
capital markets. Previously national markets remained essentially segregated from each 
other giving autonomy to monetary authorities. However, Currie argues this has been 
changed by three factors. Firstly, there has been an enormous growth of international
103 N. Lamont, Sovereign Britain. (Gerald Duckworth & Co., London, 1995), p.44.
104 M. Crawford, One Money for Europe?. (Macmillan Press, London, 1993), p.293.
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liquidity. Secondly, there has been a global move toward the abolition of capital controls 
and exchange restrictions. Finally, the development of technological communications 
further speeded financial integration. The financial markets are now international, 
interconnected and interdependent rather than being segregated on national lines.105 Grahl 
also argues that sterling has become a "weak and dependent" currency.106 He argues that 
only the “very strongest” economies (Europe, USA and Japan) can have an effective
107monetary policy.
The power of financial markets argument has been questioned. Goodhart argues the view 
is "exaggerated" with monetary policy affected to a degree rather than there being a "sea 
change". He agrees that the use of direct credit controls is no longer possible and argues 
that monetary policy must focus on the exchange rate or the use of interest rates to 
influence inflation. The ERM crisis, whilst demonstrating the impact of financial 
markets, was also due to other factors. These included the entry into the ERM at too high 
a rate, the German reunification shock and the lack of a domestic consensus on the 
required monetary disciplines. Above all, Goodhart argues, the ERM debacle illustrated 
the weakness of pegged but adjustable exchange rate systems. This leaves just "one golf 
club in the bag", namely interest rate policy. However, this remains a viable option and, 
hence, to give it over to the ECB would, in Goodhart's view, amount to a loss of 
monetary sovereignty.108
Together with the general arguments on the power of global capital a particular British
105 D. Currie, The pros and cons of EMU. (The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1997), p. 10.
106 J. Grahl, op.cit.. d.234.
107 Ibid.
108 C. Goodhart "Would it Matter if the Chancellor of the Exchequer No Longer Controlled Monetary Policy?" in C. Taylor (Ed.), 
op.cit.. pp:195-199.
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emphasis can be added. In Britain monetary policy has historically been imbued with 
intensely political significance. Until 1997 British interest rates were determined by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, making monetary policy a matter of political responsibility 
to the government, implying in turn accountability, in theory at least, to Parliament. Even 
under the new arrangements giving operational independence to the Bank of England for 
interest rate policy, the government continues to set the explicit inflation rate target and 
the Bank of England is still accountable to the government. This situation can be 
contrasted historically to that of Germany. In Germany the independent Bundesbank 
fiercely followed a policy of monetary stability. In addition the Bundesbank's policy was 
widely supported by a political consensus (including the wider electorate) bearing in 
mind the shared memory of the 1923 hyper-inflation.109 In Britain this consensus has 
historically been absent.110
The arguments on monetary sovereignty are more complex than they initially appear. As 
Congdon argues, within the Maastricht treaty, the "devil is in the detail". Overall the 
Maastricht treaty gives a high degree of monetary authority to the ECB along the lines of 
the Bundesbank model. This, in principle, appears to undermine Britain's monetary 
sovereignty given British accession to EMU. However, the primary, albeit negative, 
argument against this is that global financial flows have already undermined monetary 
sovereignty. The key question though is whether Britain can pursue an independent 
monetary policy. Using the options basis to sovereignty outlined in Chapter 2 Britain 
arguably retains monetary sovereignty outside of EMU. She retains “one golf club”, to 
use Goodhart’s terminology, namely interest rates and thereby has two options (the other 
option being giving up the golf club completely). However, the other sovereignty 
questions must not be overlooked in the inevitable emphasis on monetary issues.
109 See D. Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank that Rules Europe. (Mandarin Paperbacks, London, 1993).
110 This argument is advanced in the findings of the Kingsdown Enquiry into Britain and EMU. See C. Taylor (Ed.), op.cit.. p.83.
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Institutional Sovereignty: The European Central Bank
Closely related to the issue of monetary sovereignty is the institutional sovereignty of the 
ECB. The institution of the ECB is a central feature of EMU and justifies the use of the 
term “institutional sovereignty” as a separate sovereignty question. Although the 
discussion focuses on the narrower concept of accountability, the key point from a 
sovereignty perspective is the accountability to the political authorities of the member 
states. The establishment of the ECB has raised concerns about its political accountability 
given the high degree of operational independence. This will be discussed in four main 
areas. Firstly, what meanings can be given to the concept of accountability? Secondly, 
what are the key provisions of the Maastricht treaty? Thirdly, how does this compare to 
arrangements at other national central banks? Finally, what are the key political elements 
at the European level affecting the operation of the ECB?
Accountability within the academic literature has been given a range of meanings, three 
of which can be highlighted. The first is the narrow sense of "giving an account", namely 
reporting to relevant political authorities. The second is the wider sense of accountability 
where the central bank has full operational independence but within a contractual 
framework with political authorities. Finally, the third sense is where political authorities 
exercise an ongoing stewardship role based on the advisory capacity of the central 
bank.111 Criteria of accountability include the appointment and removal of key central 
bankers and other persons with influence, the openness of proceedings, the establishment 
of overall and specific objectives, the use of necessary monetary instruments and the 
framework of performance reporting. Accountability and independence should not be 
seen as necessarily contradictory. For example, the quantification of monetary policy 
objectives can serve both independence and accountability.112
111D. Mayes, “Accountability of the Central Bank in Europe”, Lothian Conference, A Central Bank for Europe, 19/11/1997.
112 F. Artenbrink, The Democratic Accountability o f Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank. (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1999).
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The Maastricht provisions raised serious concerns as to the accountability of the ECB. 
The only specific Article on accountability is Article 109b, which states that the ECB will 
present an annual report to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Council 
and the Commission setting out monetary policy performance on the previous and current
t 1 •}
year. This report is to be presented to the European Council and the European 
Parliament by the ECB President and a debate may be held. In addition, the European 
Parliament may request that the ECB President or any of the other executives appear 
before the relevant Committees of the European Parliament. The key power remaining 
with the political authorities is the selection of the President and five executives of the 
ECB who are chosen by the Heads of Government by "common accord".114
The debate over whether Dutch central banker Wim Duisenberg or French central banker 
Jean-Claude Trichet should be President highlighted the importance of the ECB President 
position. The eight year non-renewable terms of office with minimal rights of removal 
highlights the degree of independence of the ECB. This appeared to be undermined by 
the power struggle between Duisenberg and Trichet, which resulted in a British-led 
compromise of a “gentlemen’s agreement” whereby Duisenberg would stand down after 
four years to allow Trichet to accede to President.115 However, at this stage the ECB was 
still a fledgling organisation which had yet to utilise its formal powers. The minutes of 
key meetings are unlikely to be released for many years.116 Overall, the Maastricht 
provisions effectively amount to accountability in the narrow sense of "giving an 
account" and then only to EU political bodies rather than member state bodies. Many
113 Treaty of European Union. Article 109b, (3), 1992.
114 Ibid.. Article 109a, 2, (b).
115 See M. Marshall, The Bank. (Random House Business Books, London, 1999).
116 Ibid.. p.315.
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writers have commented on the lack of ECB accountability including Goodhart, 
Williamson and Kenen whilst others, such as Gros and Thygesen, argue that 
independence is more important.117 Overall though, the provisions for accountability are 
significantly less than those of other national central banks as can be illustrated by 
considering briefly the arrangements of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Bank of 
England and the Bundesbank.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) is often held to be an example of a central 
bank which balances independence and accountability. The objective of price stability 
was clearly established in the Reserve Bank Act of 1989 and the Policy Targets 
Agreement is established jointly between the governor and the Finance Minister. The 
governor has freedom of action in achieving the target by the appropriate use of monetary 
policy. The governor can be dismissed if his performance is deemed inadequate by the 
Finance Minister. In addition, the Minister can override the policy target for one year. 
This arrangement has led to an open decision making process with the RBNZ reporting 
every six months and appearing before the Finance and Expenditure Committee of 
Parliament five times a year. To date, the policy targets have generally been met so the 
balance has yet to be severely tested. The RBNZ has instrument independence but not 
goal independence.118
In Britain the revised arrangements for the Bank of England following the election of the 
Labour government have given the Bank of England a greater degree of independence.
117 See J. Williamson, "The Rise and Fall of Political Support for EMU" in A. Giovannini, M. Guitan and R. Portes (Eds.), The 
Monetary Future of Europe. (Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 1993); C. Goodhart, "The Political Economy of 
Monetary Union" in P. Kenen (Ed.), Understanding Interdependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy. (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1995); P. Kenen, EMU After Maastricht (Group of Thirty, Washington DC, 1992); D. Gros and N. 
Thygesen, European Monetary Integration: From the European Monetary System to the European Monetary Union. (Longman 
Publishing, London, 1992).
1,8 D. Maves. op.cit.
123
Before 1997 the Bank of England was effectively under governmental control. Gordon 
Brown, the Labour Chancellor, gave the Bank operational independence to use monetary 
instruments (including interest rates) to meet its objectives. Its monetary policy objective 
is, to quote the Chancellor, "to deliver price stability (as defined by the Government's 
inflation target) and, without prejudice to this objective, to support the Government's 
policy for growth and employment."119 It is interesting to note that die Government sets 
the target, that the operational policy is carried out by a Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) including members independent of the Bank and that responsibility for prudential 
supervision was removed from the Bank. Should the inflation target vary by an amount of 
1% (above or below) the Governor needs to send the Chancellor an "open letter" stating 
the reasons for the variance and the remedial action taken to restore the situation. In 
addition, in "extreme economic circumstances" where "the national interest" demands the 
Chancellor has a reserve power, subject to Parliamentary approval, to set interest rates for 
a limited period.120
The appointment of the Governor and two Deputy Governors is effectively made by the 
Prime Minister for a period of five years. The members of the MPC comprise the 
Governor, two Deputy Governors and six other members. Of the six other members, two 
are chosen by the Governor in consultation with the Chancellor and the other four are 
selected by the Chancellor. The terms of office are three years, very short by the 
standards of other national central banks. There has been debate as to whether the 
Treasury Select Committee should play a role in the appointment of the members of the 
MPC though this has been forthrightly rebuffed by the Treasury.121 Minutes of the 
meetings of the MPC are published, an Inflation Report is published biannually and the 
Governor regularly attends meetings of the Treasury Select Committee. In sum, although
119 Quoted in the Treasury Select Committee Report on the Accountability of the Bank o f England. 23/10/1997, Paragraph 14.
120 Ibid.. Paragraph 37.
121 P. Riddell, Speech at Institute of Historical Research. 14/1/1998.
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the move to operational independence for the Bank of England was a radical one by 
British standards, by international standards (especially the ECB) there remains a clear 
web of accountability to political authorities.
The Bundesbank arguably represented the icon of an independent central bank. The 
independence of the Bundesbank was enshrined in the Bundesbank Act of 1957 which 
also established a powerful executive board, albeit within an overall federal structure. 
The objectives of the Bundesbank covered both exchange rate stability and domestic 
price stability, though the focus was usually on price stability. Marsh argues that the 
Bundesbank, in spite of its reputation for monetary orthodoxy, was pragmatic in using a 
variety of monetary instruments to achieve its goals.122 This pragmatism allowed the 
Bundesbank to gain a credible reputation as an anti-inflationary institution and, for a 
central bank, a high degree of legitimacy with German public opinion (strengthened by 
the continuing reference to the hyper-inflation of 1923 and the subsequent rise of 
Nazism).123 This legitimacy fostered an independent attitude from the Bundesbank 
leaders in their dealings with government. This was illustrated in the 1997 "gold crisis" 
when the federal government failed in its aim of revaluing gold reserves (to help meet the 
convergence criteria for EMU) in the face of Bundesbank opposition. It also though led 
to an overall "clannishness" and tradition of secrecy within the Bundesbank.124 However, 
the Bundesbank leaders realised that their power base was a narrow one restricted to 
monetary affairs. The fight with the government over German monetary unification at par 
(one West German mark for one East German mark) and continued hesitations over the 
EMU project illustrated the overall limits of the Bundesbank's influence.
122 D. Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank that Rules Europe. (Mandarin Paperbacks, London, 1993), p23.
123 Point emphasised by German delegates, Lothian Conference, A Central Bank for Europe. 19/11/1997.
124 D. Marsh, op.cit.. p.22.
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The question of the accountability of the ECB must be seen in the context of the contrast 
between formal institutional strength and the lack of underlying political legitimacy. The 
strength is seen in the high degree of independence that the Maastricht Treaty gives the 
ECB in the area of monetary policy. The ECB operates on the basis of simple majority 
voting which further increases its operational independence. Above all, though the 
decentralised nature of the EU polity, with no clear countervailing political authority, 
highlights the relative power of the ECB. Unlike national central banks, whose 
independence may ultimately be undermined by a single central government, the statute 
of the ECB can only be changed by a new treaty ratified by all the EU member states. 
Dunnett argues that;
"The extent of the delegated power given to the ECB is all the more remarkable in that it 
is virtually irreversible. To reverse the transfer of power would require an amendment of 
the Treaty, to be ratified with the consent of the legislation of all member states."125
For Amy Verdun EMU represents an “asymmetric” model between an independent ECB 
and fiscal co-ordination by many national governments.126
The asymmetrical influence of the ECB has led to moves, especially from France, to 
establish political counterweights. The informal Euro-X grouping of the Finance 
Ministers of EMU states was illustrative of these moves.127 The grouping’s primary role 
is to evaluate and monitor the stability programmes submitted by member state 
governments in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact. It has also become an 
important venue for debate on wider economic issues related to EMU. However, it
125 D. Dunnett, "Legal and Institutional Issues affecting Monetary Union" in D. O'Keefe and P. Twomey (Eds.!. Legal Issues of die 
Maastricht Treaty. (Chancery Law Publishing, Chichester, 1994), p. 144.
126 A. Verdun, “An ‘Asymmetrical’ Economic and Monetary Union in the EU: Perceptions o f Monetary Authorities and Social 
Partners”, Journal of European Integration. Vol.20,No.l, pp:107-132.
127 R. Pitchford and A. Cox, EMU Explained. (Reuters Publishing, London, 1997). The negotiations behind the Euro-X grouping are 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.
126
suffers from three main weaknesses. Firstly, it lacks the cohesion of the ECB in seeking 
to co-ordinate the differing views of 11 different governments. Secondly, it has only an 
informal existence with no legal powers. Finally, ECOFTN remains the primary decision 
making body including the non-EMU member states such as Britain.128 From a British 
perspective the delayed entry into EMU has reduced its potential role on either the Euro- 
X grouping or the Executive Board of the ECB. Even should Britain obtain a 
representative on the six person board of the ECB this will have minimal influence given 
the majority voting rule and anyway the representative will be independent of British 
political influence.129
Although strong in terms of capability the ECB’s strength rests on a narrow base in a key 
number of respects. Its functional area is restricted to that of monetary policy. Most 
importantly though, whatever its legal independence, the ECB needs to operate in a 
political context. Whilst the decentralised nature of the EU polity with a variety of 
institutions grants a central body like the ECB greater flexibility for action it may also 
need to operate more sensitively given the number of interested parties. Marsh argues that 
the key factor for successful monetary policy is that it is ultimately understood and 
supported by the general public.130 Whilst the Bundesbank had arguably achieved a 
degree of legitimacy the ECB, being both a novel institution and operating in a 
framework of varied political communities, faces a major task in establishing legitimacy. 
Indeed any crises in EMU, whether actual or perceived, are likely to lead to political 
attacks on the ECB. This may make it difficult for the ECB to avoid arguments for a 
"political counterweight" in the longer term. Nevertheless the overall monetary authority 
and independence of the ECB presents a considerable sovereignty challenge.
128 K. Dyson, The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown?. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), pp:l 8-21.
129 See C. Goodhart, "The Chancellor of the Exchequer and Monetary Policy" in C. Taylor (Ed.L European Monetary Union: The 
Kinesdown Enquiry. (Macmillan Press Limited, London, 1995), p. 198.
130 D. Marsh, op.cit.. p.26.
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Fiscal Sovereignty
The implications of EMU for the fiscal sovereignty of EU member states have been hotly 
debated. Fiscal policy is defined here as the ability of governments to tax, borrow and 
spend. The key question is to what extent, if any, have these powers under EMU, either 
by treaty or practice, been transferred to the European level. This can be considered in 
three main areas. Firstly, what debate has occurred in the area of fiscal deficits, including 
the ability of governments to borrow? Secondly, what debate has occurred in the area of 
taxation? Finally, the debate on public expenditure will be examined. These debates will 
consider the relevant provisions, if any, of the Maastricht Treaty or the 1996 Growth and 
Stability Pact (incorporated in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty) and perceived impact of 
these provisions in practice. A brief analysis will be made of the fiscal division of powers 
in the existing federations of Switzerland, the USA and Canada.
Whilst emphasising monetary questions the Treaty was less specific on fiscal questions.
1 ' J 1In effect fiscal policies are essentially left in the hands of the member states. The one 
exception was in the area of fiscal deficits. This can be seen in two phases; as part of the 
convergence criteria in Stage 2 of EMU and as an ongoing mechanism. The convergence 
criteria were designed to ensure that there was sufficient economic convergence between 
member states prior to the move to irrevocably fixed exchange rates in Stage 3 of EMU. 
One of the key criteria was the requirement to avoid an excessive deficit (defined as not 
exceeding 3% of GDP and a debt-to-GDP ratio no higher than 60%). The other criteria 
were exchange rate stability, a degree of price stability and convergence of interest rates. 
The "excess deficit" criterion received a large degree of attention, being seen as 
excessively deflationary in certain quarters, a factor which should be bome in mind in 
later discussions of the political impact.132 However, it was primarily a transitional
131 P. Van Den Bempt, "The Impact o f Economic and Monetary Union on Member States' Fiscal Policies", in K. Gretschmann (Ed.), 
Economic and Monetary Union: Implications for National Policy Makers. (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993).
132 See J. Grahl, op.cit.
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mechanism for selecting the initial members of EMU and the criteria were not interpreted 
on a strict basis. The final decision on initial members rested with the Council and eleven 
EU member states acceded to EMU on 1 January 1999 with the other four (UK; 
Denmark; Sweden; Greece) staying aside for now. The UK and Denmark have "opt-outs" 
enshrined in the Maastricht treaty, Sweden did not meet the exchange rate stability 
criterion (interpreted as two years prior membership of the wide band ERM) and Greece 
did not meet the criteria. However, the convergence criteria, being transitional, had only a 
limited ongoing impact on fiscal sovereignty, which need to be considered in respect of 
the more permanent provisions of Stage 3.
The main fiscal controls under Stage 3 envisaged by the Maastricht treaty were threefold. 
Firstly, there is the general provision for overall budgetary discipline and macroeconomic 
co-ordination in an open manner. Secondly, there are detailed prescriptions for 
constraints on monetary financing including the abolition of monetary financing of public 
debts, the abolition of privileged access by public authorities to financial instruments and 
allocation of the responsibility for public deficits to the member state involved with no 
"bail-out" obligations for other states. Finally, the avoidance of excessive deficits is 
subject to mutual surveillance and ultimately sanctions against persistent non- 
compliance.133 The economic rationale behind the Maastricht controls was that the 
liberalised capital markets under EMU, together with the absence of an exchange rate 
risk, would provide a ready market of funds for profligate member states. The subsequent 
potential interest rate rise may affect other member states who would, in effect, be 
sharing the cost of the profligacy of a single state. Opinions vary as to whether this 
situation of sovereign debt can be solved by market forces or requires other measures. 
The Maastricht Treaty primarily supported the view that other measures were required.134
133 W. Molle, O. Sleijpen and M. Vanheukelen, "The Impact of EMU on Social and Economic Cohesion" in K. Gretschmann (Ed.), 
op.cit.. p.231.
134 P. Van Den Bempt, "The Impact of Economic and Monetary Union on Member States' Fiscal Policies", in K. Gretschmann (Ed.), 
op.cit.. p.254.
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The controls on fiscal deficits for Stage 3 in the Maastricht Treaty were largely seen to
require further development and the Stability and Growth Pact sought to address this gap.
The background to the agreement was the desire of Germany to ensure a sound basis to
EMU whilst others, notably France, sought to limit the controls. The Stability and
Growth Pact requires member states to develop, and annually update, stability and
convergence programmes. These programmes and the budgetary performance of the
member states will be monitored by the Commission and the Council who will give early
warning of "any significant deterioration which might lead to an excessive deficit" and
1
address recommendations to the relevant member state. An excessive deficit (defined
as with the convergence criteria as exceeding 3% of GDP) will be subject to a report by
the Commission giving recommendations to the Council. The 3% value may not be
applied if there is an unusual event outside the control of the member state or a severe
economic downturn (defined as an annual fall of over 2% GDP).136 The Council will ask
the member state to take effective action within four months and correct the deficit within
one year.137 Should the deficit not be addressed sanctions may be enforced in terms of
1 ^8fines (up to a maximum of 0.5% of GDP) and non interest bearing deposits.
The detailed procedures behind the Stability and Growth Pact have been outlined in order 
to focus the discussion on fiscal sovereignty. In principle the potential of sanctions being 
imposed on a sovereign state presents a considerable challenge to fiscal sovereignty. 
However, the long sequence of steps prior to the imposition of sanctions limits the 
probability of their application. Sanctions will be decided in the Council (on the basis of
135 The Stability and Growth Pact Clause 25.
136 Ibid.. Clauses 27/28.
137 Ibid.. Clause 31.
138 Ibid.. Clause 35.
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QMV), further minimising the probability of their application. Although the provisions 
appear strict at a first glance there are many areas requiring interpretation by the Council. 
The flexibility of interpretation inherent in the Pact reflected arguments, especially from 
France, that there could be no restrictions on the sovereign decisions of ECOFIN.139 In 
sum, the practical aspects of the Stability and Growth Pact, operating as it does through 
the Council and QMV, limit the overall effect on fiscal sovereignty. The only option a 
member state has to avoid is high spending and low taxation, which is usually 
economically disastrous too. They can still choose in the widest sense on high tax, high 
spending or low tax, low spending.
The area of taxation remains largely wedded to national jurisdictions. There are already 
some provisions for harmonisation of VAT in terms of minimum tax rates and some 
measures in respect of multinationals.140 These provisions are limited as illustrated by the 
reduction in VAT on fuel from 8% to 5% by the Labour government in 1997. However, 
EMU is expected to make maintaining national tax policy more difficult as price 
transparency and the reduction of transaction costs will highlight differences in taxation. 
This is particularly significant in the area of capital taxes as capital flows in a liberalised 
currency market are highly sensitive to national differences in taxation.141 In examining 
the likely impact of EMU, Genser and Hauffer make a distinction between tax co­
ordination and tax harmonisation. Tax co-ordination comprises all measures that align 
national tax systems while maintaining national tax rate autonomy. Tax harmonisation is 
a necessary further step should tax co-ordination measures be deemed infeasible or 
insufficient. They argue that tax harmonisation is particularly necessary in the areas of
139 R. Pitchford and A. Cox, Explaining EMU. (Kogan Page Limited, London, 1997), p.65.
140 P. Lagayette, "Will Parliament Retain its Power to Tax and Spend if  Britain Participated in a European Monetary Union" in C. 
Taylor (Ed.), op.cit.. p.192.
141B. Genser and A. Hauffer, 'Tax Competition, Tax Coordination and Tax Harmonisation: The Effects of EMU" in R. Holzmann 
(Ed.), Maastricht: Monetary Constitution without a Fiscal Constitution?. (NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1996), p.83.
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corporation tax and interest income in the form of minimum levels.142 In the long-term 
they argue that EMU will lead to an increasing need for tax harmonisation measures. 
Certainly even if no conscious harmonisation process takes place there is likely to be a 
narrowing of differentials due to market competition. However, for fiscal sovereignty to 
be challenged in the future European legislation will be required. The sensitivity of the 
tax harmonisation debate in the British context is discussed in further detail in Chapter 6.
The centralised European budget provides minimal scope for fiscal policy. The Wemer 
Report on EMU in the 1970s proposed a degree of fiscal centralisation and, more 
specifically, the Macdougall Report in 1977 suggested that the EU budget should consist 
of at least 5% of member states’ GDP.143 In most federations around 20-25% of GDP is 
incorporated in a central budget. In the EU the equivalent figure is around 1.27% and this 
figure was declared to be a maximum ceiling at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992.144 This 
overall ceiling was confirmed at the European Council in Berlin in 1999 following 
consideration of the financial implications of EU enlargement.145 The EU budget is 
clearly insufficient to act as an automatic fiscal stabilising mechanism during economic 
downturns.146 In addition, the budget is allocated to particular activities. Approximately 
50% of the EU budget is devoted to agriculture and around 35% to Structural and 
Cohesion funds for regional development.147 In sum, the focus on public expenditure 
under EMU will probably remain at a national level.
142 Ibid.. p. 107.
143 C. Johnson, In With the Euro. Out with the Pound. (Penguin Books, London, 1996), p.124.
144 N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union. (3rd Ed., Macmillan Press, London, 1994), p342.
145 “The European Council: Presidency conclusions”, Europa Web Site (http://europa.eu.int/council/ofl7conclu/inar99_en.htm).
146 J. Grahl, op.cit.. p.196.
147 N. Nugent, op.cit.. p.345.
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Although EMU has largely been considered in terms of the Maastricht Treaty it is often 
argued that, whatever the current provisions, EMU will inevitably lead to fiscal 
centralisation in the longer term. Two economic arguments are put forward for this view. 
Firstly, in EMU there will be a greater emphasis on fiscal policy as a stabilising factor in 
cyclical economic management at a member state level, given that they can no longer use 
the monetary policy option.148 Secondly, EMU may lead to greater regional differences 
whereby states, being unable to devalue, may need to use active fiscal policy to mediate 
any downturn. The particular situation which has attracted academic attention has been 
the possibility of an "asymmetric shock" (such as German unification), whereby a region 
or state is affected to a far greater extent than other regions or states.149 This is deemed to 
be of greater relevance in Europe due to the very low degree of labour mobility.
Proposals have been made for a system of "fiscal federalism", whereby taxes and 
expenditure would be allocated to the most efficient level in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity.150 Oskar Lamfalussy, previous President of the European 
Monetary Institute (the forerunner to the ECB), has called for a common fiscal policy for 
monetary union to work.151 The Munster agreement in October 1997 between France and 
Germany led to an agreement to co-ordinate fiscal policies in the build up to EMU.152 
However, co-ordination needs to be clearly distinguished from a common policy at a 
European level. Linkage between monetary policy and fiscal policy is not necessarily 
automatic and no agreed moves to centralise fiscal sovereignty have yet been made. In 
that sense, as Holzmann argues, the Maastricht Treaty could be seen as a "monetary
148 J. Grahl, op.cit.. p.198.
149 C. Johnson, op.cit. p. 124.
150 A discussion of "fiscal federalism" is outlined in L. Feld and G. Kirchgassner, "Ome Agens Agendo Perficitur: The Economic 
Meaning of Subsidiarity" in R. Holzmann (Ed.), op.cit.. pp-203-207.
151 Quoted in The European. 19/1/1998.
152 Ibid.
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constitution without a fiscal constitution".153 In addition, fiscal sovereignty is arguably 
more fundamental than monetary sovereignty, because of the range of functions covered 
by tax and expenditure together with the more direct linkage to democratic legitimacy.
What indications does fiscal practice in other federations hold for EMU? In Switzerland 
fiscal powers are split between three levels; the centre, the cantons and localities. The 
centre obtains most of its revenue from indirect taxation whilst direct income and 
corporation taxes provide the cantons and localities with their revenue. Indeed direct tax 
rates vary to locality level with two tax havens (Zug and Liechtenstein (which has an 
economic union with Switzerland)) attracting a high degree of top earners in a small state 
with free labour mobility. Feld and Kirchgassner in their study of Switzerland argue that 
the localities and cantons have maintained their fiscal powers over time, that the 
redistributive mechanisms are of a similar value to other federations and the provision of 
public goods is maintained in spite of the effect of tax competition. Interestingly tax 
competition has not led to a notable degree of tax convergence and arguably the system 
of direct democracy serves to limit centralisation tendencies.154 Switzerland's fiscal 
system seems to support arguments that EMU will not necessarily lead to fiscal 
centralisation and the subsequent loss of fiscal sovereignty. However, with federal level 
expenditure of 6.3% of GDP in 1989 this level remains well above the current EU level 
of 1.27%.155
In Canada and the USA the federal level plays a more significant fiscal role than 
Switzerland. In both cases, unlike Switzerland, the bulk of direct taxation goes to the
153 R. Holzmann (Ed.), op.cit.. p.9.
154 L. Feld and G. Kirchgassner, op.cit. pp:207-214.
155 Ibid.. p.213. See also D. Mackay, “Policy Legitimacy and Institutional Design”, Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.38, No.l, 
March 2000, pp:25-44.
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federal level. In 1990 the federal level accounted for 11.9% of GDP in the USA and 
16.4% in Canada, much higher than the Swiss central level.156 However, there are also 
key differences between the two systems. Canada has a more decentralised system with 
provinces having a considerable degree of fiscal freedom without being constrained by 
balanced budget provisions as in the USA. Overall in Canada there is a higher level of 
taxation and an explicit aim at the federal level to redistribute income to poorer 
provinces. Bayoumi and Masson argue that, unlike the EU, Canada and the USA are less 
likely to face one-off region specific shocks. However, stabilisation flows (a 
redistribution of income to states/provinces more affected by an asymmetric shock) 
amount to around 30 cents in a dollar in both states. This figure is similar to that in other 
European states but, as discussed earlier, the EU currently has virtually no stabilsation 
role.157 In addition both states have significant redistribution functions (22% to the dollar 
in the USA and 39% in Canada), well beyond those of the current EU Structural or 
Cohesion Funds.158
Radaelli in his analysis of the general lessons from the fiscal federations of the USA, 
Canada and Switzerland, argues that four conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, all types of 
taxes will vary with different levels of authority. Secondly, it is customary to find a 
variety of rates between different sub-units allowing tax competition though generally 
within an overall framework. Thirdly, mitigation of socio-economic differences between 
the sub-units is assured by significant fiscal transfer mechanisms. Finally, after a period 
of greater centralisation the pendulum is swinging towards greater autonomy for the sub­
units.159 Clearly the EU currently has few, if any, of these features and the main contrast 
under EMU is the cleavage between fiscal and monetary policy. Whether this cleavage is
154 T. Bayoumi and P. Mason, "What can the Fiscal Systems of the United States and Canada tell us about EMU?" in P. Welfens (Ed.),
European Monetary Developments: EMS Developments and International Post-Maastricht Perspectives. (3rd Ed., Springer Verlag,
Heidelberg, 1996), Table l,p.325.
157 Ibid.. p p :3 18- 319.
158 Ibid.. p.321.
159 C. Radaelli, The Politics o f Corporate Taxation in the European Unioa (Routledge Publishing, London, 1997), p. 191.
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sustainable in the longer term is an essentially contested argument. For Radaelli the 
conclusion is a highly tentative and conditional outcome;
"It is not inconceivable to argue, in conclusion, that the road to monetary union, will 
require, at some point, an explicit consideration of fiscal federalism as a complementary 
aspect of EMU."160
In sum, none of the existing fiscal federations would seem to supply an appropriate 
comparative model to the EU. As currently conceived fiscal arrangements under EMU 
will be considerably more decentralised than those of the three federal states of Canada, 
the USA or Switzerland.
European Political Union?
The debate over a potential link between EMU and European political union can be 
analysed in three main areas. Firstly, what meanings are given, in the literature, to 
European political union? Secondly, given the political motivations identified by a 
number of writers to the EMU process, what linkages are perceived in the process 
(especially for Germany which sought moves toward political union)? Thirdly, the 
question also arises as to whether the sustainability of EMU or potential divergences 
within the EU could lead to moves away from European political union.
There are many views on the meaning of European political union. This debate links 
closely to the current conceptions of the European Union outlined in Chapter 2, ranging 
from an intergovernmental association of sovereign states to a putative federation. 
Clearly the impact of EMU on political union depends to a large extent on the starting 
point of the author. Currie argues that, as the EU is already, in his opinion, a loose form
160 Ibid.. p. 196.
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of federation the choice is between degrees of federalism, of which EMU is one 
component.161 The Kingsdown Enquiry into Britain and EMU identified four meanings to 
political union; limited political impacts from EMU, economic union, political and 
constitutional changes to the EU and a full federal state. These meanings portray 
differences in scale as to the overall political effect of EMU. The first two meanings have 
been addressed in the discussions on monetary sovereignty and fiscal sovereignty so the 
attention here will be focused on the latter two meanings of additional political and 
constitutional changes beyond these issue areas including the ultimate position of a 
federal Europe.
The debate on the linkage between EMU and political union has been bedevilled by an 
absence of precise meaning and the lack of detailed analysis on potential links leading to 
assertions as to the presence or absence rather than complex elaboration. Unlike the 
inevitable dualism prompted by EMU (to join or not to join), political union is much 
more a matter of degree making the links between the two very complex. Little guidance 
can be found from either the Maastricht or Amsterdam treaties other than general phrases 
such as "an ever closer union". To take some examples of general views, Johnson argues 
that EMU will not lead to a "single state" but that political union of a limited kind may 
occur. This would include topics like extensions of the powers of the European 
Parliament, extensions of QMV, closer foreign and security policy and home affairs.163 
Christopher Taylor argues that EMU will not lead inexorably to political union. Even so 
he also points out that EMU is compatible with political union and perhaps essential to 
it.164 Currie stresses that EMU could lead to a centralised federation or a very 
decentralised model on the Swiss basis. The key point though is that this is a political
161 D. Currie, The pros and cons o f EMU. (Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1997), pp:17-18.
162 C. Taylor (Ed.), op.cit.. p.90.
163 C. Johnson, op.cit.. p. 196.
164 C. Taylor, op.cit.. p. 146.
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choice for Europe.165 There is then an overall sense that EMU is a necessary condition for 
political union but not a sufficient one.
One of the ironies of EMU is that for all the writings on the economics of EMU many 
writers stress the political motivation behind the process. From an economic perspective 
and having completed a book on "The Economics of Monetary Integration" De Grauwe 
provides a typical example of this characteristic;
"The decision to go ahead with monetary union has clearly been inspired by the political 
objective of European unification. In the dynamic towards political union, many 
objections expressed by economists...have been brushed aside."166
From a political science perspective Martin and Garnett argue that EMU is being 
promoted vigorously to hasten European political union. There is both the element of 
the wider ideological vision of a united Europe together with the intergovernmental 
bargaining of national interests. The key element is believed to be the central bargain 
between France and Germany. France is deemed to obtain a stable currency whilst 
Germany obtains an independent foreign policy.168 Whilst a clear oversimplification 
amongst a range of other factors, the specific aims of the German government toward 
political union provide one explicit method of discussing the linkage between EMU and 
political union.
165 D. Currie, op.cit.. p. 17.
166 P. De Grauwe, The Economics of Monetary Integration. (2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p.210.
167 L. Martin and J. Garnett, British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century. (Pinter Publishing, London, 1997), 
p. 124.
168 C. Johnson, op.cit.. p.7.
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The position of the German government was central to the successful launch of EMU. 
However, economically the advantages of a wide EMU to Germany were problematic 
given the successful, long-term record of the Bundesbank in providing price stability.169 
Hence it is argued that Germany's motives were primarily political, seeking to underpin 
EMU in return for moves to political union. An explicit linkage strategy by the German 
government can be identified prior to Maastricht. Woolley argues, utilising Putnam's 
concept of two-level games, that Kohl explicitly sought to link EMU and political union. 
At the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 Kohl tried to delay the EMU IGC 
by six months in order to consider the overall EU institutional structure. In spring 1990 
he succeeded at the Dublin European Council in setting up a parallel IGC on political 
union to run alongside the EMU IGC.170 The explicit linkage was outlined by Kohl in a 
speech ten days before the Maastricht conference;
"Political union and monetary union are inseparably linked. The one is the unconditional 
complement of the other. We cannot and will not give up sovereignty over monetary 
politics if political union remains a 'castle in the air'."171
The German government position arose from a mix of domestic and international factors. 
On the international front German unification required reassurance to their European 
partners that Germany would remain embedded in European arrangements. On the 
domestic front the long-standing political consensus in favour of European integration, 
the need to maintain the support of the coalition partner (the strongly pro-European 
liberal party (the FDP)) and the aim of dividing the opposition SPD can be seen as
179motivational factors for Kohl's linkage strategy. The other interested party was the
169 P. De Grauwe, op.cit. p.162.
170 J. Woolley, "Linking Political Union and Monetary Union" in B. Eichengreen and J. Frieden, The Political Economy o f European 
Monetary Unification. (Westview Press, Oxford, 1994), pp:71-73.
171 Quoted in D. Marsh, op.cit. p.242.
172 J. Woolley, op.cit. pp:76-83.
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Bundesbank whose very existence was directly threatened by EMU. The Bundesbank 
clearly could not openly oppose the EMU process given the strength of the political 
forces in favour. They, therefore, sought to ensure that EMU would reflect the 
Bundesbank model with tight financial convergence criteria on potential members, 
legally based independence for the ECB, an overriding objective of price stability and 
further steps toward political union. The importance of political union was underlined in 
a Bundesbank statement in September 1990;
"A monetary union is an irrevocably sworn coffatemity - "all for one and one for all" - 
which, if it is to prove durable, requires, judging from past experience, even closer links 
in the form of a comprehensive political union."173
The interesting point here though is that the Bundesbank perceived political union as 
primarily economic union, whilst the German government were more concerned with 
institutional reforms. In addition, whilst the Bundesbank was quite prepared to delay or 
even cancel EMU the German government was not prepared to go that far.174
Even if there was an explicit linkage strategy operated by the German government the 
outcome of the Maastricht treaty must also be taken into consideration. It can be argued 
that the centrepiece of the Maastricht treaty was the arrangements for EMU and that, by 
comparison, the arrangements for political union were limited. In particular the 
arrangements for foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs in 
intergovernmental "pillars", clearly separated from the main European Community 
framework, highlighted the limits to the "ever closer union". Within Germany itself Kohl 
came under fire for the lack of symmetry between EMU and political union. The popular 
press attacked him for giving up the Deutschemark and the Bundesbank openly criticised
173 Quoted in D. Marsh, op.cit. p.242.
174 D. Marsh, op.cit.. p.246.
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the lack of progress in the Maastricht Treaty.175 The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty also 
revealed only limited progress toward political union. Duff argues that Amsterdam left
I  > 7 /
much remaining to be done in order to attain a full constitutional settlement. In the 
same volume Lamberto Dini comments that Amsterdam was "a bitter disappointment" 
from a federalist perspective.177 These comments highlight the limitations on the 
automaticity of the linkage between EMU and political union.
The limitations of moves toward European political union are also illustrated in the area 
of labour market and employment policy. Following the convergence in power of Social 
Democratic governments increased emphasis was placed on employment policy. The 
Amsterdam treaty agreed the objective of promoting employment as a matter of common 
concern. This was followed by a series of initiatives at following European Councils. The 
Luxembourg summit in December 1997 focused on measures to improve the efficiency 
of the labour market and the Cardiff summit in June 1998 focused on benchmarking 
structural economic reform. These initiatives culminated in the European Employment 
Pact at the Cologne summit in June 1999. This process was marked by a divergence in 
perspectives ranging from the labour market flexibility approach of Blair’s British 
government to the neo-corporatist emphasis of the German government through to the 
statist emphasis of the French government. From a sovereignty perspective though the 
key words in the European Employment Pact were “enhanced and appropriate policy co­
ordination”, “dialogue” and “exchange of ideas”. In sum there were no major moves
178toward integration in an area of crucial economic and political significance.
175 For details see D. Marsh, op.cit.. pp239-251.
176 A. Duff (Ed.), The Amsterdam Treaty. (Federal Trust, London, 1997), p.xxxvi.
177 L. Dini, "The European Union after Amsterdam" in A. Duff (Ed.), on. cit.. p.xxviL
178 K. Dyson, The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown?. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), pp:37-42.
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Whilst the link between EMU and European political union is usually discussed in terms 
of the further development of political union, there is a converse argument that the 
possible failure of EMU may irreparably damage political union. Cohen argues that the 
sustainability of EMU is ultimately dependent on the political will of the members to 
integrate. This "political will" cannot be replaced by economic or organisational 
factors.179 Thus, there can be no assurance that EMU will prove irreversible.180 Any 
failure of EMU would have a clearly adverse impact on demands for a European political 
union. Beber has elucidated this argument from a "worried Europhile" perspective. He 
regards EMU as a major political project which diverted attention from other integration 
moves. The risks of the project must be seen in the context of the decreasing influence of 
states vis-a-vis markets and also the decreasing influence of national central banks vis-a- 
vis markets. In particular the lack of federal fiscal stabilisers may cause severe strains as 
does the division of EMU into "ins" and "outs.181
Conclusions
The challenges to sovereignty presented by EMU are complex and wide ranging. Three 
central arguments are put forward in this chapter. Firstly, from an analysis of historic and 
contemporary monetary unions it is argued that, although they shed light on certain 
features, EMU represents a unique situation in terms of both the breadth and depth of the 
project. I would agree with Panic that EMU is;
"...the most ambitious attempt ever made to create a complex international economic and 
monetary union while retaining national political institutions and sovereignty."182
179 B. Cohen, "Beyond EMU: The Problem of Sustainability" in B. Eichengreen and J. Frieden, op. c it . pp:162-163.
180 Ibid.. p. 150.
181 Arguments presented to the Lothian Foundation Conference, A Central Bank for Europe. 19/11/97; Lothian Foundation 
Conference, Can Britain Stay Outside the Euro?. 7/11/97.
182 M. Panic, European Monetary Union: Lessons from the Classical Gold Standard. (Macmillan Press, London, 1992), p.8.
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The second argument put forward is that, considering the challenges of EMU across the 
four sovereignty questions, there is a marked divergence between the monetary and 
institutional aspects compared with the fiscal and political questions. Considering the 
twin aspects of sovereignty developed in Chapter 2, namely political authority and a 
degree of effective capability, the monetary and institutional arrangements for EMU 
present considerable challenges to these sovereignty questions. The creation of the ECB 
with clearly defined and extensive monetary authorities which are unlikely to be reversed 
was the central feature of EMU. In contrast, the fiscal and political arrangements were 
more uncertain. EMU was clearly a European monetary union. However, it was an 
incomplete economic union leaving crucial economic issues such as fiscal arrangements 
and labour market flexibility unresolved. On wider political union the arrangements were 
even more uncertain.
The third and crucial argument advanced is that the challenges to sovereignty presented 
by EMU were sufficient to generate an intense political debate in Britain. Whilst the 
fiscal and political arrangements were unclear under EMU they were nevertheless placed 
on the agenda. There can be no denying the political element and significance of EMU, 
which was arguably a necessary, if not sufficient, step toward European political union. 
For Britain two other factors were significant. Firstly, Britain’s unhappy experiences with 
European monetary politics and limited role in the development of EMU, symbolised by 
the “opt-out”, heightened the overall sense of isolation from the majority of EU members. 
Secondly, EMU itself crystallises the situation for Britain in that she either joins or stays 
outside. Unlike the multiple conceptions that can be given to the EU, EMU presents a 
binary dilemma for Britain. As the Kingsdown Enquiry into Britain and EMU noted;
"Monetary union is fairly easy to describe: you either have it or you don't. Opinions may 
differ about the conditions and the criteria for membership, or about the surrounding
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institutions and instruments needed to make monetary union work satisfactorily. But 
either you have a single currency or you don't; and if there is a single currency for some 
members of the European Union, then either Britain joins, or it stays out."183
It is within this context that the British domestic debate can be considered.
183 C. Taylor (Ed.), op.cit.. p.95.
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CHAPTER 4: MAASTRICHT TREATY RATIFICATION: SOVEREIGNTY SETS
THE AGENDA 
Introduction
The British debate on EMU and sovereignty will be considered from the Maastricht 
treaty ratification debate (1992-1993) through to the aftermath of the 1999 European 
election. The Maastricht treaty, with EMU as its central component, defined the terms 
within which the British domestic debate occurred. This chapter examines the discourses 
of sovereignty during the lengthy treaty ratification process in Parliament. Four main 
aspects will be addressed. Firstly, the EMU policies of the Major government and the 
Labour opposition after Maastricht will be outlined together with related arguments on 
sovereignty. Secondly, the ratification process will be discussed, focusing on the 
sovereignty arguments advanced by proponents and opponents of the treaty. Thirdly, a 
review will be made of a selection of publications written by Eurosceptics involved in the 
Maastricht treaty debate. Finally, an appraisal of the overall ratification process will be 
made.
The basic argument advanced in this chapter is that the lengthy and troublesome 
ratification process allowed the EMU debate in British politics to be defined in terms of 
sovereignty. The Eurosceptic opponents of the treaty, though a clear minority, were able 
to set the agenda of the debate. The Eurosceptics were clearly helped by other events 
including the small parliamentary majority of the Major government, Britain's forced 
withdrawal from the ERM and the Danish "No" vote. A significant development was that 
the Eurosceptics built on the traditional idea of parliamentary sovereignty and developed 
two other elements of sovereignty, popular sovereignty (through the demand for a 
referendum) and executive sovereignty. When combined with free market ideas this 
wider conception of sovereignty became a potent cocktail. The overall effect was that, in 
spite of the ultimate ratification of the treaty, including the British EMU "opt-out", the
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emotion of the debate had been heightened and sovereignty had become a central 
component. In particular the divisions in the Conservative party along a 
sovereignty/interdependence axis widened during the ratification process and were to 
dominate the remaining years of the Conservative government.
EMU Policies Post-Maastricht
For Britain the key feature of the Maastricht treaty on EMU was the “opt-out” on joining 
Stage 3 of EMU, the key stage for forming a single currency. The EMU "opt-out" 
provided an open option for Britain which set the framework for the domestic debate. 
The very negotiation of the "opt-out" illustrated the desire of the government to defer 
such a critical issue. Forster, in a detailed study of Britain and the Maastricht 
negotiations, located the "opt-out" in British isolation (other than Denmark) over EMU.1 
There was a clear divergence of positions between Britain and the other EU states who 
were determined to press ahead with EMU leaving the "opt-out" as the only way to 
resolve the situation. The "opt-out" was officially suggested by Delors and served to 
ultimately reconcile the positions of the two groups. British attempts to negotiate a 
generalised “opt-in” rather than a specific “opt-out” (which would demonstrate British 
isolation) were also a failure.
Interpreting Britain’s “opt-out” Forster argued that Britain's attitude to EMU was derived 
from internal divisions within the Conservative party, a failure to understand the serious 
intentions of other states in creating EMU and concerns over the sovereignty and 
economic implications of EMU. Alasdair Blair also argued that government policy was 
based on short-term considerations, especially the need to maintain the unity of the 
Conservative party. Dyson and Featherstone too stressed internal Conservative divisions
1 A. Forster, Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998), p.46.
2 Ibid.. p.65.
3 A. Blair, "A Very British Affair: The Major Government and Maastricht", PSA Conference, Keele University, April 1998.
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but additionally the incompatible policy styles between Whitehall and the EU and 
Britain’s overall lack of structural power to influence other EU member states.4 
Discussion in this thesis is focused on the domestic debate following the Maastricht treaty 
for three main reasons. Firstly, and most significantly, it allows the debate to be located 
within a clear treaty framework rather than unconfirmed proposals. Secondly, the focus 
moved from the executive negotiations leading up to EMU to the wider British political 
debate. This debate itself, previously concentrated on the ERM issue, began to move 
toward detailed consideration of EMU. Finally, there has been a plethora of academic 
literature focused on the Maastricht negotiations leading to EMU.5
The initial reactions to the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty were not as hostile as may 
have been expected from later developments. Major sought to proclaim the Treaty as a 
victory for British negotiating strategy which had reversed the trend towards federalism 
in the EC. His spokesman proclaimed that it was "game, set and match" to Britain given 
the “opt-outs” over EMU and the Social Chapter, the inclusion of the principle of 
subsidiarity and the avoidance of the word "federalism" in the preamble to the treaty. 
Given that one of the factors behind the "opt-out" was to maintain party unity over EMU 
it was important for Major to play the domestic game and highlight Britain's negotiating 
achievements.6 The need to defend the negotiating "success" partly explains the 
resolution with which the Maastricht Treaty was pushed through Parliament (especially 
in respect of whipping tactics) and the contempt in which Major held the Eurosceptic
4 K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Neeotiatine Economic and Monetary Union. (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999), pp:686-689.
5 See also K. Dyson, The Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. (Longman Publishing, London, 
1994);W. Sandholtz, "Monetary Bargains: The Treaty on EMU" in A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (Eds.1. The State of the European 
Community: the Maastricht Debates and Beyond. (Longman Publishing, London, 1993); A. Blair, "The UK and the Negotiation of the 
Maastricht Treaty 1990-1991". Ph. D. Thesis, Leicester University, 1997; D. Andrews, "The Global Origins of the Maastricht Treaty 
on EMU: Closing the Window of Opportunity" in A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal ('Eds.'). The State of the European Community: the 
Maastricht Debates and Bevond. (Longman Publishing, London, 1993); D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union?. (Macmillan Publishing, 
London, 1994).
6 S. Ludlam, "The Spectre Haunting Conservatism: Europe and Backbench Rebellion" in S. Ludlam and M J . Smith (Eds.), 
Contemporary British Conservatism. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1996), p. 111.
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opposition who failed to recognise this "success". Seldon, Major's biographer, argued that 
Major himself felt that Britain's reputation for keeping agreements was at stake in the 
ratification process.7
The relatively quiescent initial domestic reaction was highlighted in a House of 
Commons debate in December 1991 following the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Only six Conservative MPs voted against a motion approving the treaty whilst another 20 
were absent or abstained.8 Mrs. Thatcher, in spite of her opposition to the treaty, only 
abstained. Whilst this small rebellion can partly be explained by the clear Conservative 
parliamentary majority of 88 at the time and the imminence of the forthcoming general 
election it is notable that leading Eurosceptics, including Teddy Taylor and William 
Cash, did not oppose the motion. The debate itself was notable for the number of 
speeches made in support of the government’s negotiating achievement, especially the 
EMU "opt-out". Eurosceptic MP Nicholas Winterton commented that the "leadership that 
he [John Major] has shown at the Maastricht conference and his toughness in the 
negotiations clearly display that he is the only party leader competent to govern this 
country".9 Even Teddy Taylor was able to support the government as a "small gesture of 
gratitude and goodwill".10
The normally Eurosceptic press was also relatively complimentary towards Major's 
negotiated outcome at Maastricht. For the Daily Mail Major had "stood firm" and
7 A. Seldon, Maior: A Political Life. (Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London, 1997), p.295.
8 Those voting against were John Biffen, John Browne, Nicholas Budgen, Richard Shepherd, Norman Tebbit and Bill Walker. See R. 
Ware, "Legislation and Ratification: the Passage ofthe European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993" in P. Giddings and G. 
Drewry (Eds.), Westminster and Europe. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1996), p.262.
9 HC Deb 10/12/1991 c876.
10 HC Deb 18/12/1991 c361.
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"prevailed".11 The Daily Telegraph commented that Major deserved the "heartfelt 
gratitude" of his party.12 For the Times the whole event was described as an "emphatic 
success".13 Young argued that the Treaty was "as good as Britain could have expected".14 
Stephens commented that "Major's assured performance at the Maastricht 
summit...secured him the best treaty available to the leader of such a divided party". 15 
Although the Maastricht Treaty had been finalised just before the 1992 election it 
actually failed to make a major impact during the election campaign. Given their internal 
divisions over Maastricht both of the main parties sought to keep the issue of Europe out 
of the campaign. Butler and Kavanagh, in their analysis of the election, suggested that 
Europe was the "lost issue". They noted that;
"Europe (which a few months earlier in the days of Mrs. Thatcher and of Maastricht had 
seemed so important) attracted little notice."16
The brewing storm was not noticeable during the election campaign.
The Conservative policy on EMU must be seen in the context of their wider policy on the 
EU. After supporting the Single Market Mrs. Thatcher had taken a considerably more 
Eurosceptic line when faced with proposals for EMU. This vehement opposition was 
illustrated in the 1988 Bruges speech where she attacked moves toward a United States of 
Europe of which EMU was a central component.17 Following Mrs. Thatcher's 
replacement by Major the tone changed significantly with Major's famous comment in
11 Daily Mail 12/12/1991.
12 Daily Telegraph. 12/12/1991.
13 Times. 12/12/1991.
14 H. Young, This Blessed Plot (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998), p.433.
15 P. Stephens, Politics and the Pound. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1997), p.203.
18 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992. (St. Martin's Press, London, 1992), p.l 10.
17 M. Thatcher, Britain and Europe: The Bruges Speech. (Conservative Political Centre, London, 1988).
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1991 that he aimed at putting Britain "where we belong", which was "at the very heart of
1 ftEurope, working with our partners in building the future". Hogg and Hill argued that 
this speech was misinterpreted because the rest of the speech, stressing Britain's desire 
for a decentralised, free trade Europe based on nation-states, could have almost been 
made by Mrs. Thatcher herself.19 Major's biographer, Seldon, pointed out that he meant 
specifically that Britain should be at the heart of the debate over the future of Europe. 
However, he further suggested that Major had no deep beliefs on Europe unlike the gut 
feelings on identity, national pride and sovereignty which were felt by other 
Conservatives such as Mrs. Thatcher. In his autobiography Major admitted that he was 
a “pragmatist” on the EU and that being at the heart of Europe was “self-evident” if 
Britain was to stay in Europe. It was very difficult to envisage a similar comment being 
made by Mrs. Thatcher. Major’s pragmatic approach to the EU provided the context in 
which the EMU policy was set.
Given the “opt-out” and the long time period prior to eventual EMU membership the 
government followed a strict "wait and see" policy over British membership of EMU. In 
his autobiography Major stressed the forces within which government policy was 
established. The divisions within the Conservative party were clearly the major constraint 
with the European issue capable of splitting the party and “hurling it into the wilderness” 
or “even destroying it for good”. Interestingly he stressed the divisions at Cabinet level 
between the “fundamental opposition to entry” of Michael Howard, Peter Lilley and 
Michael Portillo and “support for the principle” from Ken Clarke, Michael Heseltine and 
John Selwyn Gummer. Major claimed to have “stood apart from both sides” and “decided
18 In A. May, Britain and Europe Since 1945. (Addison Wesley Longman Limited, Harlow, 1999), p.80.
19 S. Hogg and J. Hill, op.ciL. p.78.
20 A. Seldon, John Major: A Political Life (Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London, 1997), p .l 10.
21 J. Major, John Maior: The Autobiography. (HarperCollins Publishers, London, 1999), p.265.
22 Ibid.. p.584.
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upon the policy I believed to be right”.23 He claimed that he had serious reservations over 
EMU, which was “a weakening of our own sovereign responsibility for domestic 
decisions” 24 However, given potential long-term economic advantages to EMU, a “wait 
and see” policy was established. Major insisted, contrary to his critics, that the policy was 
dictated by the “long view” not “short term expedient to postpone conflict”. In sum, 
sovereignty can be seen to be an important initial consideration on policy in terms of both 
Major’s own position and Conservative divisions. This influence was to be extended and 
deepened by the Maastricht ratification debate.
The other initial driving force behind government EMU policy was the inherent 
uncertainty of EMU in 1992. Indeed for the government the EMU “opt-out” was as much 
a result as an option. Even during the final Maastricht negotiations on EMU Major, whilst 
hinting that Britain might eventually join an economically strong EMU, failed to address 
the crucial sovereignty questions. Minister of State, Tristan Garel-Jones, did comment 
on the potential economic benefits and political costs of EMU;
"The Prime Minister made it absolutely clear that some benefits could flow from a single 
currency. However, if we were to go down that route, substantial political sacrifices 
would have to be made not least by this House."27
However, the main theme was to keep options open as Chancellor Lamont succinctly 
summarised the position during the Maastricht negotiations. EMU was;
"...a veiy serious issue and we ought to decide it on its merits at the time. When we see
23 Ibid.. p.273.
24 Ibid.. p.272.
25 Ibid.
26 A. Forster, op.cit.. p.67. Forster argues that Major "sidestepped die thorny sovereignty issue completely".
27 HC Deb 18/12/1991 c424.
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whether it is going to work, Britain would have the complete freedom to decide to do 
what it wanted to do on the merits of the case and we don't think we should make up our 
minds today."28
The underlying assumptions were the long time frame before the realisation of EMU and 
the considerable uncertainty over whether EMU would ever take place. It is significant 
that in his introduction of the Second Reading of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Bill, which would ratify the Maastricht Treaty in the British Parliament,
9QMajor hardly mentioned EMU. However, Chancellor Lamont, later to become one of 
the leading Eurosceptics, did comment further on the government's policy. Whilst 
pointing to some of the economic advantages of EMU such as reduced transactions costs 
and exchange rate stability he stressed that joining EMU would be an "irreversible 
commitment". Such a step would involve transferring important powers over economic 
policy from national governments to an independent monetary authority. The key point, 
though, was that such a decision was far in the distant future and, even if EMU remained 
on course, "we do not know what economic conditions will prevail when the time to
o/\
make a decision comes". In sum, the "opt-out" was the key element of a strict "wait and 
see" policy.
Labour’s EMU policy must be understood in the context of its wider EU policy and own 
modernisation process. Having disastrously lost the 1983 election on an anti-EC platform 
policy moved in a pro-EC direction. However, the transition was a gradual one. In 1986 
the party wa£ still opposed to aspects of the Single European Act on national grounds. 
The key turn came after the 1987 election defeat and partly represented a reaction to Mrs.
28 In S. Hogg and J. Hill, op.cit.. p. 149.
29 HC Deb 20/5/1992 cc261-272.
30 HC Deb 21/5/1992 cc587-588.
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Thatcher's Bruges speech and Conservative Euroscepticism. Other factors were that the 
EC seemed less of a “capitalist club” with the social dimension of Delors and the need for 
a European wide economic strategy following the perceived failure of national reflation 
policies. Traditional domestic concern with parliamentary sovereignty declined in the 
light of these other developments. However, whilst arguably a "true conversion", to quote 
Tindale, a notable caution persisted as Labour sought, in Denis MacShane's terms, to 
"protect its flank" from sceptical public opinion. The Policy Review Process tended to 
focus on domestic issues.33 The rhetoric of modernisation was applied to European issues 
(such as seeking a "people's Europe") but it could be argued that there was no substantive 
European vision.34 In sum, Labour maintained a cautious pro-European position under 
Kinnock and Smith within which they developed their EMU policy.
Labour’s EMU policy initially tended to mirror the Conservative government policy in 
terms of no definite decision over British membership of EMU. However, the language 
was significantly different in places. During the late 1980s the party was clearly split over 
the ERM, let alone EMU, between the pro-European views of Shadow Chancellor Smith 
and the Euroscepticism of Shadow Industry spokesman Bryan Gould.35 Indeed a Policy 
Review document in 1989 stated opposition toward EMU.36 However, Gould was 
removed in November 1989 and in 1990, during the genesis of detailed EMU proposals, 
Labour edged toward supporting the general principle of EMU providing it was built on 
genuine economic convergence and a politically accountable central bank.37 Gould's
31 S. George and B. Rosamond, "The EC" in M.J. Smith and J. Spear (Eds.), The Changing Labour Party. (Routledge Publishing, 
London, 1992),p.l73.
32 S. Tindale, "Learning to Love the Market: Labour and the EC", Political Quarterly. Vol 63, No. 3, July-September 1992, pp:276- 
300; D. MacShane, "Europe's Next Challenge to British Politics", Political Quarterlv.Vol. 66, No. 1, Jan-March 1995, p.26.
33 See R. Holden, "New Labour's European Challenge", PSA Conference, University of Keele, April 1998, Vol 2, pp:781-793.
34 Ibid.
35 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1992. (Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1992), p.50.
36 A. McSmith, John Smith. (Verso Publishing, London, 1993), p. 153.
37 P. Daniels, "From Hostility to Constructive Engagement1: The Europeanisation o f the Labour Party" in H. Berrington fEd.). Britain
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removal effectively marked the acceptance of neo-liberal economic policy by Labour and 
the abandonment of radical plans for industrial modernisation, removing a key obstacle to 
EMU entry.38 Kinnock himself was keener on EMU given its support by other European 
socialist parties whilst the more pragmatic Smith stressed the need for genuine 
convergence.39 The new policy was endorsed by the National Executive Committee 
(NEC) in November 1990.40 However, they refused to set a timetable preferring a 
pragmatic convergence, stressed the need for increased regional transfers to stabilise 
EMU and the requirement for an ECB to be statutorily accountable to ECOFIN.41
Within the broad position outlined above Labour elaborated three general arguments in 
favour of a positive attitude toward EMU. Firstly, there was a perceived recognition that 
EMU was likely to occur given the political will of EU members. In addition EMU was 
regarded, secondly, as providing some economic benefits. These were not just the 
obvious short-term benefits of the avoidance of transaction costs or exchange rate 
certainty but perceived longer-term benefits such as lower interest rates and lower 
inflation. Finally, and most significantly, the sovereignty question was either generally 
denied or interpreted in terms of the need for influence within the EU. EMU was 
regarded as primarily an economic rather than a political issue 42 Whilst Labour presented 
three main arguments in favour of EMU there were also four main arguments which 
qualified support for EMU. The first, and most significant, was the need for EMU to be 
in the overall economic interests of Britain. A related argument was the need for 
convergence between the EU member state economies. This was interpreted by Labour,
in the Nineties: The Politics o f Paradox. (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1998), p.85.
38 Point made by Colin Hay at the conference "New Labour: Two Years On", University o f Birmingham, 9/5/1999. Hay argued that it 
was not until after 1994 that die move to neo-liberalism was accompanied by an emphasis on globalisation discourse.
39 A. McSmith, op.cit. p. 165.
40 NEC Statement on Economic and Monetary Union. Tribune 12/12/1990.
41 Guardian. 29/11/1990.
42 Economic Renewal in the EU: UK Labour and the Delors White Paper. (Labour Party, London, 1994).
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not just in terms of the narrow financial convergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty, but 
also included wider criteria such as economic growth and unemployment. The third 
argument was the need for strengthened accountability arrangements for the ECB, 
probably through ECOFIN.43 Finally, EMU would require the "consent" of the British 
people either in a referendum or at a general election. Given these considerations official 
policy remained the cautious one of qualified support subject to economic conditions.
The EMU “opt-out” policy of the government was vigorously attacked by Labour. 
Kinnock attacked the "opt-out" as not an "assertion of sovereignty" but a "resignation of 
sovereignty".44 For Kinnock, Major had "contrived to get a two-speed Community" with 
Britain in "the slow lane" utilising "escape clauses" rather than being at the heart of 
Europe. However, Labour argued that the Maastricht treaty did not commit Britain to 
joining EMU due to economic conditions. Several stages were deemed necessary before 
EMU could occur including strict economic convergence, the need for approval of Stage 
3 by the European Council and the need for a minimum number of members for EMU to 
proceed. However, if successful in the longer run, it was difficult to stand aside because 
otherwise Britain would be a "satellite" orbiting around EMU with “no pull, no power 
and no leverage".45 Nevertheless, Labour would not commit itself "in advance of 1997 to 
enter a single currency irrespective of what the state of the economy was" 46 The stress 
again was on EMU as an economic issue divorced from political considerations. The 
1992 Manifesto called for an "active part" to be played in future EMU negotiations, 
Europe-wide policies focused on solving unemployment and increasing economic growth 
rather than just the narrower financial convergence criteria, the location of the ECB in 
London and a political counterweight to the ECB in the form of ECOFIN.47
43 P. Mandelson and R. Liddle, The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver?. (Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1996), p.169.
44 HC Deb 20/5/92 cc277-278.
45 HC Deb 18/12/1991 c289.
46 HC Deb 18/12/1991 c292.
47 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c563.
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The comparison of the EMU policies of the two main parties revealed a basically similar 
position of deciding eventual membership at a later date. However, underlying this basic 
convergence were significant differences which were to become more pronounced in the 
future. Whilst the Conservative government was stressing the "opt-out" itself it still 
foresaw significant political factors which would inhibit future EMU membership. For 
Labour EMU was primarily addressed as an economic issue which seemed to override 
political considerations. This implied that future membership of EMU would be less of a 
strategic issue for Labour. The party itself had moved away from a national Keynesian 
economic policy toward a more free market stance in a European context. This meant that 
the instrumental use of sovereignty for a national economic policy was diminished.48 
However, concerns remained as to the monetarist ideology behind the Maastricht treaty. 
Paddy Ashdown, the Liberal Democrat leader, neatly summarised the policy positions of 
the two parties in 1992. Whilst Labour were willing to join the "club" (EMU) they would 
not pay the entrance fee in terms of economic convergence. The Conservatives 
meanwhile were not certain whether to join the "club" but were prepared to pay the 
entrance fee.49
The key point about the relatively quiescent initial reaction to the Treaty and approximate 
similarity in ultimate policy positions was that the multiple discourses of sovereignty had 
yet to be articulated by leading actors. Both the initial reaction and the 1992 General 
Election campaign had not placed EMU at the centre of the debate, primarily because of 
the continued belief that EMU was either unlikely to occur or was a problem for the 
longer term. However, the 1992/3 ratification debates were to lead to the articulation of a
48 P. Daniels, op.cit.. p.91.
49 HC Deb 20/5/92 c297.
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wide range of arguments on EMU focused around sovereignty.
The Ratification Debates
The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the European Communities (Amendment) 
Bill was a parliamentary process which lasted from the spring of 1992 to July 1993 
involving all types of procedural intricacies.50 Given that EMU was the central feature of 
the Treaty the debates focused on EMU issues. The Second Reading of the Bill was 
comfortably passed by over 200 votes. However, the progress of the bill was suspended 
following the Danish "No" vote in their referendum on the Treaty. As one former 
Conservative MP commented, the Danes, by saying "Boo" to the treaty, greatly 
emboldened the British Eurosceptics.51 Major, though reportedly "depressed" after the 
ERM debacle, was determined to see through the ratification process given that he had 
personally negotiated the treaty and it was a matter of honour that it should be 
implemented.52 A "paving" motion was only won by the government by three votes due 
to the support of the Liberal Democrats. After a detailed Committee stage, on the floor of 
the House for such a constitutionally important Bill, the Third Reading tended to repeat 
previous arguments and focus on procedural intricacies around the Social Chapter as 
Labour sought to defeat the government and the Conservative Eurosceptics sought to 
defeat the Treaty. The government eventually attained ratification of the Treaty in July 
1993 after a confidence motion. The discussion below will focus on the varied meanings 
given to sovereignty throughout these debates, especially in relation to EMU. Mention 
will also be made of the impact of the ERM debacle in September 1992 following 
Britain's forced withdrawal and the attempts by the Eurosceptics to attain a referendum 
on the Treaty.
50 For an overview o f the ratification process see R. Ware, "Legislation and Ratification: the passage of the European Communities 
(Amendment) Act 1993" in P. Giddings and G. Drewry (Eds.), Westminster and Europe. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1996).
51 Author's interview.
52 Author's interview. See also John Major interviewed by Alan Clark for his TV series "History of the Conservative Party: Part 4", 
5/10/1997 and M. Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1998), p299.
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The Second Reading of the Bill illustrated a wide range of meanings given to sovereignty 
in the light of EMU. Following a speech by Major in which EMU was hardly mentioned 
EMU became the central issue of the debate provoking a wide range of responses in 
terms of sovereignty. These can be loosely grouped into three broad categories. Firstly, 
conceptions focused on the locus of sovereignty in terms of classical parliamentary 
sovereignty, executive sovereignty and popular democratic sovereignty. Secondly, other 
conceptions stressed the divisibility of sovereignty in terms of the differentiation of 
sovereignty between functional areas, the instrumental sharing or pooling of sovereignty 
and an absolutist conception of indivisibility. Finally, a range of other conceptions, which 
whilst not so prevalent nevertheless deserve separate mention, included the myth of 
sovereignty, sovereignty as a reserve power and sovereignty as a symbol. These various 
conceptions naturally overlap and interweave but their broad contours were visible in the 
debate. Whilst necessarily selective these conceptions highlight the range of reactions to 
the sovereignty issues raised by EMU. Interestingly though there was little detailed 
analysis of the specific sovereignty questions posed by EMU, namely questions of 
monetary, fiscal, institutional and political sovereignty. Instead they tended to focus on 
either the wider idea of sovereignty ‘per se’ or in relation to the EU in general.
The classical parliamentary sovereignty arguments were well expressed by two anti-EC 
veterans, the Conservative John Biffen and Labour's Peter Shore. For Biffen the Treaty 
showed a "great deal of centralist commitment". Thus, EMU meant both economic union 
and, in one of the rarer detailed comments, tax centralisation as expressed in Article 99 of 
the Treaty. He stressed that, unlike the prevailing common view in the "tearooms", EMU 
would happen as it reflected deep political will within the EU.53 For Shore the Treaty was 
a clear federalist move with EMU as the "heart" of the matter. Federalism was a "simple 
concept" in wanting a tier of government above the national level and to which the
53 HC Deb 20/5/1992 cc281-282.
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national level is subordinated. The "pillars" of the Treaty, in terms of foreign and home 
affairs, will merge into a "trunk". He argued that he had "never heard of a sovereign 
independent country which did not have its own currency".54 This subordination is 
permanent so that even when the IMF bailed out Britain in 1976 it was only restricting 
independence for two months.55 In sum, for Biffen and Shore the Treaty was a 
federalising move which inevitably undermined parliamentary sovereignty. Another 
veteran Eurosceptic, Teddy Taylor, argued that the Treaty created a unitary state rather 
than a federal state where at least some powers would reside with the member states. For 
Michael Spicer the "irrevocable" nature of EMU undermined the crucial principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty that no parliament can bind its successor.56 A more specific 
point raised by the Conservative Eurosceptic Christopher Gill was that, given one of the 
historic rights of Parliament was to raise taxes, this could be undermined by Article 99 of 
the Treaty on tax harmonisation. This was rejected by the Foreign Secretary, Douglas 
Hurd, on the grounds that the unanimity rule applied to this Article.
The idea of executive sovereignty was not at the centre of the debate given that this was a 
Parliamentary debate focused on the authority of Parliament. However, some MPs did 
extend further the notion of parliamentary sovereignty to executive sovereignty. Labour 
MP Derek Enwright, defining sovereignty as the "ability of people to control their own 
lives", argued that this effectively resided with the executive rather than Westminster. 
This was illustrated most effectively by the lack of early scrutiny on European legislation
r o
(unlike Denmark). For Conservative MP Michael Lord EMU was a major issue for 
executive sovereignty. For Lord what was at stake was the "fundamental" issue of "the
54 HC Deb 4/11/1992 c333.
55 HC Deb 20/5/1992 cc283-286.
56 HC Deb 13/1/1993 c982.
57 HC Deb 21/5/1992 cc515-516.
58 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c308.
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power and purse strings of government".59
The conception of popular democratic sovereignty was resonant throughout the debates. 
One strand built on the idea of parliamentary sovereignty, namely that parliament being 
elected by the people was the centre of democratic sovereignty. This was the kernel of the 
argument put forward by veteran anti-EC campaigner Labour MP Tony Benn. For Benn 
the main point was democracy and particularly the corresponding lack of democracy 
within the EU. The essence of democracy was whether "we have the right to respond to a 
situation over which we have no control".60 This would be best achieved by member 
states given the lack of democracy in the EU and, hence, Benn's plan to turn the EU into 
a commonwealth of independent member states. Benn also laid emphasis on the need for 
a referendum, the denial of which was an "outrage". The claim for the expression of 
popular sovereignty through a referendum was supported by a number of MPs. A related 
argument stressed the lack of democratic accountability of the ECB. For Labour MP 
Llew Smith EMU decisions would be made by unelected bankers who are not 
accountable to either elected governments or elected, sovereign parliaments.61 
Conservative MP Peter Tapsell argued that;
"People should not be under the illusion that a central bank will show a degree of 
political independence when faced with ruthless and corrupt politicians...If we lose 
control over our currency the House will lose the rock on which our democracy is 
founded-control over the money supply."62
This line of argument was supported by a wide range of MPs on both sides of the debate.
59 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c438.
60 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c317.
61 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c351.
62 In T. Gorman, The Bastards. (Pan Books, London, 1993), p. 150.
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A variant of the democratic sovereignty conception focused on the idea of sovereignty as 
residing with the people outside of any specific emphasis on Parliament. This conception 
was largely linked to the Liberal Democrats. For Paddy Ashdown;
"I do not believe in the sovereignty of this place. I believe in the sovereignty of the 
people."63
This led Ashdown to support the idea of a referendum on the Treaty. Liberal Democrat 
Russell Johnston developed further this conception of sovereignty. He supported 
federalism, which led to "a dispersal of government between different levels of 
democratic authority - supranational, national, sub-national - in which all levels are co­
ordinated but none are subordinated".65 The key phrase here was "none are subordinated" 
in that Parliament in this case does not possess ultimate authority. Ultimate authority 
resided with the people who vest this authority in a variety of institutions.
The idea of sovereignty as indivisible was strongly reflected in the debates. This was not 
just by proponents of sovereignty ‘per se’ but also the conception of sovereignty as an 
instrument which can be used for other ends. This had particular resonance on the Labour 
Eurosceptic wing which saw EMU as a monetarist vision of Europe. For these rebels 
sovereignty was the essential tool for a national economic strategy. Austin Mitchell 
argued that EMU would;
"...throw away all the weapons of economic management that we need to rebuild British
63 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c292.
64 HC Deb 4/11/1992 c317.
65 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c536.
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industry."66
For Labour MP Denzil Davies EMU was a "substantial shift of power" to "bankers and 
bureaucrats" leading to the "Hegelian ideal of a universal class of expert civil servants
• ff?whose loyalties and duties lie primarily with institutions". There were clear links here 
with the arguments on the undemocratic nature of the ECB and wider criticisms of 
monetarist ideology. The key point though was the transfer of powers to the ECB, which 
would inhibit the instrumental use of sovereignty to develop a national economic policy. 
A similar argument can be found amongst the Conservative Eurosceptics though they 
wished to use the instrument of sovereignty for the spread of free market ideas. This was 
the view of Michael Spicer whose ideas are discussed in detail later.
An alternative conception was the idea of sharing or pooling sovereignty. John Smith, 
Shadow Chancellor, developed these ideas, which were to play a key role in Labour 
policy on EMU. He talked of "shared sovereignty in commonly agreed policies and 
common institutions".68 This shared sovereignty was increasingly important as the EU 
enters new spheres of economic competence. Whilst Smith stressed the importance of 
true economic convergence and the need for direct ECB accountability to ECOFIN he 
interestingly concluded that it was "hard to envisage circumstances in which the UK 
could afford to “opt-out” when convergence has occurred and a sufficient number of 
countries are ready to join".69 In sum, sovereignty was not a barrier to EMU. Indeed, to 
Smith, it seemed;
"...to be essential that we should recognise the limits of theoretical national sovereignty 
that the real world we live in imposes...In order to regain a lost sovereignty, a sovereignty
66 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c358.
67 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c300.
68 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c582.
69 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c584.
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7 ftlost by the internationalisation of economics it is necessary to share it."
Other MPs stressed the idea of sharing sovereignty which can actually enhance or reclaim 
sovereignty through collective action. There was a feeling that with globalisation and 
interdependence sovereignty could only be regained at a European level. For Labour MP 
Peter Hain sovereignty had to be reclaimed by the European Parliament.71 For Claire 
Short the European level, rather than the nation-state, was now needed to regulate 
capitalism.72 For Conservative MP David Howell Britain regained sovereignty by 
influencing the overall debate.73
The idea of dividing sovereignty between functions (for example, monetary sovereignty 
or fiscal sovereignty) received some, though relatively few, mentions. Peter Hordern, in a 
rare reference to the specifics of EMU, placed it in the historic context of previous global 
financial regimes including the Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods regime. He 
concluded that the loss of sovereignty in respect of EMU was an illusion.74 A related 
argument was that sovereignty can be temporarily delegated to other institutions but that 
the reserve power was available to retrieve this power if necessary. For Edward Gamer 
"in delegating power to Europe we do not abdicate it".75
Whilst most MPs stressed the loss or reclamation of sovereignty others felt that
70 HC Deb 21/5/1992 cc580-581.
71 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c408.
72 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c581.
73 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c304.
74 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c331.
75 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c378.
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sovereignty was a myth in the modem world. Labour MP Tony Banks argued that the day 
of the sovereign nation-state was finished.76 Gerald Kaufman exclaimed, in typically 
dramatic terms, that the idea of an independent policy on your own currency was "living 
in cloud cuckoo land".77 In a similar vein Conservative MP Roger Evans argued that it 
was ironic that arguments over sovereignty included the right and freedom "to debauch 
the currency at will" 78 George Robertson stressed the difference between the "trappings 
of sovereignty", such as flags, and "real sovereignty", which is an illusion for all but the 
strongest economies79 Brian Sedgemore distinguished between sovereignty and 
accountability arguing that sovereignty was a myth and attention should be focused on 
the narrower concept of accountability.80 To say sovereignty was a myth was not 
synonymous with irrelevance. Geoffrey Evans stressed the fear of the loss of sovereignty
Q 1
even if this fear was irrational in the modem world. For Derek Enwright sovereignty 
was equal to arrogance which needed to be set aside to overcome national egoisms.82 The 
symbolism of sovereignty was significant, even to those who argued that the actuality of 
sovereignty was largely a myth in the modem world.
In sum, the Second Reading debates postulated a wide variety of conceptions of 
sovereignty. Most of these conceptions approached the general theory of sovereignty 
rather than dealing with specific aspects of EMU. However, sovereignty was at the heart 
of the debate from a variety of viewpoints. In spite of a rebellion of 26 Conservative MPs 
the government successfully won the vote on the Second Reading. However, external 
events, including the initial rejection of the Treaty by the Danish electorate and the
76 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c568.
77 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c525.
78 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c435.
79 HC Deb 20/5/1992 c460.
80 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c571.
81 HC Deb 21/5/1992 c436.
82 HC Deb 18/12/1991 c386.
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ignominious withdrawal of Britain from the ERM, served to accelerate the tensions 
which were inherent in the debate over the Second Reading.
The Danish "No" vote in June 1992 galvanised opposition to the Maastricht Treaty. An 
Early Day Motion urging the government to suspend the Bill was signed by 84 
Conservative MPs. However, it was the forced withdrawal from the ERM on "Black 
Wednesday" which also raised the stakes on the ratification process. The debate 
following "Black Wednesday" was instructive in the way it highlighted the link between 
the ERM and EMU. For Major the implication of the ERM debacle was that EMU was 
unlikely;
"I must tell those who have exaggerated ambitions for a single currency that it must now 
be an ambition postponed."83
In another interesting comment which encapsulated Major's attitude to EMU;
"This decision, as I said then, is too important to be an act of faith; it must also be an act 
of judgement, and that judgement cannot sensibly be made until we see the economic 
circumstances of the day."84
Deferral was definitely the order of the day. The ERM debate also served to exacerbate 
existing differences. For pro-EMU supporters the failure of the ERM was a very good 
reason for pushing ahead with EMU which would, by definition, avoid speculative 
activity. Ashdown argued that the problem can be solved only "by going into a single 
currency and not by running away from it".85 For Heath it was time to give "serious
83 HC Deb 24/9/1992 c8.
m HC Deb 4/11/1992 c292.
85 HC Deb 24/9/1992 c33.
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consideration" to EMU, especially as continental Europeans would forge ahead with the 
project.86 Correspondingly opponents of EMU saw the ERM debacle as a reason for not 
pursuing EMU. For Ken Baker the ERM failure tore "a gaping hole" in the Treaty.87 For 
arch Eurosceptic Cash the ERM was the "Maginot line" on the road to Maastricht which
AO
had "failed spectacularly". In sum, the ERM debacle only served to accelerate the 
divergences over EMU. By diminishing severely the credibility of the government's 
economic policy it simultaneously strengthened the resistance of the Eurosceptic wing of 
the Conservative party. Focusing their arguments around sovereignty the Conservative 
Eurosceptics increasingly extracted concessions from the government.
The demand for a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was an early demand of the 
Eurosceptics given that they were unlikely to be able ultimately to stop ratification of the 
Treaty in Parliament. The referendum idea was opposed by both main parties on the 
grounds that both parties had indicated support for the Treaty in their 1992 election
OQ
manifestos. Seldon, in his biography of Major, argued that he was initially sympathetic 
to the referendum idea. However, given Mrs. Thatcher's open call for a referendum Major 
felt that this was an attack on his authority which needed to be resisted at all costs.90
The referendum debate was ironic in the sense that the keenest supporters of 
parliamentary sovereignty called for a referendum which would inevitably bind 
Parliament. However, the referendum was justified on the grounds of popular sovereignty 
given the constitutional significance of the Treaty. The referendum proposal was also
86 HC Deb 24/9/1992 c25.
87 HC Deb 24/9/1992 c58.
88 HC Deb 24/9/1992 c69.
89 See HC Deb 24/9/1992 clO.
90 A. Seldon, Major: A Political Life. (Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London, 1997), p.244.
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supported by some pro-Treaty supporters such as many Liberal Democrats (in accordance 
with their view of popular sovereignty). For opponents of the referendum it was a 
contradiction to the very principle of parliamentary sovereignty. This was the basis for 
Major's rejection of the demand;
"We are a parliamentary democracy, and the House is the place in which to consider the 
Bill-line by line and clause by clause. Other nations may have a tradition of 
referendums...That is not our parliamentary tradition, and I do not believe that it would be 
acceptable to the House."91
This statement was interesting in the light of subsequent developments. However, it was 
widely supported in the House. Other arguments against a referendum included the 
difficulty of setting an appropriate question for complex issues and the belief that a 
referendum would get mixed up with the political climate of the day. The key argument 
though was that it contradicted parliamentary sovereignty, an argument ironically made 
by supporters of the Treaty, who were not so forthcoming in assessing the effect of the 
Treaty itself on parliamentary sovereignty. For Hugh Dykes a referendum was 
irreconcilable with parliamentary sovereignty;
"I can think of nothing that more undermines the sacred constitutional sovereignty of the 
House of Commons."92
For Benn the issue was equally sacred but from a favourable perspective for a 
referendum;
"We are not entitled to decide this matter ourselves...I beg all hon. Members...to agree 
with the principle that the matter must be determined by everybody in our land."93
91 HC Deb 24/9/1992 c9.
92 HC Deb 2/12/1992 c338.
93 HC Deb 2/12/1992 c336.
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Eurosceptic Discourses
As well as their vehement opposition in Parliament it was noticeable that a number of 
Conservative Eurosceptics decided to write detailed publications both during and after 
the Treaty ratification process. Four such publications are chosen to illustrate a range of 
Eurosceptic positions. These are Michael Spicer's "A Treaty Too Far", William Cash's 
"Europe: The Crunch", Teresa Gorman's "The Bastards" and Norman Lamont's 
"Sovereign Britain".94 The diversity is shown in the market emphasis of Michael Spicer, 
the legalism of William Cash, the populism of Teresa Gorman and the later 
conversionism of Norman Lamont. In spite of these differences the central argument 
made here is the overwhelming emphasis on an absolutist conception of sovereignty 
which was under threat from developments in the EU.
Michael Spicer's book was arguably the most comprehensive of the Eurosceptic treaty 
critiques. For Spicer the Treaty required the most far reaching legal changes to the British 
constitution and was a move to a unified, centralised European state.95 The central 
element was the "irrevocable" EMU;
"Irrevocable means unalterable, gone beyond recall, in other words, for ever. It is 
impossible, in my view to exaggerate the significance of this notion of eternity into the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. It is what sets Maastricht apart from everything that 
has gone before. If it were to be ratified it would, indeed, quite literally be the point of no 
return."96
This affected the "very foundation" of the constitution based on the "supreme authority"
94 M. Spicer, A Treaty Too Far. (4th Estate Limited, London, 1992); N. Lamont, Sovereign Britain. (Gerald Duckworth & Co.,
London, 1995); W. Cash, Europe: The Crunch. (Gerald Duckworth & Co., London, 1992); T. Gorman, The Bastards. (Pan Books, 
London, 1993).
95 M. Spicer, op.cit.. p3.
96 Ibid.. p.13.
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of parliamentary sovereignty. Irrevocability was a direct challenge to the parliamentary 
principle of not binding successors. For Spicer sovereignty was an absolute, you either 
had final authority or you did not. Under EMU you did not;
"A single currency means a single monetary authority, means a single government [for] 
everything that counts."97
The right to raise taxes and to choose expenditure priorities was the very essence of 
national democratic sovereignty. Thus, Maastricht's "monumental historic significance" 
was the single currency, which was the "most damaging single act" to a nation's 
existence. It was a "treaty too far" as Britain's previous membership was based on 
guarantees defending sovereignty. However, the "unelected, unaccountable and secretive 
ECB” was;
"...most likely to consummate the development of a politically united Community. 
Control over monetary policy is central to the function of government. Just as the transfer 
of power from Crown to Parliament was bom essentially out of parliamentary control of 
economic policy, so is the transfer of economic policy from national Governments to a 
European body intended to herald a fundamental shift in political power."98
EMU was not just a technical, economic view but;
"The real issues surrounding a move towards a Single Currency are above all political. 
They involve in their essence the consideration of the future of the nation state. This is 
because, as the Treaty of Maastricht makes plain a Single Currency is for ever. When a 
country surrenders its right to issue its own coinage, and does so irrevocably, it loses its
97 Ibid.. p.l 5.
98 Ibid.. p.52.
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sovereignty and thus the basis of its existence as a separate nation state."99
However, Spicer was still optimistic that the trend could be halted;
"I have consistently maintained the position throughout this book that sovereignty has not 
yet changed hands. I am persuaded by the majority of legal opinion, which suggests that 
Britain, her people and her political leaders retain ultimate control over their own destiny. 
This means that essential choices are left open; above all, it means that what has already 
been done is not yet irrevocable." 100
However, the clash of principles between the EU and parliamentary sovereignty was 
irreconcilable;
"In particular, the doctrine of parliamentaiy sovereignty which lies at the root of British 
democracy cannot be squared with European political union as it is currently proposed. 
Parliamentary sovereignty allows for there to be no limit on the power of the people's 
elected representatives in Westminster."101
Spicer stressed the variety of opposition, both Conservative and Labour, to the Treaty. 
Four elements of Conservative opposition were identified. Firstly, traditional anti- 
Marketeers such as Roger Moate, Richard Body, John Biffen, Teddy Taylor, Toby 
Jessell. Secondly, the "Constitutionalists", who stressed the institutional and legal 
changes of the EU, included William Cash, Richard Shepherd, Christopher Gill, James 
Cran and Ian Duncan-Smith. Thirdly, the "Patriots" included Tony Marlow, John 
Carlisle, Nicholas Winterton, Ann Winterton, Harry Greenway, Bill Walker, Trevor 
Skeet, David Porter and Andrew Hunter. Finally, the "Marketeers", who emphasised the
protectionist nature of the EU, included Spicer himself, John Biffen, Nick Budgen, John 
Butcher, Roger Knapman, Patrick Mcnair-Wilson, Peter Tapsell, David Howell and Tom 
Arnold. For Labour three strands were apparent. These were those who stressed 
democratic sovereignty (Peter Shore), those who saw the EU as a "capitalist club" 
(Dennis Skinner) and those who saw the EU as an "economic straitjacket" (Bryan 
Gould).102 However, in Spicer's view Labour resistance was fading and only the 
Conservative party could be the main force in halting the Treaty.
William Cash's book, also written during the ratification process, was a political tract 
with short sections on various arguments surrounding the Treaty. Each section was 
organised on the basis of replying to "arguments" from Treaty supporters. The key theme 
was the stress laid on the undemocratic nature of the Treaty when compared with British 
traditions;
"Our open and accountable parliamentary system in Britain is a great historical 
inheritance...It is not something which can be created out of the blue by a legislative act, 
but is the achievement of generations."103
On EMU by not using the veto (accepting the “opt-out”) Britain "lost the war";
"Opposition to EMU is based on the democratic principle that the control of the 
monetary, economic and fiscal policies of the European Community cannot and should 
not be concentrated in the hands of unaccountable bankers...To accept the irreversible 
process towards a monetary union for a tight core of powerful countries at the centre of
102 Spicer quotes an interesting early reference to a potential EMU from Labour's 1975 pro-European referendum document (Britain's 
New Deal in Europe) which stated that;
"...there was a threat to employment in Britain from the movement in the Common Market towards an Economic and Monetary 
Union. This could have forced us to accept fixed exchanges rates for the pound restricting industrial growth and putting jobs at risk. 
This threat has now been removed". (In Ibid.. pp:184-5).
103 W. Cash, op.cit.p.25.
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the continent, grouped around Germany, would be to deny the future of the Community 
of twelve, and to accept the creation of a continental superstate"104
Interestingly Cash saw the ECB as only having the "illusion of independence". In effect it 
would be controlled by majority voting in the Council of Ministers, namely Germany 
given its overall influence. The only loss was "democratic control";
"...far from liberating monetary policy from political control, EMU simply reimposes it at 
the European level, without the safeguard of democracy."105
The other emphasis was on the EU as a "legal order". The principle of subsidiarity was 
seen as being based on "effectiveness", which favoured centralisation rather than 
"democracy", and would anyway be ultimately interpreted by the ECJ, the most 
integrationist institution. "Decentralisation" was a misnomer as this conceded that the EU 
had a "centre";
"The use of the word ’decentralisation' explicitly accepts that sovereignty (ultimate legal 
authority) resides in the Community, from which individual powers may or may not be 
devolved...The Community should not be regarded as a 'centre', for the nation-states 
should guard their legal and effective sovereignty"106
The Single European Act was where "the line should be drawn" but even here the 
Commission had interpreted Art 100A to strengthen their powers;
104 Ibid.. pd 37-29.
105 Ibid.. p.32.
106 Ibid.. pp:38-39.
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"The British government has recently given in, yet again, over VAT harmonisation and 
reduced Britain's independence in the process to less than that of a state in the USA,
107where different sales taxes already apply in a federal country."
Cash quoted a White Paper by the Heath government with approval on sovereignty;
“...the Treaty of Rome commits its signatories to support agreed aims; but the 
commitment represents the voluntary undertaking of a sovereign state to observe policies 
which it has helped to form. There is no question of any erosion of national sovereignty.”
to which he added ironically;
"How far, how very far, we have come since then." 108
The integration process then was a linear one accelerated by a reassertiveness of 
Germany since unification. Indeed the treaty was "largely dreamed up by the German 
government."109 The new Europe wiould be a German Europe just as the German 
customs union had led to a German political union;
"Accepting EMU will entrench the German domination of Europe, committing Britain to 
remain eternally peripheral to Europe's central monetary and economic considerations, 
destroying jobs, the economy and any hope of recovery...We are simply giving away 
control over our own economy." 110
107 Ibid.. p.44.
108 Ibid.. dp:48-49.
109 Ibid.. p.50.
110 Ibid.. p.59.
173
Teresa Gorman's idiosyncratic book, "The Bastards" focused on the whipping tactics used 
by the government and the rebels, the daily events of the rebellion and the variety of 
persons and views within the rebellion. Gorman admitted to not understanding the details 
of the Maastricht Treaty;
"For me trying to grasp its implications was like swimming through porridge and I felt a 
certain sympathy for Kenneth Clarke, who once admitted he had not read it."111
For Gorman the rebellion was an instinctive attempt "to save our democracy from being 
submerged in Brussels".112 Cash was the 'de facto' leader of the rebels in terms of 
mastering the details of the Treaty, especially during the Committee stage. Gorman 
stressed the variety of the rebels in similar terms to Spicer but emphasised the common 
goal of securing the promise of a referendum.
Norman Lamont's work was an interesting contrast to the other three books given that 
Lamont was on the "other side" as Chancellor during most of the ratification saga. 
However, once dismissed by Major, Lamont became a fervent Eurosceptic even 
considering the ultimate option of withdrawal from the EU. In his book he dealt 
extensively with the sovereignty issues raised by EMU. Lamont argued that Europe was 
shaped by the interests of France and Germany, which were intrinsically different from 
Britain's;
"We should recognise that Europe is more important to France and Germany than it is to 
us. The European Union has been and will continue to be created in their image and not 
in ours."113
111 T. Gorman op.cit. p.85.
112 Ibid., p.57.
113 N. Lamont, op.cit.. p.25.
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This meant that it was futile to try to influence the development of Europe as Britain's 
interests differed from the rest of Europe. The conception which underpins Lamont's 
Euroscepticism was the idea of the nation-state where Lamont approvingly quoted De 
Gaulle's emphasis on the loyalty that the nation-state engenders.114 Whilst the UK was a 
nation-state, albeit based on a number of nations, Europe was a geographical expression.
Within this broader conception of Europe the ERM was regarded as a mere staging post 
for EMU. For Lamont the major reason for the failure of the ERM was the asymmetric 
shock of German unification and the response of high public expenditure and high 
interest rates. On EMU Lamont expressed his opposition on both economic and political 
grounds. Economically there was a denial that EMU was necessary to complete the 
Single Market. Convergence was regarded as impossible with such a diverse range of 
economies, especially in terms of debt levels. Above all structural adjustment would be 
more difficult under EMU.115
Lamont's main opposition to EMU was based on political grounds. He regarded EMU as 
being driven for political reasons, namely the "inevitable" creation of a European 
government. The link between EMU and European political union is very explicit in 
Lamont's rejection of EMU;
"Having our own currency is vital to our continuing to govern ourselves."116
All of the sovereignty issues are addressed in Lamont's analysis of EMU as a move to
114 Ibid.. p.101.
115 Ibid.. p.42.
116 Ibid.. p.44.
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complete European government. On monetary sovereignty the ECB was seen as requiring 
"powers of such magnitude" in order to keep inflation down and control borrowing. This 
in turn would hit fiscal sovereignty;
"We would soon lose our freedom to decide how much tax we pay and how much public 
money the Government should spend."117
The institutional sovereignty ceded to the ECB would mean that "our way of governing 
ourselves" would be "empty theatre". Being unrepresentative there would be a move to 
elected Euro-commissioners and real powers being given to the European Parliament. In 
sum, Lamont saw EMU as leading to a "pan-European state".118
Lamont also considered the process by which a sovereign state may no longer be 
sovereign. This is discussed in the context of the 1975 White Paper, which stated that 
there would be no move to monetary union. Hence EMU was again regarded as central to 
sovereignty. Other key issues on sovereignty were authority over immigration policy, 
taxation policy, foreign policy and general legislative measures. He argued that when a 
state has given up most of these functions it ceased to be a sovereign state. Admitting that 
it was difficult to prescribe a precise point when sovereignty is lost he argued that this 
point was now approaching which would leave Britain equivalent to the state of 
Delaware rather than a sovereign state.119 Overall the individual differences between the 
Eurosceptic writers were minor when compared with their overwhelming emphasis on an 
absolutist conception of sovereignty which would be undermined by EMU.
117 Ibid.
" ‘ ibid.
119 Ibid.. p.68.
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The Ratification Debates: Appraisal
The first point that needs to be made on the backbench rebellion over Maastricht was its 
relative strength in a comparative historical perspective. Ludlam argued that, taking the 
traditional distinction between dissent and more serious factionalism, the rebellion had 
crossed the boundary to the latter.120 The importance of the Maastricht rebellion was 
heightened by the fact that overall the Conservative parliamentary party was no more 
rebellious than previous Conservative governments, according to statistical analysis used 
by Cowley and Norton.121 Given the long tradition of Conservative loyalty and unity the 
Maastricht rebellion was clearly a significant event.
Although a significant rebellion the focus on the debate 'per se' must be balanced against 
the fact that opposition to the treaty was carried out by a clear minority in Parliament. 
Ware, in a statistical analysis of contributions made to the debate, pointed out that over 
half of all MPs did not make any contribution at all during the ratification process. Only 
68 MPs made more than eight contributions in total. Of these, 38 were clear opponents of 
the treaty. Top of the list was Tony Marlow closely followed by Teddy Taylor and Bill 
Cash. Other leading speakers were Peter Shore, Nigel Spearing, Nicholas Budgen and 
Bill Walker. Leading proponents to make frequent contributions included, for the 
Conservatives, Edwina Currie, Ian Taylor, Ray Whitney, Stephen Milligan, Hugh Dykes 
and Andrew Rowe. For Labour leading proponents included Peter Mandelson, Giles 
Radice, Geoff Hoon, Stuart Randall and Calum Macdonald.122 In sum, the debates were 
dominated by MPs with strong convictions on either side of the debate and they were in a 
minority on both sides. Overall though most MPs from the three main parties supported 
the Maastricht treaty and the Eurosceptics were a clear minority. Their influence was
120 S. Ludlam (Ed.), Contemporary British Conservatism. (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1996), p.99.
121 P. Cowley and P. Norton, "Rebels and rebellions: Conservative MP's in the 1992 Parliament" in British Journal o f Politics and 
International Relations. Vol 1, No. 1, pp:84-103.
122 R. Ware, "Legislation and Ratification: the passage o f the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993", in P. Giddings and G. 
Drewry (Eds.), Westminster and Europe. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1996), pp:269-271.
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undoubtedly increased by the pursuit of narrow party political advantage by both of the 
main parties. Of the Conservative rebels on all the Maastricht votes the number voting 
against never exceeded 51.123
Whilst the Eurosceptics were a clear minority in both parties they did cut across 
ideological cleavages in both parties. In the Conservative party the differentiation 
between the Eurosceptics has been noted in a variety of contributions. Spicer's typology 
has already been discussed. For Williams the Eurosceptics varied as much in 
personalities as ideological convictions.124 Cowley and Norton argued that the 
Eurosceptics were divided into those who opposed membership of the EU 'per se',
1 A C
opposition on constitutional grounds and opposition on economic grounds. However, 
they also argued that the Eurosceptics could be incorporated into the standard framework 
of the internal divisions within the Conservative party developed by Norton in 1990.126 
These were Thatcherite (subdivided into Neo-Liberal, Old Right, Pure Thatcherites), 
Populist, Party Faithful and Critic (subdivided into Wets and Damps). On Maastricht the 
main opposition came from the Thatcherite grouping and the Populist grouping but rebels 
came from all groupings.127
The wide range of Euroscepticism has led some writers to reappraise typologies of the 
Conservative parliamentary party. Baker et al. argued that Norton's categories were no 
longer relevant given the Conservative divisions over Europe. They proposed an
123 S. Ludlam, op.cit. p. 105.
124 H. Williams, GuiltvMen: Conservative Decline and Fall 1992-1997. (Aurum Press Ltd., London, 1998), p.85.
125 P. Cowley and P. Norton, op.cit.. p.91.
126 Ibid.. p.95.
127 Ibid.. p.98.
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alternative typology based on attitudes to European integration as opposed to traditional 
Left/Right analyses. This incorporated a new axis termed the sovereignty/ 
interdependence axis which, when combined with an extended government/limited
19R
government axis, allowed a more complete picture to be derived. For example, the 
positions of Geoffrey Howe (pro-European and monetarist) and Nigel Lawson 
(Eurosceptic and less monetarist) could be clearly identified. For Baker et. al. Europe was
19 0a strategic "split" as opposed to less serious "divisions". The striking feature of the
internal splits was the ideological dimension, derived from the fusion of traditionalist and
Thatcherite supporters, with particular emphasis on the idea of the EU as antithetical to
free market ideas. Young stressed the importance of former Thatcherites who felt that
1
their careers were limited in the Major government. For Berrington and Hague the 
emphasis should be placed on the traditionalists.131 For Sowemimo sovereignty was now 
the main dividing line.132
Whilst there were differences in the individual personalities and beliefs of the 
Conservative Eurosceptics there was nonetheless a clear underlying cohesion. As Baker, 
Gamble and Ludlam argued "what unites all shades of right-wing and Thatcherite opinion 
over Europe is a rejection of full economic and monetary union".133 Organisationally the 
Eurosceptics were cohesive in terms of parliamentary tactics. Ideologically on 
sovereignty their arguments were essentially based on an absolutist doctrine of
128 D. Baker, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British 
Ratification", Parliamentary Affairs. Vol 47, No. 1, Jan. 1994, pp:37-60.
129 D. Baker, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam, "1846...1906...1996? Conservative Splits and European Integration", Political Quarterly. Vol. 
64, No.4, Oct-Dec. 1993, p.421.
130 H. Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe From Churchill to Blair. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998), p.385.
131 H. Berrington and R. Hague, "Europe, Thatcherism and Traditionalism: Opinion, Rebellion and the Maastricht Treaty in the 
Backbench Conservative Party 1992-1994" in H. Berrington (Ed.), Britain in the Nineties: The Politics of Paradox. (Frank Cass 
Publishers, London, 1998), p.65.
132 M. Sowemimo, "The Conservative Party and European Integration 1988-1995", Party Politics. Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan. 1996, pp:77-98.
133 D. Baker, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam, "Whips or Scorpions? The Maastricht Vote and the Conservative Party". Parliamentary 
Affairs. Vol. 46, No. 2, April 1993, p.160.
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sovereignty. Whilst they developed the sovereignty arguments on three grounds 
(executive; parliamentary and popular) the key point was that all three of these nuances 
would be undermined by EMU. A useful distinction can be made between defending 
sovereignty 'per se' and the use of sovereignty for other goals such as the spread of free 
market ideas.134 However, they all visualised sovereignty as being absolute and 
indivisible on all the sovereignty questions. Thus, the monetary, fiscal, institutional and 
political sovereignty questions were rolled together into a single concept, absolutist 
sovereignty, which through EMU was transferred to the EU. This transfer effectively 
undermined executive, parliamentary and popular sovereignty of Britain in one 
transaction.
Like Conservative Euroscepticism, Labour Euroscepticism combined a number of 
elements. Probably the most telling distinction was between the fundamental democratic 
stress of Tony Benn and Peter Shore and the more economic arguments of Denzil Davies 
and Austin Mitchell in seeking to use sovereignty as an instrument for socialist economic 
policies within the nation-state. However, unlike the Conservatives, the Euroscepticism 
of the Labour parliamentary party was decreasing rather than increasing. A cutting 
remark by Tessa Blackstone was that Labour Eurosceptics were "mainly extinct 
volcanoes".135
A 1995 survey by Baker and Seawright sought to test the European views of Labour 
1MPs. 30% of MPs surveyed agreed with the statement that "sovereignty cannot be 
pooled" compared with 59% cent who disagreed. On EMU only 21% felt that it would
134 H. Berrington and R. Hague, op.cit.. p.53.
135 Observer. 15/5/1994.
136 D. Baker and D. Seawright, "A 'Rosy* Map of Europe?" in D. Baker and D. Seawright (Eds.), Britain For and Against Europe. 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), p.60.
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"signal the end of the UK as a sovereign state" against 74% who disagreed with this 
statement. Opinion was split on the need for a referendum and as to whether EMU would 
institutionalise neo-liberal policy. However, a small majority (42% against 38%) felt that 
"Britain should never permit its monetary policy to be determined by an independent 
ECB" even though this was the central feature of EMU.137 Baker and Seawright further 
analysed the survey data to argue that more recent Labour MPs were less Eurosceptic.138 
In sum, whilst arguably not reflecting the depth of Conservative divisions, there remained 
a significant degree of EMU scepticism, if not wider Euroscepticism, amongst Labour 
MPs. This scepticism was centred on questions of sovereignty, particularly the 
institutional sovereignty of the ECB. Like the Conservatives a 
sovereignty/interdependence cleavage was helpful in analysing divisions within the party 
cutting across the traditional Left/Right cleavage. The fact that 71 Labour MPs defied the 
party line on the Third Reading of the Bill (a greater number than Conservative rebels)
• 13Qillustrated the continuing significance of the Labour Eurosceptic minority.
Baker's term "parliamentary siege" was a highly appropriate one for the ratification 
debate. The parliamentary context was important. As discussed in Chapter 2 the 
sovereignty of Parliament was often a cover for executive sovereignty through 
Parliament. Indeed Parliament was increasingly under pressure from a variety of angles. 
Riddell argued that Parliament had come under pressure from the media, European 
legislation, the speed of current events, judicial review and semi-independent 
regulators.140 However, in the circumstances of a small parliamentary majority, 
parliamentary sovereignty took on a substantive meaning. This was the situation in the 
ratification debate. The length and procedural complexity of the parliamentary process 
certainly produced plenty of confusion. The Economist concluded that;
137 Ibid.. p.63.
138 Ibid.. p.76.
139 S. Ludlam, op.cit. p. 105.
140 P. Riddell, Parliament Under Pressure. (Victor Gollancz, London, 1998), p. 12.
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"The British Parliament has been ridiculed. The public is baffled...This week saw the 
nadir of confusion."141
However, in spite of widespread confusion and seeming irrelevance to daily life, Ware 
argued that the process did, in the absence of a popular referendum, reflect wider 
anxieties about the Maastricht treaty.142 The very length of the process was used tactically 
by the Eurosceptics in, for example, attempting to ensure that ratification was delayed 
until after the second Danish referendum in the hope that another "No" vote would 
torpedo the treaty. It was ironic that, when the Eurosceptics stressed both the executive 
and popular aspects of sovereignty, it was parliamentary sovereignty that allowed them 
opportunity for influence. This influence was used to raise the stakes in the debate for 
which the Eurosceptics passion exceeded their party loyalty.
There was also the feeling that they had wider support in the parliamentary party. Major's 
unscripted comments to a television interviewer about the three "bastards" in his Cabinet 
illustrated the depth of feeling on both sides.143 A survey of Conservative MPs and MEPs 
in 1994 seemed to confirm the wider support for some Eurosceptic views.144 Whilst the 
great majority of MPs supported EU membership there were significant differences over 
EMU. Only 27% "strongly agreed or agreed" with joining EMU compared with 66% 
"disagreeing or strongly disagreeing". Asked whether EMU would signal the end of the 
UK as a sovereign nation 48% agreed compared to 41% disagreeing. The MPs were 
equally split on the referendum question and agreed with the statement that "sovereignty 
cannot be pooled" by a margin on two to one. Significantly the MEPs were far more
141 Economist 8/5/1993.
142 R. Ware, op.cit.. p.276.
143 Quoted in H. Williams, op.cit.. p.41.
144 In S. Ludlam, "The Cauldron: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration" in D. Baker and D. Seawright (Eds.), 
op.cit.. p.39.
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favourable towards EMU compared to the MPs.
In interpreting the survey data Ludlam argued that sovereignty had become a major fault 
line in the Conservative party, even as it became ever more complex or problematic in 
academia;
"However unsatisfactory sovereignty may have become as a concept in political 
science...it nevertheless remains a crucial concept for the Conservatives."145
This fault line of sovereignty/interdependence needs to be added to the traditional 
Left/Right (or in Conservative terminology Wet/Dry) cleavage in order to explain 
Conservative divisions. The fault line can also be classified as those that take an 
absolutist conception of sovereignty and those that support the idea of pooling 
sovereignty, developed in similar ways to the conceptions of sovereignty discussed 
earlier. The application of these two conceptions of sovereignty outlined by Ludlam is 
not easy to apply to individual circumstances. He compared Mrs. Thatcher's support for 
QMV in respect of the Single Market with her hostility to EMU.146 In my view this 
highlights the importance of the issue itself in assessing the application of sovereignty 
conceptions. EMU is a binary issue of greater significance to sovereignty when compared 
to the Single Market issues subjected to QMV.
The key point though was the depth of the divisions within the Conservative party around 
the cleavage of sovereignty. One loyalist Conservative MP, who had served across 
several Parliamentary sessions, stated how deep and personal the divisions became during
145 Ibid.. dp:41-42.
146 Ibid.. p.43.
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this period.147 Ludlam concluded that the divisions were "fundamentally irreconcilable" 
and;
"The disputes over sovereignty, complex and intellectually messy though they may be, 
are thus clearly central to understanding the divisions in contemporary Conservatism."148
Hurd concluded that the ratification process was a "fierce tussle within our own party...by 
a stalwart group, basing themselves on their convinced interpretation of Conservative 
tradition".149 However, he also regarded the ratification process as an essential success of 
the Major government. Major commented that the ratification process was “the longest 
white-knuckle ride in recent British politics”.150 For veteran Conservative Alan Clark in 
his TV series of the Conservative party the depth of the divisions prefigured the looming 
1997 election disaster.151 For Hurd, whilst the ratification debate had been successfully 
completed, Major increasingly felt that he could not win with the Eurosceptics.152
Major's own views on the EU became more sceptical after the ERM debacle and the next 
four years were to be focused on a process of attempting and failing to heal party 
divisions.153 According to his biographer, Seldon, Major did not see the EU as an 
emotional issue but as one for negotiation and diplomacy. Hence the ERM debacle was a 
particular disappointment which led him on a more sceptical path personally as outlined 
in the Leiden lecture in 1994 stressing the need for a flexible, variable geometry EU.154
147 Author's interview.
148 Ibid.. p.45.
149 HC Deb 23/7/1993 c713.
150 J. Major, op. c it . p.384.
151 Alan Clark, TV series "History of the Conservative Party: Part 4", 5/10/1997.
152 M. Stuart, op.cit.. p.315.
153 Author's interview.
154 A. Seldon, Major: A Political Life. (Wiedenfield & Nicolson, London, 1997), p.486.
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His main aim, though, or even "obsession" according to Seldon, was to keep the 
Conservative party together after 1993.155 The important point here is that these divisions 
were arguably increasing both in terms of numbers and hostility as the "parliamentary 
siege" of the ratification saga allowed conceptions of sovereignty to take centre stage in 
the debate.
Conclusions
The debates on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty helped to develop a set of 
discourses focused around the idea of sovereignty. EMU was deemed to provide a series 
of challenges to sovereignty. For some this meant that EMU was 'per se' an inadmissible 
policy option whatever the economic consequences. For others it was a consideration to 
be taken into account. For yet others it was either dismissed or rationalised in terms that 
meant that it was not a barrier in itself to EMU membership, which could be decided by 
other factors. Sovereignty though was not a singular idea but a varied multiplicity of 
discourses, of which three broad groups of conceptions can be identified. Firstly, 
absolutist conceptions of sovereignty included the ideas of executive, parliamentary and 
popular sovereignty. Sovereignty was seen as a key value both inherently and as an 
instrument for other actions, whether free market or collectivist. The strength of this 
perspective was the conflation of traditional parliamentary sovereignty with the 
democratic strain of popular sovereignty reflected in calls for a referendum. The second 
grouping focused around the idea of pooling or sharing sovereignty. This was often 
linked with the argument that Britain must use its influence in the EU. The third grouping 
centred on the idea of dividing sovereignty. This included the idea of dividing 
sovereignty between functions or issues, between institutions, between the symbolic and 
actual aspects in the modem world and the between the delegation of operational 
competence and the maintenance of reserve powers. The political debate tended to 
polarise between the absolutist and pooling groupings but a wide variety of conceptions 
were prevalent reflecting the overall resonance of sovereignty.
155 Ibid.. p.727.
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The key result of the multiple discourses of sovereignty articulated in the ratification 
debate was to set the agenda for the ongoing debate over EMU in terms of sovereignty. 
This was not a necessary or inevitable step but required articulation in a contingent and 
dynamic external environment. The initial reaction to the Maastricht negotiations and 
even the 1992 General Election had not produced the heat of the debate that was to 
follow. Whilst external events were very important including the small Conservative 
majority, the ERM debacle and the Danish "No" vote, the articulations of a Eurosceptic 
minority set the agenda of the debate. This led to a protracted debate focused around 
Parliament. This minority though was shown later to have significant and eventually 
majority support within the Conservative party. The Labour opposition leadership did not 
place sovereignty at the centre of their analysis (though they utilised the notion of pooling 
sovereignty) focusing instead on economic factors. However, they themselves had a 
significant minority which continued to argue for instrumental sovereignty, were 
themselves concerned at the independence of the ECB and were ultimately in opposition 
rather than government.
The varying discourses of sovereignty were yet to be directly aligned with the EMU 
policies of the two main parties. At the surface both parties adhered to a "wait and see" 
policy which left a decision on EMU to an undefined future date when circumstances 
would become clearer. This inevitably reflected the then prevailing belief throughout the 
British political system that EMU was not necessarily going to occur, a belief that 
permeated Parliamentary debates throughout the long ratification process. However, 
beneath the surface the details of the policy positions were quite different. The 
Conservative government was strictly wedded to the EMU "opt-out" negotiated at 
Maastricht and did not consider the detailed political and economic factors which could 
precede British entry into EMU. The Labour opposition supported EMU in principle but
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stressed the need for true economic convergence and political accountability for the ECB. 
The seeds for the future divergence of policies had been sown.
The hallmark feature of the Maastricht ratification debate was that it was very much an 
elite debate. As Wincott, Buller and Hay argued, policy was conducted in the “existing 
mystifying and elitist terms of discourse within Britain -  in itself an important form of 
structural constraint”.156 The idea of a popular referendum over EMU had entered the 
political debate as the opponents of the Maastricht Treaty sought to gain an alternative 
channel to halt the Treaty. The referendum debates developed an intensive debate on the 
distinction between parliamentary and popular sovereignty. The debate was not just 
between supporters and opponents with, for example, many Liberal Democrats 
supporting a referendum in principle. However, both of the main parties rejected a 
referendum largely on the grounds of parliamentary sovereignty. The issue was, 
nevertheless, placed on the agenda and having failed on the Treaty the opponents turned 
their attention to ensuring that any future British entry into EMU was subject to a 
referendum. It is to this debate that the discussion now turns.
156 D. Wincott, J. Buller and C. Hay, “Strategic Error and/or Structural Binds? Major and European Integration” in P. Dorey (Ed.), The 
Maior Premiership. (Macmillan Press, London, 1999), p.89.
CHAPTER 5: INTO THE PUBLIC SPHERE: THE 1996 REFERENDUM AND
1997 GENERAL ELECTION DEBATES 
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the key policy shift which took the EMU issue from 
the parliamentary sphere during the Maastricht ratification debate to the wider public 
sphere. This shift followed the 1996 decision by the main parties to pledge a referendum 
over any future decision by Britain to enter EMU. The origins of this decision will be 
examined together with the wider debate during the 1997 General Election. Four main 
aspects will be considered. Firstly, a brief analysis will be made of the 1975 referendum, 
which took Britain into the EC, focusing on the role sovereignty played in the debate. 
Secondly, the 1996 decision of the Major government to pledge a referendum will be 
discussed. Thirdly, the corresponding decision of the Labour Shadow Cabinet will be 
analysed. The chapter concludes with an examination of the EMU debate during the 1997 
general election. The overwhelming need for electoral victory meant that the policies of 
the two main parties remained convergent even as the discourses of sovereignty diverged.
The importance of the 1996 referendum decision cannot be understated. Five key 
arguments are made in this chapter. Firstly, the referendum decision was itself a change 
of policy by both main parties. Secondly, the primary reason for the Conservative 
referendum commitment was the split within the Conservative party (including Cabinet 
level). As argued in Chapter 4 sovereignty was a key component of the Conservative 
split. Thirdly, illustrating the dynamics behind the debate, the Labour opposition reacted 
to the Conservative decision with its own referendum commitment. Fourthly, underlying 
the party political debate was the wider notion that the EMU issue was so fundamental 
that popular consent was ultimately required. Finally, and most significantly, the 
referendum commitment moved the debate firmly into the wider public sphere. This 
created a major constraint to EMU accession given popular scepticism. The 1997 general
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election debate reaffirmed the referendum commitment by both parties, underlined the 
importance of the EMU issue in the public debate and highlighted an increasingly 
sceptical tone towards potential EMU membership by the two major parties.
The 1975 EC Referendum
A referendum can be defined as the act, practice or principle of submitting the direct
decision of a question at issue to the whole body of voters.1 It can thus be clearly
distinguished from an election at which the voters choose between individuals or parties.
Other comparative terms used are representative democracy, where elected
representatives follow their own consciences, and direct democracy, where referendums
are often used for major decisions. Another distinction which is sometimes made is that
between referendums and plebiscites. Plebiscites tend to symbolise a wider notion as a
r • 2general expression of public opinion rather than being restricted to a question at issue. 
Referendums in pure form should be focused on a clear issue and should either be 
binding on the government or be given major consideration in reaching the final decision.
There is almost a complete absence of a direct democracy tradition in British politics. 
This is partly due to the entrenched concept of parliamentary sovereignty which, by 
emphasising the supremacy of Parliament in the making of all laws, undermines any 
distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law. Constitutional law, which deals 
with the basic rules of the political system and basic liberties, is often embodied in 
written form with provisions restricting easy change in many Western democracies. Any 
changes are often subject to popular referendum. However, Britain's unwritten 
constitutional laws are subordinated to the concept of parliamentary sovereignty where 
Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever.3 Other traditions which
1 J. Grimond and B. Neve, The Referendum. (Rex Collings, London, 1975), p.53.
2 Ibid., p.54.
3 Ibid.. p.58.
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have mitigated against the use of referendums included those of centralised government, 
the idea of an MP as a free-thinking representative and the idea that governments once 
elected should govern (subject to Parliamentary scrutiny and approval).4 Occasionally 
referendums have entered the political debate including the Conservative 1910 
referendum proposal over constitutional reform, the 1930 proposal over Empire Free 
Trade and Churchill's 1945 proposal to continue the wartime Parliament but none of these 
proposals came to fruition.5
When the issue of British membership of the EC arose in 1970 anti-EC campaigners 
quickly raised the question of a referendum over British entry. However, they failed to 
stop the pro-EC Conservative government led by Heath from joining the EC in 1972 
without a referendum. The primary cause of the 1975 referendum was the severe internal 
divisions within the Labour party with the referendum offering a device to resolve these 
divisions. Labour’s Jim Callaghan in 1970 commented prophetically that the referendum 
idea was "a little rubber life raft into which the whole party may one day have to climb".6 
Labour leader Harold Wilson had initially been against a referendum. Indeed in the 1970 
election campaign he commented that;
"The answer to that [a referendum] is no. I've given my answer many times...I shall not 
change my attitude on that."7
However, faced with party disunity the referendum allowed all sides to express their 
views without the party reaching a final decision until just before the referendum. The 
referendum commitment was made in 1972 and carried through to the two general
* Ibid.. pp:28-42.
5 Ibid.. d 212.
6 P. Goodhart, The Referendum. (Tom Stacy Ltd., London, 1971), p.27.
7 Quoted in Ibid.. pp:12-13.
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elections in 1974 where Wilson defeated Heath. After the "so-called renegotiations" of 
Britain's EC membership in 1975 the referendum campaign commenced with the Wilson
o
government, minus a few anti-EC ministers, advocating a vote to remain within the EC.
The 1975 referendum campaign was marked by an active debate about sovereignty. 
However, sovereignty was not the central issue of the campaign. King argued that the 
wider issue of sovereignty was secondary to the narrower issues of food prices and 
purported economic advantages of the "Common Market" area. He argued that 
sovereignty only exercised the minds of a minority of anti-EC voters;
"It also appeared to be the case that, although some voters were greatly moved by the 
question of sovereignty, most were not moved at all. It was an issue of intense interest to 
only a small minority, and that minority was already mobilised on the anti-European 
side."9
George also argued that the referendum campaign was largely dominated by "bread and 
butter" issues such as food prices, income levels and overall economic security.10
Whilst sovereignty may not have been the central issue of the campaign it was certainly 
debated. The Referendum Bill debate in Parliament provided a classic example of the 
discourse on sovereignty in the clash between bitter rivals Heath and Enoch Powell. 
Powell argued that the EC directly contravened the rights of Parliament;
8 A. King, Britain Savs Yes. (American Public Policy Research, Washington, 1977), p.69.
9 Ibid.. p. 114.
10 S. George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community. (2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), p.93. See 
also M. Steed, "The Landmarks of the British Referendum", Parliamentary Affairs. Vol. 30,1977, pp:130-133.
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"Membership of the European Community requires from this House and this country a 
renunciation of Parliament's sole right to authorise the laws and taxes of this country."11
His explanation for the Conservative party, the party that supposedly was devoted to the 
protection of British institutions, joining the EC was that of an attempt to regain an area 
of power or influence to replace the loss of Empire. In sum the EC was a "surrogate" for 
Empire. Heath took an alternative view of sovereignty. Accusing Powell of wishing to 
"carefully protect" sovereignty in a "greatcoat with its collar turned up" Heath stressed 
the "purpose" of sovereignty;
"Sovereignty is something for us as custodians to use in the interests of our own 
country...I answer without hesitation that the sacrifice of sovereignty...or the sharing of 
sovereignty, the transfer of sovereignty or the offering of sovereignty is fully justified...I 
believe, therefore, that the purpose of sovereignty is for this House to use in the way it 
thinks best."12
Heath's key point though reflected the "influence" discourse in that there was no 
alternative to the EC;
"Going it alone undoubtedly means the loss of our political influence."13
The clash between the two was the classic statement of the opposing discourses on 
sovereignty in Parliament. However, the sovereignty debate was also carried to the local 
political party level, according to Kitzinger.14
11 Ibid.. p.142.
12 Ibid.. p.143.
13 Ibid.. p.144.
14 Point made at the Institute of Contemporary British History Conference, Britain and Europe. April 1997.
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The literature of the umbrella campaign organisations also directly addressed the 
sovereignty debate. The "Britain in Europe" campaign leaflet, "Why You Should Vote 
Yes", reportedly read by 82% of voters, addressed the sovereignty issue directly. The 
main argument put forward was that Britain could not go it alone in the modem world;
"That is why so much of the argument about sovereignty is a false one. It's not a matter of 
dry legal theory. The real test is how we can protect our own interests and exercise 
British influence in the world. The best way is to work with our friends and neighbours. 
If we came out...we would be clinging to the shadow of British sovereignty while its 
substance flies out of the window."15
The Government pamphlet "Britain's New Deal in Europe" laid greater stress on the "re­
negotiations" of Britain's accession terms together with economic factors. However, there 
was also a detailed consideration of sovereignty both in terms of the advancement and 
protection of British national interests and as being unaffected by EC membership. The 
government argued that continuing membership of the EC was dependent on the 
continuing assent of Parliament, which retained the final right to leave the EC. In addition 
the veto arrangements were stressed in the government pamphlet;
"No important new policy can be decided in Bmssels or anywhere else without the 
consent of a British minister answerable to a British Government and a British 
Parliament"16
Hence the government pamphlet sought to use the continued efficacy of sovereignty 
argument alongside the more common "influence" discourse resonant in the "Britain in 
Europe" literature.
15 D. Butler and U. Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum. (2nd Ed.,Macmillan Press, London, 1996), p.292.
16 In Ibid., p.298.
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The "National Referendum Campaign" was the umbrella organisation for those groups 
opposed to continued British membership of the EC. Sovereignty, or more specifically 
the loss of British sovereignty to the EC, was a major theme of their campaign. The main 
pamphlet "Why You Should Vote No" dealt with sovereignty as one of its key issues. 
The direct message was that;
"The fundamental question is whether or not we remain free to rule ourselves in our own 
way."17
Laws were now being decided by unelected Commissioners in Brussels which meant that 
the "Yes" campaign effectively foresaw no independent future for "our country". The 
conclusion was that we should be "living in friendship with all nations - but governing
1 Rourselves". Whilst increased food prices and the loss of jobs were other major themes, 
sovereignty was clearly a major theme of the "No" campaign.
To what extent did the sovereignty debate influence the course of the referendum 
campaign? It does seem that the conclusions of King and George were borne out by the 
available polling data. A Harris poll found that 24% mentioned that "we can't go it 
alone", 17% "bigger markets" and 17% "because we are in now" as reasons for pro-EC 
positions. Of the anti-EC arguments 14% mentioned "lower prices", 12% "we were better 
off before" and 11% "independence".19 Butler and Kitzinger, in their analysis of the press 
coverage of the campaign, also pointed to food prices rather than sovereignty as the key
17 In Ibid.. p.301.
18 In Ibid., p.302.
19 In A. King, op.cit.. p.108.
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issue in an overwhelmingly pro-EC press.20 The "EC causes high food prices" argument 
of the anti-EC campaign was effectively spiked by high world prices at the time. 
Sovereignty was itself difficult to explain given its complexity and non-tangible 
characteristics. King made the valid point that sovereignty was not a new argument of the 
anti-EC camp and given that Britain had already joined the EC it was difficult to bring 
this point home to the voters. Also important though was that the debate on the EC was 
constantly referred to as the "Common Market" rather than the "European Community" 
with a correspondingly reduced connotation of any serious implications for British 
sovereignty. The EC at this time was still far from acquiring the range of competencies it 
was later to develop.
With its two key arguments over food prices and sovereignty effectively spiked the 
referendum result was a clear victory for the pro-EC camp with 67.6% in favour and 
32.4% against. There were many reasons for the victory of the pro-EC campaign in 
addition to the central arguments advanced. Undoubtedly the campaign of "Britain in 
Europe" was better organised and financed than the "National Referendum Campaign". 
Most leading interest groups including business, the farmers and consumers groups 
supported the pro-EC camp as did the vast majority of the press. Above all, the 
personalities of key political leaders in the pro-EC camp appeared to be a key factor with 
the ill-assorted group of anti-EC leaders failing to win popular support. In addition, 
having already joined the EC in 1972 the public were voting cautiously for a 'status quo' 
situation rather than positive change.21 Butler and Kitzinger concluded their study by 
arguing that support for the EC was "wide but not deep".22 King argued that it proved 
that, whilst the British generally preferred co-operation to integration in the EC, they 
ultimately preferred integration to isolation if a stark choice was required.23 The EC
20 D. Butler and U. Kitzinger, op.cit. p.292.
21 S. George, op.cit.. p.95.
22 D. Butler and U. Kitzinger, op. c it. p.280.
23 A. King, op.cit. p. 144.
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referendum set a constitutional precedent for the 1996 EMU referendum debate and also 
effectively settled the question of EC membership which had dogged British politics for 
many years.24
The 1996 Referendum Commitment; The Conservative Discourse
The 1996 EMU referendum debate within the Conservative party needs to be seen in the 
context of the wider divisions over Europe highlighted in the Maastricht debate discussed 
in Chapter 4. Following the ratification of the Maastricht treaty by Parliament in 1993 
there had been a temporary truce. However, this truce was shattered at the October 1994 
party conference in Bournemouth when leading speakers including Norman Lamont and 
Norman Tebbit gave Eurosceptic speeches. In November 1994 an EU budget vote, agreed 
by the government as part of the Maastricht negotiations, was made an issue of 
confidence by the government. Although the government won the vote comfortably, eight 
Conservative MPs voted against the Bill and subsequently had the Conservative whip 
withdrawn, an unprecedented action by a government. However, this action only served 
to exaggerate the importance of the "whipless eight" and reduce the government's own 
perilous majority. In April 1995 the whip was reinstated. The leadership challenge by 
John Redwood in the summer of 1995, whilst unsuccessful, attracted the significant 
support of 89 MPs (20 others abstained).26 It was against this background that the EMU 
referendum debate took place.
Given the Eurosceptic offensive the government maintained its "negotiate then decide" 
policy on EMU, based on the “opt-out” negotiated at Maastricht. They argued that this 
stance allowed them to be part of the EMU decision making process where they could
24 Ibid.. p. 137.
25 P. Norton, "The Conservative Party" in A. King (Ed.), New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls. (Chatham House Publishers, 
London, 1998), p.87.
26 Ibid., p. 100.
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negotiate in the national interest.27 There was an underlying theme that this process 
would take some time so no firm decision could be made. This meant that all options on 
timing were kept open including the 1999 start date. However, when this decision was 
required Major confirmed that;
"We should need to consider not only the economic conditions but the political and 
constitutional implications."28
The government refused to indicate where the balance of potential advantages or 
disadvantages of EMU would lie unlike the Labour position of supporting EMU in 
principle, albeit subject to a number of rigorous conditions. The ultimate decision on 
EMU then would be, to quote Chancellor Clarke, based on a "hard-nosed judgement of 
British interests judged when we see what the details are".29 One of the few clear policy 
implications was a determination not to re-enter the ERM following the 1992 debacle. 
Hurd, in 1995, referred in the House of Commons to the "wariness" of the government 
over EMU, a comment which was interpreted by some MPs as "weariness".31
The demand for a referendum was primarily a tactical move by the Eurosceptics. Given 
their minority position in Parliament a referendum provided another potential block to 
EMU membership, which they felt was opposed by popular opinion. Even after his defeat 
in the leadership contest Redwood argued openly for a referendum on EMU in view of its 
seminal importance. His proposal prompted an immediate joint statement from Lord 
Howe, Lord Kingsdown and Leon Brittan arguing that the Conservative party should not
27 Statement by FCO Minister, David Davis, HC Deb 7/6/1995 c206.
28 HC Deb 8/6/1995 c316.
29 HC Deb 15/6/1995 c875.
30 HC Deb 21/6/1995 c446.
31 HC Deb 21/6/1995 c364.
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deny its "capacity to share in one of the most important economic developments of the 
coming decades".32
Whilst the referendum was initially a Eurosceptic demand it increasingly found favour 
within the government. The key point is that the referendum idea was not an immediate 
decision but had been considered ever since the end of the Maastricht ratification 
debate.33 As seen in Chapter 4 Major considered a referendum on the Maastricht treaty 
and following the ratification he investigated the idea of an EMU referendum primarily to 
placate Eurosceptics. Hurd (though himself initially sceptical) was given the task of 
securing Cabinet support but met severe opposition from Europhiles Clarke and Heseltine 
and Eurosceptic Portillo (a differing cleavage from the usual EMU divide). In his 
autobiography Heseltine claimed that he was “resolutely opposed” to a referendum. His 
reasons included opposition to referendums in principle, a belief that a referendum move 
would embolden the Eurosceptics and that a referendum would, in the longer term, 
inhibit ultimate British membership of EMU. However, in seeking to help Major, he 
eventually supported a proposal for a referendum in “the next Parliament”, a move he 
later regretted.34 Clarke and Portillo were also against referendums in principle. However, 
whilst Clarke primarily felt that such a move was a needless concession to the 
Eurosceptics, Portillo felt that a referendum supporting EMU membership would be 
irreversible.35
The key turning point was the Ioannina Compromise (spring 1994) when Britain initially 
opposed changes in the QMV arrangements required given the EU enlargement to
32 Daily Telegraph. 13/12/1995.
33 Author's interview.
34 M. Heseltine, Life in the Jungle: Mv Autobiography. (Hodder and Stoughton Press, London, 2000), pp:520-521.
35 Author's interview.
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Austria, Finland and Sweden before compromising shortly afterwards. From this point 
Major felt that the referendum was a necessary concession to the Eurosceptics in order to 
reunite the Conservative party prior to the general election.36 The idea was formally put 
to the Cabinet in autumn 1994 by Hurd who sought to link the referendum proposal with 
an assertion that it would only occur should a united Cabinet support and campaign for
7^future entry into EMU. He argued that a referendum commitment would be a popular 
electoral move, a pre-emption of the Labour party (which was considering such a move) 
and, above all, a new move to restore some degree of party unity. However, the resistance 
of Portillo and Clarke delayed the proposal.
In December 1995 Major commented in a Commons statement that there may be a 
possibility of a referendum which "had been in [his] mind for a long time" for "a decision 
of such magnitude" as EMU.38 Here was an explicit recognition that EMU was such an 
important issue that a referendum needed to be considered. However, ardent Europhiles 
were still opposed to the idea. Heath argued forcefully that "the Conservative Party in its 
history has never supported a referendum, never".39 The delay reflected continued 
opposition from Clarke who argued that it was no way "to run a mature industrial 
democracy".40 In contrast the Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind argued in favour of a 
referendum, whilst stressing that joining EMU was an "historic decision" which would be 
"irrevocable".41 He also emphasised the political nature of EMU both in terms of "the 
transfer of significant control over economic decision-making to the European level" and 
in terms of the motivation of European states for greater political integration. This led
36 M. Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1998), p.380.
37 Independent 2/4/1996.
33 Times. 19/12/1995.
39 Ibid.
40 Sunday Times. 24/12/1995.
41 Daily Telegraph. 27/12/1995.
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him to argue that Britain should only join EMU if there were "substantial" economic 
benefits. Again the emphasis was on the highly significant nature of the EMU decision, 
which underpinned the referendum debate.
As well as Cabinet divisions the referendum decision was delayed by the government's 
continued belief that EMU might never happen or would be significantly delayed. The 
difficulties of economic convergence and the political ramifications of EMU membership 
were still significant uncertainties at this stage and were utilised by the government as 
part of its delaying strategy. The government also sought to ensure that EMU was based 
on a strict interpretation of the Maastricht criteria. In an interview in January 1996 Major 
argued that he had "growing doubts about the timetable" including the 1999 start date. It 
was important that "the economics are right" and this was doubtful in the European 
situation at that time. Major argued that "if you look at what is happening to the European 
economies, the German economy is slowing down, the French economy is slowing down, 
a number of European economies self-evidently are not going to be in any state of 
convergence for monetary union in 1999, or...for some time afterwards".42 The message 
was clearly that EMU was not the foregone conclusion laid out in the Maastricht treaty.
The primary factor behind the delay though was the position of Chancellor Clarke who 
seemed prepared to make the issue a resigning matter. He was angry at the perceived 
creeping appeasement of the Eurosceptics 43 He felt that any concession of a referendum 
to the Eurosceptics would merely lead to further concessions in the future. Clarke had 
been a consistent advocate of maintaining a viable option of entering EMU even at the 
1999 start date. He also underplayed the constitutional significance of EMU. In an 
outspoken speech to the European Movement in February 1995 Clarke refuted any major
42 Sunday Telegraph. 28/1/1996.
43 Independent 2/4/1996.
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constitutional implications arising from EMU. He argued that Britain's role in the world 
was dependent on;
"...Our position as a European power. It depends on our ability to develop as one of the 
movers and shakers in European Union affairs...We must not allow Britain to become 
marginalised in Europe."44
He was equally direct on the relationship between EMU and European political union;
"It is quite possible to have monetary union without political union. It is a mistake to 
believe that monetary union need be a huge step on the path to a federal Europe."45
Philip Stephens has commented that Clarke's speech was originally diluted by senior 
officials but that he went along with his original draft in spite of the advice of his own 
political adviser, Tessa Keswick 46
Almost as equally outspoken from a Eurosceptic perspective was Defence Minister 
Portillo. In a 1994 TV interview he openly opposed EMU. He argued that it would lead to 
the undermining of sovereignty because of the centralisation of economic decision­
making. In a classic statement flatly contradicting Clarke's argument he argued that;
"No British government can give up the government of the UK. That's impossible."47
In a direct reaction to Clarke's February 1995 speech he declared the speech as
44 K. Clarke, Speech to the European Movement Gala Dinner. (HM Treasury, 9/2/1995).
45 Ibid.
46 P. Stephens, Politics and the Pound. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1997), p.314.
47 Ibid.. p.312.
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"unhelpful" and urged all his Cabinet colleagues to keep their personal opinions as to the 
future unfolding of EMU private.48 The views of two key Cabinet heavyweights could 
not be more openly or diametrically opposed. Yet in spite of their divergent views on 
EMU they were both initially sceptical of the referendum proposal. Portillo foresaw the 
situation that a referendum under the conditions put forward by Hurd would imply, 
firstly, government support for EMU and, secondly, a campaign in favour of EMU with 
which Portillo would have severe difficulties. However, he gradually withdrew his 
opposition given the position of other Eurosceptics and the majority of Cabinet.
Another contributory factor at this time was the launch of the Referendum Party by 
wealthy businessman James Goldsmith in October 1995. This party sought a referendum 
on Britain’s future in Europe between being part of a "federal Europe" or a "common 
trading market".49 Goldsmith's party added pressure to Conservative backbenchers who 
felt that it would appeal to disaffected Conservative voters. Its populist democratic appeal 
focused on the idea of a referendum was also significant when the Conservative 
government was openly discussing the EMU referendum idea. Carter et. al., in their study 
of the Referendum Party, charted its increasingly Eurosceptic tone following the 
intervention of businessman Paul Sykes (who offered money to any Conservative 
candidate standing on an anti-EMU platform).50 Its overall impact in the final EMU 
referendum decision by the main parties was difficult to assess but it certainly "added to 
the pressure".51 Clearly the main forces lay within the Conservative party given the long 
gestation period of the referendum commitment.52 In his autobiography Major admitted 
that he met Goldsmith but denies that the topic of an EMU referendum was even
48 Ibid.. p.315.
49 N. Carter, M. Evans, K. Alderman, S. Gorham, "Europe, Goldsmith and the Referendum Party", Parliamentary Affairs. Vol 19, No.
4, Winter 1998, pp:47(M85.
50 Ibid.. p.475.
51 Ibid., p.479.
52 Author's interviews.
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discussed.53 However, there was some evidence of unrest amongst Conservative 
backbenchers who felt that an EMU referendum was an ideal solution to pre-empt the 
Referendum Party.54
Under these pressures events proceeded at a faster pace. Backbench pressure in favour of 
an EMU referendum was articulated by Marcus Fox, chairman of the influential 
backbench 1922 Committee, who openly called for a referendum. A survey of over 
30,000 grassroots Conservative members, planned as part of the manifesto process, found 
an increasingly Eurosceptic position.55 The timing of the findings in March 1996 was 
significant and was exploited by Party Chairman Brian Mulwhinney. He played a key 
role in gaining the support of the majority of the Cabinet in favour of the referendum 
option. There was also the increasing fear that Labour could pre-empt the government 
with their own EMU referendum commitment.56 In the Commons on 7 March 1996 
Major announced that the Cabinet, under the leadership of Rifkind, was looking into the 
detailed circumstances of a referendum option.57 Rifkind himself spoke in favour of the 
principle of referendums when "certain issues cannot be resolved through a general 
election because there is not the clear division of labour between the two main parties".58 
With Major himself in favour of a referendum the Chancellor was increasingly isolated.
Although isolated Clarke put up a fierce resistance, even going off on an African trip
53 J. Major, John Major: The Autobiography. (HarperCollins Publishing, London, 1999), p.703.
54 Author's interviews.
55 Financial Times. 28/3/1996.
56 A. Seldon, John Major: A Political Life. (Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London, 1997), p. 636. As Seldon notes "the [Cabinet] balance 
in favour was overwhelming".
57 Daily Telegraph. 8/3/1996.
58 Financial Times. 19/3/1996.
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refusing to deny resignation speculation.59 Stephens reported that, at the Cabinet meeting 
of 7 March, Clarke was reportedly furious at his isolated position and was reported by 
one minister as either about to have a heart attack or liable to hit someone.60 Realising his 
isolated position Clarke sought to extract the maximum concessions in return for an 
acceptance of the principle of a referendum. At the Cabinet meeting of 3 April Clarke 
gained a guarantee that the Maastricht option to join EMU, including at the 1999 start 
date, would be the Conservative position in the 1997 general election. At the press 
conference following the announcement of the conditional referendum decision Clarke 
insisted that he had not changed his "well-known" views on referendums and had secured 
the EMU option.61
Reaction to the referendum decision was mixed. The Guardian interpreted the decision as 
a victory for the pro-European elements whilst Marr of the Independent saw the move as 
a victory for the Eurosceptics. This mixed reaction reflected the cross-cutting cleavages 
generated by the referendum debate. Portillo's Eurosceptic reticence on referendums was 
paralleled by the pro-European Lord Howe's enthusiasm that "as in 1975 any government 
advocating a 'yes' vote would be well placed to win".63 Hence it was not easy to draw 
parallels between the Europhile/Eurosceptic axis and the pro/anti-referendum axis. 
Underlying the debate was the idea that EMU was a fundamental issue requiring a 
referendum. Even Clarke admitted that a referendum in the specific circumstances of 
EMU may be appropriate given that the Government would not have a clear mandate 
from the general election.64 However, Clarke's initial anti-referendum argument that the 
Eurosceptics would be emboldened by another concession was reflected in the aftermath
59 Independent 14/3/1996.
60 P. Stephens, op.cit.. p.340.
61 Ibid., p.344.
62 Guardian. 4/4/1996; A. Marr, Independent 4/4/1996.
63 P. Riddell, Times. 4/4/1996.
64 Independent 4/4/1996.
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of the government's referendum decision.65 Redwood quickly called for a wider 
referendum commitment on Britain's future relationship with the EU.66 A former 
Conservative MP who worked hard for the referendum commitment concluded that the 
tactic failed miserably as the Eurosceptics effectively pocketed the concession.67 The 
referendum debate within the Conservative party had been effectively a microcosm of the 
ongoing divisions within the party.
The 1996 Referendum Commitment: The Labour Discourse
Following John Smith’s death in 1994 and Tony Blair’s accession to leadership Labour 
moved slowly to a more pro-EMU position. A detailed and influential statement was 
developed by Mandelson and Liddle on the sovereignty issues raised by EMU. The 
central argument was that sovereignty would be "pooled" under EMU;
"Sovereignty would be pooled in order to bring about the benefits...for...the economy as a 
whole. This would mean sharing responsibility for monetary policy with our European 
partners and the European Central Bank (in which we would actively participate)."68
There was an explicit rejection of the argument that EMU would mean that Britain would 
cease to be an independent nation-state. Instead Britain would play a "leading role" in 
Europe by forging a new London-Paris-Bonn axis.69 Sovereignty was portrayed in terms 
of influence rather than independence which is seen as a theoretical diversion;
"In fact the loss of national sovereignty in these arrangements would be more theoretical 
than real. At present, because of the scale of international capital flows and currency
65 In a later typically blunt comment Clarke commented that "give them an inch and they will take a mile". K. Clarke, TV interview, 
SkvNews. 18/6/1999.
66 Times. 9/5/1996.
67 Author's interview.
68 P. Mandelson and R. Liddle, The Blair Revolution: Can New Labour Deliver?. (Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1996), p. 168.
69 Ibid.. p. 179.
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transactions, markets are more sovereign than ministers. True, the markets cannot prevent 
governments making foolish decisions, but they make them pay a heavy price for their 
folly...The question about a single currency, therefore, is not primarily political or 
constitutional but economic."70
The primacy of the economic over the political is then again highlighted. In particular the 
reference to markets mirrored the acceptance of globalisation discourse which had been a 
marked feature of the modernisation process in the Labour party.71 In sum, EMU was 
seen as a way of managing globalisation by a "further pooling" of sovereignty at the EU 
level.72 Similar arguments were advanced by Layard, in a book outlining "What Labour 
Can Do" (with a foreword by Shadow Chancellor Gordon Brown). In a strongly pro- 
EMU article he argued that there were "very many" arguments for joining and a need for 
EMU membership so that Britain can "join in" the leadership of Europe. Official policy 
though remained that of qualified support subject to economic conditions.
The Labour referendum debate intriguingly paralleled the Conservative debate. Part of 
the Conservative fear was that Labour may "trump" their policy by being the first party to 
announce a referendum commitment. However, Labour persevered with a wider idea of 
"consent". In a Commons statement on 12 March 1996 Shadow Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook argued that no British government could join EMU "without the consent of the 
British people".74 Consent could only be obtained either at a general election or at a 
referendum. However, the logic of EMU’s timing muddled the "consent" approach. Given 
EMU's start date in 1999 and the improbability of Labour declaring a policy of joining
70 Ibid.. p. 169.
71 See C. Hay, "The Discourse of Globalisation and the Logic of No Alternative", PSA Conference, University of Keele, April 1998,
Vol 2, pp:812-822.
72 D. MacShane, "Europe's Next Challenge to British Politics", Political Quarterly. Jan-March 1995, p. 26.
73 R. Layard, What Labour Can Do. (Warner Books, London, 1997), pp:144-145.
74 Guardian. 13/3/1996.
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EMU before the 1997 general election, any post-1997 decision to join EMU in 1999 
would inevitably be subject to a referendum.75 However, Labour refused to make an 
immediate explicit referendum commitment. Like the Cabinet the Shadow Cabinet was 
divided. Brown, arguably then the most pro-EMU member, was reportedly against a 
referendum commitment whilst Cook, arguably then the most EMU-sceptic member and 
Shadow Home Secretary Jack Straw, favoured such a commitment. Blair was reportedly 
undecided and given this schism the "consent" policy continued.
The main arguments advanced against the referendum commitment reflected the overall 
economistic as opposed to political discourse surrounding EMU by Labour. Four 
arguments were advanced against an early referendum commitment. The first was the 
uncertainty surrounding EMU in early 1996, especially the conditions surrounding the 
stability agreement. With three years still to go to the launch an early referendum 
commitment was felt to be premature. The second argument reflected the "influence" 
discourse alluded to earlier. Labour wished to build its relationship with its potential EU 
partners, especially France and Germany. Any move toward a referendum may have been 
interpreted as an anti-EU move. Related to this was the general argument that a 
referendum move was essentially a Eurosceptic move, which should be avoided given 
Labour's general pro-EU rhetoric. Finally, from a party political perspective any pre­
emptive move before the Conservatives could be portrayed as opportunism.76 Overall 
though the key arguments, largely put forward by Brown, in an intriguing parallel to the 
position of Clarke, reflected the discourse on EMU as largely a technical, economic 
matter.
75 Financial Times. 15/3/1996.
76 Ibid.
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The arguments in favour of a referendum commitment countered the economistic 
discourse with a wider range of arguments. Four key arguments were made. Firstly, the 
general principle of a referendum over such an important issue as EMU was widely seen 
to be essential and a key component of New Labour's approach. Key Labour figures 
argued in favour of a referendum. Tony Wright, then a leading Blairite, argued that;
"Labour has staked its claim to be a new kind of party. Old kinds of parties embrace 
referendums as tactical devices; new kinds of parties embrace them as instruments of 
democratic principle."77
In similar terms Tindale, a former policy adviser and researcher at the Institute for Public 
Policy Research, argued that in order to be consistent with the rhetoric of "a People's 
Europe" a referendum was required, especially for a "change of major constitutional
7ftimport" such as EMU. Secondly, these arguments were strengthened by Labour’s 
promise of referendums in other arenas including devolution and constitutional reform. 
Thirdly, party political considerations were also significant. Labour had a chance to 
"trump" the Conservatives given their delayed decision. From a defensive position 
Labour could not easily be seen to be vague about a referendum should the Conservatives 
give a clear commitment. Also a referendum would conceivably exacerbate divisions 
within the Conservative party with the Eurosceptics arguing for "clearer blue water" 
between the parties.79 Finally, internal party differences could be overcome by a 
referendum pledge.
How widely were Shadow Cabinet differences over EMU reflected in the Labour 
parliamentary party? Given Labour's severe divisions on Europe in the 1975 referendum 
the situation had changed markedly by 1995. A survey of 33% of the parliamentary party
77 T. Wright, Independent 3/4/1996.
78 S. Tindale, "A People's Europe" in G. Radice (Ed.), What Needs to Change. (Harper-Collins Publishers, London, 1996), p.244.
7> Financial Times. 15/3/1996.
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by Baker et. al. found four significant findings.80 On the general principle as to whether 
sovereignty could be pooled 59% thought that it could whilst 30% thought it could not. 
On EMU leading to the end of the sovereign nation-state only 21% felt that it would 
whilst 74% thought that it would not. However, on the proposition that the ECB should 
never determine monetary policy, a central feature of EMU, 42% agreed, 38% disagreed 
and 20% were undecided. On the call for a referendum the party was even more divided. 
50% favoured a referendum whilst 40% were opposed. Interestingly the front bench 
respondents were marginally opposed to a referendum whilst the backbenchers were in
O t
favour. The authors concluded, that, whilst there had been a moderate move in a pro- 
European direction, there were still party fissures on certain questions (especially those 
which challenged Labour's traditional collectivist values).82
Whilst the Eurosceptic position within Labour had waned there was still a significant 
strand in the parliamentary party. This coalesced around the Labour Euro-Safeguards 
grouping which published monthly newsletters seeking safeguards against further EU 
integrative moves. Leading campaigners included Benn, Mitchell and Davies covering a 
range of ideological views within the parliamentary party. The grouping reportedly had 
the support of one-quarter of all Labour MPs in 1990 but had been much diminished by 
1996. Rowley, writing for the Eurosceptic Bruges Group, admitted reluctantly that in 
terms of the EU debate the “party may be over”, as New Labour was overwhelmingly 
pro-EU. This though, he argued, arose from image rather than deep passion.84
80 D. Baker, A. Gamble, S. Ludlam, D. Seawright, "Labour and Europe: A Survey of MFs", Political Quarterly. Vol 67, No.2, Jul-Sep 
1996.
81 Ibid., p.357.
82 Ibid., p.370.
83 Ibid.. p.356.
84 C. Rowley, "The Party's Over", Occasional Paper No. 22. (Bruges Group, London, 1996).
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In spite of the general pro-EU shift, EMU continued to raise organised opposition from 
within Labour ranks. In order to openly campaign for a referendum on EMU over 50 MPs 
formed "A People's Europe" (an ironic play on New Labour rhetoric) group, which was 
publicly opposed to EMU. The key argument used was that the Maastricht framework 
reflected monetarist ideology. The framework was seen to be excessively deflationary 
leading to increased unemployment and cuts in public spending. EMU would deprive any 
future Labour government of the essential tools of macro-economic management. The 
ECB was also attacked for being the rule of unelected bankers over the European 
economy.85 For Berry monetary sovereignty was needed as an instrument against fiscal 
conservatism and unemployment. It was interesting to note the primarily economic 
concerns of the Labour Eurosceptics in contrast to the more political concerns of the 
Conservative Eurosceptics. However, there was also the clear overlap with the perceived 
lack of accountability to the ECB. MPs supporting the group included former Defence 
spokesman Davies, Llew Smith and Alan Simpson.87 Some Labour MPs also sought to 
maintain devaluation as an ultimate option. The discourse of constitutional parliamentary 
sovereignty was less resonant in Labour Euroscepticism than both their own history or 
Conservative Euroscepticism. However, there were still some expressions of 
constitutionalism. Davies argued that EMU's main purpose was constitutional namely to 
be a major plank in the creation of a centralised European state.88 Hence, although 
confined to a clear minority, there remained detectable unease within the Parliamentary 
Party.
Given the range of factors outlined Labour failed to beat the Conservatives in declaring a
85 Guardian. 28/3/1996.
86 R. Berry, "Against a Single Currency", Fabian Pamphlet 572. London, 1995.
87 Guardian. 21/4/1996.
88 HC Deb 8/6/1995 c380.
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clear referendum commitment. The immediate response to the Conservative decision was 
to maintain the vague idea of "consent’'.89 During the summer of 1996 the pro­
referendum forces within the party, especially the People's Europe group, continued to 
campaign confidently for a referendum.90 The Conservatives had forged an open flank 
which looked particularly vulnerable given Labour's referendum proposals in other policy 
areas. Throughout this period the conditions for EMU, especially the stability 
arrangements, remained unclear so that Labour ruled out giving a clear commitment to 
EMU entry in its election manifesto. This meant by implication that any decision to enter 
EMU in the subsequent Parliament would require a referendum in order to meet the 
"consent" commitment.91 Cook continued to emphasise the conditions before EMU entry, 
especially that jobs would be the bottom line, whilst Brown stressed the benefits.92 
Brown, whilst instinctively opposed to a referendum on what he regarded primarily as an 
economic issue, realised that a referendum commitment was probably inevitable.93 Like 
Clarke, Brown, increasingly isolated within the Shadow Cabinet, sought to balance 
acquiescence in a referendum commitment with the guarantee that all options, including 
EMU entry in 1999, remained open after the general election. Given this bargain Labour 
announced its referendum commitment in November 1996. The move was announced by 
Brown to ensure that its policy change was not seen as a move in an EMU-sceptic 
direction.94
The decision inevitably reflected the desire to match the Conservative referendum 
commitment for electoral reasons. Once the Conservatives had declared for a referendum 
Labour had little option but to follow course. Gould, a media adviser, stressed the
89 T. Wright, Independent 3/4/1996.
90 Guardian. 2/7/1996.
91 Independent on Sunday. 17/11/1996.
92 Daily Telegraph. 18/11/1996.
93 Independent 19/11/1996.
94 Times. 18/11/1996.
importance of "reassurance, reassurance and reassurance" in Labour's election campaign 
strategy;
"This (the referendum commitment) eliminated another attack the Tories were planning 
to use. An increasingly Euro-sceptical Tory party would no longer be able to accuse 
Labour of 'selling out' British sovereignty. Tony Blair was slowly reappropriating 
Labour's patriotic heritage."95
A leading Labour MP closely involved in the deliberations felt that electoral 
considerations were the most important factor. Conservative opponents also felt that this 
was a case of action-reaction.96 In spite of the divergent discourses EMU policy between 
the two main parties remained essentially similar, now including a referendum 
commitment.
1975...1996 Continuity or Change?
In drawing parallels between the 1975 referendum debate and the 1996 EMU referendum 
debate there were clear elements of continuity in the discourses surrounding sovereignty. 
Britain's relationship with Europe expressed in terms of sovereignty remained central to 
the political debate. The issues involved continued to cause deep divisions between, but 
more significantly within, political parties. These divisions did not match the usual left- 
right cleavage. Whilst looking at a particular aspect the EMU debate has reflected the 
sovereignty themes of the 1975 referendum. Indeed the range and degree of sovereignty 
issues has arguably been more widespread than the 1975 debate. Although the 1975 
referendum effectively decided Britain's membership of the EC the nature of that 
relationship has remained a hotly contested issue.
95 P. Gould, The Unfinished Revolution. (Little, Brown & Co., London, 1998), p.270.
96 Author's interview.
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In spite of some elements of continuity the elements of change appear to be more 
resonant. These can be seen in the structure/agency/discourse framework. The main 
structural change had been the changing nature of the EU from a common market to a 
deeper association. The 1970s discourse was marked by the constant reference to the 
Common Market rather than the European Union. This may have reflected the 
peculiarities of the British political debate but the functional stress on agricultural issues 
was also noticeable. The agency element was reflected in the changed domestic context 
in Britain. The most distinct change was the changed position of the two main parties 
with Labour in the 1990s being relatively more pro-EU and less divided than the 
Conservatives, an almost symmetrical reversal of the 1975 position. The divisions had 
also become more varied. In particular a significant portion of the media had become 
more Eurosceptic and the business community was more divided (see Chapter 7). Should 
a referendum occur it is likely that one of the main parties (the Conservatives) will 
openly campaign against EMU membership and, unlike 1975, a positive decision to join 
EMU (rather than stay in the EC) will be required. The sovereignty discourse too had 
subtly changed. The focus on constitutionalism, legalism and parliamentary sovereignty 
in 1975 had been partly displaced by two alternative discourses. On the Eurosceptic 
Conservative side the emphasis was on the end of the nation state reflected in ideas of 
identity and authority. On the Labour side the stress, from both pro and anti-EMU 
groups, was on economic factors seen most vividly in the acceptance of the discourse of 
global markets. Sovereignty, where utilised, was interpreted in an instrumental manner, 
either from EMU supporters to gain influence in the EU or from EMU opponents as a 
means of following alternative economic policies.
The 1996 referendum discourse also intriguingly paralleled the 1970s debate. The 
decision to announce the 1975 referendum arose largely from internal Labour party 
divisions and established a precedent for future referendums. This made it increasingly 
difficult for the two main parties to resist the pressure for a referendum on an issue as
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significant as EMU. Even the Labour party, which sought to play down the political 
dimension of EMU, had to accede to a referendum commitment. However, the move to a 
definite referendum commitment was slow in both parties. This reflected internal 
divisions, uncertainties over the progress of EMU and inherent caution. The referendum 
also served as a convenient cover for more clearly defined EMU positions. As Peston 
commented both Blair and Major were united in their desire to sidestep the EMU 
questions.97 Peterson, reviewing Britain's relationship with Europe, argued that in spite of 
the differing rhetoric Labour approached EU matters with great caution;
"Regardless of Blair's...'turn towards Europe', the British electorate was uniquely ill- 
prepared to pass judgement on EMU, which constituted one of the most dramatic and 
historic political choices facing the UK since the War."98
The discourses between the parties continued to slowly diverge but policies were closely 
intertwined with the referendum instrument serving to cover the growing divergence.
The 1997 General Election Debate
The 1996 referendum commitments placed EMU into the public sphere where the issue 
was hotly debated during the 1997 British general election. The nature of this debate will 
be discussed in four main areas. Firstly, the manifestoes of the political parties in respect 
of EMU will be discussed. Secondly, the development of EMU as an issue during the 
election campaign will be analysed, focusing primarily on the views of the party 
leaderships. Thirdly, the range of views expressed by dissident parliamentary candidates, 
especially in the Conservative party, will be outlined. Finally, a brief analysis of the 
impact of EMU on the election result will be made. The basic contention advanced is that 
EMU and its associated discourses of sovereignty had become a central issue in the 
public debate. Whilst the discourses became increasingly polarised during the campaign
97 Financial Times. 18/11/1996.
98 J. Peterson "Britain, Europe and the World" in P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday and G. Peele, (Eds.), Developments in British 
Politics 5. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1997), p.29.
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the essentially similar policy position of the major parties remained. EMU 'per se' had a 
limited effect on the election result but it was an indicator of the widespread divisions 
within the Conservative party, which clearly contributed to their defeat.
The Conservative party manifesto, You Can Be Sure With the Conservatives, continued 
the policy of "negotiate then decide" (or "wait and see") based on the existence of the 
Maastricht “opt-out”. This effectively deferred the decision until a later date;
"We believe it is in our national interest to keep our options open to take a decision on a 
Single Currency when all the facts are before us."99
EMU was seen to be an issue of "enormous significance" for which all the consequences 
had to be considered. The context of the "wait and see" policy stressed three main 
elements. The first of these was the need to negotiate. Placed in the context of Major's 
“opt-out” at Maastricht it was the responsibility of the government to ensure that Britain's 
national interest was protected by ensuring that the rules were not fixed against British 
interests. The second feature was the stress on European economies meeting the 
convergence criteria. It was interesting to note that there was no specific reference to the 
Maastricht criteria. The argument is made that there needs to be sufficient convergence 
before EMU can begin and that this convergence was unlikely before 1 January 1999. 
There was an explicit statement that a Conservative government would not proceed if 
EMU was created without sufficient convergence. The final feature was the "referendum 
guarantee" whereby, should a Conservative government seek to join EMU, there would 
be a guarantee that this decision was subject to express approval by the people. The 
conceptual background of Britain's relationship with the EU was one of "a partnership of 
nation states" as opposed to a federal Europe.100
99 Conservative General Election Manifesto 1997, You Can Be Sure With the Conservatives. (Conservative Party, London, 1997), 
Section "A Single Currency: Our Referendum Guarantee".
100 Ibid.. Section on Britain and the European Union.
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The Labour party manifesto, New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better, set a very 
similar tone to the Conservative manifesto. The overall conception of the EU was of an 
"alliance of nation-states" co-operating to achieve goals they cannot achieve alone. 
Labour were specifically opposed to a "European federal superstate".101 On EMU Labour 
followed a similar "negotiate then decide" policy. The manifesto reflected a more 
sceptical tone than a previous 1996 draft and was written personally by Blair. In 
particular “formidable obstacles” were deemed to face early EMU membership. The 
underlying rationale for the EMU decision was to be "a hard-headed assessment of 
Britain's economic interests". However, the three features discussed in terms of the 
Conservative party manifesto were intriguingly reflected in Labour's manifesto. Firstly, 
the need to negotiate is argued in terms of influence;
"...to exclude British membership of EMU forever would be to destroy any influence we 
have over a process which will affect us whether we are in or out. We must therefore play 
a full part in the debate to influence it in Britain's interests."102
Secondly, the success of EMU was seen to be dependent on genuine convergence (again 
no specific reference to the Maastricht criteria) without any fudging of the rules, a 
process unlikely to be achieved by 1 January 1999. Finally, Labour too confirmed the 
need for approval in a referendum before Britain could enter EMU. In what was referred 
to as the "triple lock" over British membership of EMU, approval would be needed by the 
Cabinet, Parliament and the people.103 In sum, the similarity between the Conservative 
and Labour manifestos was very striking.
101 Labour General Election Manifesto 1997, New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better. (Labour Party, London, 1997).
The Liberal Democrat manifesto, Make the Difference, was significantly different from 
the two major parties. The overall conception of the EU was of a strong and united 
Europe that is decentralised, democratic and diverse but respects cultural traditions, 
national identities and regional identities.104 Unlike the "wait and see" policy of the other 
parties there was an explicit commitment to "participate in a successful single currency" 
in order to enhance economic prosperity. There were three conditions placed on British 
membership of EMU. The first was that EMU must be firmly founded on the Maastricht 
criteria (a particular reference). The second condition was that Britain must meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Finally, the British people must agree to EMU membership. Indeed 
the Liberal Democrats were committed to the wider use of referendums on any reform 
that "fundamentally changes Britain's place in Europe". Perceived advantages of EMU 
included low inflation, low interest rates and the need to avoid losing influence and 
investment.105
The 1997 general election was also marked by the presence of a number of smaller 
parties focused on European issues. The most significant was the Referendum Party led 
by Goldsmith. Its aim was primarily the single issue of obtaining a referendum on 
Britain's future in the European Union. The proposed question was whether the UK 
should be part of a federal Europe or "return to an association of sovereign nations that 
are part of a common trading market".106 Although opposed in principle to EMU the 
party was more generally opposed to the wider EU project and argued that sovereignty 
had essentially been transferred by the UK accession to the EC in 1972 when Heath had 
"misled" the British people. The party put up 547 candidates, by far the largest number of 
the minor parties. The other political party with a clear focus on European issues was the
104 Liberal Democrats General Election Manifesto 1997, Make the Difference. (Liberal Democrats, 1997).
105 Ibid.
106 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, The British General Election of 1997. (Macmillan Press Limited, London, 1996), p.71.
217
UK Independence party, founded in 1993, which explicitly advocated the withdrawal of 
the UK from the EU. The party led by academic Alan Sked put up 194 candidates in the 
election but lacked financial support by comparison with the Referendum party with 
whom they clashed in 169 constituencies.
The Election Campaign: The Conservatives
In spite of the policy similarities contained in the manifestoes of the two major parties the 
presentation of policy highlighted the differences within the Conservative cabinet to a 
greater extent than those of the Labour party. Clarke and Heseltine still sought to keep the 
EMU option open, including the possibility of joining in 1999. Portillo and Lilley 
remained very sceptical, while the rest of the Cabinet, including Major, occupied a 
middle position in the Cabinet debate. The referendum commitment given in 1996 was, 
as seen earlier, tied to an agreement to maintain the Cabinet line of "wait and see". This 
had been renamed "negotiate then decide" in September 1996 to give the policy a more 
positive tone and a nuance was made in January 1997 that it was "very unlikely" that 
Britain would join EMU in 1999.107 On the backbenches the Eurosceptics were 
continuing their offensive as demonstrated at a vociferous 1922 Committee meeting in 
December 1996.108 The Europhile wing too was becoming more assertive with Major 
being particularly upset by a "grandees" letters in 1996, signed by Hurd, stressing 
Britain's role in an interdependent Europe.109 It was against this background that the 
fragile Cabinet unity entered the election campaign.
An early example of cracks appeared after the Wirral by-election defeat when Heseltine 
and Stephen Dorrell, the Health Minister, gave different messages on the same day. 
Heseltine, interviewed by BBC's John Humphrys, argued that a "clear, united view"
107 A. Seldon, John Major: A Political Life. (Wiedenfield & Nicolson, London, 1997), p.676.
108 Ibid.. p.688.
109 M. Stuart, Douglas Hurd: The Public Servant (Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1998), p.434.
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would emerge on EMU based on the "negotiate then decide" policy including the "very 
unlikely but not impossible" option of accession in 1999. Dorrell, on ITV's "Dimbleby" 
programme, stated that "we shan't be joining a single currency on January 1 1999", a 
statement reversed within three hours of the interview.110 A more significant conflict 
occurred between Clarke and Rifkind. Rifkind, also on a TV interview, argued that "on 
balance we are hostile to a single currency" (an interesting metaphorical mix), a 
statement later backed by Major. Clarke, on Sky News, stated that Rifkind had made a 
slip, an argument later refuted by Rifkind. The embarrassing episode ended with a joint 
statement that the Cabinet were "hostile to a fudged single currency" reported by the 
Evening Standard as "Rifkind .v. Ken: Now it's War".111 In an exchange with Cook, 
Rifkind highlighted the divergence between the two opposing Cabinet discourses (and 
ironically between Rifkind and Clarke). Responding to Cook's comments that if EMU 
was a success for France and Germany Britain would ultimately have to join Rifkind 
commented;
"I think that's the wrong criteria. I think you have to judge what are the implications for 
the United Kingdom...but also whether any benefits of a single currency would be so 
substantial as to outweigh the loss of national decision-making on crucial things like 
interest rates."112
The difference in discourse was clear even if the policies were similar.
Whilst differences were appearing amongst senior ministers the campaign itself led to 
more significant differences amongst junior ministers. The first minister to "break ranks" 
was Angela Browning, the junior agriculture minister. She argued, in an election address
110 N. Jones, Campaign 1997. (Indigo Publishing, London, 1997), pp:I27-128.
111 Ibid.. p. 129.
112 Independent 7/4/1997.
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to her own constituents, that EMU would lead to gold and foreign currency transfers to 
Frankfurt. This would in turn lead to tax and interest rates being determined in Europe
j  t o
and the "end of sovereignty of the nation state". Her defiance was surprising in view of 
the belief that she would gain promotion should the Conservatives win the election. 
Major, having stated at the start of the campaign that it would be "complete fantasy" that 
any minister would contradict the manifesto line, tried to smooth over the differences. In 
particular he emphasised that he too was opposed to any implications that EMU may 
have for transferring key tax and expenditure decisions to the European level.114 
Following a similar statement by Angela Rumbold, vice-chairman of the party, Major 
stated that;
"She's a backbencher, she's not a member of the government. She is entitled to express 
her views...I expect ministers to support the Conservative manifesto and make it clear 
they support the manifesto."115
The die had been cast.
The next episode came within days of Major's statement on Rumbold. Challenged by the 
Prime Minister to uncover divergences within ministerial ranks the media were not slow 
to act. BBC2's Newsnight reported that junior minister John Horam had published an 
election leaflet saying that he was "opposed to the Euro replacing the pound sterling". 
Horam sought to "square the circle" by arguing that, whilst he would argue against EMU 
in a referendum, he was not breaching the "negotiate then decide" position. Then James 
Paice was quoted as saying that "a single currency would lead inexorably to political 
union for which Britain was not ready".116 The next day David Maclean was reported to
113 Guardian. 11/4/1997.
114 Times. 12/4/1997.
115 NJones. op.cit. p.218.
116 Independent 16/4/1997.
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be opposed to EMU.117 All three denied that their statements contradicted the manifesto 
position and Major refused to take any action against the junior ministers. The revolt of 
the junior ministers raised the stakes and was quickly reflected at senior level. 
Eurosceptic minister Lilley, when asked whether he could imagine circumstances in 
which he would support a European single currency, replied that he had "a fertile
1 10
imagination" and could "imagine almost anything".
With the open divergences within ministerial ranks EMU suddenly became a key issue in 
the campaign. Major decided to take the issue directly to the electorate launching into a 
passionate justification of his policy toward EMU. He argued that the issue was the most 
important to face Britain in his political career and had been much misunderstood. Should 
EMU be successful delivering a zone of low inflation and high living standards across 
Europe then it was important that Britain retained an option to join. However, his 
experience of the ERM debacle led him to be cautious. He expressly ruled out joining 
EMU if it would lead to a single tax system or a loss of national government control over 
public expenditure. These issues "genuinely do touch upon the sovereignty of the British 
nation and upon the sovereignty of the British House of Commons".119 The ambivalent 
locus of sovereignty within the British polity was highlighted by this phrase but the 
contrast between the British and European levels was illustrated by the repetition of the 
word "British". The complexity of the issue led ultimately to a stress on the need to 
negotiate for Britain's interests;
"I will negotiate in the interests of the United Kingdom as a whole, not in the convenient 
party political interests of the Conservative Party...I'm going to keep to the position of 
negotiate and decide, in the interests of the British nation,...Whether you agree with me,
117 N. Jones, op.cit. p.219.
118 Independent 16/4/1997.
119 Guardian. 17/4/1997.
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disagree with me, like me or loathe me, don’t bind my hands when I am negotiating on 
behalf of the British nation."120
Hence the issue had been raised beyond the confines of the Conservative party into one 
of national interest and been placed at the centre of the campaign.
Following the press statement Major recorded a party election broadcast to directly 
appeal to the British electorate on EMU replacing the scheduled broadcast. The broadcast 
stressed the need to negotiate in an analogy based on keeping cards face down on the 
table. Again the importance of the issue was emphasised with the comment that there had 
been no matter like this in peacetime or in the living political memory of anyone. The 
most significant statement though was to reaffirm the referendum pledge;
"This is of such importance that in those circumstances there would be a 
referendum...open to every adult in the country...I will not take Britain into a single 
currency. Only the British nation can do that."121
However, it failed to stop the ministerial divisions with more junior ministers confirming 
their personal opposition to EMU, including Eric Forth, Oliver Heald and Liam Fox. In 
addition nine of the ten members of the influential 1922 executive had declared against 
EMU.122 Interestingly, in spite of its apparent desperation, Alastair Campbell, one of 
Labour's "spin doctors", was quoted by Jones as commenting that Major had made the 
best of a bad job.123
120 Quoted in N. Jones..op.cit.. p220.
121 Quoted in Ibid.. p222.
122 Guardian. 17/4/1997.
123 N. Jones, op.cit. p.223.
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Following the dramatic move by Major to place EMU at the heart of the campaign 
electoral tactics were changed to meet the new situation. Major had sought to raise 
himself above the party debate as the defender of the national interest and thereby stress 
the issue of his personal leadership. This was contrasted with Blair’s inexperience which 
would lead him to take a "white flag" to the Intergovernmental conference in 
Amsterdam.124 Party divisions over EMU were painted as a positive advantage with the 
Conservatives open to debate unlike Labour. However, Major took the debate forward 
another stage by hinting at a free vote for Conservative MPs on EMU. This move, 
made without reference to the Chancellor, led to Labour jibes of policy being "made on 
the hoof'. Major, responded by saying that he did not always need to consult "Ken Clarke 
or Joe Bloggs". This led Brown to conclude that policy was being made on the hoof and 
that he was as likely to consult Joe Bloggs as the Chancellor on the major economic issue 
facing the country. The final straw in ministerial divisions was illustrated when Heseltine, 
unable to keep up with the fast moving events, denied that Major was discussing the
t  r
option of a "free vote" position. In sum, the "negotiate then decide" policy became 
extremely frayed as the campaign developed and divisions became increasingly sharp 
both within ministerial ranks and the wider Conservative party. Clarke, though 
increasingly isolated, continued to frankly defend the government line. Less than one 
week before the election he argued that EMU was not necessarily irrevocable serving to 
anger both the EMU Commissioner, Yves-Thibault de Silguy, and the Eurosceptics.127
The Election Campaign: The Labour Party
The Labour campaign on EMU sought to exploit Conservative differences over EMU 
whilst playing down their own and portrayed the benefits of a united Labour government
124 Times. 18/4/1997.
125 N. Jones, op.cit. p.224.
126 Ibid.. p.226.
127 Times. 26/4/1997.
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battling for British interests in Europe. Labour were particularly successful at minimising 
their differences over EMU. Within the Shadow Cabinet Brown was believed to be more 
favourable to EMU than either Cook or Deputy Leader, John Prescott. During a pre­
election visit to the US in February 1997 Brown set out the five British economic tests on 
which a decision on British membership of EMU would be based. These included the 
impact on employment, the impact on investment, the convergence of economic cycles 
between Britain and the EU, the need for flexibility in response to asymmetric shocks and 
the impact on the financial services industry. However, Brown sought explicitly to retain 
the option of "participating in the next parliament and in the first wave" if "the economic 
conditions are right".128 Two weeks earlier Cook made a more "sceptical" speech arguing 
that EMU would be subject to a "hard-headed economic assessment" but that this did not 
mean that Labour was committed to signing up to EMU in 2001, 2002 or 2003.129
Whilst there were relatively minor differences of emphasis within the Labour 
parliamentary party these hardly surfaced during the campaign. The only significant 
incident occurred on 6 April when Cook predicted that it was unlikely that a fixture 
Labour government would enter EMU in the short-term and that the waiting period could 
extend beyond the next Parliament.130 The significant Eurosceptic Labour minority were 
also noticeably quiet on this issue during the campaign. The "People’s Europe" campaign 
was temporarily disbanded during the election campaign. Veteran Eurosceptic Shore, 
retiring as an MP, commented that there had been "a considerable effort to keep silence
n i
on this issue". Certainly in comparison with the open warfare within the Conservative 
party the differences within the Labour party over EMU were minor.132 However, the 
"negotiate then decide" option was probably a flexible enough policy to contain any
128 Financial Times. 20/2/1997.
129 Irish Times. 6/2/1997.
130 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, op.cit.. p.108. Also Independent 7/4/1997.
131 Sunday Times. 20/4/1997.
132 Financial Times. 14/4/1997.
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potential differences together with the overwhelming discipline and desire for election 
victory following four successive election defeats.
The Labour Party progressively took a more sceptical approach toward EMU and the EU 
in general as the campaign progressed. This was partly a proactive decision in order to 
portray the Labour party as a patriotic party and partly as a result of events and 
Conservative attacks. The proactive element was suitably illustrated by the election party 
broadcast involving a bulldog called Fitz. The broadcast showed a tired and listless Fitz 
gradually being inspired by Labour's policy agenda and eventually breaking free from his 
leash as Blair states that;
"I am a British patriot and I want the best out of Europe for Britain"133
The bulldog as a symbol of history and tradition, associated with former Conservative 
prime minister Winston Churchill, was now being usurped to demonstrate Labour's 
patriotic credentials. A later broadcast used the musical backdrop of "Land of Hope and 
Glory" as Labour's policy themes and attacks on the Conservative government record 
were displayed in the foreground. The Union Jack flag was also prominently used in 
Labour's campaigning literature and platforms in order to underscore the patriotic 
symbolism.
On EMU itself Labour's main policy emphasis was the referendum promise. Following 
Major’s decision to make EMU the centerpiece of the campaign, Labour campaign 
manager Mandelson admitted that they took an increasingly sceptical view on EMU and
133 N. Jones, op.cit. p.231.
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ensured that their referendum promise was placed in "headlights".134 This increased 
scepticism was mainly to ensure that the Conservatives did not outflank Labour. Above 
all Blair increasingly rationalised the "formidable obstacles" to EMU entry outlined in the 
Labour manifesto moving directly to address the territory of the "sovereignty questions". 
On the economic front these included the importance of the economic tests and ensuring 
that there were no proposals to give up tax-raising powers. Most significantly Blair 
admitted that joining EMU would have constitutional and political implications though 
these were not necessarily "insuperable".135 He also acknowledged the passionate feelings 
of those who wished to retain the pound.136 Above all the referendum was continually 
stressed including the condition that, should a Labour cabinet believe that the British 
people would not vote for EMU in a referendum, then it would not even attempt to join
117 _ . ,up. This was the ultimate political factor alongside the economic factors normally 
emphasised by Labour.
Other external events intervened to highlight the European dimension toward the end of 
the campaign. The first was an intervention in the campaign by EU Commission 
President Jacques Santer. He attacked the Eurosceptics and called for further European 
integration. The Conservatives sought to link Labour to Santer's policies. Blair responded 
with a stinging attack on Santer;
"What Santer says, with all due respect, is neither here nor there...If I am elected I will 
represent Britain."138
In addition he expressly stated that defence, taxation and immigration would remain
134 Ibid.. p.223.
135 Independent on Sunday. 20/4/1997.
136 Financial Times. 18/4/1997.
137 Independent  28/4/1997.
138 Quoted in N. Jones, op.cit.. p.233.
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subject to the British veto. Above all he would have "no truck with a European 
superstate" and would "slay the dragon" if it arose. Another significant move in tone was 
the statement that whilst not seeking isolation Labour were prepared to be isolated in 
Europe in order to defend British national interests.139 This was a change from the 1996 
Labour Conference when Blair had declared that he would not allow Britain to be 
isolated in Europe. A similar European intervention came in the form of EMU 
Commissioner, De Silguy, who suggested that should Britain stay outside of EMU they 
would lose influence as a new "G-3" would be developed between the US, Japan and EU 
states within the EMU zone. This was rejected equally vigorously by both Blair and 
Major.140 In the last week of the campaign Labour continually reemphasised their 
referendum commitment alongside their other key policy pledges. In sum, Labour was 
increasingly forced to adopt a more sceptical position on EMU, and the EU in general, as 
the campaign progressed.
The Conservative Discourse: The Conflation of EMU and Political Sovereignty
The split within the Conservative party was underpinned by the Eurosceptics conviction 
as to the serious implications of EMU for political sovereignty. EMU was represented as 
a big step toward political union. The four sovereignty questions were effectively rolled 
together with EMU regarded as the key step to an absolute loss of sovereignty rather than 
a staged dimunition. The most comprehensive expression of these views was made by 
Redwood in his book "One Currency, One Country". Similar views were expressed in the 
campaign literature by a number of Conservative candidates, whose views will be 
analysed in accordance with the sovereignty questions.
Redwood's book presented a detailed set of arguments against EMU from a clear
139 Independent on Sunday. 20/4/1997.
140 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, op.cit.. p.108.
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Eurosceptic viewpoint. Having stood unsuccessfully against Major for the Conservative 
leadership in 1995 Redwood had staked a clearly Eurosceptic position. The timing of the 
publication in March 1997 on the verge of the election campaign was widely seen as a 
direct challenge to the "negotiate then decide" policy of the Major Cabinet. The very title 
of the book, Our Currency, Our Country, highlighted the central theme of a perceived 
link between EMU and the creation of a federal European state. Redwood argued that the 
aim of European Union was to create a country called Europe and that EMU (“the single 
most important step on the federal road”) must be seen in this context;
"The idea of monetary union is an important part of a far bigger whole. It is part of a plan 
to create a new country called Europe;"141
In this context Britain was a key barrier to the creation of this country;
"...if we abolish the pound we make a decisive move towards a country called Europe, 
governed from Brussels and Frankfurt."142
Redwood explicitly addressed each of the other three sovereignty questions. On monetary 
sovereignty the initial assumption made by Redwood was that monetary policy is central 
in detennining the level of prices and employment. Under EMU the loss of monetary 
sovereignty to the ECB was significant and permanent;
"The single currency is like rejoining the ERM, locking yourself in and throwing away 
the key."143
On fiscal sovereignty Redwood rejected the argument that EMU was merely a monetary
141 J. Redwood, Our Currency. Our Country. (Penguin Books, London, 1997), p. 13 and p. 191.
142 Ibid., p.33.
143 Ibid.. p.63.
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matter. The convergence criteria undermined the right of an individual state to increase 
its borrowings. The role of the Commission, as exclusive interpreter of the Maastricht 
treaty, left member states "severely constrained" in their budgetary policies with 
increased expenditure necessary at the European level in order to cement unity within 
EMU.144 On taxation Redwood argued that regional disparities within the EMU area 
would inevitably lead to the transfer of funds from richer areas to poorer ones. The 
institutional sovereignty of the ECB was also addressed by Redwood. He saw the 
constitution of the ECB as basically reflecting Bundesbank traditions of secrecy, 
independence, limited accountability and technocratic efficiency. Redwood argued that it 
was inappropriate to transfer essentially political decisions on the economy to a 
"committee of experts".145 Overall Redwood presented a series of arguments across the 
range of sovereignty questions arguing that EMU would undermine sovereignty. A 
currency was a major symbol of nationhood but also a "question of power" in that;
"He who issues banknotes can have a decisive influence on the state of the economy."146
The key argument then was EMU’s primary role in a plan to create one country.
The detailed arguments espoused by Redwood were mirrored to a degree in the wide 
range of personal statements made by Conservative candidates in their personal campaign 
literature. A survey of the literature of 66 candidates opposed to EMU highlighted the 
explicit link perceived between EMU and sovereignty. The responses can be grouped into 
four types; those opposed to EMU on political sovereignty grounds, those opposed to 
EMU in principle, those opposed to EMU on other sovereignty grounds and those 
opposed on efficiency grounds. The relevant numbers in each group were 31, 29, 3 and 3
144 Ibid.. p.68.
145 Ibid.. p.30.
146 Ibid., pp:24-25.
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respectively, emphasising the significance of political sovereignty arguments.
Even more interesting was the language used by the candidates opposed on political 
sovereignty grounds. The link between EMU and absolute political sovereignty was very 
explicit in a number of cases. Nicholas Winterton argued that "if we join EMU we’ll lose 
control of the country"; John Bercow argued that "EMU is politically inherently 
incompatible with a sovereign Britain" and Neil Jones that "a single currency would 
mean losing our political independence". Other arguments included Ivan Lawrence who 
commented that "a single currency would imply national surrender and is totally 
unacceptable"; Richard Body that "a single currency would lock us into a federal Europe 
and Dudley Smith that "a common currency would lead inevitably to a federal 
Europe".147 The use of words such as "surrender", "lock" and "inevitably" reflected the 
perceived monocausal link between EMU and European political union. Indeed the logic 
is even reversed in the statement made by Theresa May. She argued that "being opposed 
to federal Europe" makes her opposed to EMU. One of the few EMU opponents on 
efficiency grounds was David Mellor who stated that "I do not see how [a] single 
currency could succeed". It was notable, however, that Mellor had not expressed sceptical 
views on Europe before the election and was opposed in his constituency by Goldsmith, 
leader of the Referendum party.148
A similar survey of statements by 102 Conservative candidates came to similar 
conclusions. Using the four categories outlined above 24 explicitly linked EMU to a loss 
of political sovereignty, only five opposed EMU on expressly economic efficiency 
grounds and the rest stated that they were opposed to EMU in principle.149 There were no
147 Daily Mail. 16/4/1997.
148 Ibid.
149 Times. 16/4/1997.
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cases of specific opposition on the three other sovereignty grounds (monetary, fiscal or 
institutional) although they may have been partial factors to those opposed to EMU on 
principle. Whilst not expressing specific reasons the strength of those opposed to EMU in 
principle was clear from their statements. Examples ranged from Marcus Fox's cautious 
statement that he could not see "any circumstances" where he would vote for the 
abolition of the pound to Julian Lewis who would "never" vote for a single currency and 
David Shaw who, whilst stating that he would listen carefully to arguments about the 
single currency, then stated categorically that he would have voted against.150 The link 
between EMU and a federal Europe was a recurrent theme throughout the campaign 
leaflets.
The views expressed by the candidates did not just represent a minority position. By the
end of the election campaign it was estimated that 282 candidates, nearly half of all
Conservative candidates, had openly declared themselves against EMU with over 230
receiving funding from Paul Sykes, the EMU-sceptic millionaire businessman.151 Hence
the scale of the revolt was arguably unprecedented in electoral history. It was very
difficult to reconcile the principled opposition to EMU with the manifesto line of
"negotiate then decide". The campaign address of one candidate, Nick St. Aubyn,
captured this tension. He commented that "I support Major but I would vote against 
1joining EMU". In sum, the widespread dissension amongst Conservative candidates 
was marked by a discourse, which stressed the monocausal link between joining EMU 
and the loss of political sovereignty to a centralised European state.
150 ibid.
151 Times. 19/4/1997.
152 Daily M ail 16/4/1997.
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Campaign: Evaluation of EMU Themes
Butler and Kavanagh argued that Europe was a key issue in the campaign taking the most 
media space.153 Of the European issues EMU was undoubtedly the most significant. 
However, in evaluating the discourse around EMU it was difficult to disentangle EMU 
from the wider issue of Britain's relationship with the EU. EMU came to symbolise the 
wider European debate. The major themes can be examined in four main areas. Firstly, 
how did Europe rate as an issue vis-a-vis other issues in the campaign? Secondly, in the 
light of the "sovereignty questions", what were the main foci of the discourse during the 
campaign? In particular what factors impinged on the discourse during the campaign? 
Thirdly, to what extent were the policies on EMU modified by the campaign process? 
Finally, to what extent was the election result influenced by the EMU debate?
Europe was arguably the major issue of the campaign. The three main issues were 
probably Europe, sleaze and the party campaign strategies. In a statistical analysis by 
topic of press coverage during the campaign, Europe came out as the primary topic in 
terms of both lead stories and editorials with 22% and 16% respectively. The only issues 
that came near were party strategies and sleaze with 19% and 11% respectively.154 This 
may have reflected Eurosceptic newspaper preferences but the conscious decision of 
Major to place Europe at the centre of the agenda clearly had an impact. Most 
significantly, Europe in the election meant "EMU, the Social Chapter and fish - but more 
than all these, the divisions in the Conservative party".155 Further evidence of the primacy 
of Europe as the main election issue can be seen in the volume of television time with 
Europe ranking first in terms of air time.156 In sum the centrality of Europe as an issue in 
the 1997 election campaign was clear, a sharp contrast to previous elections.
153 D. Baker andD. Kavanagh, op.cit. p. 105.
154 M. Scammell and M. Harrop, "The Press" in D. Baker and D. Kavanagh, op.cit. p. 175.
155 M. Harrison, "Politics on the Air" in D. Baker and D. Kavanagh, op.cit. p.138.
156 Ibid.. Table 8.3. p.140.
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The discourse of the two main parties has already been analysed in detail but some 
themes need evaluating in terms of the overall discourse. Six main themes can be 
discerned. The first was the "patriotic" nature of the discourse. The deliberate attempt by 
Labour to recapture the patriotic ground from the Conservative party has already been 
noted. However, the whole debate reflected Europe as a potential "threat" to Britain, 
which had either to be resisted or actively led by a government single-mindedly pursuing 
the national interest. As the campaign developed the second theme was the increasingly 
Eurosceptic tone culminating graphically in advertisements depicting Blair and Major in 
the lap of Chancellor Kohl. The third theme was the novel presence of specific 
Eurosceptic parties, especially the Referendum party. According to one survey a 
staggering 22% of households received a video from the Referendum party.157 Whilst the 
Referendum party failed to make a significant electoral breakthrough they were arguably 
significant as a perceived threat. Fourthly, the Eurosceptic flank was also strengthened by 
the interventions of EU politicians such as Santer and De Silguy. The fifth theme was the 
individual personal competition between Blair and Major to be the best negotiator in the 
EU for British interests. Finally, of the four sovereignty questions the election discourse 
can be said to be dominated by the political union question. There was little specific 
debate on the specific monetary, fiscal or institutional sovereignty questions. The 
countervailing discourse of the absence of sovereignty as a dimension in the EMU debate 
stressing instead economic factors was held by Labour throughout the campaign. The 
polarised positions of the discourse of absence and presence in terms of EMU and 
sovereignty were classically illustrated during the election campaign.
What influence did the increasingly Eurosceptic discourse have on policy toward EMU?
157 D. Baker and D. Kavanagh, op.cit. p.219.
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Both parties generally continued the “negotiate then decide” policy. The only specific 
policy move was Major's suggestion of a free vote for Conservative backbenchers on 
EMU. However, as Major argued, it was illogical to allow backbenchers to express their 
personal views on EMU during the election campaign and then expect them to be
1 SRwhipped into a voting position in the subsequent Parliament. There was not so much a 
policy change on EMU by the Conservatives as an erosion of credibility in a policy 
clearly at variance with a large section of its parliamentary candidates. The policy did not 
move as much as implode. The Labour policy line did not change either even though it 
was presented in an increasingly sceptical manner. However, the key difference was that 
Labour maintained a degree of unity totally at variance with the deep Conservative 
divisions over EMU. On EMU policy itself it was difficult to determine a significant 
difference between the two main parties. Hence, even though Europe was arguably the 
defining issue of the election, it was difficult to match this issue to a particular party. To 
quote Scammell and Harrop this dilemma was neatly encapsulated in the position of the 
Times newspaper;
"Given that Europe was 'the defining issue of the election', for whom should the paper's 
readers actually vote? For the 'weak, ineffectual' John Major or for Mr. Blair's 'chameleon 
attractions'?"159
In sum there was a paradox between the increasingly Eurosceptic discourse of the two 
main parties and an overall continuity of policy. However, the key difference between the 
two parties was that the campaign made the Conservative policy seem incredible in the 
light of party differences whilst Labour maintained a degree of credible cohesion.
Although the major issue in the campaign it was difficult to disentangle EMU (and 
Europe generally) as causal factors in the final election statistics, which amounted to a
1SIN. Jones, op.cit. p.225.
159 M. Scammell and M. Harrop, "The Press" in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, op.cit. p .l68.
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landslide victory for Labour and a crushing defeat for the Conservatives. Given the 
similar policy stance of the two main parties it was difficult to assess directly the effect of 
EMU. One indirect measure of Eurosceptic opinion was the electoral performance of the 
Referendum party. The party attained an average of 3.1% of the vote in 547 
constituencies; it gained 3.6% in seats being defended by Conservative candidates and 
only 2.5% in seats being defended by Labour. The regional focus of support occurred in 
the suburbs of the South-East and the rural areas of East Anglia. In general it is estimated 
that the Referendum party only cost six Conservative MPs their seats.160 The 
Conservative candidates who stood on an explicitly anti-EMU platform suffered an 
average 11.4% drop in their vote similar to the overall swing of 11.3%.161 Another 
interesting feature was that the fall in the Conservative vote was not marked by any 
significant regional variations suggesting a wide range of general factors for their election 
defeat. Butler and Kavanagh concluded that the Conservatives did not so much lose on
policy issues (where differences between the parties were relatively minor) as on value
• 1 (\)issues such as party unity, competence, newness, trust and integrity.
Although EMU as a policy issue "per se" may not explain the Conservative defeat it was 
symbolic of two major factors. The first was the competence of the Conservative 
government following the withdrawal of Britain from the ERM in 1992. Following that 
event the polls moved significantly to Labour's advantage and the Conservatives were 
never to recover. Having fought the 1992 election with membership of the ERM as a 
centrepiece of its strategy the embarrassing failure undermined the trust of the electorate 
in the Conservative government. The link between Conservative fortunes and European 
monetary politics was clearly established at this point. The second symbol was that EMU 
epitomised differences within the Conservative party. An interesting postscript was made
160 J. Curtice and M. Steed, "Appendix 2: The Results Analysed" in D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, op.cit. p.308.
161 Ibid.
162 D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, op.cit.. p. 247.
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by Conservative campaign manager, Charles Lewington, who commented that he knew 
the "game was up" when Major failed to axe junior ministers Horam and Paice. This 
demonstrated to him both the weakness of Major's leadership and the unravelling of 
differences within the Conservative party.
Conclusions
Both the 1996 referendum and the 1997 general election debates illustrated the move of 
the EMU debate from the parliamentary sphere into the public sphere. The Maastricht 
ratification debate had set the agenda in a protracted parliamentary debate focused on 
multiple conceptions of sovereignty. The “politics of sovereignty” was evident in a 
number of ways during the referendum debate. An absolutist conception of sovereignty 
was a key factor behind Conservative internal divisions. The 1996 referendum decision 
was primarily a move to reconcile these divisions. The “politics of sovereignty” was also 
seen in the reactive response of the Labour opposition to close a potential flank from 
Conservative attacks. Outside the narrower party political debate the wider idea that 
EMU was such an important issue that the popular sovereignty of the British people was 
required through a referendum was prevalent throughout the debate. Another notable 
feature throughout was the continued caution of both major parties in the light of the 
challenges to sovereignty from EMU. The referendum option was arguably itself an “opt- 
out” from the necessary decisions over EMU. Once promised, however, it moved the 
debate unalterably into the public sphere.
Economic considerations played a minor role throughout this period. The most significant 
factor was the uncertainty during this period that EMU would actually proceed, and, if so, 
whether it would be a narrow or wide membership EMU. The Conservative government, 
in particular, persisted with the belief that EMU may be delayed given the difficulties 
faced by many states in meeting the convergence criteria. This made the narrower
163 N. Jones, op.cit. p. 279.
236
calculation of British economic interest much more difficult. Labour too was cautious 
about assessing the economic impact of EMU at this time. As will be outlined in Chapter 
7 business interests were quiescent during this period given the internal sovereignty 
debate within the Conservative party.
Electoral considerations played a role throughout the 1996 referendum debate. The 
Labour party, after four election defeats, responded to the Conservative decision for 
electoral reassurance and to close a potentially exposed flank. However, for the 
Conservative party the sovereignty debate and the internal divisions within the party led 
to a prolonged debate on a referendum over many years. The delay in approving a 
referendum decision resulted from Cabinet divisions, especially the position of 
Chancellor Clarke. Clearly the Conservatives wished to enhance their electoral appeal by 
announcing the referendum commitment. However, the move was primarily a move to 
placate the Eurosceptic wing of the party; a move which failed completely. It was 
difficult to perceive an electoral advantage to the referendum commitment given that the 
move would inevitably be followed by the Labour opposition. The 1997 election 
influenced the cautious approach of both parties on EMU given that EMU had yet to 
occur. However, it merely served to delay the policy divergence between the two parties. 
Overall electoral considerations influenced the timing of the 1996 referendum decision 
but crucially followed on from the intense sovereignty debate within the Conservative 
party.
The wider arena of the 1997 election campaign allowed the discourse to polarise between 
those arguing the monocausal link between EMU and political sovereignty and those 
denying this link. The discourse on Europe became increasingly Eurosceptic in tone from 
both parties as the campaign progressed. However, on EMU the Labour leadership
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continued to stress the economic basis on their position on EMU. Unlike the 
Conservative party this line was widely supported by Labour candidates. The 
Conservative party in contrast imploded over the EMU question which, as illustrated in 
the statements made by many candidates, was regarded as a question of vital principle. 
EMU, in highlighting the differing degrees of internal divisions within the two parties, 
indirectly contributed to the landslide Labour victory. In spite of the polarisation of the 
discourse the policy positions remained largely unchanged with caution again being a 
notable feature. An alignment of a clear policy divergence with the divergent discourses 
of sovereignty had to wait until after the election.
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CHAPTER 6: EMU AND SOVEREIGNTY: POST-ELECTION POLICY
DIVERGENCE
Introduction
The conclusive landslide victory in the 1997 general election for Labour after 18 years of 
Conservative rule provided a change in environment within which both of the main 
parties quickly adapted their policies toward EMU. Both moved away from the "wait and 
see" policy adopted during the election to clearly divergent positions. The new Labour 
government moved pragmatically to a "prepare and decide" policy based on five 
economic tests, albeit effectively ruling out EMU membership in the lifetime of the 
Parliament. The Conservative opposition, under the new leadership of William Hague, 
moved to a policy of explicitly rejecting EMU for the next two Parliaments. Whilst both 
policy turns were hedged with conditions their polarisation was clear and foreshadowed a 
"phoney war" in planning and organising for a future EMU referendum. There remained 
significant dissenting voices within both parties, especially the Conservatives, but the 
overall pattern of both parties’ policy became clear. The policy positions were now more 
clearly aligned with the differing conceptions of sovereignty outlined by the two parties. 
For Labour the pooling of sovereignty was explicitly acknowledged. For the 
Conservatives an absolutist conception of sovereignty remained a significant barrier to 
EMU membership.
This chapter will address the policy divergence between the two main parties, and its 
relationship with the differing conceptions of sovereignty, in three main parts. Firstly, the 
policy turns in the latter part of 1997 will be discussed. For the Labour government a key 
statement was made in October 1997 in the context of financial market uncertainty. For 
the Conservatives the perceived failure of the "wait and see" policy following a landslide 
election defeat led to a swift policy turn against EMU. Secondly, the continued 
divergence of the two positions throughout 1998 and 1999 will be analysed. For the
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Labour government this was symbolised by the 1998 European Presidency and the 1999 
National Changeover Plan. For the Conservatives a party ballot confirmed the leadership 
position. The third area of discussion will highlight the external dynamic of the wider 
debate arising from EMU. This included the issue of the Euro-X grouping designed to 
give a wider economic voice to EMU, the debate on tax harmonisation within the EU and 
the actuality of EMU's launch on 1 January 1999. In spite of the government's attempts to 
develop a long-term strategy favouring EMU as a narrow monetary adventure the 
dynamics of the EU debate meant that other aspects of fiscal and political sovereignty 
increasingly came to the fore. This was reflected in the debate during, and in the 
aftermath of, the 1999 European election.
Labour's October 1997 Statement: Prepare and Decide
The new Labour government's immediate task on Europe was to address the 
Intergovernmental Conference at Amsterdam in June 1997. EMU was not a central issue 
at the IGC other than confirmation of the Stability Pact. The government adopted a 
pragmatic approach obtaining an “opt-out” for border controls (along with Ireland), 
agreeing to the extension of QMV to a small number of areas and seeking further co­
operation in other sectors such as crime. Generally though there was nothing extremely 
contentious at Amsterdam and, to quote Young, within six weeks of the general election, 
Europe had been reduced to a "part of quotidian banality".1 However, three other points 
need to be stressed. Firstly, the Amsterdam Treaty was by common consent, a very 
limited step in European integration with key institutional questions deferred.2 Secondly, 
the pro-European tone of the Blair government was significantly different from that of 
the Major government.3 Finally, Blair sought to go beyond EU issues by pronouncing on 
wider New Labour ideology such as the need for flexible labour markets, Anglo-Saxon 
economic liberalism and the overall "Third Way" to a "People's Europe" beyond the "old
1 H. Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998), p.490.
2 See A. Duff (Ed.), The Treaty of Amsterdam. (Federal Trust, London, 1997).
3 H. Young, op. cit.. p.489.
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Left" or the "new Right".4 Labour’s EU discourse was though expressed in instrumental 
terms, namely how Labour’s approach, as opposed to Conservative isolationism, would 
best advance defined British interests. There was little sense of a partnership approach or 
any influence arising from continental European ideas.5 This "lecturing", bome from the 
confidence of a landslide election victory, caused some resentment in European circles 
but the overall tone of political engagement in EU affairs was a distinctive change from 
the previous government.6
Within the overall pro-European rhetoric EMU initially played a small role. Indeed the 
government itself sought to initiate a wider debate on EMU in the summer of 1997. There 
was a realisation that, to quote Chancellor Brown, whether Britain is "in or out, it will
n
have profound implications for British business and the British economy". Interestingly 
Brown did not then rule out membership in the first wave in 1999 and was, ironically, 
under pressure from the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), who had declared for
Q
the principle of EMU, not to enter in 1999 because of the high exchange rate. In the 
monetary arena the most radical step was to grant operational independence to the Bank 
of England. Whilst this move was a necessary step towards meeting the Maastricht 
conditions for EMU entry the main reason was probably the desire of the government to 
set out a long-term stable monetary framework avoiding the volatility and politicisation 
which had characterised monetary policy under the Conservative government.9
4 T. Blair, Speech to the European Socialists Congress. Malmo, 6/6/1997.
5 R. Smith, “Sources of New Labour” in J. Milful] (Ed.), Britain in Europe. (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 1999), p.130.
6 H. Young, op.cit.. p.491.
7 Times. 17/7/1997.
* Ibid.
9 H. Pym and N. Kochan, Gordon Brown: The First Year in Power. (Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 1998), p.7.
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The 1997 summer peace over EMU abruptly ended in the autumn triggered ironically in 
part by the governments own advisers but more directly by volatility in the financial 
markets. In September 1997 the Financial Times, quoting "ministerial sources", claimed 
that there was an increasing likelihood of UK entry to EMU in 1999.10 This story was 
seemingly contradicted by Brown in an interview in the Times in October but was in turn 
reconfirmed by Mandelson. In the confused situation shares initially soared at the 
prospect of UK entry in 1999 but later declined equally dramatically when these rumours 
receded.11 The "spin doctors" had ironically left the government in a spin and Brown's 
statement of 27 October 1997 served to clarify government policy in the light of the 
prevailing uncertainty.
Whilst bom in confusing circumstances Brown's statement served to define the 
government's basic policy on EMU for the lifetime of the Parliament. Four elements can 
be highlighted. The first was explicit support for the principle of EMU, which would 
arguably be in Britain's long-term economic interest;
"We believe that, in principle, British membership of a successful single currency would 
be beneficial to Britain...The potential benefits for Britain of a successful single currency
19are obvious, in terms of trade, transparency of costs and currency stability."
The stress was on economic benefits not just for Europe but specifically for Britain.
The second element was that Brown dealt directly with the question of sovereignty or
10 Financial Times. 26/9/1999.
11 Times. 25/10/1997.
12 G. Brown, "Statement on Economic and Monetary Union". HM Treasury, 28/10/1997.
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what he called a "constitutional bar" to EMU membership. The stress on "pooling" 
sovereignty is clear along with the denial of a constitutional bar;
"It must be clearly recognised that to share a common monetary policy with other states 
does represent a major pooling of economic sovereignty...The constitutional issue is a 
factor in the decision but it is not an overriding one. Rather, it signifies that in order for 
monetary union to be right for Britain, the economic benefit should be clear and 
unambiguous."13
This explicit linking of the "pooling" of sovereignty with support for EMU in principle 
were significant developments. Brown also reaffirmed the need for popular support in a 
referendum "as a matter of principle" and set in train a series of preparatory measures.
Despite the two pro-EMU arguments Brown stressed that economic conditions precluded 
EMU membership in the short-term. The economic benefits of EMU needed to be "clear 
and unambiguous" in accordance with five subjective economic tests. Firstly, could there 
be sustainable cyclical and structural convergence between Britain and the economies 
within EMU? Secondly, was there sufficient flexibility, especially labour market 
flexibility, to cope with economic change? Thirdly, would joining EMU create better 
conditions for businesses to make long-term investment decisions? Fourthly, would the 
financial services industry continue to thrive under EMU? Finally, would EMU 
membership be good for employment? These tests were subjectively vague with, 
arguably, the first test on convergence being the most substantive. Interpreting these tests 
in 1997 Brown concluded that membership of EMU was deemed to be impossible in 
1999 and "barring some fundamental and unforeseen change in economic circumstances" 
unrealistic during the Parliament.14 The strategy then was clearly a pragmatic, long-term 
one with an "escape hatch" in the form of economic tests available should economic
circumstances change or popular opinion remain sceptical.
The balanced nature of Brown's statement was reflected in a range of interpretations. For 
the CBI and the TUC there was criticism that EMU entry in the lifetime of the Parliament 
had effectively been ruled out whilst for Shadow Chancellor Lilley, Brown had sounded 
the "death knell for the pound".15 Equally diverse was the reaction of political 
commentators. For Stephens and Barber in the Financial Times the Chancellor's 
statement was not a decisive move.16 For Young the government had taken "the line of
1 n
least resistance" but with a "plain intention" to hold a referendum before 2002. For 
Riddell there was the clear "outlines" of a five-year strategy to enter EMU in "the most
1 Q
pro-European statement by any senior minister for a long time". I would argue that the 
statement marked a clear policy turn toward EMU, albeit hedged in the pragmatism of a 
government determined to secure a second election victory by achieving other manifesto 
commitments in its first term.
The explanations for the government policy statement have tended to focus on the 
activities of the "spin doctors" who allowed the issue to temporarily get out of control. 
The classic example was the phone call of adviser Charlie Whelan to the press from the 
Red Lion pub which was overheard by a political opponent.19 The confused situation and 
financial speculation undoubtedly explain the timing of the announcement. Arguably the 
decision to rule out EMU membership for the entire Parliament, barring unforeseeable
15 Financial Times. 27/10/1999.
16 Financial Times. 28/10/1999.
17 H. Young, op.cit.. p.493 and p.514.
18 Times. 28/10/1997.
19 H. Pym and L. Kochan, op.cit.. p.142.
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consequences, may have been accelerated by the desire to avoid ongoing financial 
speculation triggered by the spin crisis (vividly captured on television by Brown opening 
a new trading system in front of a sea of red lights caused by falling share prices).
Routledge, in his biography of Brown, stressed his desire to avoid economic uncertainty
0 0  • following the Conservative ERM debacle. In their analysis of the episode Pym and
Kochan point out that clear policy plans were being developed prior to the crisis. The
government had already concluded that entry in 1999 could not be attempted for the
01economic reasons of lack of preparations and lack of underlying convergence.
Whilst economic factors may explain the timing of potential EMU entry the decision to 
stay out of EMU for the entire Parliament was arguably governed by political factors. 
The key argument was that Labour did not want its first term of government for 18 years 
to be marked by a highly divisive referendum campaign in the light of a sceptical public 
and hostile media.22 Pym and Kochan argued that this political point was stressed by 
Brown who, contrary to most perceptions, was more cautious than Blair, preferring 
instead to focus on domestic issues.23 The summer of 1999 represented a rather narrow 
"window of opportunity" for the government to join EMU given their large majority and 
disarray amongst the Conservatives. Delay would lead to further financial speculation 
and mid-term problems 24 A pro-EMU Labour MP suggested that the very inexperience 
of the government was a key factor in failing to grasp the issue at this key time.25 
Whatever the underlying reasons the policy was now effectively determined for the 
Parliament. However, given the absence of a clear timetable and flexible conditions the 
policy was inevitably to come under careful scrutiny in the following years.
20 P. Routledge, Gordon Brown: A Biography. (Simon and Schuster, London, 1998), p.326.
21 H. Pym and N. Kochan, op. cit.. p.135.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.. p.139.
24 Author's interview.
25 Author's interview.
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Conservatives in Opposition: No EMU Membership for Two Parliaments
Following their landslide election defeat and the immediate resignation of Major the 
Conservatives were involved in a bitter leadership battle which reflected their divisions 
on EMU. Hague, Redwood, Howard and Lilley ran on an EMU-sceptic platform whilst 
Clarke and Dorrell continued the "wait and see" policy. Hague's ultimate victory, in spite 
of a surprising last minute alliance between Clarke and Redwood, prefigured a change in 
EMU policy. Hague was determined to clarify the policy on EMU away from "wait and 
see", especially after Clarke refused to join the Shadow Cabinet, to accord with his 
personal scepticism toward EMU.
Following his leadership victory and, with a largely EMU-sceptic Shadow Cabinet, the 
Conservatives decided to move from the immediate post-Hague position of ruling out 
EMU for the "foreseeable future" to a policy of ruling out EMU membership for two 
Parliaments. This was clearly an intermediate position between the previous "wait and 
see" policy and ruling out EMU in principle. However, the tone of pronouncements on 
EMU was highly sceptical. Hague himself concentrated on economic factors arguing that 
EMU needed to be fully tested through both stages of the economic cycle ("boom and 
bust") before British entry could even be considered.27 To the CBI he referred to EMU as 
a "building with no exits".28 The "No EMU for Two Parliaments" policy served to 
crystallise the continuing splits within the Conservative hierarchy leading to the 
resignation of remaining pro-EMU Shadow Cabinet members such as David Curry and 
Ian Taylor. Heseltine and Clarke remained vociferous opponents of the new policy and
26 Times. 24/10/1997.
27 Interview with William Hague, Times. 6/10/1997.
28 Independent 11/11/1997.
29 Times. 3/11/1997.
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agreed to join a cross-party campaign to secure a "yes" vote in any future referendum, 
being in turn referred to as "retired Cabinet ministers". Indeed they tended to be more 
pro-EMU than the Labour government illustrated by an open letter from 12 "grandees", 
including Chris Patten, in January 1998 urging the government to "prepare now to join a
' i  i
successful single currency". However, whilst the divisions remained there had been a 
clear turn in official Conservative policy.
Policy Consolidation: The Labour Government
Following the October 1997 statement the government sought to use its Presidency of the 
EU in the first half of 1998 to demonstrate its pro-European credentials on issues other 
than EMU. However, the issue was eventually to dominate the Presidency thwarting 
British leadership ambitions. The Presidency was launched amidst a fanfare of rhetoric 
and symbolism as the government sought a "People's Europe". The focus was on 
reconnecting the EU with "People's issues" such as employment, crime, drugs and the 
environment rather than seemingly abstract institutional issues. This would, according to 
Cook, lead to giving "Europe back to the people". This ambitious aim was backed by 
other rhetoric on the need for Europe to adapt "Anglo-Saxon" liberalism and to take the 
"Third Way" between traditional socialism and unfettered capitalism.33
The symbolism of the new pro-European tone was captured in Blair's speech in French to 
the French Parliament in March 1998. However, the limits to the pro-European approach 
were also evident in the speech. On EMU Blair reiterated the government position 
stressing the need for economic convergence. However, on the wider sovereignty 
questions Blair emphasised underlying concerns to the integration process;
30 Times. 31/10/1997.
31 European. 14/11/1998.
32 R. Cook, Speech to the REA. 3/11/1997.
33 See T. Blair. Speech to European Socialists Congress. Mabno, 6/6/1997.
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"You do not have to be a Eurosceptic, in any shape or form, to appreciate the deep 
concern amongst our peoples as to how they make sense and relate to the new Europe."34
Thus, further integrative moves should be analysed on a functional basis. Whilst 
integrative moves should be made in the areas of pollution and crime in other areas such 
as welfare and taxes "subsidiarity" should rule. Above all, we should avoid "a Europe of 
conformity, a United States of Europe run by bureaucrats".
The centrality of EMU in the EU during 1998 was to come into sharp focus during the 
London Summit which confirmed the participants in EMU and the head of the ECB. The 
expected dispute over participants was relatively easily solved by a clearly flexible 
interpretation of the Maastricht convergence criteria with only Greece being effectively 
excluded for economic reasons. However, there was a severe disagreement over the 
appointment of the head of the ECB, with France favouring French central banker, Jean- 
Claude Trichet, and the rest of the EU supporting Dutch central banker Wim Duisenberg. 
The launch of EMU was ironically marked by a bitter national battle. Blair managed to 
preside over a classic compromise with Duisenberg agreeing by "gentlemen’s agreement" 
to retire after four years of his eight year term to be replaced by a Frenchman. Whilst the 
deal kept EMU on course Blair was criticised by Hague for presiding over a "fudged and 
flawed" currency.36 However, the key point was that Britain was standing aside as the 
eleven members forged ahead with EMU, the issue which had dominated the EU 
Presidency.
34 T. Blair, Speech to the French National Assembly. 24/3/1998.
35 Ibid.
36 Times. 6/5/1999.
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Assessments of the UK Presidency were varied. The Presidency had achieved a number 
of practical steps including the EMU deal, the launch of enlargement negotiations and 
initiatives in a number of areas including citizenship and environment. However, in terms 
of the initial objectives set at the start of the Presidency and the idea of leading Europe 
many criticisms were made of the UK Presidency, the chief of which was overambition. 
A French journalist commented that if the British Presidency was to be judged on the 
basis of its own expectations it was "little less than a disaster" but judged more sensibly it 
served to normalise Britain’s relations with Europe.37 Even the Minister for Europe 
during the Presidency, Doug Henderson, admitted subsequently that "solid achievements" 
rather than "glorious triumphs" had been made.38 However, it could be argued that the 
achievement of normalised relations would require EMU membership in the near 
future.39 Certainly the launch of EMU was a defining moment during the Presidency, a 
moment from which Britain stood apart.40
Away from the European Presidency the domestic pressure on the government continued. 
A Treasury Select Committee report in the spring of 1998 crystallised an interesting 
discussion as to the nature of the five economic tests which Brown had outlined in his 
October 1997 statement. Taking a detailed examination of the five tests the Labour-led 
committee concluded that it would be impossible to judge whether EMU was a success 
for at least five years.41 They also felt that the euro would enter Britain 'de facto', 
emphasised the need for greater preparations and laid emphasis on exchange rate policy
37 Pierre Bocev, Le Figaro. 30/6/1998.
38 D. Henderson, "The UK Presidency: An Insider's View", Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 36, No. 4, December 1998, 
p.565.
39 P. Ludlow, "The 1998 UK Presidency: A View from Brussels", Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 36, No. 4, December 
1998, p.583.
40 For a sceptical view of the Labour government's pro-European credentials see R. Holden, "The Marginalisation of Europe: Testing 
New Labour's European Credentials", PSA Conference, Nottingham, 24/3/1999.
41 Treasury Select Committee, "The UK and Preparations for Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union". (HM Treasury, 1998).
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given the high value of sterling. The Treasury Select Committee report was particularly 
concerned about the key economic test, convergence, arguing that the Treasury “should 
make its policy clearer”. They were also disappointed by the Chancellor’s response to the 
Report arguing that the Treasury should set out more precisely the ways in which the 
tests would be assessed.42 The Committee's findings clearly illustrated that the "tests'1 are 
subjective economic guidelines rather than objective standards allowing the government a 
future escape route should external developments (the success of EMU with the eleven 
starters) or domestic developments (continued public scepticism) not be favourable to 
EMU. The very logic of deciding early in the following Parliament seemed to imply a 
political rather than economic dynamic. 43 The key political factor remained the need to 
win a popular referendum.
The seeming lesson of the EU Presidency for the government appeared to be that in order 
to play a leadership role in the EU membership of EMU was becoming increasingly 
necessary. An interview with Blair in October 1998 revealed some interesting insights 
into his views on EMU. Firstly, he tacitly acknowledged that Britain would have less 
influence outside EMU. Secondly, he emphasised again the absence of a constitutional 
and political barrier to EMU membership. This inevitably, in turn, meant that the 
economics must be clearly and unambiguously beneficial for Britain. However, even here 
Blair suggested that the coming of EMU had already assisted stability in the EU given the 
Asian economic crisis. He also argued that Britain had made equivalent preparations to 
other EU states.44 These comments, whilst not individually significant, reinforced the 
gradual warming in the tone of EMU pronouncements.
42 Times. 27/4/1998.
43 G. Radice, Independent. 4/5/1998.
44 Times. 21/10/1998.
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A series of practical steps seemed to support incremental moves in a more pro-EMU 
direction. The Cabinet reshuffle in the summer of 1998 promoted leading pro-EU 
politicians such as Mandelson to Trade and Industry and Joyce Quin to minister for 
Europe.45 At the CBI conference in November Mandelson appeared to imply a shift to 
"when" rather than "if' Britain would join EMU. Mandelson, arguing that "Europe needs 
our influence", stated that "we will join the single currency when it is in Britain's 
economic interests to do so".46 Brown outlined more detailed work on preparations 
including confirmation of the launch of the National Changeover Plan in 1999. Whilst 
these statements were not seen as a change of policy by the government they were 
undeniably a consolidation. Another indicator was the support given by the government 
to a joint Socialist manifesto for the June 1999 European elections. The central point was 
the need for a regulatory framework for the management of EMU. EMU would require 
"closer co-ordination of economic and structural policies" and a need "to avoid harmful 
tax competition".47 The signing of this manifesto illustrated the desire not to be isolated 
in the EU after the launch of EMU and implied further consolidation to a pro-EMU 
policy. Thus, there were a series of incremental steps which seemed to imply a 
consolidation of the pro-EMU position.
These incremental steps were supported by the launch of the National Changeover Plan 
in February 1999 which, in the government's own words, was a "change in gear" if not in 
policy. The Plan itself envisaged a clear timetable of three years from a successful 
referendum result to the withdrawal of sterling. In addition, "tens of millions of pounds" 
of public money was to be spent on preparing public sector institutions for EMU. The 
Plan also set out a number of detailed steps, including examples, which would need to be
45 Financial Times. 6/8/1998.
46 Daily Telegraph. 3/11/1998.
47 Times. 18/11/98.
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taken by business in their EMU preparations.48 Significantly Blair decided to introduce 
the Plan himself, rather than allowing Brown to do so, a move which served to heighten 
its importance.
The core of Blair’s speech was a reiteration of the "prepare and decide" policy announced 
by Brown in October 1997. Britain would only join EMU if it was in its "national 
economic interest", which was defined by the five economic tests. Hence, membership 
was conditional and not inevitable. However, in principle a successful EMU would be 
good for British jobs, investment and trade. The key change now was that EMU was a 
reality and given that more than 50% of British trade was with the EU preparations were 
vital. Blair gave an upbeat assessment of the progress on the economic tests to date. This 
included convergence of UK interest rates with the EU, independence of the Bank of 
England and fiscal stability. However, the EU itself needed to be more flexible in terms 
of labour, capital and social regulation.
The speech dealt explicitly with the impact on sovereignty of EMU. Answering criticisms 
that he had underplayed the political nature of EMU, Blair admitted its political nature 
but stressed that it could only be made to work economically. In the British case the 
political question had been addressed by the explicit denial that there was a constitutional 
principle blocking membership. Sovereignty had been modified by the "modem world" 
developments of technology, global finance, mass communications, travel and culture. In 
these circumstances;
"Sovereignty pooled can be sovereignty, or at least power and influence, renewed."49
48 Preparing for the Euro: The National Changeover Plan. HM Treasury, 24/2/1999.
49 T. Blair, Financial Times. 24/2/1999.
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This represented an interesting conflation of sovereignty with power and influence but 
continued the idea of pooling of sovereignty. Sovereignty was placed in a dynamic 
context interpreted in policy terms by the denial of sovereignty 'per se' being a barrier to 
EMU membership. Interestingly EMU was not just seen as bringing narrow economic 
benefits but could also enhance British power and influence.50 There was a subtle change 
in tone emphasising the political impact of EMU membership. This, though, focused on 
“influence” in the EU rather than “constitutional sovereignty”. In spite of the warmer pro- 
EMU tone no future deadlines were set in terms of a final decision and Blair again 
stressed the conditionality of the economic tests.
The complex and nuanced statement led to a variety of interpretations. The most 
widespread interpretation was that the statement represented a change of policy as much 
as a change of gear. In a memorable phrase Ashdown congratulated Blair on "crossing 
the Rubicon". Conversely Hague criticised Blair as putting forward a "national handover 
plan" and of jeopardising "one thousand years" of independence (an interesting comment 
on the official Conservative policy of only ruling out EMU for two Parliaments).51 The 
Conservative decision to withdraw from a preparations committee confirmed their 
interpretation that the policy had changed. From the pro-EMU Conservatives Heath 
claimed that Blair was "absolutely right in everything he said" and Clarke welcomed the 
"marked change in tone". Accusations were made that Heseltine and Clarke had colluded 
with the statement. In sum, these interpretations continued the process of policy 
divergence both between and within the two main parties.
50 Ibid.
51 Daily Telegraph. 24/2/1999.
52 Sunday Times. 28/2/1999.
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An alternative interpretation was that the statement was only a change of gear. The 
absence of a future decision date disappointed the Labour Movement for Europe which 
had been campaigning for a target date for entry.53 This interpretation was also supported 
by the repudiation of pro-EMU MP Denis MacShane's statement to a French newspaper 
that the government had effectively signed up to EMU.54 In addition, it was reported that 
Labour would not focus on EMU during the June European election for fear of alienating 
voters. These signs support the idea that the statement was indeed a "change of gear". The 
Economist, supporting this supposition, argued that the statement was designed to "fly a 
kite" in order to assess public and media reaction to a warming tone toward EMU.55 
However, whilst agreeing with this interpretation I would also argue that the "gear 
change" represented a consolidating step along a fairly consistent long-term strategy to 
enter EMU should economic conditions permit. I would, therefore, disagree with David 
Baker that the statement was merely a delaying tactic in order to defer the issue beyond 
the following general election.56
Given the varying interpretations of the policy itself there were also many interpretations 
in understanding the policy approach. One political explanation was that differences 
existed within the Cabinet with, in particular, Blair being tactically more cautious on 
EMU than Brown.57 However, Blair's personal decision to announce the National 
Changeover Plan appeared to show a united Cabinet position. Baker argued that a 
contributing factor may have been the need to maintain Labour party unity on an issue
CO
which had traditionally been a divisive one. The Labour voices of opposition to EMU,
53 Financial Times. 6/1/1999.
54 Financial Times. 3/3/1999.
55 Bagehot, Economist 27/2/1999.
56 D. Baker, A. Gamble and D. Seawright “The Sounds of Silence? New Labour Party Management and European Union”, PSA 
Conference, Nottingham, 25/3/1999.
57 Independent 24/2/1999.
58 D. Baker, A. Gamble and D. Seawright op. cit.
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though still in existence, were now largely marginalised.
Economic arguments are often cited for the government's cautious approach. British 
preparations for EMU were undoubtedly limited in comparison with other EU states (see 
Chapter 7). The economy itself followed a different economic cycle from those of the EU 
economies and clearly convergence would require some time, however, defined. This had 
led even EMU supporters, such as the CBI, to recommend that Britain should not join 
EMU at the 1999 start date. The government's five economic tests served to define the 
range of economic factors that Britain would need to meet for EMU entry. The question 
also arose as to whether Britain should join the ERM prior to EMU entry, as deemed 
necessary by the Maastricht treaty. Interestingly both Denmark and Greece rejoined the 
ERM in 1999 whist Britain, bruised by the previous ERM experience, remained 
outside.59 Whilst important though I would argue that economic factors fail to explain 
long-term caution as a date could have been set for future entry. The crucial element 
remained public scepticism toward EMU.60
A popular explanation for the government's caution was the overwhelmingly 
Eurosceptical approach of the British media, especially Rupert Murdoch's Sun 
newspaper.61 Undoubtedly the majority of the press could be classified as Eurosceptic. 
These included the Sim, the Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail. On the 
Europhile side were the Independent, the Daily Mirror, the Financial Times and the 
Guardian (though with some scepticism toward EMU). A rough calculation of readers 
leads to approximately 76% of the press being classified as Eurosceptic and 24% as
59 Independent 25/2/1999.
60 Authors interviews.
61 Independent 25/4/1998. There was also a series o f accusations over the government's links with Murdoch, including favoured 
legislation.
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Europhile.62 The virulence of the media coverage was illustrated by the Sun's depiction of 
Blair as possibly "the most dangerous man in Britain".63 However, there were a wide 
range of alternative sources of information available, especially television, which reduce 
the impact of biased press coverage.64
The deep underlying scepticism of public opinion to EMU has been consistently captured 
in a wide range of opinion poll data. One poll, which has consistently asked respondents 
both their own position on EMU and their position if the government openly advocates 
EMU, is the MORI/Salomon Smith Barney poll. Since 1996 the balance of opinion 
(excluding “don’t knows”) opposed to EMU has consistently been over 20%. When 
asked the position if the government strongly urged membership the balance of opinion 
was still around 10%.65 Whilst there was the possibility that this margin may represent 
"soft" opinion, the overall consistency of the results was clearly a deterrent to the 
government adopting a more pro-EMU policy.
The scepticism of public opinion to EMU was, in my opinion, the key factor behind the 
government's caution. Blair would hardly, having got into government after 18 years of 
Conservative rule, have risked his entire government programme on an early EMU 
referendum. This illustrated the dynamic impact of the sovereignty debate over EMU. 
The 1996 move to accept a referendum by both parties on EMU as a demonstration of 
popular sovereignty had effectively constrained future policy. The referendum 
commitment had been constantly reiterated by the government, had gained overwhelming
62 P. J. Anderson and A. Weymouth, Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. (Addison Weseley Longman 
Ltd., Harlow, 1999), p. 184.
63 Sun. 24/6/1998.
64 P. J. Anderson and A. Weymouth, op. cit.. p. 185.
65 Economist 27/2/1999.
support amongst Labour MPs and was scarcely reversible. As argued in Chapter 5 the 
referendum commitment was partly seen as a necessary demonstration of popular 
sovereignty decision given the significance of EMU. This in turn generated a cautious 
policy approach given the continued EMU-scepticism expressed in the media and public 
opinion surveys.
Policy Consolidation: The Conservatives
The Conservative policy turn to "No EMU membership for Two Parliaments" continued 
to cause major divisions in the party during 1998. Hague’s response was a dramatic move 
to ensure party support by organising a poll of party members to support the EMU policy. 
The pro-EMU Conservatives refused to campaign against the leadership leading to the 
inevitable overwhelming vote of 84% of the membership in support of Hague.66 Indeed 
the result had little impact on the pro-EMU Conservatives who continued their 
campaigns. However, the result also emboldened the EMU-sceptics, such as Portillo, to 
stress the political arguments against EMU membership. The speeches of Hague and 
Portillo illustrated the range of EMU-sceptic arguments.
In a wide ranging speech at the INSEAD business school in Fontainbleau in May 1998 
Hague had argued that EMU would have significant political consequences. The 
economic effect of EMU in terms of the differential economic returns of EMU could lead 
to political unrest. The direct political consequences were even greater in that EMU was a 
fundamental step toward the goal of political union. The means for this process was close 
fiscal co-ordination of taxes and spending. This goes to the heart of sovereignty;
"The powers to raise taxes from ones citizens and to spend money on their behalf are 
defining features of a sovereign state. I believe that to delegate powers over taxation and 
spending to the EU would take us beyond the limits of political union towards the
“ Times. 5/10/1998.
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fncreation of what would in effect be a European state."
These dangers were heightened by the irreversible nature of EMU, which meant that one
/ • o
could find "oneself trapped...in a burning building with no exits". The political critique 
of EMU was very wide ranging.
In other domestic speeches Hague emphasised the economic weaknesses of EMU and the 
need for EMU to be a long-term success. In a speech launching the party membership 
vote he identified three main questions which need to be addressed prior to potential UK 
membership. Firstly, will EMU work during both booms and slumps, especially against 
financial speculators? Secondly, will a single, unvarying interest rate lead to severe 
regional differences? Finally, will EMU lead to fiscal centralisation? These were Hague's 
primary economic questions but he also stressed political risks, namely whether EMU 
would "undermine democracy and lead us down a road to a United States of Europe".69 In 
sum, Hague’s scepticism covered the whole range of the sovereignty questions. However, 
even after his membership vote victory Hague continued to stress that EMU was not 
ruled out in principle.
Portillo, having lost his seat during the election, was temporarily marginalised but, in a 
"comeback" lecture in February 1998, he focused on the link between democratic values
70and EMU. For Portillo, EMU was a threat to both democracy and sovereignty. The EU 
itself could not be democratic because of the lack of a "demos" and the continuing
67 W. Hague, "The Potential for Europe and the Limits to Union". Insead, Fontainbleau, 19/5/1999.
68 Ibid.
69 W. Hague, Daily Telegraph. 8/9/1998.
70 M. Portillo, Democratic Values and the Currency. (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, February 1998).
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strength of national identities. On sovereignty he attacks the notion that sovereignty is 
out-of-date because this confuses sovereignty with autonomy of action. He argued;
"There are degrees of freedom, and the fact that we are not totally independent of outside 
influences is no argument for throwing away the considerable scope for action we still 
possess. More importantly, our right to make choices for ourselves should not be given 
up on such spurious grounds." 71
All of the sovereignty questions were addressed as the "transfer of monetary and fiscal 
policy is inevitable" and EMU will lead to a "political union".72
Prior to the Conservative conference in 1998 Portillo argued that the Conservatives 
should take a greater lead in opposing EMU. Unlike Hague he stressed political factors 
over economic points;
"The critical points are none the less political. Economic union means that key 
decisions...will be taken by people who are unelected and unaccountable. It beggars 
belief that we could shoehorn the nationalities of Europe into an artificial political 
union."73
Not only did Portillo cover all the sovereignty questions but the political dimension of 
sovereignty was seen as affecting national identity as well as political institutions, leading 
possibly to violent dissent. Portillo stressed the historic symbolism of currencies in 
particular the proposed loss of the Queen's head on euro notes. Sovereignty would be 
completely lost if Britain joined EMU;
71 Ibid., p.18.
72 Ibid.. p. 17.
73 Times. 10/11/1998
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"There is no example of a sovereign nation that does not control its own currency...In 
every other country in Europe, EMU is correctly debated as being part of the project to 
achieve a political union."74
In spite of the differing arguments used by Hague and Portillo these were minor nuances 
when compared with the arguments put forward by the pro-EMU Conservatives. 
Heseltine, for example, argued that it was a question of when, not if, Britain joined 
EMU. Clarke denied that fiscal harmonisation and political union would result from 
EMU. Ian Taylor, a former Shadow Cabinet minister, urged the Labour government to 
"get off the fence" following the launch of EMU in 1999. Whilst stressing the economic 
advantages of EMU he also emphasised the political aspect of the need for influence in 
Europe over key issues. Above all, in order to fulfil the leadership role to which Blair 
"rightly" aspires "as a great country" we must join EMU.76 Leon Brittan argued that the 
Conservative leadership mistook the modem "fluid" notion of sovereignty and were stuck
• • ■ 7 7with a 19th century nation-state notion. Most of the views expressed were more pro- 
EMU than the position of the Labour government.
A strong proponent of the pro-EMU Conservative position was Lord Geoffrey Howe. In 
1990 he had written an article which specifically articulated the idea of pooling 
sovereignty. For Howe sovereignty was synonymous with influence in the world;
"[Sovereignty] might be summarised as a nation's practical capacity to maximise its
74 Ibid.
75 M. Heseltine, Times. 31/10/1999.
76 Times. 7/10/1998.
77 L. Brittan, "Policy and Politics", Guardian. 29/5/1998.
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influence in the world."78
For Howe sovereignty needed to be judged by its utility as a policy resource. It was a 
"resource to be traded rather than guarded" and should not be seen as a "pre-defined 
absolute" but as "a flexible, adaptable, organic notion that evolves and adjusts with
7 0  •circumstances". Applying this conception of sovereignty as influence m 1998 Howe 
was fervently in favour of British membership of EMU;
"EMU is now rightly seen as the defining issue. Inside the single currency, Britain can 
and will be a full and equal partner. Outside EMU, however, we are never likely to carry 
the same influence or weight."80
The development of the Euro-X grouping was regarded by Howe as a development which 
would limit Britain's influence, and therefore sovereignty, if she remained outside of 
EMU for a significant time period.
“Phoney War”: Divergence Confirmed?
By 1999 it was possible to discern an overall pattern in the party political debate over 
EMU. Majorities within both major political parties could be said to support their 
respective policy positions. The poll within the Conservative membership indicated 
overwhelming support for the leadership policy. Whilst no similar exercise was carried 
out within the Labour party a majority appeared to support the leadership. Dissent tended 
to focus around figures on the "Old Labour Left" such as Shore, Benn, Skinner and 
Simpson though there were more "moderate" figures such as Field and Davies. The key 
groups were the Euro - S afeguards Campaign and the Campaign Against Euro-Federalism.
78 G. Howe, "Sovereignty and Interdependence: Britain's Place in the World", International Affairs. Vol. 66,1990, p.687.
79 Ibid.. p.678.
80 G. Howe, "Why Europe Matters" in M. Fraser (Ed.), Britain in Europe: The Next Phase. (Strategems Publishing, London, 1998), 
p.175.
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The Labour dissenters had two key arguments against EMU. Firstly, EMU represented a 
move on the unilinear drive towards a central European state. For Shore the EU "from the 
start" set "an unbridgeable gap" between the desire by continental Europeans for a central 
European state and Britain's own "settled national purpose".81 Similarly for Field "if we 
ditch the pound and join the euro that is the end of Britain as an independent country".82 
The other key argument focused on the powers of the ECB and its perceived lack of 
democratic accountability. For Shore this represented a "hand over for ever the power of 
deciding interest rates to a wholly independent European central bank whose policies no 
British government and no British electorate can ever hope to influence or control".83 For 
John Boyd, secretary of the Campaign against Euro-Federalism, the ECB deprived the 
electorate of rights to use the ballot box to remove those who govern us.84 The campaign 
against EMU was stepped up in December 1998 by the launch of an anti-EMU pamphlet 
by Richard Heller (claiming the support of 80 MPs), which argued that VAT would be 
extended to all goods and even that the NHS might be under threat.85 These criticisms 
clearly covered the whole range of the sovereignty questions but stressed the ultimate 
reality of a centralised European state.
Within the Labour party generally though the anti-EMU voice remained a minority. The 
TUC generally supported EMU membership though some unions including Unison, the
o r
T&GWU and GMB preferred a slower speed toward EMU. Within the parliamentary
81 P. Shore, Sunday Times. 27/12/1998.
82 F.Field, Daily Telegraph. 23/11/1998.
83 Ibid.
84 J. Boyd, "Just Say No Go", Tribune. 5/2/1999.
85 Times. 9/12/1998.
86 Daily Telegraph. 13/9/1998.
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•  87party a survey by Baker et al. revealed a general and increasing pro-EMU attitude. Only 
22% of the 1997 cohort (compared to a 1996 figure of 30%) "strongly agreed or agreed" 
with the idea that sovereignty cannot be pooled and only 11% (compared to a 1996 figure 
of 21%) felt that EMU would signal the end of the UK as a sovereign state. Even more 
significantly only 20% (compared to a 1996 figure of 42%) felt that Britain should never 
permit its monetary policy to be determined by an independent ECB. There was also a 
marked increase in support for a referendum on British membership of EMU from 50% 
in 1996 to 80% in 1998. In sum, there was a significant increase in pro-EMU feeling.
The wide support amongst Labour MPs for the government's position on EMU can partly 
be explained by their own beliefs. However, Baker argued that a key factor was also the
QQ
loyalty of many new Labour MPs to Blair's leadership. They felt that they owed their 
position partly to Blair and New Labour and were looking for long parliamentary careers. 
This was reinforced by the cohesion and ruthlessness of the Labour parliamentary 
machine. The very flexibility of the "prepare and decide" policy allowed most MPs to 
support the leadership. There was also a feeling that EMU was not a burning issue 
amongst MPs when compared to say social issues. One MP commented that there had not 
been much debate in the party and that most would like the issue to go away.89 There 
were a minority of MPs who took a keener interest on both sides of the debate. On the 
pro-EMU side Radice, MacShane, Tam Dalyell, Stuart Bell and Brian Sedgemore were 
regular contributors. The EMU sceptics, as discussed earlier, were also familiar names. 
Overall though the majority of the party supported the government's policy.
87 D. Baker, A. Gamble and D. Seawright  op.cit, PSA Conference, Nottingham, 25/3/1999. Interviews carried out Spring 1998.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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There was then a core support for the respective main policies of the two major parties.90 
Around this core were significant minorities in both of the main parties. However, on the 
Conservative side this included many political "heavyweight" figures such as Clarke, 
Heseltine, Patten, Heath, Howe, Brittan and Dorrell. They may have been, to quote 
Hague, "ageing former Cabinet ministers", but their opposition remained significant. 
Another development in 1999 was the formation of the Pro-Euro Conservative party by 
two former Conservative MEPs, John Stephens and Brendan Donnelley.91 Norton, in a 
survey comparing the Conservative parliamentary party before and after the 1997 
election, argued that approximately 20% of MPs could be classified as Europhile, 30% as 
Eurosceptic and 50% as loyal to the leadership, a relatively unchanged balance.92 The 
interesting factor about the minorities in both parties was the very resolute nature of their 
position, which often went further than the positions of the core of the opposing party. In 
sum, the Conservative minority was very pro-EMU and the Labour minority very anti- 
EMU. The other interesting point was that the divisions could not be seen in traditional 
Left/Right terms. On the Conservative side "moderates" such as William Waldegrave and 
Jim Prior were anti-EMU. On the Labour side "moderates" such as Field and Davies were 
anti-EMU whilst traditional "Left" figures such as Brian Sedgemore and Tony Banks 
were pro-EMU. The fissile, pluralistic qualities of EMU spread throughout the main 
parties but by 1999 the overall polarisation of the debate was becoming clear.
The fissile but polarised nature of the EMU debate was also reflected in a rash of pressure 
groups which were beginning to form and reform. Whilst these groups were significant in 
campaigning and organisational terms their influence on policy was limited given that 
EMU was such a central challenge to British governments. The splintering process was 
particularly prevalent on the anti-EMU side where a whole network of organisations
90 My own attendance at local party meetings on EMU reflected this core support although there was a noticeable difference between 
the passion of anti-EMU feelings of the Conservative meetings and the tacit pro-EMU acquiescence of the Labour meetings.
91 Daily Telegraph. 21/7/1999.
92 P. Norton, "Electing the Leader: The Conservative Leadership Contest 1997", Politics Review. Vol. 7,1998.
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bloomed. Five main groups can be identified. On the Conservative Eurosceptic wing 
were groups like Spicer's European Research Group and Cash's European Foundation. On 
the Labour side were the Euro-Safeguards Campaign and the Campaign Against Euro- 
Federalism. Key non-party groups included Lord Marsh's Business for Sterling and Lord 
Owen's New Europe. Key "nationalist" parties included the Democracy Movement (for 
which businessman Sykes had pledged £20 million) and the UK Independence Party. 
Finally, there were a host of smaller groups such as Save Britain's Fish and the British 
Weights and Measures Association.
On the pro-EMU side the key groups were more united and established. The main cross- 
party group was the European Movement. Key spokesmen were Radice for Labour, 
Menzies Campbell for the Liberal Democrats and Clarke for the Conservatives. On the 
Labour side the Labour Movement for Europe had the support of approximately 100 
Labour MPs.94 The Conservative groups were more diverse. They included the Tory 
Reform Group, the Action Centre for Europe and Conservative Mainstream. These 
groups were co-ordinated under the umbrella group, Britain in Europe. Overall the 
greater cohesion and co-ordination but more limited range of the pro-EMU groups is 
significant.
The arguments put forward by Britain in Europe and New Europe reflected the whole 
range of arguments over EMU used in the party political debate though in a slightly more 
refined and complete manner. Britain in Europe's central argument was the need for 
Britain to finally decide whether she was "in" or "out" of Europe. Only "in" Europe could 
Britain exercise her full influence both in the economic arena of the Euro-X and in the
93 Sunday Telegraph. 1/11/1998.
94 Financial Times. 6/1/1999.
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wider arena of the EU.95 There was also a strong focus on the perceived economic 
benefits of EMU membership including lower interest rates, lower inflation, price 
transparency and lower transaction costs. More specifically inside EMU British business 
would thrive with more investment, lower costs and a competitive advantage. Outside 
EMU British business would suffer exchange rate volatility and a loss of inward 
investment. There were specific rebuttals of EMU-sceptic arguments such as a denial that 
tax harmonisation will occur, a denial that Britain will pay for other countries' pensions 
and a denial that Europe will take control of economic policy. The key message though 
was that "out of Europe and Britain is left behind" whilst "inside the single currency 
Britain will lead in Europe-making Europe work for us, with real influence to achieve 
reform".96
The most significant group to emerge on the EMU-sceptic side was arguably "New 
Europe" led by Lord David Owen, former Labour Foreign Secretary, and including 
former ministers Denis Healey (Labour) and James Prior (Conservative). The group 
claimed to be pro-European but anti-EMU and reflected centrist opinion as opposed to 
the relative extremes of many other EMU-sceptic groups. The "New Europe" group, 
whilst originally established as a campaigning group before the European election, 
primarily focused on developing the key arguments against EMU. Interestingly the main 
initial focus was on economic arguments with the group working closely with Business 
for Sterling.97 Under the theme of "Advantage Britain" New Europe argued that "Britain 
will be better off outside the single currency". A single currency has no escape route, 
could lead to tighter regulations, an inappropriate interest rate and a large EU budget to
QQ
counter regional variations. The political arguments were also stressed though. Firstly, 
EMU membership would lead "to a major loss of power over our own affairs". Secondly,
95 Author's interview.
96 "Are we in or are we out", Britain in Europe. (Wellington Design, London, 1999).
97 Author's interview.
98 Author's interview.
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outside EMU the government was answerable to the electorate for its economic policy. 
Thirdly, the key influence argument was specifically rebutted on the basis of Britain 
being the fifth biggest economy in the world, a key player in NATO with a major defence 
capability, a permanent member of the Security Council and a trusted ally of the US."
Owen himself has presented a series of idiosyncratic political arguments around EMU 
including the widest meaning of political sovereignty. EMU, for Owen, was a "highly 
political animal" with a destiny of a federal Europe which was not shared by Britain. 
EMU was the last attempt at a centralised EU model with the ECB being even more 
secret and unaccountable than the European Commission. Thus, it was "not just 
economic sovereignty which could be foregone, but political sovereignty as well".100 The 
most interesting aspect of Owen's critique of EMU was the linkage made between EMU 
and British foreign policy. Owen was concerned that EMU could damage relations with 
the USA both in terms of EMU competing with the US dollar as a global currency and in 
wider foreign policy questions. Membership of EMU would, in Owen's opinion, sap 
Britain’s “inner confidence” to step outside an EU consensus position. EU foreign policy 
positions within a euro zone would inevitably "keep policy within the middle of the 
pack", which would be against Britain's independent interests. Above all, Britain would 
not be as free to support its traditional ally, the United States, whose decisiveness (on 
Iraq for example) is contrasted with inconsistent EU policy (on, for example, the 
recognition of Croatia).101 In sum, these wide ranging criticisms again stressed the widest 
political meaning to sovereignty from a relatively moderate spokesperson.
99 "Our vision", New Europe. (Merchant Publishing, London, 1999).
100 Financial Times. 30/4/1998.
101 D. Owen. "Yes to Europe. No to Federalism". (Unpublished Pamphlet, Jan 1998), pp:21-26; "The Future o f the Nation State" 
(Social Market Foundation, London, 1999).
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External Dynamics: Euro-X. Tax Harmonisation. EMU a Reality
Whilst the domestic debate aligned differing conceptions of sovereignty with divergent 
policies the external dynamics of EMU presented a series of challenges which focused on 
differing aspects of the "sovereignty questions". The Euro-X grouping was an attempt, 
led by France, to establish a political co-ordinating body to counteract the institutional 
powers acquired by the ECB. The debate on tax harmonisation, inspired by German 
Finance Minister, Oskar Lafontaine, exploded late in 1998, impacting on the crucial area 
of fiscal sovereignty. The actual, and technically successful, start of EMU in January 
1999 led to a degree of self-congratulation and a debate as to the next stage of the 
political integration process. Each of these external dynamics led to a series of challenges 
to the Labour government which were met with a variety of responses illustrating the 
dynamic ongoing debate around the key sovereignty questions.
The Euro-X grouping entered the debate in the autumn of 1997 following Brown's 
October 1997 statement. It largely reflected French efforts to forge a body for macro- 
economic co-ordination as opposed to regular meetings of ECOFIN. After the British 
decision not to join EMU in 1999 the government's aim was to ensure participation in the 
Euro-X or, at least, minimise the range of issues it dealt with to those strictly concerning 
EMU issues such as the setting of EMU's external exchange rate policy. At the 
Luxembourg summit in 1997 Britain had to accept that it could not join the Euro-X given 
its non-participation in EMU. However, Blair was successful in gaining assurances that 
the grouping would only deal with internal EMU affairs. The debate continued in 1998 
but Blair took advantage of French unpopularity at the Brussels summit in May 
(following the dispute over the head of the ECB) to gain further agreement as to the 
limits of the Euro-X. These included assurances that non-EMU states would be involved 
in preparations for meetings and confirmation of the overall primacy of ECOFIN in 
economic policy. In this venture Britain was supported by Germany who sought a strong
268
EMU free from political interference.102 This development challenged the traditional 
view of Britain as an "awkward partner" unable to build coalitions. However, the 
symbolism of Britain's exclusion from the first meeting during the British Presidency was 
equally significant.103 The role of the Euro-X grouping was limited for the time being but 
the external dynamic of EU developments was evident.
Whilst the government was moderately successful in initially resolving the Euro-X 
dispute it was caught by surprise by the tax harmonisation debate in the autumn of 1998 
propagated dramatically by the new German Social Democrat government in the form of 
the radical Finance Minister, Lafontaine (known as "Red Oskar" to his political 
opponents). The initial debate was fostered by the Austrian presidency which placed tax 
harmonisation clearly on the EU agenda. A European Commission "code", launched by 
Commissioner Mario Monti, aimed at reducing unfair tax competition within the EU 
continued the debate. The French Finance minister, Dominique Strass-Kahn, sought to 
turn the voluntary code into a binding commitment.104 However, it was Lafontaine’s 
intervention that provoked a fierce domestic debate in Britain. A joint socialist document, 
"The New European Way", strongly advanced by Lafontaine and endorsed by the Labour 
government called for closer tax co-operation. A Franco-German summit in December 
1998 set out further moves to strengthen integration continuing the tradition of the 
Franco-German "motor" as the central force in EU integration. The communique called 
for "a stronger co-ordination of economic policies" and a move to "press for rapid tax 
harmonisation".105 Even more significant was the suggestion that tax measures should be 
subject to QMV rather than the national veto.106
102 Guardian. 1/5/1998.
103 Independent 29/4/1998.
104 Times. 6/10/1998.
105 Times. 2/12/1998.
106 Times. 3/12/1998.
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The domestic reaction of the Labour government to this spate of tax harmonisation 
initiatives was sharp. Whilst accepting moves to voluntary tax co-operation and the 
closing of "loopholes" Brown stressed that Britain would not support wider moves. He 
argued that "tax decisions will be made in Britain and not in Brussels" and insisted that 
Britain would "not hesitate to use its veto" to block moves towards further tax 
harmonisation.107 This resolute defence of British interests and the threatened use of the 
veto recalled the language of the Major years. The response of EU politicians was highly 
critical with Strass-Kahn referring to Brown's threat as "virile" and Lafontaine arguing 
that he "had been misunderstood on the island".108 The government had clearly been 
shaken into a defiant mood by the tax harmonisation debate.
A noticeable feature of tbe domestic tax harmonisation debate was the way in which a 
series of seemingly disjointed proposals were threaded into a uniform move to complete 
tax harmonisation in the EU. The Eurosceptic media undoubtedly played a key part in 
propagating the debate. The Sun, in characteristically dramatic terms, denounced 
Lafontaine with the question of "is this the most dangerous man in Europe?".109 Blair 
himself counterattacked with a bitter attack on the media coverage of the debate;
"The two weeks in which the tax harmonisation row raged were bizarre. There were 
screaming headlines, about the Germans setting our taxes, VAT on children’s clothes and 
our veto on tax being abolished...The casualty has been any sense of balance in the 
debate."110
107 Times. 24/11/1998.
108 Times. 9/12/1998.
109 Sun. 24/11/1998.
110 T. Blair. Times. 14/12/1998.
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Feeling the need to counterattack further Blair enlisted the support of German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroder to issue a communique which ruled out the harmonisation of personal
taxes and a unified system of corporate taxation (whilst supporting moves to iron out
"unfair tax competition").111 Whilst the tax harmonisation debate probably did generate
more "heat than light" it served as an interesting microcosm of the "heat" that may be
generated in any future referendum campaign. It also arguably illustrated a "functionalist"
tendency for the debate to transfer from the monetary arena of EMU to the much more
• 112politically sensitive arena of taxation.
The tax harmonisation debate in the autumn of 1998 was undoubtedly marked by 
generalities rather than specific proposals. The debate receded temporarily in early 1999 
with the resignation of Lafontaine and the entire European Commission. However, there 
were some specific tax initiatives which illustrated the variety of the issues involved. A 
proposal to harmonise taxes in the art market was reluctantly accepted by Britain in spite 
of a net adverse effect on the British art market.113 However, a move to impose 
withholding taxes on the Eurobond market evoked a more hostile response. This move 
was expected to hit the City significantly and led to strong opposition from the 
International Securities Markets Association. The government threatened to use the veto 
to block the measures. However, this was very much seen as a last resort and a preferred 
approach was to circumvent the effect of the proposals by a change in tax legislation. The 
deadlock on this issue at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 with Britain 
again isolated in the EU highlighted the sensitivity of taxation issues.114 There were also 
calls for tax havens such as the Channel Islands to be closed to avoid harmful tax
111 Times. 10/12/1998.
112 Former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stressed this argument in answering my question as to the linkage between the two arenas 
at the Lothian Conference on EMU, November 1997.
113 Daily Telegraph. 21/1/1999.
114 Financial Times. 10/12/1999. The proposal was eventually suspended in June 2000. Financial Times. 20/6/2000.
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competition.115 Ironically some of the effects of these varied proposals were 
contradictory. For example, the Eurobond move would probably benefit the Channel 
Islands, which are outside of the ElTs jurisdiction.
The debate over tax harmonisation in Britain has often seemed at variance with actual 
developments. The discussion in Chapter 3 illustrated the complexity of the tax 
harmonisation process. The relevance of the debate in the corporation tax area in 
particular has arguably been overstated. A study of corporate taxation in the EU by 
Radaelli stressed the flexibility of global multinationals in minimising their corporation 
tax liability in any particular jurisdiction.116 The very political controversy across the EU 
over detailed tax issues such as the Eurobond tax has delayed further proposals. Both the 
German and Austrian presidencies, which placed tax harmonisation at the heart of their 
objectives, failed to make significant progress with other issues such as European defence
117arrangements after the Kosovo conflict taking centre stage. Arguably taxation issues 
with their traditional links to territory and democratic representation are of even greater
• 11Rpolitical significance than monetary issues making change more problematic. 
However, the key argument made here is that the details have tended be overriden in the 
politicisation of the tax harmonisation debate, which focused on a prime aspect of the 
sovereignty debate.
The actual launch of EMU in January 1999 highlighted Britain's marginalisation on EMU 
and prompted a debate as to future developments after EMU. The launch itself went
115 Daily Telegraph. 2/1/1999.
116 GM.Radaelli, The Politics of Corporate Taxation in the European Union: Knowledge and International Policy Agendas.
(Routledge Publishing, London, 1997).
117 Author's interviews.
1,8 Ibid.
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relatively smoothly both in terms of technical financial systems, an avoidance of pre- 
launch speculative activity and an initial strengthening of the new currency. It signified 
the realisation of a grand scheme which Major had once referred to as a "rain dance", 
implying pious hopes rather than actual achievements. In his response to the launch Blah- 
praised EMU and pointed to many of the potential benefits including exchange rate 
stability, price transparency and lower transactions costs without mentioning any 
potential drawbacks. This was another signal of the government’s warming tone toward 
EMU. However, there were also symbols of Britain’s marginalisation. Brown's decision 
not to go to the EMU launch celebrations and to send Britain's ambassador to the EU 
was an interesting symbolic parallel to Britain's decision to send a civil servant to the 
Messina summit.119 An even more poignant symbol in terms of scale was the comparison 
between the high risk launch of EMU and Brown's immediate response, which was to 
announce a revision of the statistical method for calculating inflation in order to align the 
measure with the EMU states.120
Other than the symbolism of the launch the main effect was to engender a debate as to the 
EU's next step. The leading EU politicians crowned EMU's launch by stressing its 
political nature. For Santer, President of the EU Commission, it was "now up to us to see 
that we embark on the next stage leading to political unity". For the Italian Finance 
Minister EMU was a "decisive step towards ever closer political and institutional union". 
Duisenberg stressed that monetary policy, "usually an essential part of national 
sovereignty will be decided by a truly European institution". The German economy and 
technology minister emphasised the need for "economic policy co-ordination" and tax 
reform to meet "the need to eliminate unfair competition".121 The wider political 
implications were stressed by proposals for a "Mr Euro" to speak for the Euro-zone in
119 Daily Telegraph. 31/12/1998.
120 Sunday Telegraph. 27/12/1998.
121 Daily Telegraph. 1/1/1999.
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1wider international institutions such as the G-7 and the IMF. Domestically the launch 
of EMU accelerated the debate leading to calls from the Liberal Democrats and the
171Labour Movement for Europe for a specific entry date. Radice, chairman of the 
European Movement, argued in dramatic terms that "Britain is in danger of being left out 
and ultimately left behind".124 Clearly many of these contributions were the rhetorical 
marking of an historic event and the future of further integrative moves remained highly 
uncertain.
After three months the initial successful launch of EMU looked less auspicious following 
a 10% decline in value against sterling and continued recession in the euro-zone. The EU 
itself had to face a host of other problems including the resignation of the entire
17^Commission, enlargement and budgetary problems. These problems could, though, 
paradoxically strengthen integrative moves (as the ERM crisis in 1992 had strengthened 
resolve to attain EMU). However, as the tax harmonisation debacle in the autumn of 
1998 had illustrated, the external dynamic of EU developments, whether in terms of 
integrative leaps or incremental compromises, would continue to challenge the 
government’s cautious "euro-creep" strategy. Above all, the sovereignty questions of 
fiscal sovereignty (in the tax harmonisation debate), institutional sovereignty (in the 
Euro-X grouping) and political sovereignty (in the EMU launch debate) were at the 
centre of the debate.
Internal Dynamics: The 1999 European Election
The European election of June 1999 represented the first major test of UK opinion since 
the launch of EMU. The results were both surprising and paradoxical in two main
122 Times. 5/11/1998.
123 Financial Times. 6/1/1999.
124 Guardian. 1/1/1999.
125 Sunday Telegraph. 4/4/1999.
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respects. Firstly, the turnout in the election at 26% was the lowest turnout for any UK 
election in the 20th century. Secondly, in contrast to national opinion polls showing a 
clear lead for the Labour government over the other parties, the Conservative party 
emerged as the largest single party (with 36% of the vote) pushing Labour (28%) into 
second place. There was also significant support for the Eurosceptic UK Independence 
Party (7%) and the Green Party (6%) whilst the Liberal Democrats (13%) vote receded 
and the new Pro-Euro Conservative party (1%) failed to make any impact.126 The initial 
reactions then were of agnosticism and scepticism on European issues though the low 
turnout necessarily made any psephological conclusions highly tentative. However, the 
campaign and subsequent reactions confirmed the centrality of British membership of 
EMU at the heart of the European debate, the continued polarisation of the debate and the 
continued constraint of the referendum commitment in the light of public hostility to 
EMU.
The campaign itself was marked by a clear divergence between the two main parties with 
the Conservatives seeking to make the campaign "a referendum on the pound" whilst 
Labour sought to focus on domestic issues. The Conservative campaign openly sought to 
defend the pound under the slogan of "In Europe but not run by Europe". An election 
communication by Hague made the position very explicit;
"The Labour government and their Liberal allies want to scrap the Pound. Only the 
Conservatives will fight the next election pledged to oppose the single currency during 
the next Parliament. So if anyone wants to tell Labour and the Liberals they are opposed 
to their plans to scrap the Pound, then vote Conservative."127
Although the policy remained restricted to the "next Parliament" the strong language of
126 Economist 19/6/1999.
127 "In Europe, not run bv Europe". Conservative Election Communication South East Region, June 1999.
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"scrap the pound" was very significant. Whilst the Conservatives were opposed by the 
new Pro-Euro Conservative party they were assisted by the decision of leading politicians 
Clarke and Heseltine to remain silent on EMU during the campaign.
The Labour government fought the campaign on a basis of a joint manifesto with other 
European socialist parties. This document supported EMU which "should make a 
significant contribution to promoting sustainable growth, low inflation and high levels of 
employment".128 In their domestic campaign literature Labour sought to stress the 
importance of domestic rather than European election issues. Indeed their South East 
campaign document did not even mention EMU at all.129 The title of one leaflet "What 
has Europe ever done for you" was regarded by one Labour MP as being
1 m ___ .indistinguishable from the claim made by the UK Independence Party. The Liberal 
Democrats, whilst also focusing on domestic issues, made clear their support for an early 
referendum on UK membership of EMU based on the need to avoid continued 
marginalisation between the US dollar and the euro.131 The Green Party and the UK 
Independence Party were both opposed in principle to UK membership of EMU.132
EMU membership quickly became the central question of the campaign. At the start of 
the campaign Blair sought to reaffirm the continuity of the government's position on 
EMU membership by stressing the test of national economic interest based on "real 
intention" to join a successful EMU provided that "real conditions" were met. He refused
128 Party of European Socialists, Manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, p.8.
129 Taking a Lead on Europe". Labour European Election Communication South East Region, June 1999.
130 Author's interview.
131 Liberal Democrat manifesto for the 1999 European Elections, www.libdems.euro99.cix.co.uk
132 "Green Votes Count". Green Party European Election Communication South East Region and "Keep the Pound. Leave the EU".
UK Independence Party European Election Communication South East Region.
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to set an arbitrary time limit for the referendum and sought to focus on domestic issues 
and Conservative divisions over Europe.133 In contrast the Conservative campaign openly 
focused on "saving the pound". Hague declared that "as long I am leader I will never 
agree to surrendering control of the economy to Brussels", a statement later modified to 
match official policy.134 From the pro-EMU angle, Ashdown sought to aim for "clear 
yellow water" between the Liberal Democrats and Labour, who were "sitting on the 
fence" on EMU and the Conservatives who were saying to the world "we want to get 
off'.135 With other smaller parties taking radical positions in favour or against EMU 
membership the polarisation process had developed significantly.
The development of the campaign was marked by a Conservative offensive designed to 
place EMU membership at the centre of the campaign and a Labour defence seeking to 
stop the election becoming a shadow referendum. Portillo emerged from political purdah 
to accuse the Labour government of submerging British identity in a rush to join EMU.136 
Hague urged voters to "put the country before the party". Blair admitted that were a 
referendum to be held on EMU membership at this time it would be lost and also 
admitted that EMU was "a political idea", though British membership would be
1 ^ 7determined by economic interests. At the Cologne summit in the last week of the 
campaign Blair sharply defended the government's line on EMU emphasising again the 
real intention to join if the real conditions were met.138 The EMU membership issue was 
then the focus of an albeit lacklustre campaign which was partly overshadowed by the 
Kosovo conflict.
133 Guardian. 20/5/1999.
134 Independent 18/5/1999.
135 Times. 18/5/1999.
136 Guardian. 9/6/1999.
137 Guardian. 10/6/1999; Financial Times. 7/6/1999.
138 Financial Times. 4/11/1999.
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The Aftermath: Political Sovereignty Centrestage
The European election results could be interpreted as either a demonstration of
Euroscepticism or Euroagnosticism. For the Conservatives their "save the pound"
strategy seemed to be vindicated further marginalising the shrinking pro-EMU minority
and strengthening Hague's fragile leadership. The most interesting debate was in the pro-
EMU camp focusing on the delayed official launch of the umbrella group, Britain in
Europe (BiE). For some in BiE the lack of active leadership by the government was
effectively leaving the stage open to the EMU-sceptic campaigners. Leading pro-EMU
business campaigner, Niall Fitzgerald, openly urged Blair to attend the launch of BiE.
The role of Heseltine and Clarke was also uncertain as they sought to ensure Blair's
1^0support before becoming actively involved themselves. A pro-EMU Labour MP 
argued that Blair and Brown must actively lead the campaign for EMU membership in 
view of the European election results, which even opened the question of continued UK 
membership of the EU.140
The government's response was initially to reaffirm its pragmatic line on EMU. However, 
the tensions were clearly below the surface. Alistair Campbell, Blair's press secretary, 
was reported as saying that he didn't understand the purpose of BiE. He wondered 
whether it was a campaign about Britain in Europe or the start of the campaign to join 
EMU as the "two things are entirely different".141 In contrast, for some in the BiE 
campaign these two were explicitly linked with the EMU decision being a choice 
between "working at the heart of Europe or going it alone in isolation".142 These tensions 
were reflected in a significant and direct statement by Blair in which he described two
139 Financial Times. 17/6/1999.
140 Author's interview.
141 Financial Times. 22/6/1999.
142 Britain in Europe, "Are we in or are we out?", June 1999.
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EMU policy positions as "daft". The first was that Britain should join EMU now and the 
second was the "no, never" attitude of the Conservatives. In contrast the "prepare and 
decide" policy of the government was the only sensible course. He also stressed the need 
for wider economic reform of the EU which has been interpreted by some as adding a 
"sixth economic test".143 The equal bracketing of pro-EMU supporters with Conservative 
opponents was a significant development reflecting Labour sensitivity to continued, and 
even increasing, popular scepticism on EMU membership. An internal Labour report into 
their poor showing in the European election highlighted the hostility of older, traditional 
Labour voters to EMU membership.144
The tensions between the BiE and the government led to cancellation of the BiE's formal 
launch in July 1999 until the autumn. After detailed negotiations Blair agreed to support 
the BiE provided that its aims were modified from being a campaign group for British 
membership of EMU to the wider issue of supporting British membership of the EU. 
Mandelson acted as a negotiator to ensure that Heseltine and Clarke would also be aboard 
the relaunched cross-party campaign. BiE denied that its aims had changed but claimed 
the summer recess was not an appropriate time for a launch.145 Clearly the government's 
"prepare and decide" policy was being reviewed, in the light of the European election, in 
a more cautious direction. Cook argued that it was "preposterous" to suggest that a 
referendum after the next election was "inevitable", contrasting Jack Cunningham's 
statement during the European election campaign that it would be "extraordinary" if the 
referendum did not take place during the same period.146 The continued uncertainty over 
future policy was reflected by speculation that Brown, previously regarded as the most 
pro-EMU minister, wished to focus on domestic economic issues and was urging a delay
143 Financial Times. 21/6/1999. See also T. Blair, Europe: The Third Wav. 8/6/1999 and G. Brown, Speech to the TUC Conference on 
EMU. 13/5/1999.
144 Author's interview.
145 Financial Times. 13/7/1999.
146 Daily Telegraph. 21/7/1999; Financial Times. 7/6/1999.
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in any future referendum for a number of years.147 The uncertainty which had marked 
government EMU policy throughout the decade was again demonstrated.
The “Britain in Europe” campaign launch symbolised the wider focus on Britain’s 
membership of the EU as opposed to EMU ‘per se’. Announcing formally that he would 
lead the Britain in Europe campaign Blair denounced the "reflexive anti-Europeanism" of 
the Conservatives which "has left it lurching down an extremist path and contemplating a 
complete withdrawal".148 For Hague, conversely, the "battle" for the pound was a key 
political issue of the time;
"Sticking solely to the economics would be a mistake. The debate about the pound is also 
a debate about Britain's place in the world and about the place of democracy in 
Britain."149
Such a statement contrasted sharply with a policy of remaining outside EMU only until 
the end of the following Parliament. The formal launch of Britain in Europe in October 
1999 with Blair flanked by pro-European Conservatives Clarke and Heseltine followed 
the next day by Hague’s “Save the Pound” campaign symbolised the polarisation in the 
British debate. Equally significant was the conflation of EMU with the wider question of 
Britain’s relationship with the EU. Britain in Europe’s mission statement focused on the 
aim of promoting “public understanding of Britain playing a leading role in the European 
Union, and of retaining the option to join the single currency in the next Parliament”.150 
In sum, the EMU debate had become inextricably interwoven with the wider debate on 
British political sovereignty in relation to the EU.
147 Guardian. 20/7/1999.
14S T. Blair, Speech to the London Business School 27/7/1999.
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The other interesting dimension to the EMU debate was the spread of the divided debate
to other issues. The Conservatives increasingly saw the government's policy as one of
seeking to enter EMU by "stealth". A government decision to replace reserves of gold
with euros and dollars was criticised by the opposition as a step toward EMU
membership rather than, as the government argued, a rebalancing of reserves. Even the
dropping of the £ symbol on the new £20 note was interpreted as a step towards EMU
membership by some Conservatives.151 Similarly debate over possible exchange rate
targets for the Bank of England given the strength of sterling was interpreted as a
1possible or desirable move toward EMU membership. Public divisions within key 
institutions were also evident. In the Bank of England Eddie George's admission to the 
Treasury Select Committee that EMU membership was "an act of faith" contrasted with 
Willem Buiter's argument that staying out of EMU was an "expensive luxury" to 
maintain sovereignty.153 Treasury civil servant Nigel Wicks took the unusual step in 
penning an article arguing that EMU would not have wider economic and political 
implications.154 Finally, an exchange of letters between retired diplomats over the 
question of British influence arising from EMU membership served to further illustrate 
the divisive nature of the EMU debate throughout the political establishment.155
The divisive debate was also illustrated by growing tactical divisions within the 
government. This tension was captured by the paradox between the emphasis on the need 
for political influence arising from EMU membership whilst arguably tightening the
151 Times. 28/6/1999.
152 Times 19/5/1999.
153 Financial Times. 17/6/1999.
154 Financial Times. 17/5/1999.
155 Sunday Telegraph. 4/7/1999.
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economic conditions. In an intriguing personal switch Foreign Secretary Cook in Japan 
openly espoused the political influence argument, whilst Chancellor Brown stressed the 
continued economic conditions.156 This switch of positions may have reflected internal 
Labour cabinet politics, bureaucratic politics between the Treasury and the Foreign 
Office or, more probably, tactical positions. Cook argued that the government could not 
go through the next election campaign without issuing an update on the five economic
1 ^7tests, whilst Brown wished to emphasise the government record on the economy. Cook 
was joined by Mandelson and new Industry Secretary Stephen Byers in stressing the 
political and economic advantages to EMU. However, Brown, in his annual Mansion 
House speech, reasserted his position that “the tests, for which this Government and this 
Treasury is the guardian are real”.158 Nevertheless the longer-term goal of achieving 
EMU membership remained government policy subject to achievement of the five 
economic tests.
Overall the aftermath of the 1999 European election was marked by a continuing 
divergence between the two main parties in terms of the discourse. Ironically though 
continued pragmatism by both parties, especially by the government given its reluctance 
to set a date for a referendum, meant that the policy divergence had stabilised. Indeed 
given increased government caution there could even be a convergence of policy if a 
referendum was delayed beyond the following Parliament. The debate had become 
focused on the political sovereignty question of the nature of Britain's relationship with 
the EU. For Blair, whilst sticking to the "prepare and decide" policy, the "crusade" had 
begun against the anti-Europeanism (not just Euroscepticism) of the Conservatives and 
sections of the media.159 This represented a tactical change to focusing on affirmation of 
Britain's place within the EU prior to openly campaigning for EMU entry.
156 Financial Times. 24/9/1999.
157 Times. 17/1/2000.
158 G. Brown, Speech at the Mansion House. 15/6/2000. My italics.
159 T. Blair, Speech to the London Business School 27/7/1999.
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Blair’s position reflected continuing public hostility to British membership of EMU 
captured in the MORI/Salomon Smith Barney survey. From the summer of 1999 there 
was a marked increase in overall hostility with the margin of respondents opposed to 
EMU membership increasing to 31% in July 1999, a trend that continued at a figure of 
29% in November 1999.160 The government implicitly recognised the popular scepticism. 
Mandelson acknowledged that the government strategy of downplaying political and 
constitutional arguments on the EMU issue was a “mistake”.161 As seen Blair 
acknowledged, prior to the European election result, that a referendum could not then be 
won. In a later TV interview he acknowledged that the British people were opposed to 
EMU membership, stressed that he would not “bounce” Britain into a referendum shortly 
after an election victory and admitted that it could take “several years” to turn opinion 
around.162 He even explicitly acknowledged the strength of the finite sovereignty 
argument put forward by opponents of EMU membership. In a speech, which argued that 
Britain was a “pivotal” power between the USA and the EU, he admitted that the political 
debate was;
“...absolutely saturated with the notion that wherever Britain co-operates with...Europe 
it is somehow yielding up its national sovereignty. This argument is powerful. It plays to 
the instinctive dislike o f change.”163
Here was an explicit admission by the Prime Minister on the influence of a specific 
discourse of sovereignty on the wider public debate.
160 www.mori.co.uk. Report January 2000.
161 Financial Times. 16/11/2000.
162 Financial Times. 17/1/2000.
163 Guardian. 23/11/1999. My italics.
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Conclusions
The post-election period provided an environment in which a clear policy divergence 
developed between the two main parties. A broad pattern was emerging. The cores of 
both parties coalesced around distinctive policies. For the Conservatives this meant 
staying out of EMU for two Parliaments. For Labour EMU was supported in principle but 
with a “prepare and decide” policy at some future date when the five economic tests were 
met. Around the core significant minorities in each party remained strongly opposed to 
official policies. The polarisation was reflected in the formation of a wide range of 
groupings providing the foundations for any future referendum campaign.
The policy divergence was now clearly aligned with the conceptions of sovereignty 
formulated by both parties. The Conservative position utilised an absolutist conception of 
sovereignty which was very difficult to reconcile with future EMU membership. The 
speeches of Hague and Portillio argued that EMU was seen as undermining key aspects 
of the four sovereignty questions; monetary, fiscal, institutional and political. It was 
difficult to reconcile Hague's speeches with future membership at any time, let alone 
within two Parliaments. The aim was to create "clear blue water" with the government 
but also succeeded in creating "clear blue water" with the Conservative pro-European 
minority.
The Labour government explicitly placed economics as an important factor in their policy 
on EMU in the form of the five economic tests. However, these tests were extremely 
subjective. The detailed analysis of the tests by the Treasury Select Committee illustrated 
their subjective nature. The conclusion of the Committee that the Treasury should set out 
more precisely the way in which the tests would be assessed reflected their vague nature. 
Whilst the Labour government explicitly stressed economics the construction of the tests
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themselves presented a barrier to the articulation of the perceived economic advantages 
of EMU. In sum the economics of EMU in government discourse remained uncertain 
throughout this period. The decision to remain outside of EMU “for this Parliament” 
reflected the political dimension of EMU policy. Blair’s admission that a referendum 
could not be won and the decision to focus on pro-EU rather than pro-EMU arguments in 
the Britain in Europe campaign reflected the continued resonance of the politics of 
sovereignty.
Electoral considerations affected the timing of the policy changes in 1997. The 
government moved to set policy for the entire Parliament free from immediate electoral 
concerns. The landslide defeat for the Conservatives allowed the majority anti-EMU 
forces within the party to take over the leadership of the party and definitively change 
policy in an anti-EMU direction. However, Labour’s continued promise of a referendum 
effectively transferred the EMU issue away from general election politics. Continued 
public scepticism reflected in opinion polls and the 1999 European election results 
reinforced the continued delay and caution epitomised by the referendum decision. The 
Conservatives took an increasingly robust anti-EMU line. Throughout the period the 
EMU policies of the two main parties continued to slowly diverge marked by the 
formation of EMU-specific groupings. There was no moderation of EMU policies for 
electoral reasons in the pre-2001 election period.
The Labour government developed a long-term policy toward eventual EMU 
membership in alignment with a conception of sovereignty. The policy was sufficiently 
flexible to adapt to possibly changed circumstances in the future either externally (such 
as problems with EMU itself) or internally (such as continued underlying EMU- 
scepticism in public opinion). However, in examining the discourse the bias in favour of 
eventual EMU membership seemed to be increasingly clear. Whilst the New Labour
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government approached Europe with a good deal of rhetoric on "leading Europe" and 
"people's Europe" there was arguably a clear underlying policy. Likewise, underneath the 
rhetoric of globalisation and modernity there was an underlying discourse on sovereignty. 
This discourse focused on pooling or sharing sovereignty. Given this discourse a move to 
EMU could be rationalised with the continued maintenance of sovereignty. Indeed a 
subtext to the main argument was that sovereignty, in terms of influence, could actually 
be increased by EMU membership. This could apply to all of the sovereignty questions 
though it was denied that EMU would necessarily challenge sovereignty outside of the 
monetary sector. Most significantly the government had explicitly declared that there was 
no constitutional barrier to British membership of EMU.
The polarisation of the debate was marked by the fact that EMU had become a symbol of 
the wider relationship between Britain and Europe. The political sovereignty question had 
become the central focus of the debate. For the Conservatives EMU was an unacceptable 
challenge to political sovereignty epitomised in their “Save the Pound” campaign. For the 
Labour government it was necessary to reassert the overall benefits of the EU prior to 
focusing on EMU membership. The changed priorities of Britain in Europe at its official 
launch following Labour government pressure were indicative of this tactical switch.
Whilst the Labour government's conception of sovereignty allowed EMU membership it 
was ironic that the policy was constrained by an earlier manifestation of the sovereignty 
debate. The decision to make EMU membership subject to a popular referendum in 1996 
was an implicit recognition of the importance of the EMU issue and of the significance of 
popular sovereignty. The ultimate authority or sovereignty on British membership of 
EMU was to reside with the British people. Whilst the decision to accede to a referendum 
in 1996 was triggered by party political factors the referendum commitment had been 
reaffirmed many times during both the 1997 general election and in subsequent
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statements. It is indeed one of the ironies of the Labour government policy that, whilst 
stressing that referendums should be reserved for constitutional issues such as devolution 
and electoral reform, they explicitly deny a constitutional barrier to British membership 
of EMU. Given the consistent polling data against EMU, the results of the 1999 European 
election and a generally Eurosceptic media the referendum commitment placed a clear 
constraint on the development of a more favourable pro-EMU policy in the short-term. In 
this manner the discourses of sovereignty were not only aligned with the policies of the 
two parties but were actively influencing these policies.
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CHAPTER 7: BRITISH BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES ON EMU
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the British business debate over membership of 
EMU. The central question addressed in this chapter is to what extent has there been an 
alternative business debate outside of the political sovereignty debate? Clearly the two 
debates are interrelated but it is possible to distinguish a business debate, focused on the 
economic attributes of EMU, from a political debate centred around sovereignty. The 
business debate over British membership of EMU has developed in a complex manner 
since the Major government negotiated the “opt-out” provision in the Maastricht treaty. 
The argument put forward in this chapter is that the business debate has largely been 
subordinated to the political sovereignty debate. Indeed there has not been a clear 
alternative discourse in the business arena which has unduly influenced government 
policy on EMU. The business debate has been marked by a heterogeneity of views and a 
demand for certainty in policy as opposed to its direction. A functional trend in favour of 
British membership of EMU was evident over time but has yet to significantly influence 
policy. The general "wait and see" policy followed by both the Conservative and Labour 
governments, partly engendered by the sovereignty debate, created an uncertain 
environment for business.
This chapter will focus on the business debate on EMU in four main areas. Firstly, an 
overview of the wider business debate in Britain amongst leading peak business 
organisations will be discussed prior to and, in the immediate aftermath of, the 1997 
general election. Secondly, the perceived polarisation and deepening of the business 
debate after the 1997 election will be considered. Thirdly, the salient feature of the 
prevailing uncertainty in the business debate will be discussed. Finally, in the light of the 
above debate, the detailed EMU arrangements of two large British companies with which 
I was involved will be discussed.
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The Business Debate: 1992-1997
Within Britain the conventional approach to studying the relationship between business 
and politics has been to focus on the attitudes of the peak business organisations such as 
the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institute of Directors (IoD) and the 
British Chambers of Commerce (BCC). With the accession of the Conservative 
government in 1979 there was arguably a fundamental change in the nature of the 
business-govemment relationship away from the corporatist relationship to one where 
interest groups were largely ignored in the government decision making process.1 An 
alternative view was that die nature of business representation changed toward contacts 
with individual companies as opposed to peak business organisations. In addition, the 
role of industry specific trade associations also needs to be taken into account.3 In sum a 
wide range of channels need to be considered in analysing the business-govemment 
dialogue over EMU.
What overall influence does business exercise in relation to government in Britain? The 
primary emphasis in this chapter is the debate within business towards EMU rather than 
business-govemment relations. However, the question of the influence of business in 
Britain remains a pertinent one. There can be little doubt that business exercises 
considerable economic leverage but the translation of this leverage into the political arena 
is more problematic. Grant argued that;
"...Britain has a business sector in which there is an increasing concentration of economic
1 See B. Jones (Ed.), Politics UK. (Macmillan Press Limited, Basingstoke, 1994); B. Coxall and L. Robins, Contemporary British 
Politics. (Macmillan Press Limited, Basingstoke, 1994); I. Budge and D. Mackay (Eds.), The Developing British Political System. 
(Longman Publishing, Harlow, 1993).
2 W. Grant, Business and Politics in Britain. (Macmillan Press Limited, Basingstoke, 1994).
3 See T.C. May, J. McHigh and T. Taylor, "Business Representation in the UK", Political Studies. VoL 46, No. 2, June 1998.
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power, but business remains politically weak."4
This relative political weakness lies in the multiple channels used and the very diversity 
of the business sector in terms of company size and interests. In the parliamentary arena 
Judge argued that, whilst Parliament has maintained the legitimacy of the industrial 
process (by supporting free market ideas), it has failed to effectively represent its 
functional interests.51 will argue that the debate over EMU supported Grant's basic thesis 
as to the relative political weakness of business. However, on EMU this relative political 
weakness was also exacerbated by the absence of a cohesive policy position.
The business debate on EMU was far more varied than commonly portrayed in the 
British media where there was often an implicit assumption that business is generally 
pro-EMU. The views of the CBI developed slowly over time toward a more pro-EMU 
position. Kate Barker, an economist at the CBI in a submission to the Kingsdown 
Enquiry in 1995, argued that industrialists had not focused on intangible issues such as 
sovereignty but on more practical issues such as the costs and benefits of EMU.6 The 
benefits were perceived in the longer term to be a better macro environment for trade and 
investment. However, there were reasons for caution including potential fiscal transfers, 
the need for labour flexibility and the volatility of British interest rates.7 In sum, there 
was an overall perceived economic benefit of EMU ignoring political considerations. 
However, in 1995 these views were expressed in a very cautious manner;
"While there is still uncertainty about the process of transition, CBI members support the 
government in maintaining its option on EMU, but consider it important that this is
4 W. Grant, Business and Politics in Britain. (Macmillan Education Limited, Basingstoke, 1987).
s D. Judge, Parliament and Industry. (Dartmouth Publishing Company, Aldershot, 1990), p.2.
6 K. Barker, "EMU and Industry" in C. Taylor, European Monetary Union: The Kingsdown Enquiry. (Macmillan Press Limited,
London, 1996), p. 241.
7 Ibid.. p.243.
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thought of as an opt-in as much as an opt-out."8
This trend was reemphasised during evidence given to the Treasury Select Committee in 
1996 by Adair Turner, the Director General, and Barker. The memorandum presented to 
the Committee urged the need for a steer from government as the CBI felt that it was 
"totally in the dark".9 They stressed the need for guidelines on a variety of factors 
including the prospects of Britain meeting the Maastricht convergence criteria, other 
relevant economic criteria, the likelihood of other EU member states joining EMU in the 
first wave, the dependence on a clear legislative framework and the degree of popular 
support needed for British membership. The CBI also argued for a "national steering 
structure" to act as a focal point in the education process for EMU. In an ironic but 
perceptive comment they stated that they realised that the chance of obtaining clear 
guidelines was an "unrealistic hope".10
The CBI were pushing for a government lead partly because their own views were at that 
stage unclear. Turner admitted that the CBI were hedging their position as a unified view 
had yet to emerge with a nuance, though not wide, in views between large companies 
which tended to favour EMU and small companies which tended to be opposed.11 Whilst 
admitting that uncertainty was bad for business Turner developed this theme by arguing 
that the abolition of exchange rate uncertainty was "the fundamental argument" for 
joining EMU.12 However, he personally favoured entry based on tight convergence
8 Ibid.. p.244.
9 HC 283 iv 1995/6, Treasury Select Committee, The Proenosis for Stage 3 o f Economic and Monetary Union. 25/3/1996, p.48.
10 Ibid.. p.49.
11 Ibid.. 0182.
12 Ibid, Q239.
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criteria rather than the "1999 or never" argument.13 An interesting comment arose during 
a discussion of the surveys carried out by the CBI when one of the Select Committee 
members, asked Turner the reasons for the CBI "sitting back" on such a major national 
issue and "waiting for the next questionnaire". The reply came that the CBI "was not a 
dictatorship" and had to consult widely with its members.14 This episode reflected the 
cautious approach of the CBI towards the political forces underlying EMU, rather than 
seeking to influence these forces, and the continuing uncertainty within its own 
membership.
The very cautious pro-EMU position of 1995 and 1996 had changed markedly by the 
November 1997 CBI conference. This closely reflected the move in the position of the 
Labour government in its October 1997 statement from a policy of "wait and see" to 
“prepare and decide”. However, it was not until July 1997, after the General Election and 
following a four month consultation period, that the CBI finally came out openly in 
favour of EMU when the economic conditions were right. During the 1997 general 
election campaign the CBI stuck steadfastly to its own "wait and see" policy, in spite of 
speculation that they were moving toward a more pro-EMU position. In April 1997 a 
controversy had arisen over the three options being considered in the CBI consultation 
paper. The CBI Eurosceptics argued that these three options were all in favour of joining 
EMU when they were actually not joining at all or in the "foreseeable future" (seen as at 
least ten years), joining as soon as practicable and joining in the medium-term.15 Colin 
Marshall, president of the CBI, wrote a letter to the Financial Times expressly denying 
that the CBI was set to back EMU.16 The long gestation period before the CBI’s eventual 
pro-EMU position (albeit when conditions were right) reflected the wide range of 
opinions within its membership on the EMU issue.
13 Ibid.. 0244.
14 Ibid.. 0245.
15 Guardian. 26/4/1997.
16 Financial Times. 23/4/1997.
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The eventual declaration of support for EMU by the CBI in July 1997 was hedged by the 
pragmatic position that Britain should only enter when the time is ripe, a clear reflection 
of the Labour government's view. Turner emphasised the economic basis of the CBI's 
decision in an interesting passage of an article outlining the CBI's new policy after a long 
period of "sitting on the fence";
"For some EMU is primarily a political question. Some believe it a necessary precursor to 
a desirable political union; others a threat to national sovereignty. And it would be absurd 
to deny that EMU has a political dimension. But I think some of the arguments are 
overplayed. National economic sovereignty is severely constrained by the facts of 
economic life. The issue is how to maximise economic success, not the illusion of 
national control. It is on the economic arguments for or against that we need to focus,"17
The positive economic case stressed by Turner included exchange rate stability, price 
transparency, a single European capital market and completion of the Single Market. 
However, the requisite conditions included sustained economic convergence and labour 
market flexibility. In January 1998 the new president-elect of the CBI, Clive Thompson 
argued in a similar positive manner that EMU would be good for Britain;
"What the single currency represents is the opportunity for stability, the opportunity for 
lower interest rates which in turn means growth in levels of employment, which is good 
for everyone."18
17 Adair Turner, Financial Times. 23/7/1997.
18 Independent 26/6/1998.
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The pragmatic pro-EMU position, however, also highlighted the perceived fear of Britain 
being outside of EMU rather than the positive case of membership. Turner, in an 
interview in November 1997, stressed the importance of flexible labour markets as much 
as EMU membership. Other arguments included the myth that the exchange rate can be a 
useful economic weapon. In particular there was a denial that Britain's membership of the 
ERM was an unmitigated disaster with the blame being laid more with the "Lawson 
boom" of 1986-1989, when lax macroeconomic management overheated the economy. 
The key argument though was that there are "significant dangers" of being out in the 
longer term. This led to a difference with the Labour government position in urging the 
retention of an option of joining in 2001 or 2002 during the same parliamentary term.19 A 
similar practical argument advanced was that British business will adopt the Euro 'de 
facto' even if Britain stays outside EMU.20
The eventual pragmatic pro-EMU position of the CBI masked some clear divergences 
within the CBI over EMU. On the one side were clear pro-EMU supporters such as Niall 
Fitzgerald (chairman of Unilever) and David Simon (former chairman of BP) and on the 
other equally clear opponents including Stanley Kalins (chairman of Dixons) and Lord 
Hanson. A letter to the Sunday Times in January 1997 signed by eighteen top 
businessmen argued that EMU could "be disastrous for Britain".21 These divergences 
became clear during a debate at the November 1997 conference. Fitzgerald argued that 
Britain should not continue the policy of "missed chances" in Europe which had done 
"terrible damage to British interests and influence". Britain should join EMU at the 
earliest opportunity and business should take a vigorous approach to promote the benefits 
of EMU. In contrast, Kalms argued that EMU would impose further crippling burdens on 
British business and lead to a federal superstate.22 This would lead to drastic
19 Guardian. 6/11/1997.
20 Independent. 6/11/1997.
21 Sunday Times. 19/1/1997.
22 Daily Telegraph. 11/11/1997.
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consequences;
"Membership of a single currency would be irreversible, irrevocable and irretrievable. 
The nearest analogy is castration: our voices may be pitched higher in the councils of 
Europe but only at the cost of our economic virility."
From a more moderate EMU-sceptic viewpoint Martin Taylor, then chief executive of 
Barclays bank, argued that EMU would inevitably lead to a federal tax system and an 
increased EU budget in order to meet the resulting high regional unemployment.24
The differences within the senior ranks of the CBI raised the question as to the extent to 
which the CBI represents business opinion. The CBI claimed 250,000 members, though 
many are affiliated through trade associations. The Eurosceptics have argued that the CBI 
failed to represent the broad mass of its members and was dominated by large business 
interests. Kalms argued that on EMU the CBI had been "hijacked" by the "loudest 
voices" which explained its pro-EMU policy.25 The CBI annual surveys of its 
membership on EMU have attracted a wide degree of criticism from a variety of sources. 
An Independent article argued that the questions were never the same twice and "are
*yfkasked to elicit the biggest yes vote". In its survey prior to its November 1997 
conference the CBI claimed that 72% of its respondents supported EMU "as soon as 
economic convergence is in place" with only 16% against. However, replies were 
received from only 30% of the 2,441 companies polled. Wagstyl of the Financial Times 
argued that the CBI should let an independent pollster manage its EMU polls.27 A MORI
23 Independent 11/11/1997.
24 Financial Times. 11/11/1997.
25 Sir Stanley Kalms, Sunday Telegraph. 9/11/1997.
26 Independent 14/11/1997.
27 Financial Times. 13/11/1997.
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poll of 5,000 companies in 1996 found 56% of business in favour in principle of British 
entry in principle.28 A Gallup poll for the Daily Telegraph showed 61% in favour of 
British membership and 39% opposed which they concluded revealed "widespread but 
shallow" support for EMU.29 In the same survey over half of the businessman surveyed 
feared a similar outcome to the ERM debacle. These surveys lent some putative support 
to the CBI survey and to the CBI's general view on EMU. However, even if the majority 
of British business was pro-EMU it was clear that a substantial minority remained 
opposed or agnostic.
The British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), which claimed to represent over 200,000 
businesses the majority of which have less than 20 employees, took a slightly more 
restrained approach to EMU than the CBI. In a memorandum to the Treasury Select 
Committee they argued that the relative balance of costs and benefits on EMU were not 
conclusive and, hence, they were agnostic about EMU. They, therefore, proposed the 
establishment of an independent committee to hear evidence and distribute impartial 
information.30 Two key points arose from their evidence to the Committee. Firstly, they 
stressed unequivocally that there will be winners and losers in the process which leads to 
the need to get away from the use of the generic term "business". The other key element 
was the continued stress on uncertainty;
"It is extremely difficult to plan for a single currency whilst so many uncertainties 
remain."31
This uncertainty was clarified more fully by Mr. Geldard (President) when, under 
questioning, he identified three types of uncertainty which had "frustrated" his members.
28 Ibid.
29 Daily Telegraph. 10/11/1997.
30 HC 283 iv, 1995/6, Memorandum presented by British Chambers of Commerce, 1/1/1996, p.64.
31 Ibid.. p.69.
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These were the political uncertainty as to EMU itself (including British membership), the 
financial uncertainties (especially in relation to the changeover costs), and the sheer 
complexity of the transition process (exacerbated by the lack of proper practical 
information). In sum, he concluded that "uncertainty is very damaging" and "it is the leap 
in the dark" which surrounds EMU.32 The discourse itself was very apposite with the 
Chambers calling for the whole issue to be "depoliticised" with the view that since the 
ratification of the Maastricht treaty there had been little meaningful debate.33 The BCC 
eventually followed the CBI move to open support for EMU in principle, though in a 
more cautious manner, in September 1997. They outlined their policy of support for 
eventual EMU membership on the basis that the “UK’s long-term economic interests are 
best served through its membership of EMU”.34
The other major business organisation is the Institute of Directors (IoD). The IoD 
traditionally represented smaller businesses than the CBI (claiming a similar membership 
of 250,000). These smaller businesses inevitably saw the short-term costs of EMU as 
opposed to any potential long-term benefits. The IoD's political view is very free market 
and anti-regulation. On EMU its position from the start was very clear being against 
EMU for the "foreseeable future", which meant many years.35 The IoD's reasons for 
staying out of EMU were primarily economic, especially the perceived key structural 
differences between the British economy and the economies of other EU members. These 
included the larger importance of the energy and service industries in Britain, the shorter 
term structural basis of British debt, the volatility of British interest rates and an 
economic cycle more akin to the US than the rest of the EU. However, they also pointed 
to the wider case that EMU, in their opinion, was essentially a political move which will
32 Ibid, Q265, Q291 and Q292.
33 Ibid.. p.69.
34 British Chambers of Commerce, “Policy Brief: European Monetary Union”, September 1997.
35 Tim Melville-Ross, Daily Telegraph. 24/4/1997.
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lead to fiscal union and arguably political union. The definitive opposition of the IoD to 
EMU led to a clash of opinion with the CBI during the 1997 election campaign as the 
CBI veered slowly toward a more pro-EMU position. Lord Young, former Conservative 
minister during many confrontations between the Thatcher government and the CBI in 
the 1980s and then IoD President, attacked the CBI for seeing EMU as the "easy way" 
out. A constant IoD theme was the need for big companies to look beyond their own 
corporate interest to the wider economy. Not surprisingly IoD surveys of its 
membership have tended to confirm overall opposition to EMU.
An Andersens survey of 26 senior executives of multinational businesses based in 
London in Spring 1995 shed greater light on the detailed attitudes of key business leaders 
at that time. The survey was not necessarily representative and excluded small and 
medium-sized businesses. There was a perceived benefit from Britain joining EMU in 
terms of providing a stable business environment but in particular that British industry 
would face greater disadvantages if Britain were to choose not to join EMU. Whilst 
predominantly concerned with economic issues it was interesting to note that amongst the 
potential disadvantages of EMU were aspects of sovereignty. In the area of the potential 
loss of monetary sovereignty one business executive was quoted as follows;
"Business would be unable to lobby for appropriate monetary policies, if this is a 
disadvantage."39
There was also a significant minority which supported the hypothesis that Britain's 
economic position was significantly different from the Continent and that the ECB would
36 HC 283 I I 1995/6, Evidence given by Ruth Lea (Head o f the Policy Unit) and Tim Melville-Ross (Director General) to the Treasury 
Select Committee, The Prognosis for Stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union. Q729-730.
37 Tim Melville-Ross, Director-General, "Directors and CBI slug it out on the euro", The Daily Telegraph. 24/4/1997.
38 Andersen Consulting, "The Impact of European Economic and Monetary Union on British Industry" in C. Taylor (Ed.), European 
Monetary Union: The Kingsdown Enquiry. (Macmillan Press Limited, London, 1996), p.251.
39 Ibid.. d.256.
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be unlikely to follow a policy which would be beneficial for British industry. However, 
whilst there were some concerns as to the loss of an independent monetary policy, the 
prominent concern was that Britain would lose influence from remaining outside EMU, 
reflecting the "influence” as opposed to the "sovereignty" discourse. This even led 15 of 
the 26 business executives interviewed to feel that the EU could apply covert 
protectionist measures if Britain did not join EMU.40
Post-1997 General Election Polarisation?
In spite of the long gestation period in which the peak business organisations developed 
their views on EMU there was a polarisation of views on EMU following the 1997 
General Election. This polarisation included the beginning of nascent organisational 
frameworks reflecting a similar trend to the organisational polarisation in the political 
arena. These represented not just the split between the CBI and the IoD but EMU-specific 
pressure groups which sought to put forward the views of business on EMU. It should be 
emphasised that the divisions on EMU did not generally reflect the overall views of 
business on the EU in general. Business was generally in favour of the Single Market in 
particular and was also united against extensive social provisions arising from the Social 
Chapter and the perceived "excesses" of regulations from the European Commission. 
Nevertheless most of the business peak organisations sought to influence affairs directly 
through representation in Brussels (especially the BCC), using informal business 
networks such as European Business Agenda.41 These increasing networks led 
Greenwood and Stancich to conclude their study of business attitudes to the EU as;
"...British business is likely to become more socialized and integrated into mainstream 
European values."42
40 Ibid.. d.273.
41 J. Greenwood and L. Stancich, "British Business: Managing Complexity" in D. Baker and D. Seawright (Eds.), Britain For and 
Against Europe. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), p. 163.
42 Ibid.. p. 164.
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The nascent organisational frameworks included participation in the Britain in Europe 
campaign group.43 On the anti-EMU side the formation of the group "Business for 
Sterling", led by Lord Marsh, provided the organisational framework for the business 
anti-EMU campaign. These polarised groupings were reflected in the vigorous views 
propounded by EMU business proponents and opponents, the discourse of which was 
evident by letters published in the national press in 1998. The "Business for Sterling" 
campaign was launched in June 1998 with an open letter in the Times. The main 
arguments stressed were the economic differences between Britain and the rest of the EU. 
These included structural differences such as the relative volatility of British interest rates 
and the idea that the timing of Britain's economic cycle was necessarily different to the 
rest of the EU. In addition, general economic arguments militated against EMU such as 
the lack of labour mobility throughout the EMU area and moves to fiscal and tax 
harmonisation. Underlying the economic arguments was the notion that EMU was a 
political move leading to excessive integration;
"EMU is essentially a project of political integration...For Britain, with its special trading, 
investment and financial patterns, the risk of jeopardising our competitive edge through 
excessive integration remains too high to be acceptable."44
Writing in reply to the news that the CBI was to cancel its 1998 annual survey on EMU 
representatives from the "Business for Sterling" pressure group launched an open attack 
on the CBI's EMU policy. The strength of their opposition was clear in the following 
phrase;
43 Times. 9/10/1998.
44 Times. 11/6/1998.
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"We believe that Britain is in danger of being bulldozed into what could at worst be a 
disastrous decision."45
This was backed by a claim that concern about the dangers of British membership of 
EMU was shared by business persons from every section of British industry and 
commerce. The CBI were regarded as seeking to deny a public debate on EMU. The 
letter was signed by Lord Marsh, Michael Edwardes, John Craven, Rodney Leach, 
Malcolm Me Alpine and Lord Young.
From the pro-EMU camp a letter was published in the Financial Times on 23 November 
1998 co-ordinated by the European Movement and containing 114 signatories. This letter 
argued both a positive and negative case for British membership of EMU. The positive 
case argued that EMU would be a force for economic stability and would promote trade, 
investment and economic growth. However, equally significant was the negative case for 
British membership;
"A decision to remain outside the single currency indefinitely, on the other hand, would 
pose a serious threat to our future prosperity and to our influence in the world."46
Prosperity would be impacted by higher interest rates and a more exposed currency. 
Influence would be reduced by exclusion from the Euro-X grouping. This led to the 
conclusion that the best economic interest would be served by joining soon after EMU is 
established and the best policy was based on the assumption that Britain will join. The 
letter was signed by representatives from 29 of the FT-SE 100 companies highlighting 
the support for British membership of EMU from the larger companies and also by 
several representatives from key inward investing companies. However, it should be 
pointed out that the signatories signed in a personal capacity as opposed to their corporate
45 Daily Telegraph. 7/9/1998.
46 Financial Times. 23/11/1998.
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capacity. It was arguably the most significant pro-EMU business statement and 
represented a hardening of business opinion on the eve of the launch of EMU. However, 
given the continuing opposition to British membership of EMU it failed to deliver a 
"knock-out blow".47
The perceived polarisation of the debate was also present at the CBI conference in 
November 1998. Following the acrimonious debates at the 1997 conference the decision 
was taken not to hold a major debate on EMU during the main session and to defer a 
survey of member companies attitudes on EMU.48 However, the speeches by Chancellor 
Brown and Industry Secretary Mandelson at the start of the conference seemed to 
indicate a possible change in the government's attitude toward EMU to one of "when 
rather than if ' Britain would enter EMU (though it was later denied that the policy was 
changed at all).49 In addition the looming launch of EMU in continental Europe was 
underlined by speeches from the new German Chancellor Schroder, and the Spanish 
Premier Aznar urging British entry into EMU. These speeches set the tone for the 
conference though the message from the CBI was consistent in the call for more certainty 
from the government. Clive Thompson, the CBI president, argued that;
"There isn't enough leadership being given by the Government in terms of preparation for 
the euro...We are not at all prepared in this country to the extent we should be and this 
would be helped by the Government setting a date."50
The internal CBI debate over EMU was relegated to a fringe debate which, whilst fieiy, 
was a reflection of the CBI leadership's attempt to downplay the EMU issue at the
47 Financial Times. 23/11/1998.
48 Daily Telegraph. 4/11/1998.
49 Ibid.
50 In Ibid.
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conference given the perceived polarisation of business attitudes toward EMU. Adair 
Turner, the CBI director-general, argued that there had been a polarisation between those 
who were definitely anti-EMU and those who were not just in favour in principle but 
wanted to also "get on with it as soon as possible". However, the current period was too 
much of a "phoney war period" in which to have a full debate.51
By 1999 there was a clear polarisation between the leading business organisations. After 
many delays the CBI carried out an opinion poll of its own members through MORI. This 
reaffirmed the central policy of support for EMU in principle subject to a number of 
conditions. 52% of respondents supported EMU in principle and sought British 
membership at an uncertain future date. 36% of respondents favoured a total “wait and 
see” policy with only 10% opposed to EMU in principle. For CBI President Thompson 
the survey supported the CBI policy of supporting “UK membership of a successful 
EMU”, which “would enable British firms to participate fully in a more complete and 
competitive single market.”52 Two qualifications arose from the survey. Firstly, many 
members wished to enter EMU at a rate of 2.65-2.70 Deutschemarks, well below the then 
prevailing rate. Secondly, only just over one-quarter of firms responded to the MORI 
survey. The EMU-sceptic organisations, including the IoD and the Federation of Small 
Business, remained implacably opposed to EMU membership. A Business for Sterling 
poll found 59% of firms opposed to EMU membership.53 The “battle of the polls” 
symbolically marked the polarisation of the leading business organisations.
Whilst the polarisation of views had developed it was noticeable that the pro-EMU 
business organisations continued to take a cautious stance tactically in the light of a
51 Daily Telegraph. 2/11/1998.
52 CBI Press Release, “CBI Members Reaffirm Support for EMU Membership in Principle”. (CBI, London, 20/7/1999).
53 www.hfors.com. July 1999.
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perceived drift in government policy on EMU and continued differences within their own 
membership. The CBI, following the replacement of Director-General Turner by Digby 
Jones, decided that open campaigning for EMU would be suspended for the time being.54 
A more dramatic switch was taken by the BCC following an extensive poll of their 
membership. This showed that its members were totally divided with 38% supporting 
membership and 36% wanting to rule out membership for the foreseeable future. Given 
this position the BCC Deputy Director, Ian Peters, stated that not only would the BCC 
not campaign for EMU in principle but would neither “encourage membership...or 
discourage membership”. In a telling comment he added that should the government wish 
to support membership “the onus is on ministers to take the lead”.55 Arguably there was 
even a drift in business sentiment against EMU. The BCC poll showed a marked increase 
in scepticism from its 1997 survey and a poll of finance directors in late 1999 showed 
that 55% were opposed to membership in the next Parliament (as compared with 42% in 
early 1999). Reasons given included the continued strong performance of the British 
economy, the continued weakness of the euro and comments by Bank of England 
governor Eddie George that Britain was “prospering” outside EMU.56
Business Debate: Widespead Uncertainty?
The most significant trend was that, beneath the apparent polarisation of business views, 
there was an underlying uncertainty and ignorance. This can be seen anecdotally as well 
as arising from wider surveys. The business cases discussed later certainly give support to 
this view. Murray, business correspondent of the Times, captured the situation on 
observing the EMU discussion at a business conference by noting that the "overwhelming 
feeling" was that EMU was a practical problem that companies will have to get on with.57 
However, EMU was only seen as one amongst many key business issues such as solving
54 Financial Times. 27/11/1999.
55 Financial Times. 31/3/2000.
54 Accountancy Age. 6/1/2000.
57 A. Murray, Times. 25/9/1998.
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the Millennium bug or the wider problems of the international economy. Nevertheless, 
although seen as a practical issue there was also an underlying fatalistic belief that EMU 
will inevitably happen and that, therefore, preparations must be made. This could lead to 
functional, 'de facto' support for EMU on the basis of time and effort foregone in business 
preparations rather than on the intrinsic merits, political or economic, of the EMU 
project. As Murray puts it;
"It is not that the grassroots business believes the broader political questions to be 
unimportant, simply that industry is unable to divorce this aspect from the practical 
realities of the arrival of the single currency. It is a less fundamentalist approach than that
r o
adopted by politicians and the more vocal pros and antis in the business lobby."
A manifestation of the practical approach toward EMU was the growing perception that 
the euro currency would be widely accepted as a 'de facto' currency in Britain even 
though it remains officially outside the EMU zone. This point had already been 
highlighted by the Business Advisory Group established by the Labour government in 
1997.S9
The underlying agnosticism and ignorance was captured by a Financial Times/MORI 
survey in September 1998. This showed a majority of businesses (63%) in favour of 
immediate or eventual EMU entry but also highlighted a lack of preparation.60 Equally 
significantly less than half of the businesses surveyed felt that full participation in EMU 
would be good for the economy. This seemed to support the argument advanced that 
business tends to take a realistic view that British membership of EMU will happen and 
should be implemented as effectively as possible rather than being in favour 'per se'. 
Another significant finding was that 59% of businesses surveyed felt that they were not
58 Ibid.
59 HC503 i, Treasury Select Committee, Fifth Report, The UK and Preparations for Stage 3 of EMU. 1997/8, 53-55.
60 Financial Times. 28/11/1998.
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very informed or not at all informed. A key conditional factor for EMU support was the 
exchange rate at which the Britain entered EMU, namely the desire for a competitive 
exchange rate (defined as less than 2.70 Deutschemarks). However, 57% of businesses 
surveyed felt that they would be using the euro by 2010 reflecting the feeling of 
inevitability around eventual British entry into EMU. The key word here is probably 
"eventual" as the survey found that only 60% of large companies (defined as companies 
with 200 or more employees) and only 17% of small companies (those with less than 50 
employees) had made some preparations for EMU.61 The survey revealed significant 
sectoral differences with larger, Southern, financial services firms more likely to support 
EMU than smaller, Northern manufacturing firms. In sum, the survey underpinned the 
uncertainty of the business debate over EMU but with a growing 'de facto' acceptance of 
the likelihood of British entry into EMU. This "functional" approach to British entry 
contrasted vividly to the "heat" generated by the political sovereignty debate.
The relationship between the political sovereignty debate and the business debate was 
intriguingly captured in a Treasury Select Committee cross-examination of leading 
representatives of the CBI, the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF), the Federation 
of Small Businesses (FSB) and the British Retail Consortium (BRC).62 Particularly 
significant was the exchange between Spicer, the Eurosceptic MP, and Barker, the CBI 
representative. Questioned on the "pooling" of sovereignty involved in EMU she sought 
to distinguish between monetary and fiscal sovereignty in arguing that national tax 
systems could remain distinct in EMU. There was a similar rejection of the view that the 
CBI's conditional support for EMU led them to additionally support "ever closer union" 
in the EU;
"I am not sure that the CBI, as an organisation has expressed a very strong view on the
61 Ibid.
62 HC503 vi, Treasury Select Committee, Fifth Report, The UK and Preparations for Stage 3 o f  Economic and Monetary Union. 
1997/8.
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question of ever closer union...in particular the CBI as a business organisation has 
generally taken the view that the way forward for Europe is towards an organisation that 
fosters trade and makes economies work better and function better."
The limited role of the CBI is stressed in response to further questioning about the CBrs 
role in any future referendum;
"When we have a popular referendum on monetary union, it will then correctly be the 
case that individuals' voting will take into account the political element. The CBI's role in 
that is to comment on what they believe the balance of business and economic facts to be 
and I think they would say that was positive. The political questions I think we would 
rightly hesitate to express a view on because it is not correct for us to have a view on it or 
undue influence on political processes."64
The clear distinction made here between the "political" and the "economic" highlights the 
reluctance of the CBI, the most pro-EMU business organisation, to campaign openly on 
all questions surrounding EMU, especially the political questions. The reservations 
expressed by the CBI on labour market flexibility, the need for fiscal prudence and 
limitation on further political integration also indicated the conditionality of the CBI's 
support for EMU.
The Select Committee examination highlighted three other arguments outlined in this 
chapter. The diversity of the business debate was provided by the general EMU positions 
of the business organisations. The conditional pro-EMU view of the CBI was 
contradicted by the general scepticism of the Federation of Small Businesses. This 
dichotomy was balanced by the stated neutral positions of the British Retail Consortium
63 Ibid.. 116.
64 Ibid.. 117.
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and the Engineering Employers Federation. The concern with the practical, functional 
issues of EMU was prevalent throughout the minutes of evidence. In particular concern 
was expressed at the entry exchange rate for Britain into EMU and the costs of transition. 
It was also widely felt that the market impact of EMU, even without British membership, 
would be felt throughout the British economy. However, the key message throughout was 
the difficulty of preparation for EMU in an environment of political uncertainty. The 
concluding words of the Chair, Malcolm Bmce, were significant in this respect;
"I think one of the things that has become apparent, however, is that your {the four 
business representatives} answers might have been crisper if you knew exactly when this 
damn thing was going to happen.
(Mr. Williams^ {Representative o f the British Retail Consortium} It would be a great 
help."65
As well as presenting a series of political challenges EMU presented a range of technical 
challenges to businesses and regulatory authorities in preparing for its introduction. A 
Deloittes survey on preparations in 1997 highlighted the differences between EU member 
states and Britain. Most of the other EU states established working groups co-ordinated 
by Finance Ministries.66 In Britain the Bank of England was the focal point of co­
ordination for EMU preparations. This was an interesting comment on the degree of 
political input in the EMU preparation process. Austria even went as far to appoint a
fnminister specifically for the Euro.
65 Ibid.. 130. My italics.
66 Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu International, Managing the Euro. (Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu International Studio, London, 1997), 
p.43.
67 Ibid.. pp:5-6.
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In the areas of accountancy and company law a majority of states implemented blanket 
legislation on the substitution of currencies whilst Britain was only planning to amend 
each relevant law. Interestingly British company law tends to be more flexible in terms of 
its treatment of currencies. It is one of the few countries that recognises that international 
businesses which trade in goods and services in a non-sterling currency should be free to 
use that currency for accounting purposes. A good example is the oil industry where most 
transactions are carried out in US dollars. The principle adopted in Britain is that the 
accounting currency should reflect the primary economic environment in which the 
company operates. The other extreme is the position in Sweden where national legislation 
insists that Swedish krona must be used for all transactions (in other words final figures 
can not just be translated into Swedish krona at the end of the financial year).68 Clearly 
differences in these areas reflected national traditions as much as the relative position of 
preparations for EMU but the contrast between Britain and most of her EU partners is 
again conspicuous.
Whilst the focus of Deloitte’s survey was on technical preparation in specialised 
functional areas a Kleinwort Peats survey on strategic planning and business opinion 
reinforced the contrast between Britain and its EU partners. Asked about the importance 
of EMU vis-a-vis other key business issues only 30% of the UK companies surveyed put 
EMU towards the top of their list, the lowest percentage of all EU members save 
Scandinavia.69 Again on expected benefits from EMU only 56% of UK businesses saw 
any benefits, the lowest in the EU.70 The most significant finding was the degree of 
strategic planning for EMU. 19% of UK companies had a strategy in place and 30% were 
planning to develop one (a total of 49%) which was again the lowest of all EU 
members.71 The equivalent total figures were 94% for Italy, 85% for Germany, 65% for
61 Ibid.. p.12.
69 KPMG Management Consulting, Economic and Monetary Union Research Report (KPMG Management Consulting, 1997), p.10.
70 Ibid.. p .ll .
71 Ibid, p.22.
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Benelux and 55% for France.72 In estimating the costs of conversion to EMU only 18% 
of UK companies had an estimate, lower than EU member states except France and 
Scandinavia.73 Given these results the executive summary concluded;
"The state of companies' planning for EMU was woefully inadequate. Two thirds of 
respondents had no plans in place to cope with the introduction of EMU...German 
companies were most prepared: over one half had a plan; and one third were preparing a 
plan. UK respondents were the least well prepared: only one in five had a plan; although 
one quarter of UK respondents were preparing one, over half of the UK companies 
without a plan were not developing one."74
These conclusions were supported by similar surveys in 1998. Another KPMG survey on 
the transitional issues of EMU which required special national legislation for the 
introduction of the euro notes showed that only some transitional legislation dealing with 
adverse tax consequences was proposed in the UK. By contrast most of the other EU 
member states had detailed plans co-ordinated by the Finance ministries including 
significantly Sweden, which, like the UK, did not join EMU in the first wave.75 Even 
more prescient was the conclusion of a Treasury survey on awareness among UK 
businesses of EMU. Their telephone survey of a wide range of businesses found that 
awareness of the impact of EMU was 10% below the EU average, a finding supported by 
similar surveys by the accountancy firms, KPMG and Grant Thornton. Most significantly 
though was that, in spite of greater awareness by the larger companies, in the survey they 
were failing to make a lead in technical EMU preparations;
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.. p.28.
74 Ibid.. p.1.
75 KPMG, EU Economic and Monetary Union. June 1998.
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"Whilst these larger firms obviously have a better grasp of the basics than the SMEs 
(Small to Medium Enterprises) researched...they demonstrate a lack of strategic and
n c.
detailed, 'technical' planning."
The relationship between the government and business can be seen as a symbiotic 
relationship in that each side, by continually urging the need for greater preparations for 
EMU on the other, led to a resultant functional development of both sides in moves 
toward EMU. The call at the CBI conference in November 1998 for greater government 
direction to stimulate investment in EMU preparations was matched by the speeches of 
the Chancellor Brown and Industry Secretary Mandelson hinting at a warmer tone toward 
EMU. This was in turn matched later by the Financial Times letter urging a clearer 
government policy to which the government response was to stress the coming launch in 
January 1999 of the National Changeover Plan in order to "send a further signal" to 
business that it should prepare seriously for UK entry.77
It is clear that the likelihood of Britain's later entry into EMU was reflected in the relative 
lack of preparation by British companies. However, uncertainty as to the EMU project 
itself and Britain's participation were probably the key factors. British companies seem 
less concerned about whether their Government takes them into EMU than they are by a 
high and continuing level of uncertainty. I would argue that uncertainty as opposed to 
business preferences over EMU has been the key characteristic of the British business 
debate to date. This uncertainty was reflected in an increasingly accelerated symbiotic 
debate between government and business with each side urging greater preparations on 
the other. This may lead functionally to greater preparations for British membership and 
arguably a growing perception that membership is an inevitability. However, the political 
constraint of attaining support in a referendum remained paramount.
76 HM Treasury Euro Preparations Unit, Research Findings on Awareness Among UK Businesses o f the Single Currency. June 1998.
77 Financial Times. 23/11/1998.
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Business Cases
My personal experience on the EMU preparations of two large British companies 
between 1997 and 1999 has tended to support the argument made that business required a 
greater degree of certainty in government policy on EMU.78 This led in turn to a relative 
lack of preparation and lack of clear strategic planning toward EMU. The following 
summaries will refer to five areas of the EMU planning of the two companies concerned. 
These were the general company policy toward EMU, the organisation of strategic 
planning within the firms, the level of awareness throughout each company on EMU, the 
relative preparation of different functional areas and the key problems affecting EMU 
planning. The two companies, one an energy company and the other a financial services 
company, whilst from very different business sectors, were similar in that they were 
primarily UK based but had some European interests.
Both companies took a strictly neutral position in their general attitude toward EMU in 
public pronouncements. This was reflected internally by the corollary that EMU was 
primarily a technical business issue which needed to be addressed. However, this is not to 
say that there was no debate as to the general advantages and disadvantages of EMU. In 
the energy company there was a significant debate as to whether the company should 
adopt a cautious pro-EMU attitude provided that the convergence criteria were followed 
and Britain entered at a competitive exchange rate. However, this position was rejected 
and a strictly neutral position was followed. In the financial services company there was a 
gridlock situation at the board level with one key director a strong advocate of EMU and 
another a strong opponent. The outcome was an unwritten 'modus vivendi' that EMU 
would not be discussed at main Board level with the result that EMU planning was 
passed to the next level of management under the remit of a third director.
78 This section is derived from a series of personal interviews across die two companies.
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The neutral EMU policy position of both companies directly influenced their overall 
strategies toward EMU. Both companies adopted a general strategy of compliance toward 
EMU. This meant that priority was given to ensuring that information systems and 
accounting systems were compliant in terms of being able to process EMU transactions. 
This strategy inevitably downplayed alternative strategies aimed at assessing the strategic 
impact that EMU would have on the individual business environments of the two 
companies. It also led to a concern with the costs of EMU as a compliance project rather 
than enumeration of longer-term advantages. A classic symptom of this approach within 
the financial services company was the amount of time spent on internal arguments as to 
how the costs of the EMU project were to be allocated across the business.
The neutral policy toward EMU was reflected in a low key approach in the political 
contacts carried out by the two companies. Grant argued that firms which had regular 
contacts with government tended to fall into two main groups. These were the ’tripartite' 
firms which tended to prefer bureaucratised contacts with government often via 
multilateral business organisations and the 'capitalist aggressive' firms which tended to
70  •favour more personal contacts. In my own experience this distinction was not followed 
in practice as both companies sought to utilise a wide range of government contacts over 
EMU. The energy company maintained an office in Brussels in order to directly obtain 
information and lobby over developments in the EU. However, the company’s interests 
on EMU were channelled through the European Committee of the CBI. The financial 
services company used direct contacts with the Treasury in order to confirm its planning 
assumptions on EMU. In addition, they were represented on the relevant industry 
committee on EMU which also had contacts with the government. In spite of the use of 
multiple channels the neutral policy toward EMU adopted by both companies meant that 
most of the government contacts were conducted in a low key manner with the primary
79 W. Grant and J. Sargent, Business and Politics in Britain. (Macmillan Education Limited, London, 1987), p.93.
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aim of obtaining detailed information on EMU for planning purposes.
The organisation of EMU planning in the two companies was markedly different but 
reflected a lack of cohesive leadership from the board of directors in both cases. In the 
energy company responsibility for EMU was assigned to the finance director who in turn 
delegated responsibility to the treasury function. This immediately meant that EMU was 
treated in a highly specialised way rather than as a cross-functional project which would 
affect all areas of the business. Indeed by vesting the responsibility with treasury 
specialists, led by an idiosyncratic manager, the range of skills required for a cross­
functional co-ordination review were much reduced. The inertia and political sensitivities 
inherent in large organisations meant that any attempt to transfer EMU responsibilities to 
other areas was negated. An internal audit review suggesting the establishment of a cross­
functional working group to replace the individual responsibility of the Treasury 
department was subsequently diluted to a narrower working group under Treasury 
leadership. The result was a hiatus in co-ordinated planning across the company and the 
formation of "islands" of uncoordinated EMU activity. This situation was gradually 
addressed during 1998 as the wider issues raised by EMU were progressively seen to be 
of greater significance than previously believed. This led to a much wider group co­
ordinating group being established albeit still under Treasury leadership.
The outcome of the organisational structure adopted by the energy company led to a 
decentralised style of decision making. This meant that crucial planning assumptions 
necessary for EMU were not developed in any detail. There was some consideration and 
discussion as to the likely business scenarios within the co-ordinating groups but no clear 
planning assumptions had been made by the end of 1998. These would have included the 
likely date of British entry into EMU, the probability of British entry at all, the nature or
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length of the transition period, the overall accounting policy and whether systems would 
be converted in a "big bang" or over a staged conversion process. Planning assumptions 
were left to individual business and functional areas with a resultant differentiation in 
EMU activity dependent on resource availability. This was a particular concern for the 
European branches which were largely left to develop their own local EMU strategies 
with minimal support from the UK head office.
In the financial services company the gridlock at board level led one of the main business 
unit directors (reportedly with the consent of the rest of the board) to establish a 
dedicated EMU planning team with a specific budget. This meant that EMU planning 
was not confined to a narrow functional department but was established on a wider basis 
within the major business unit of the company. The result was a set of relatively clear 
planning assumptions and a project plan with specific stages. The planning assumptions 
made included the assumption of British entry into EMU in 2002, the operation of a 
transition period for at least 18 months when both sterling and euros would be legally 
acceptable and a "big bang" conversion strategy with regard to information systems. The 
project plan contained three main stages. These were an initial strategy review, an 
evaluation of planning options and a detailed impact assessment. However, whilst this 
relatively centralised EMU team was making some progress the company itself was 
going through a phase of radical decentralisation into smaller units which inevitably 
impacted upon EMU planning. The result was a series of "turf wars" within the wider 
business unit which threatened to undermine the progress of EMU planning.
The level of awareness throughout both companies on the issues raised by EMU can only 
be described as extremely poor. Five general attitudes can be stressed. The first was the 
general level of ignorance amongst all levels of staff as to basic facts around EMU such 
as the name of the currency or the timetable for first wave members. Secondly, there was
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a widespread misunderstanding as to the nature of EMU. A large number of people 
thought that EMU was just another temporary exchange rate arrangement like the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism rather than an irrevocable single currency. The third tendency 
was to compare EMU with decimalisation in 1971 even though the scale of EMU was 
considerably greater. The most significant perception though was that EMU was 
something that was happening in continental Europe which would not ultimately affect 
Britain. There was a similar attitude to Major's comment about EMU as a "rain dance" 
following the Maastricht debates which may be more in hope than expectation. Even 
when there was an acceptance that EMU was a reality, a fifth attitude was the tendency to 
underestimate the complexity of the necessary changes. EMU was often regarded as 
merely a required change to currency indicators rather than as a change which would 
have a series of significant impacts across the wider business environment.
Given the absence of a cohesive business strategy in both companies together with the 
wide lack of staff awareness towards EMU it was difficult to differentiate the degree of 
planning within different functions. Indeed the primary characteristic in the EMU 
planning process in both companies was that progress depended on the enthusiasm of a 
few key individuals. Thus, EMU planning developed haphazardly as "islands" of detailed 
work were carried out in certain areas leading to both duplication and omission. In the 
energy company the main "islands" were in the legal and finance departments. However, 
there was a complete lack of planning in the procurement and computing departments. In 
the financial services company the computing department led the way to such an extent 
that EMU planning was beginning to be system-led rather than business-led. This was 
due largely to one individual whose enthusiasm and knowledge led to a rapid degree of 
progress being made. In contrast the marketing department, which played a key role in 
the development of new products, was still not taking any account of EMU in its product 
planning even by the end of 1998. A noticeable development was that many of the 
managers who were involved in EMU planning in both companies seemed to almost 
imperceptibly and increasingly assume that EMU, including British entry, was both
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ultimately inevitable and also beneficial. This tended to support the functional trend 
noticeable within the business arena since the 1997 general election.
What were the main problems of EMU planning? Four key problems were common to 
both companies. The first was that EMU presented a wide range of issues which could 
not be dealt with by a single department or function. This meant that a large degree of co­
ordination was required across both large companies which inevitably engendered a 
degree of bureaucratic politics in both cases. Secondly, there was the problem of attaining 
appropriate staff resources. EMU was not seen by many staff as necessarily a good career 
move and tended to be filled by less enthusiastic or less skilled staff. Another resource 
planning problem was that, given the long-term nature of EMU planning, staff resources 
tended to be taken from the project at short notice on to more immediate projects. The 
third problem was the presence of the Year 2000 computer problem, which was very 
significant for both companies. The key feature of the "Millennium bug" was that it was a 
definite problem with a definite deadline. This focused the necessary management 
processes required to resolve the problem and required a large input of scarce and 
expensive computer staff resources. A coincidental outcome of the "Millennium bug" 
was the perception that the "Millennium bug" and EMU planning were similar business 
problems when in actuality EMU was both a wider and more uncertain business issue. 
The fourth and most significant problem though was the lack of certainty surrounding the 
likelihood and timing of British entry into EMU. In the light of this uncertainty both 
companies were reluctant to commit the necessary resources to ensure comprehensive 
EMU planning. EMU was only one of many issues faced by both companies most of 
which were both more certain and needed to be resolved in a shorter time frame. The 
uncertainty was reflected by the lack of a clear direction from board level, defensive 
strategies aimed at low cost compliance and a general lack of awareness amongst all 
levels of staff.
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In sum, the two business cases tend to support the argument as to the relative lack of 
detailed preparation of British companies engendered by the uncertainty surrounding 
British entry into EMU. It is difficult to draw general conclusions from just two 
companies. However, the cases tend to support the wider survey and oral evidence 
discussed earlier in the chapter. The two companies showed inevitable differences in their 
approaches to EMU planning which partly reflected their differing business environments 
and corporate philosophies. The financial services company had carried out a noticeably 
more detailed level of EMU planning compared to the energy company. Another 
difference was that whilst in the energy company the EMU project was led by the 
treasury department the financial services company utilised a dedicated EMU planning 
team which included representatives from a variety of functions. However, the 
similarities between the two companies, companies from very different business sectors, 
were much more pronounced. These included the neutral approach to EMU, the general 
compliance strategy taken towards EMU planning, the absence of clear leadership at 
board level and the tendency for EMU planning to reflect the isolated actions of key 
individuals rather than organised bureaucratic controls. These characteristics reflected the 
general desire of business to carry out EMU planning in the light of a clearly stated 
government objective of British entry within a stated timetable.
Conclusions
Five tentative conclusions can be drawn on the business debate on EMU. The first was 
the general heterogeneity of the business community in their attitudes on EMU reflecting 
the wider divisions within other groups. Although there was arguably a narrow pro-EMU 
majority there were a wide variety of views on the issue. There appeared to be a division 
between larger businesses favouring EMU whilst smaller companies opposed EMU, 
partly reflecting the asymmetric advantages which are likely to accrue to larger 
companies. The sectoral situation was less clear given the complex effects of EMU on 
each sector. Secondly, there has been some attempt to counter the political nature of the 
debate with a debate as to the relative economic advantages and disadvantages of EMU.
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Thirdly, in spite of the general stress on the economic debate there were some subsidiary 
political undercurrents to the business debate. These have tended to mirror the wider 
political debate with the fear of loss of influence being argued in the pro-EMU cause and 
fear of a regulating, overbureaucratic EU in the anti-EMU cause. The fourth element was 
that the business debate seems to have followed rather than led the political party debate. 
The long time frame within the CBI before the decision to advocate a cautious pro-EMU 
position was indicative of this lag.
Arguably the most important outcome of the heterogeneity and caution of the business 
debate has been to add to the prevailing sense of uncertainty in respect of Britain's 
eventual policy toward EMU. The uncertainty in policy, engendered in part by the 
sovereignty questions in the political arena, has not been challenged by a cohesive 
business position on EMU. The outcome was a relative lack of preparations for EMU 
entry. The two individual company cases tend to support the conclusions outlined above.
Whilst general conclusions can be made the timing of the debate was also noticeable. 
There was an increasingly polarised debate amongst leading businessmen over British 
entry into EMU. The timing was significant in that it took place in the changed 
environment of a new Labour government with a more favourable policy toward EMU 
compared with the previous Conservative government and a delayed realisation that 
EMU was certain to take place in the majority of EU states. This has been reflected in the 
organisation of EMU specific business groups. The increasing stress in the discourse by 
both government and business on the need to prepare has arguably led to a functional 
trend which may be significant in ultimate British entry. However, underlying the 
apparent polarisation there remains a serious degree of uncertainty in business 
preparations.
Although the business debate had taken a higher profile since the election of the Labour 
government political considerations remained paramount. The cautious approach of the 
Labour government with its "prepare and decide" policy, based on a decision to be made 
in the following Parliament, was rooted in the political calculation that it did not wish 
other important legislation in its first term to be jeopardised by an acrimonious debate 
over EMU. This gradualist strategy was based on detailed preparations being made 
together with business which may lead to a clear coalition of interests arguing in favour 
of EMU entry. This development was based on a "sparring" debate between government 
and business. Government stressed the need for preparations from business whilst 
business in turn sought certainty from government leading to a functional move towards 
EMU entry. The actual realisation of EMU in the eleven first-wave states accelerated this 
move.
Business groups also ultimately accepted the subordination of business interests to the 
sovereignty debate. Business interests were basically driven by economic factors with 
those companies trading in the EU favouring EMU membership, whilst domestically 
orientated companies were opposed. However, even pro-EMU business supporters 
recognised the overriding nature of the sovereignty debate. The discourse of the CBI 
representatives in the Select Committee evidence discussed was itself indicative of this 
general caution. The decision of both the CBI and the BCC to suspend active 
campaigning on EMU in 1999 was a practical expression of the cautious approach. 
Business recognised self-limitations on their influence over EMU.
Ultimately though the clear party political divisions over EMU and the promise of a 
referendum on EMU entry acted as a "gatekeeper" to any functional trend towards British
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membership. EMU was increasingly regarded as a "litmus test" on Britain's overall 
relationship with the EU. The absence of a clear, cohesive discourse from business 
allowed considerations such as sovereignty to take centre stage, considerations which 
have made uncertainty the primary feature of the business debate over British entry into 
EMU. One prescient comment received during my involvement with one of the 
companies cited encapsulated the argument presented in this chapter. A manager, 
increasingly exasperated by the changing assumptions involved in EMU planning, 
commented that it was impossible to carry out EMU planning "whilst the politicians keep 
banging on about sovereignty".
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS: THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND EMU
Introduction
The aim of this concluding chapter is to draw together the main themes outlined in the 
seven previous chapters. Restating the central thesis the politics of sovereignty were key 
to understanding British government policy on EMU. The politics of sovereignty 
represented the multiple discourses of sovereignty developed by political actors in the 
wider debate on EMU and British sovereignty. EMU presented a series of challenges to 
British sovereignty which have been the subject of intense academic debate. The crucial 
argument made is that, whatever the academic arguments made in respect of EMU and 
sovereignty, it was the way in which the concepts of "EMU" and "sovereignty" were 
interpreted in the public debate that influenced government policy. The outcome of both 
the debate and government policy was uncertain and difficult to predict. Events could 
have been different if, say, there were clear economic advantages to EMU membership or 
a stronger political leadership approach had been taken.
Government policy on EMU was influenced by the politics of sovereignty in five ways. 
Firstly, the discourses of sovereignty reinforced the cautious style of government policy 
followed by both the Labour and the Conservative governments. Secondly, sovereignty 
was a key component of the Conservative divisions, which influenced the Major 
government. Thirdly, Conservative divisions, arguments on popular sovereignty and 
reaction by the Labour opposition fostered a referendum commitment by both major 
parties. Fourthly, the referendum commitment once given influenced Labour government 
policy after 1997. Finally, after 1997, there was an alignment between the alternative 
discourses of pooling and absolutist sovereignty of the two major parties and their 
divergent policies. The Conservative policy of “No EMU membership for two 
Parliaments” was underpinned by an absolutist conception of sovereignty. For the Labour 
government a pooling conception supported its policy of conditional support for EMU
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membership subject to economic tests. These five relationships operated in a dynamic 
and interrelated manner. Conservative divisions during the Maastricht ratification process 
fostered the referendum commitment by the Major government. In a case of action- 
reaction the Labour opposition made a similar referendum commitment which, following 
their accession to government in 1997, held back the development of a more pro-EMU 
policy. The key features of these five relationships are summarised below before 
consideration of other explanations of British government EMU policy in relation to the 
politics of sovereignty.
The Sovereignty Debate: Key Features
Given the external challenge of EMU and the internal constraint of sovereignty, the 
sovereignty debate in the public arena developed a series of discourses of sovereignty 
focused around an absolutist conception, a pooling conception and a popular conception. 
These discourses have influenced government policy in the five key respects outlined 
above. The general caution of both Conservative and Labour governments on EMU was 
prevalent throughout given the challenge of EMU, the sovereignty barrier and the heat 
generated by the sovereignty debate. The arguments around sovereignty reinforced the 
natural forces of inertia which need to be overcome for Britain to accede to EMU 
membership. Throughout the debate the zeal of absolutist sovereignty arguments 
favoured by EMU opponents contrasted with the caution of EMU proponents. The 
epithets marking the policy have been "wait and see", "negotiate then decide", "prepare 
and decide" and "real conditions". Timetables have only been noticeable by their absence. 
For a long time the Conservative government gave the impression that EMU would not 
even take place. This ambivalence and caution was characteristic of both the Labour and 
Conservative governments, despite their very different majorities in the House of 
Commons. Labour maintained its caution even with a huge parliamentary majority and a 
popular leader. It is tempting to interpret this caution as instinctive British pragmatism 
but it has developed along with the ongoing sovereignty debate.
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The long Maastricht ratification debate was crucial in allowing the discourses of 
sovereignty to dominate the agenda and set the dynamics of the debate. Both parties 
thereafter continually responded in a short-term fashion reacting to rather than leading 
events. Four classic examples were Major's decision to suspend the Maastricht 
ratification debate after the Danish "No" vote, the "rain dance" speech denying EMU will 
occur, the media spin crisis which engulfed the Labour government prior to its October 
1997 statement and the virtually non-existent government campaign on EMU in the 1999 
European election. The ambivalence of government policy opened it up to incessant 
reinterpretation by the media leading to further governmental caution and a cycle of 
denial and counter-denial.
The second relationship between the discourses of sovereignty and government policy 
was the divisions within the Conservative party over EMU, which reflected deep feelings 
over sovereignty. Labour divisions were serious but manageable whilst the Conservative 
splits were deep and bitter. One Labour MP aptly summarised the difference between the 
“extinct” Labour volcanoes and the “erupting” Conservative volcanoes.1 The depth of the 
divisions was shown by the organised rebellions, breakdown of traditional party loyalty, 
divisions within the Cabinet and the fact that within five years the Eurosceptics had 
effectively transformed Conservative policy. The strength of feeling of the dwindling but 
influential Europhiles was also very noticeable. A new and significant cleavage was 
created in the party along a sovereignty/interdependence axis. These divisions acted as 
the agency through which the idea of sovereignty influenced Conservative government 
policy with a gradual erosion of the "wait and see" policy. Once in opposition under 
Hague a clearer EMU-sceptic policy evolved (with a few conditions). The divisions were 
extraordinary in historical perspective. As Mark Stuart commented in his biography of 
Douglas Hurd;
1 Author's interview.
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"There was a widespread view in the Party that further European integration threatened 
the British way of life, its parliamentary institutions and its cherished institutions...It was 
the emotional response to this perceived threat which caused the Conservative party to 
tear itself apart whilst in government...Ideology and emotion held sway over 
pragmatism."2
The root of these divisions was an absolutist conception of sovereignty which was 
deemed to be undermined by EMU.
The divisions within the Conservative party were probably the most decisive factor in the 
third key relationship, namely the 1996 referendum commitment made by the 
Conservative government shortly followed by the Labour opposition. This contrasted 
with political tradition with the only UK-wide referendum to date having been on EC 
membership in 1975. The importance of the referendum commitment cannot be 
overstated as it qualitatively changed the EMU debate. The debate was taken from the 
parliamentary sphere in which the Maastricht ratification predominated into the wider 
public sphere. The centrality of the EMU issue in the 1997 general election campaign 
highlighted the importance of the public dimension. The key reason for the referendum 
was probably the desire of the Conservative government to minimise internal party 
divisions prior to the general election in an intriguing parallel to Wilson's decision to 
launch the 1975 referendum. Labour followed with their own commitment primarily for 
electoral reasons and to avoid opening a flank to Conservative attack. A further 
consideration was the widespread feeling that EMU was an issue of such significance for 
the future of the British state that a referendum was required. Any final decision on EMU 
membership would need to be approved by the popular sovereignty of the vote of the 
British people. Whilst this may have been a widespread feeling it does not account for the 
timing of the referendum commitment which was due to electoral considerations.
2 M. Stuart, Douglas Hurd: A Public Servant (Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1998), pp:427-428.
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The referendum commitment itself acted as the fourth relationship between the 
discourses of sovereignty and government policy in that once the referendum 
commitment had been pledged this further acted as a constraining influence on policy, 
particularly for the Labour government. The Labour party gave the referendum pledge for 
reassurance to the electorate and made it a central plank of their 1997 general election 
campaign. Having made this promise they were inevitably prey to the vagaries of public 
opinion on this issue. Public opinion surveys have shown consistently large majorities 
against British membership of EMU. Given this scepticism the government had to be 
careful about an EMU policy openly in favour of membership. The referendum constraint 
was a key factor in deferring policy into the distant future. Blair's admission that a 
referendum could not be won in 1999 and decision to focus on restating the case for 
active British membership in the EU in heading the Britain in Europe campaign were 
indicative of the cautious approach to winning over a sceptical electorate. Pro-EMU 
campaigners argued that the opposition was relatively fickle, the electorate would be won 
over by a determined government campaign (as occurred in the 1975 EC referendum) and 
were effectively resigned to eventual EMU membership. However, as one MP 
commented, it was one thing to say that the people were resigned to EMU membership it 
was another question entirely to get the "resigned" to turn out to vote in a referendum.3 
The other noticeable element was the greater zeal of the EMU-sceptic campaigners as 
illustrated by the plethora of publications and campaign groups. The referendum 
commitment, initially triggered by internal Conservative divisions, had ironically come to 
act as a major influence on the Labour government.
The final key relationship was the alignment between the multiple discourses of 
sovereignty and the different policies carried out by the Conservative and Labour parties.
3 Author's interview.
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The Conservative government, given its internal divisions, did not develop a coherent 
discourse of sovereignty but acknowledged that EMU membership would have 
considerable constitutional consequences. They were, though, under significant pressure 
from an increasingly vocal Eurosceptic wing with a clear absolutist conception of 
sovereignty. The Labour government focused explicitly on a concept of sharing 
sovereignty with EU partners. These differing discourses were finally marked by a clear 
divergence of policy after the 1997 general election between the Labour government's 
"prepare and decide" policy and the Conservative opposition's "no EMU for two 
Parliaments" policy. Whilst qualifications and caveats continued to feature in both 
policies they still amounted to distinctly different policies.
Why was there a time lag between the divergent discourses and the divergent policies? 
The main reasons were the continuing uncertainty of the EMU project itself and the focus 
of both main parties on the 1997 election which encouraged them to remain cautious on 
EMU. In this sense their policies were largely indistinguishable during the 1997 election 
the main difference being Labour's success in maintaining a united front compared with 
the Conservatives. The significance of the differing discourses of sovereignty has, 
though, become evident over the longer term. By defining the problem in terms of 
sharing sovereignty, Labour have been able to support EMU in principle and deny any 
overriding constitutional impediment to EMU membership making it conceivable, and 
even probable, that they will eventually support EMU membership. In contrast the 
discourse of sovereignty used by the Conservative opposition to support its "save the 
pound" campaign make it inconceivable that the party would support EMU membership, 
in spite of the commitment only to rule EMU membership for one parliamentary term.
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Alternative Interpretations?
Other interpretations have been put forward to account for government EMU policy. 
Those considered throughout this thesis include business interests, electoral 
considerations, economics, structural explanations of history and geography, the media 
and national identity. The key points can be summarised here in relation to the 
sovereignty debate. A chapter was devoted to the business debate given the importance 
and nature of the EMU issue. The business debate tended to follow rather than lead the 
political debate which developed during the Maastricht ratification process. This was 
probably because the nature of the business debate focused on economic questions rather 
than more fundamental sovereignty questions. As EMU progressively became more 
probable the business debate developed, including different underlying conceptions of the 
EU from the "market Europe" vision of the CBI to the "regulatory Europe" vision of the 
IoD. The issue undoubtedly caused significant divisions throughout the business 
community. The influence of business opinion was probably greater on the Labour 
government given the Conservative government concern with internal party divisions. 
The overriding theme though was a demand for certainty of policy to assist business 
planning which was still in an undeveloped phase. Business groups also ultimately 
accepted the subordination of business interests to the sovereignty debate. Overall though 
the business debate has been a subsidiary factor in government policy on EMU.
The electoral politics argument stressed that political parties adjust their policies to 
maximise the possibility of re-election. In particular the major political parties reacted to 
each other in a balancing manner. In this way Labour scepticism on Europe in the 1970s 
was balanced by Conservative pro-Europeanism and the growth of Euroscepticism in the 
Conservative party in the 1980s prompted the Labour party to move in a pro-European 
direction.4 In the EMU debate electoral considerations were significant, especially in the
4 N. Ashford, “T he Political Parties” in S. George (Ed.), Britain and the European Community: The Politics o f  Semi- 
Detachment. (Oxford U niversity Press, Oxford, 1992).
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Labour party decision to support a referendum on EMU in 1996 reacting to the same 
decision by the Conservative government. Electoral considerations also provided a very 
broad constraint in that, even under Hague, the Conservatives did not say “never” to 
EMU membership and public scepticism on EMU constrained the Labour government.
Whilst significant in certain respects the electoral politics argument has four key 
limitations. Firstly, whilst the public was sceptical toward EMU, EMU itself was not 
necessarily the key issue for voters. The Salomon Smith Mori surveys consistently 
ranked EMU below other issues such as health, education and law and order.5 Secondly, 
the referendum itself deferred the EMU issue to an uncertain future date. Labour stressed 
the referendum commitment in both the 1997 and 2001 general elections thereby 
defusing the immediate relevance of EMU as a general election issue. Ironically constant 
reiteration of the referendum commitment made Labour government policy sensitive to 
the whims of public opinion. Language was indeed part of the action and the specific 
issue of EMU would be subject to a future referendum, unlike the myriad range of issues 
at a general election. Thirdly, there was no overall balancing of party positions. Indeed 
there was a clear divergence of positions between the major parties both in terms of 
sovereignty discourses but also practical EMU policies. Finally, the constraints of 
sovereignty as a value, as a practical barrier to EMU through the referendum and as 
opposing a change to the status quo were far more significant than the looser constraints 
of electoral politics. In sum, ideology held sway over pragmatism.
The economics of EMU have inevitably been the focus of intense debate given the nature 
of EMU. The central economic factor throughout the period covered was the uncertainty 
of EMU actually succeeding in reality. The lack of preparations made by British business 
and the lack of economic convergence by 1997 was certainly a factor in the Labour
5 www.mori.co.uk
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government's decision to delay EMU beyond 1999. Over the longer term though the 
economic benefits or costs of EMU, especially to Britain, were unclear (reflected in 
widespread disagreement between academic economists). The benefits of EMU such as 
lower interest rates and lower inflation tended to be both longer term and more uncertain 
than the initial transition costs of EMU. The key point though was that any economic 
benefits were not articulated in the political debate. Whilst the government mentioned the 
perceived long-term economic benefits they also established the five economic tests for 
British accession to EMU.
The economic tests were not significant barriers to Britain joining EMU. The tests 
themselves were extremely vague as discussed in the Treasury Select Committee 
evidence. The Labour government insisted that the economic tests were real conditions 
and a summary of Britain’s economic self-interest in joining EMU. They seem though, 
like the Maastricht convergence criteria, to be indicators rather than significant barriers. 
The statement that the tests would be reviewed in the "next Parliament" highlighted the 
importance of political as opposed to economic timing (unless the political cycle has also 
converged to the economic cycle). The fact that the outcome of the Treasury analysis of 
the tests was delayed until at least 2003, together with the uncertainty of this analysis, 
meant that the government could not articulate specific economic advantages to EMU. 
This allowed the arguments around sovereignty to be dominant throughout the period 
covered in this thesis. Should the government come out strongly in favour of the 
beneficial economics of EMU in the future then the economics of EMU could challenge 
the politics of sovereignty. However, this has yet to occur.
As outlined in Chapter 2 structural explanations of history and geography have been put 
forward to explain Britain's "semi-detachment" from the rest of the EU. Historically 
Britain's traditions of avoiding war on its territory, centralised government and
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bureaucracy and parliamentary traditions were seen as distinctive compared to the rest of 
the EU. Similarly the "offshore island" mentality and close links to the US and the 
Commonwealth were geographical differences. Whilst these factors were of some 
significance they had to be constructed within the debate to attain a degree of 
contemporary relevance. Parliamentary sovereignty was an important conception of 
sovereignty but was one amongst a plurality of other competing conceptions. 
Geographically the EMU debate has been largely marked by an absence of specific 
alternatives expressed in terms of stronger Atlantic or Commonwealth links (a contrast to 
the 1975 debate). There has been some debate at the level of general values such as 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism versus the European Social model. Specific alternatives to EMU 
membership in monetary terms have tended to stress either Britain’s global role (from 
EMU opponents) or Britain's isolation (from EMU supporters).
The role of the media has certainly added flavour to the EMU debate, especially the 
popular press. A clear majority of the press is undoubtedly EMU-sceptic. These include 
the Daily Telegraph, the Times, the Daily Mail and most outspokenly the Sun. On the 
pro-EMU side are the Financial Times, the Independent, the Daily Express and, albeit 
critically, the Guardian. According to the analysis of Anderson and Weymouth 
approximately two-thirds of the total readership read the EMU-sceptic press and one- 
third the pro-EMU press.6 This contrasted vividly with the situation in 1975 when most 
of the press supported Britain's EC membership. The tone of the debate was, to put it 
mildly, basic and significantly polarised. For the Sim Blair and then Lafontaine were, in 
turn, possibly the most dangerous men in Britain. Concern has also been voiced over the 
excessive influence of Rupert Murdoch and at times EMU has been portrayed as a Blair 
.v. Murdoch issue. The overall influence was clearly important but difficult to assess. 
Broadly independent coverage remained on the key media channel of television. The 
press undoubtedly influenced the debate but current public scepticism on EMU clearly
6 P. Anderson and A. Weymouth, Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. (Addison Weseley Publishing, 
London, 1999).
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has a deeper base than just the EMU-sceptic press.
The other political factor in the realm of ideas has been the assertion that national identity 
has become a crucial component in the debate, especially in the Conservative party. 
Philip Lynch traced the importance of the “politics of nationhood” in the history of the 
Conservative party.7 In the EMU debate there have been clear expressions of nationhood. 
Arguably Major’s most famous statement reflected a traditional nation of "warm beer,
o
invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and...old maids bicycling to communion”. Labour 
too has started to engage in ideas of nationhood in its political campaigning. The 
sovereignty debate significantly overlapped with ideas of national identity, especially in 
the conception of popular sovereignty utilised in the debate, which stressed the role of the 
"people" (often loosely equated to the "nation"). However, two qualifications need to be 
made. Firstly, the majority of statements have focused narrowly on the issue of 
sovereignty in terms of final and absolute authority over the particular issue areas of 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, the institution of the ECB and, above all, political 
integration. The second qualification is that whilst in government statements on 
nationhood and EMU have largely been absent or deliberately vague. Finally, whilst the 
relationship between EMU and sovereignty is clear but contested the link between EMU 
and national identity was logically more problematic and indirect. In sum, I would argue 
that the "politics of sovereignty" were more significant than the "politics of nationhood" 
on the EMU issue.
“Wait and See”: An Understandable Policy?
The complexity of government EMU policy has clearly been influenced by a wide range 
of factors but central to its understanding are the multiple discourses of sovereignty
7 P. Lynch, The Politics o f Nationhood: Sovereignty. Britishness and Conservative Politics. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998).
* Quoted in A. Seldon, Major: A Political Life. (Wiedenfield and Nicolson Publishing, London, 1997), p.370. In his autobiography 
Major downplayed the significance of this speech. J. Major, John Maior: The Autobiography. (HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), p.376.
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which have influenced policy through the five relationships outlined in this conclusion. 
The final remaining question is that in addition to understanding government policy has 
the largely "wait and see" policy followed by both governments been an understandable 
or justifiable one? There were four grounds for a reasoned argument that the general 
"wait and see" policy was an understandable approach. Firstly, there can be little doubt 
that EMU membership is one of the most important issues facing British politics for a 
number of years, especially as it is a binary issue requiring a "Yes" or "No" position. A 
Guardian discussion paper on EMU captured this in a superbly understated manner;
"The single currency is not one of the great existential dilemmas of all time, though it is 
perhaps the most important political decision to be taken in the lifetime of many people 
alive today.”9
The second ground was the divisive nature of the EMU issue. Political parties, the press, 
business, trades unions, economists, academics and even the Bank of England have 
shown clear divisions in an increasingly polarised debate. Thirdly, the development of the 
political debate on EMU tended to collapse together the distinctive aspects of the four 
sovereignty questions into the more fundamental political sovereignty question of 
Britain's wider relationship with the EU. In effect EMU had become a litmus test of the 
degree to which Britain was integrated, semi-detached or detached in its relations with 
the EU. The general "wait and see" policy can be seen as a reasonable response to the 
severe and conflicting pressures created by EMU. Finally, in most of its conceptions, 
especially from government politicians, sovereignty was regarded as a key value and, 
therefore, posed a series of practical (such as winning a referendum) and conceptual 
(such as reconciling sovereignty with EMU membership) barriers to EMU membership. 
Given the inherent uncertainty of EMU and the range of complex political and economic 
issues involved the decision to wait a number of years before evaluating the overall costs 
and benefits of EMU seems a reasonable, if not brave, policy choice. Given the pressures 
involved the issue is unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future.
9 Guardian Debate. The Single Currency: Should Britain Join?. (Vintage Publishing, London, 1997), p.4.
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Simon Bulmer argued that in accounting for British semi-detachment in the EU British 
politics matters}0 I would agree with this comment but add that in the EMU debate the 
idea of sovereignty matters. Sovereignty was socially constructed in a number of ways 
which taken together influenced government policy in a number of analytically distinct 
but interlinked, dynamic ways. The power of the idea can be seen in the fact that the 
party which had dominated British politics for most of the 20th century became deeply 
divided by an event that could still conceivably never take place (namely British 
membership of EMU). The initial question that comes to mind on considering EMU and 
sovereignty is to assess how EMU affects British sovereignty. This inevitably leads to an 
essentially contested debate over a range of legal and political issues. Turning the 
question around allows an understanding of the policy response to EMU to be seen as 
linked to the essentially contested debate over sovereignty which has pervaded British 
politics. The conceptions of sovereignty, transmitted primarily through the agency of the 
party political system, underlines that British politics do matter along with a key idea. 
Anthony Forster, in concluding his book on Britain and the Maastricht negotiations, 
quoted Jean Monnet to summarise the British approach;
"There is only one thing you British will never understand: an idea. And there is one 
thing you are supremely good at grasping: a hard fact." 11
In the EMU debate this dictum could probably be reversed. The debate had been 
dominated by an abstract idea, sovereignty, which operated in a heated manner making 
"hard fact" a very contested concept.
10 S. Bulmer in S. George(Ed.), The Politics of Semi-Detachment: Britain and the European Community. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1992). His italics p2.
11 A. Forster, Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations. (Macmillan Publishing, London, 1998), p. 183.
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POSTSCRIPT: 2001 GENERAL ELECTION
The 2001 General Election illustrated once again the key features of the sovereignty 
debate on EMU. The central headline theme was the attempt by the Conservative party to 
place their “save the pound” message at the centre of the general election campaign. This 
was defeated in another Labour landslide victory marked by Labour’s continued promise 
of a referendum and the importance for the electorate of other election issues.1 
Underneath the headline theme the five key features of the sovereignty debate were 
reflected throughout the campaign.
The policy divergence between the main parties was clearly reflected in the campaign. 
The Labour party maintained its “prepare and decide” policy subject to the five economic 
tests, which would be reviewed within two years of an election victory. Any 
recommendation for entry would be subject to a referendum. The Conservative party 
rejected EMU for the next Parliament, promising to “save the pound”. The Liberal 
Democrats supported EMU entry in principle subject to a realistic exchange rate and a 
referendum.4 The differing policies reflected different discourses of sovereignty with 
Labour and Liberal Democrats stressing the pooling of sovereignty and the Conservatives 
an absolutist conception. The subsequent election of Eurosceptic Ian Duncan-Smith as 
Conservative leader confirmed the policy divergence.
Differences within the Conservative party continued to rumble throughout the campaign. 
Whilst the Europhile minority, notably Ken Clarke, were largely silent differences
1 Financial Tim es. 25/5/2001.
2 Labour M anifesto, Am bitions for Britain. (Labour Party, London, 2001).
3 Conservative M anifesto, Time for Common Sense. (Conservative Party, London, 2001).
4 Liberal D em ocrat M anifesto, Freedom. Justice. Honesty. (Liberal Democratic Party, London, 2001).
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continued between the official line of ruling out EMU for one parliamentary term and 
others ruling out EMU in principle. A symbol of this division was a speech by Mrs. 
Thatcher where she specifically emphasised that she would “never” join EMU.5 There 
were also tactical differences within the leadership over the primary emphasis in the 
campaign on EMU rather than other issues such as public services. These differences 
were to become more apparent in the leadership election following the Labour landslide 
and Hague’s subsequent resignation. All of the candidates acknowledged that the EMU 
issue had been overplayed during the campaign. The choice of pro-Euro Ken Clarke and 
hardline Eurosceptic Ian Duncan-Smith as the two top candidates highlighted 
dramatically the polarisation within the party.6
The referendum commitment by Labour and the Liberal Democrats continued to be a 
major feature. The Conservatives sought to make the election a ‘de facto’ referendum on 
the pound. This was symbolised by a large clock counting down to the end of the pound. 
However, this tactic misfired given that a Conservative election defeat could be 
interpreted as a potential vote for the euro. The line was quickly amended to that of being 
the last “fair” vote on the pound given that, according to the Conservatives, any 
referendum question and campaign were likely to be biased in favour of the euro. In 
effect the electorate perceived the euro referendum as an issue to be decided at a future
n
date rather than at the general election.
Whilst the referendum commitment failed to help the Conservatives it also continued to 
constrain the government. Throughout the campaign the referendum commitment was
5 Daily Telegraph. 23/5/2001. M any individual candidates supported the “never” line in their campaign literature.
6 Independent. 17/6/2001.
7 D aily Telegraph. 28/5/2001.
336
constantly emphasised by Labour. Given their large opinion poll lead Blair was able to 
speculate about the future outcome of the euro issue. He argued that the referendum 
could be won and stated that, although the Treasury was the “guardian” of the economic
o
tests, any decision to recommend the euro would be taken collectively by Cabinet. No 
firm timetable was forthcoming throughout the campaign. Public opinion, whilst 
regarding the euro as a less significant election issue, still remained overwhelmingly 
hostile. The MORI opinion surveys referred to throughout this thesis revealed no material 
movement during or after the election campaign.9
The key feature of the politics of sovereignty during and after the campaign was the 
continued cautious approach of the government. This was accompanied by continuing 
speculation about the longer term intentions of the government. During the 1997 
uncertainty over the new Labour government’s intentions on the euro a former Cabinet 
minister had referred to the “smoke and mirrors” nature of the political debate.10 The 
Cabinet reshuffle, removing pro-Euro ministers Robin Cook and Stephen Byers from key 
positions and bringing in more “sceptical” ministers Jack Straw and Peter Hain to the 
Foreign Office, reflected the absence of clarity. One interpretation was that the 
government was seeking to present a united front and that presentation of a pro-euro 
policy by more “sceptical” ministers would win greater public support.11 An alternative 
interpretation was that the move was simply the adoption of a more sceptical position on 
the euro.12
8 Financial Times. 26/5/2001.
9 www.m ori.co.uk
10 A uthor’s interview.
11 Financial Times. 11/6/2001.
12 Independent. 17/6/2001.
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Following the 2001 election landslide a similar situation developed to the 1997 
uncertainty. Volatility on the currency markets together with pressure from pro-euro 
pressure groups forced the government onto the defensive. During his annual Mansion 
House speech Brown sought to push the euro issue into the “long grass”. He stressed that 
the Treasury had yet to commence the assessment of the economic tests and that the 
decision could be negative.13 In further speeches the government appeared to raise further 
hurdles to euro entry. Brown stressed the weak accountability framework of the ECB 
compared to the Bank of England whilst Blair emphasised the need for wider economic 
reform in the EU.14 However, the absence of specific timetables in the government 
position continued the “smoke and mirrors” political debate and led to further media 
speculation.15 The opaque and cautious position of the government was the key feature of 
the politics of sovereignty during the election period. In spite of the Labour landslide 
victory the key features of the politics of sovereignty remained prevalent.
Raymond Keitch 
September 2001
13 Independent. 21/6/2001.
14 T he E conom ist 4/8/2001.
15 Financial Times. 27/7/2001.
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